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Hardwired Behavior: What Neuroscience Reveals about Morality

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With the rapid demise of religious ethics and the belief by many that there is a fixed, immutable human nature, it is perhaps of no surprise that some ethicists would look to the brain for answers to fundamental questions in ethics. The study of the brain has revealed, at least in the last decade, that many behaviors, if not all, can be given a causal explanation. But traditional formulations of ethics have held it to be axiomatic that if (human) behaviors are to be classified as either "good" or "bad", i.e. if a system of ethics is to be constructed, then this system must hold that human actions are the result of free will, that they be the result of free, conscious intent.

Research in neuroscience has given serious doubt as to the axiomatic status of free will. Indeed, some researchers have dispensed with the notion all together, and have spoken of the "illusion" of conscious will. If one examines this research with an open but skeptical mind, one will discover a rich source of ideas, supported by empirical data that enable one to begin the construction of a system of ethics that is grounded entirely in neuroscience. The system has been referred to as `neuroethics', and has attracted the attention of some philosophers and many in the legal profession. Neuroethics is based on a profound and some might say frightening view of human nature and personal identity. But it has so far delivered on its (unstated) promise of giving a scientific foundation for ethics.

In this book the author gives a somewhat brief but helpful overview of neuroethics. His background is in psychiatry, and therefore he is able to give a different perspective on the subject, namely of someone who is interacting with patients and therefore observes more directly the consequences of the complicated synapses of the brain. Such a perspective is refreshing, since a successful theory of ethics must address directly the problems, conflicts, and moral dilemmas of real people, and not just engage in abstract theorizing, the latter of which has been the predominant methodology in ethics, especially in philosophical circles.

No doubt there will be many who when reading this book will be aghast at the willingness of the author to question the concept of free will and to embrace the notion that ethical and moral principles are "hardwired" in the brain. It might appear that concepts such as personal responsibility cannot be contained in neuroethics, and if so this has direct consequences both politically and legally. The reader will find however that one can still have a notion of personal responsibility in neuroethics, although it will be one that is different than the ones that are found in many different ethical systems.

If neuroethics is to be comprehensive in scope it must deal meaningfully with some of the more typical issues that ethics grapples with, such as greed, deception, and sexual relations. Can neuroscience explain for example the reason(s) that some individuals crave enormous amounts of wealth, even though they would never have the time nor the energy to enjoy the things their quantity of wealth would allow them to have? The author takes on the first part of this question by identifying the regions of the brain that affect monetary decision-making: the amygdala, hippocampus, prefrontal cortex, and the anterior cingulate cortex. Financial decision-making does of course involve wild swings in emotion, so it is not surprising to learn these regions come into play. The amygdala for example is involved in `conditioned fear', responds sensitively to winning and losing. The author quotes fMRI studies that show how the amygdala is activated when economic losses occur. Interestingly, research of this same type indicates that economic gains do not activate the amygdala to the same extent as losses do. The author though is careful to note that there is a lot of variation in the response of the amygdala, this arising from genetics and brain biology. Some genetic abnormalities he reports can be responsible for some individuals to react with an "excess of fear" when they are confronted with financial decisions that are extremely risky. But it is the `dopamine system' that supplies the appropriate pleasure when wealth is accumulated. In this context, and this is most interesting, the author claims that the human brain loves risk taking, but that these risks are a matter of degree. A reward that is less predictable will result in a larger amount of dopamine produced, thus overwhelming the individual with pleasure. Money, the author says, acts on different pathways of the reward system than "natural rewards", such as food and water, and affects the brain in a way similar to some drugs, such as cocaine. And the pleasures of dopamine (from making money), like the pleasures of cocaine, lead to an excess of behavior in obtaining this money, which we normally refer to as greed. And this greed can result in uncontrolled compulsions with the result that lying, fraud, or embezzlement can become frequent strategies in the obsessive goal of obtaining more money.

