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Handbook of Sociological Theory (Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research)

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Jonathan H. Turner has been an indefatigable promoter of sociological theory, such as the many editions of The Structure of Sociological Theory and this book, the Handbook of Sociological Theory. Turner approach to theory is inclusive: anything that calls itself sociological theory is welcome into the fold for Turner, although he of course has his own favorites (I tend to agree with his assessments). This book includes a number of contributions from postmodernism (which I consider mindless, presumptuous, fatuous, and not worth following) to symbolic interactionism (great fun, greatly overrated), systems theory (tedious functionalism), evolutionary sociology (should be a lot more widely represented), and the inevitable array of contributions covering power, conflict, stratification, and social dynamics.

I purchased this book because I was interested in two slim chapters, Role Theory (Ralph Turner) and Action Theory (Hans Joas and Jens Beckert). Of course, I did not expect to see anything new in here (handbooks aren't supposed to be new, but rather inclusive and representative of the state of the art). However, I also found a gem of a synthetic chapter by Siegwart Lindenberg, who offers an exceptionally insightful exposition and critique of the rational actor model. I will describe these contributions, keeping in mind my central goal, which is to see what prevents a fruitful interaction between economics and sociology, and what theoretical innovations will be necessary to bridge the formidable gap between the two---a gap predicated upon the proliferation of theoretical inconsistencies wrapped up in the unquenchable prejudices of theorists in both camps.

Economic theory has a simple taxonomy. There are consumers, workers, and entrepreneurs. There are firms, households, and a state sector. There are multiple industries within each of which there is a more or less fine division of productive roles (types of employment). Sociology sees the world through a much more complex prism. In addition to the above, there are males and females, young and old, diverse ethnicities and races, multiple creeds and a plethora of statuses. However, economics and sociology will share consonant taxonomies if each sociological role is a substantive expansion of an economic type. This is precisely how Ralph Turner develops the role concept in his chapter on "Role Theory." For Turner, the division of labor in economics becomes the functional differentiation of society into roles. A social role consists of three properties or characteristics: "functionality," "representationality," and "tenability." Functionality represents the role's contribution to the reproduction of the system, an extension of the economic concept of a productive input. In economics, we only think of labor as a productive input, but in the larger social perspective, there are many institutions besides firms that must be reproduced by role-occupants. The "tenability" of a role is the manner in which incentives are arranged so that role-occupants are induced to carry out the tasks assigned to them. These include simple economic incentives, plus prestige and social esteem. Turner does not discuss this, but it would be easy to add that roles have associated normative principles, these principles may be obeyed either as constraints or internalized as ethical goals, and in many situations the ethical and normative aspect of role tenability are paramount. The third characteristic of roles is their "representability," by which Turner means that a role-occupant may be expected to behave is concordant ways in role-positions quite removed from the functionality of the role itself. For instance, star athletes are expected to lead exemplary lives even out of the public view, and politicians may be expected to attend church. Especially interesting is the concept of "role-merger," in which a role-incumbent so internalizes the functional and moral aspects of the role-position that the role becomes part of the occupant rather than being a mere instrument to other ends.

In contrast to this insightful exposition of role theory, Joas and Beckert's treatment of action theory is a showcase in misunderstanding the rational actor model, but in a way which is shared by the overwhelming majority of sociologists. Joas and Beckert begin by characterizing the rational actor model as claiming that "actors' decisions can be understood from their motivation to optimize their utility." (p.269) Even the most elementary exposition of the model, by contrast, stresses that if individuals have consistent preferences, we can represent their behavior as maximization, but this is not their "motivation" any more than the fact that we can represent the motion of light waves by minimizing a Hamiltonian means that "light waves want to travel minimal paths." So, is simply absurd to think that economists believe it is rational to be "motivated to optimize." Joas and Beckert then assert that "the debate on action in sociology tends to focus primarily on rational choice theory on the one hand and on normative theories of action on the other... The competition between economics and sociology is largely founded on radically opposed action theories. The most influential sociological alternative to rational actor theory has been the normative model of action." (p. 270-271) Now, I do not want to deny that this is the case, but I do want to deny, categorically, that there is any conflict between rational action and normative action. There is nothing in the rational actor model that precludes normative elements in the actor's preference function. Nor is there anything in the normative model that precludes individuals from making welfare-improving trade-offs between normative principles (e.g., fairness, honesty, trustworthiness) and self-regarding concerns (material goods and services, leisure, prestige). Indeed, a raft of experiments in behavioral game theory exhibit the consonance of self-regarding interests, other-regarding interests, and character virtues in the preferences of rational agents. The failure of sociologists to understand this point is probably the chief reason core sociological theory has never had a chance to develop (economics has its own problems, of course, but that is a matter better discussed elsewhere).

Siegwart Lindenberg's contribution, "Social Rationality versus Rational Egoism," shows exactly how the economist's rational actor model can be enriched to serve sociological purposes without abandoning the analytical clarity and power of economic theory. I tend to stress that the rational actor model requires no more that preference consistency, and refer for support to the success of the model in game-theoretic models of animal behavior. Now, animals are hardly rational according to most meanings of the term "rational," but they do tend to satisfy preference consistency, and hence their strategic interactions can be cogently modeled as rational action---even if the creatures are pond scum or dung beetles. However, sociologists demand a richer concept of rationality, and Lindenberg offers an expanded concept of rationality, one that conserves yet goes beyond what economists care about. He argues of human individuals that (a) they are resourceful and goal-motivated; (b) they are constrained and confronted with scarcity of time, energy, and resources; (c) they form expectations and learn; (d) they differentially value distinct states of the world; (e) they are motivated to achieve; (f) in novel situations, they search for the proper frame for the event in their reservoir of know event types. (p. 636) Of course, these characteristics are plausible and in no way conflict with the rational actor model.

So, why then does the chasm between sociology and economics persist? Good question.