Handcuffed to a Corpse: German Intervention in the Balkans and on the Galician Front, 1914-1917 [Hardcover]

Michael P. Kihntopf (Author)

Product Details

• Hardcover: 128 pages
• Publisher: White Mane Pub (October 2002)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1572492422
• ISBN-13: 978-1572492424
• Product Dimensions: 9.5 x 6 x 0.6 inches
• Shipping Weight: 13.6 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 2.2 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (4 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #5,394,788 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

25 of 25 people found the following review helpful:

1.0 out of 5 stars Save your money, September 29, 2002

By 

R. J. Rozen (Chicago, IL United States) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Handcuffed to a Corpse: German Intervention in the Balkans and on the Galician Front, 1914-1917 (Hardcover)

Michael Kihntopf's "Handcuffed to a Corpse" purports to be a history of Germany's intervention on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian empire during the First World War. The author asserts that "few historians have recorded the events of the World War I's [sic] Balkan and Galician Fronts." Perhaps, although Norman Stone's book on the Eastern Front is still available, and remains a solid, informative work. This, on the other hand, is not.

Kihntopf's account is, above all, superficial: the book has a mere 113 pages of text -- with fairly large type -- and there is really nothing new here. Indeed, the author has failed to consult any non-English language sources, an unforgivable failing for someone who is attempting to give a history of the German and Austro-Hungarian side of the war. Not that the author's command of English is too steady: the frequent grammar, spelling, and punctuation errors lead me to conclude that no one ever bothered to edit this book. More importantly, the author makes frequent, careless factual errors: the military governor of Bosnia was Oskar Potiorek, not "Potinorek;" the Belgian monarch was King Albert, not "Prince Albert." Finally, the book ends in 1917 -- not with the Russian Revolution (which would have made some sense), but on New Year's Day -- as if that date had any military or political significance. Perhaps the author could have justified this incomprehensible choice, but he seems to have omitted any conclusion from his final chapter.

On the plus side, there are complete organizational tables for the German and Russian armies as they stood at the outbreak of the war, although these are readily available in other books (as is the Austro-Hungarian -- it is baffling why this was omitted here). The maps are marginally useful, and the photographs are interesting. In sum, the information here is available in other books, at better prices, and with a better chance of reliability. I recommend the aforementioned book by Norman Stone or Holger Herwig's book on the German and Austro-Hungarian war efforts. Also, Spencer Tucker's short volume on the war does a better job of covering the Eastern Front than most other general histories, and is highly recommended.

5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

1.0 out of 5 stars A Book to Avoid!!, May 13, 2005

By 

Bill Zweiter "bill_zweiter" (Philadelphia, PA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Handcuffed to a Corpse: German Intervention in the Balkans and on the Galician Front, 1914-1917 (Hardcover)

The author makes a cottage industry of WW I East Front books it appears. None of any quality or scholarship. This is a book - like his others - to avoid.

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

2.0 out of 5 stars somewhat thin soup, August 22, 2005

By 

Konrad Baumeister (Milwaukee, WI) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Handcuffed to a Corpse: German Intervention in the Balkans and on the Galician Front, 1914-1917 (Hardcover)

Michael Kihntopf's Handcuffed To A Corpse is a thin, 113-page volume examining Imperial Germany's direct intervention in a few specific military campaigns and battles on behalf of her lame and basically useless ally, Austria-Hungary. Although the book's subtitle suggests that this covers operations in the Balkans and Galicia "1914-1917," in point of fact it ends with the campaign Mackensen ran effectively removing Romania from the war in late 1916.

There isn't a whole lot of anything new here. The occasionally irritating misspellings or inaccuracies give one the impression that this could have been some college history paper. The military detail is of interest, but seems incomplete, and the book itself picks only a few of the campaigns, leaving out other important developments (especially considering Germany's decisive campaigns in the east in 1917 are not even referred to). I read the book as essentially a lengthy opinion piece, rather than a work of significant research (new or otherwise).

Kihntopf starts with a good chapter on the goals, ambitions and capabilities of the main combatants in the theater, going into some detail regarding training and equipping of the various forces, and giving his opinion on just how realistic some of these policies were. He then gets to the meat of the book, which is a narrative account of the progress, and often direct German involvement in, several battles (Lemberg) or campaigns (Serbia 1914-1915, Romania 1916). Kihntopf's main theme is that Austria-Hungary's army and leadership was so inept and incompetent that frankly they were more of a liability to the German war effort than a help, and he shows how the Austrians were repeatedly bested by two otherwise mediocre armies, Russia's and Serbia's, until German leadership and well-trained and motivated troops were sent to fix things. Germany's poor choice of allies is made worse by adding the shortsighted and greedy Bulgarians, disinterested in helping the war effort once their own specific war aims (Serbia's Macedonia and Romania's Dobruja regions) were achieved, and Ottoman Turkey, who once brought on board had to be supplied and armed (causing the Germans to have to take care of the Serbs once and for all, in order to use their slice of the Berlin/Constantinople railway).

Kihntopf's conclusion, an appraisal of the general strategic situation in the east as of 1/1/1917, is that Serbia and Romania objectively had ceased to exist territorially and had thus failed in their strategic objectives; that Russia was seriously on the ropes due to massive losses in manpower and irreplaceable arms; but that the seemingly ascendant Central Powers Austria and Bulgaria were also in general trouble, strained to the limit. Only Germany could be said to have achieved all of its strategic goals: removing the danger to the German eastern regions from the Russians, dominating the Balkans entirely, and keeping the rail line open to Turkey.

The book is, in its limited way, okay. It does include some maps, but these are poorly done, and the reader would benefit from a much better and more detailed set. Likewise, the photos included could have been from anywhere, and there are far superior examples available in many other books. At $25 it is overpriced for what you get; there are many other books for less which cover the war in the east far more exhaustively and reliably.