Grounding the basis of ethics in neuronal processes raises issues in traditional (philosophical) formulations of ethics that the author does not address. He is correct to do so, since these formulations are too abstract to be of much value to the real problems of humankind. There is much that neuroethics needs to answer before it can be practical, but the author's discussion makes it readily apparent that it should be considered seriously. In addition, it brings up complex legal and political issues dealing with the genetic engineering of the brain. The author addresses the latter topic in the book by including a hypothetical debate that is set in the year 2100. In that debate certain groups of individuals are advocating brain modification in order to alleviate or eliminate negative social behaviors. The engineering of the brain may seem disquieting to some, but its consequences are awesome, and it should be pursued with cautious optimism.

This really is an outstanding piece of work. The author is both a psychiatrist and a lawyer who argues, quite rightly, that many of our assumptions about free will and individual responsibility must be drastically revised in the light of scientific discoveries about the brain.

This is part of a larger debate that is going on within psychiatry, psychology and the legal profession. As an example, at what age should a young person be able to drive a car or be legally liable for their decisions? The driving question comes up because the brain and nervous system of a fifteen-year-old is still far from being fully mature, and may lead to poor coordination and decision-making. Can an eighteen-year-old be held liable for his or her behavior, at a time that his or her brain is not fully formed? Yet he or she is able to fight for his or her country. Our answers to those questions are likely to be a mixture of political positions and personal experience. But now we also have to factor in our burgeoning knowledge about the brain. There seems no doubt that this explosion of knowledge about the brain will be factored into some future legal decisions.

In Tancredi's book, he applies knowledge derived from recent research to such traditional moral concerns as violence, sexual infidelity, lying and physical "excess." For anybody working in the field, it is very clear that hormones, nutritional status, drugs, genetic abnormalities, injuries and traumatic experiences all have profound effects on the structure and functioning of the brain. Therefore they may all have an impact on our moral choices. Some experimental work implies that our actions are initiated by pre-conscious and unconscious processes in the brain before we are consciously aware of them. Does that mean that our sense of moral agency is a retrospective illusion? And what about free will?? Is that an illusion too?

I very much like this book, and also the recent book by Michael Gazzaniga, entitled The Ethical Brain. But for all the research, we remain bewilderingly complex creatures, and there is evidence for the existence of systems - for instance social systems - that can interact with and over-ride some of the neurological ones. So even after reading and studying hundreds of books and scientific papers and talking to hundreds of scientists around the world, I remain convinced that free will is not an illusion, and that there really is a genuine morality which is a great deal more than the firing of neurons in the brain.

Highly recommended.

AMAZING!
I found out about this book because, while waiting in my dentists office, I happened to read the rave review in NATURE MAGAZINE. The concepts of morality and the brain were not only revelatory and fascinating, Tancredi's writing style made them surprisingly engaging. I actually had a hard time putting it down. I question why I haven't heard more about it. I make a point to read the New York Times Book Review every week, and though I've found many books I've enjoyed that way, few have been as interesting. Perhaps this new concept of brain function and free will is a little too controversial. In any case, I'm glad I found out about it. I don't think I'll ever look at my choices/decision making in quite the same way.

Summary
Laurence Tancredi's, "Hardwired Behavior: What Neuroscience Reveals about Morality," provides an excellent, thorough investigation of the relationship between brain biology and "moral" actions. Current neuroscience research is moving farther away from the mind-brain dichotomy and instead suggesting that the physical brain has a major role in shaping our emotions. Tancredi examines how specific aspects of the brain determine moral thinking and repeatedly asks, "could it be possible that we are assigning too much power to `free will' and blaming the perpetrator, who may instead be a `victim' of his or her own biology?" (pg. 13)

The Moral Brain
The first four chapters examine the potential for a physical, biological basis for a "moral brain." First, Tancredi acknowledges that our current notions of morality and well-defined "evil" actions (i.e. murder, stealing, etc) are social constructs, which have evolved to promote stability in our community. Neuroscientific discoveries have been complicating these conclusions, however, by suggesting that certain aspects of our behavior are predetermined by physical aspects of our brain biology and genetics. Some early examples of this paradigm shift are the experiments of Libet, Platt, and Glimcher, whose research seems to diminish the concept of our free will over simple actions like moving our hand.
The fourth chapter provides an anatomical exploration of the brain, organized into the emotional brain (amygdala, hippocampus, the anterior cingulated cortex and the hypothalamus), the frontal lobes, the inhibitory networks, and the mirror-neuron system.

Bad Without Conscience
This chapter explores the troubled life of the serial killer Ricky Green, in an attempt to decipher his psychopathic personality. There is a strong case that genetics may play an important role in these abnormal personalities: Recent research has suggested that there is an "aggression gene," characterized by a defect in the gene that codes for the enzyme mono-amine oxidase A. However, some of these genetic predispositions may need some form of external activation (nurture) to become part of one's character: "The hardwiring of moral ability in our brain, according to selection (nature), is genetically determined. Throughout our lives we discover, through personal moral challenges, what has already been built into our brains" (pg. 81).

Brain Biology and Sex
Several aspects of human behavior, including mathematical, visuospatial and verbal abilities, demonstrate significant differences between males and females. It is thought that complex steroidal interactions with different parts of the brain at different periods in our development determine sexual behavior and gender identity. Tancredi also presents biological differences between homosexual and heterosexual males, in humans and many species, debunking the viewpoint of homosexuality as an immoral lifestyle choice. Throughout the chapter, Tancredi presents the complicated biology of sexual attraction and arousal, lust, and romantic love.

Deception
Although it is universally condemned, lying seems like an innate skill. There are obvious evolutionary benefits of self-protection and self-promotion as a result of lying. Moreover, lying seems to be present in some primates and in children as young as three years old, even when these children are not in fear of punishment. Functional MRI has revealed certain areas of increased brain activity during deception, suggesting that our brain biologically accommodates for lying and is hardwired for doing so.

Money
This chapter explores the brain activity associated with monetary decisions and risk. Tancredi recalls patients with damages to their amygdala and frontal lobe, and how these alterations impact their ability to assess risk and make advantageous choices. There is also a strong association between money and the brain's reward circuitry, resulting in dopamine activation, a euphoric high and the potential for excessive greed and compulsive gambling. "What are the moral implications of abnormal or antisocial behaviors (gambling among them) that are, indeed, biologically driven? And we mustn't forget that there was an evolutionary advantage for many of these behaviors, which we now see as criminal because of their disruptive potential to society" (pg. 137).

Bad vs Mad
Although there is only a small difference in people we characterize as "bad" versus those we label "mad," there is an enormous discrepancy in the way we treat those individuals. However, "We are learning that many of the distinctions we are accustomed to making are not so clear; significant overlaps appear to exist" (pg. 143). Those that have full control over their bad actions are likely to represent a much smaller percentage of those we now label as bad. This would drastically change the way we treat people who demonstrate destructive behaviors like addiction and alcoholism. The "mentally ill person cannot exercise normal control over his or her thinking, behavior, or acts and thus cannot be held to normal standards of responsibility" (pg. 152).

Creating a Moral Brain
The final chapter presents the discussion of using future medical technologies to interfere or select certain desirable characteristics of a moral brain. In the same way drugs are used to combat depression, anxiety, ADD and other disorders, we may one day be able to eradicate other "evil" tendencies. But what are the moral implications of altering brain biology to modify "abnormal" characteristics such as sexual behavior or addiction? "The merits of creating a moral, if not monolithic society, have to be balanced against the possibilities of altering basic elements of an individual's personality and the benefits of diversity--even deviancy--to further the creative interests of a society" (pg. 174).

Conclusion
Overall, I feel this was an excellent discussion of the fundamental importance of brain biology in determining moral behavior. By comparing evolutionary processes, brain structural abnormalities and clinical cases, Tancredi presents a compelling argument supporting a genetic predisposition towards certain immoral behaviors. He also proposes thoughtful questions about the far-reaching implications of this new evidence: How do we interact with and punish perpetrators of deviant actions and determine their accountability? I appreciate the open-endedness of such questions, as he does not propose a definitive answer, but emphasizes the need for a public discourse. A highly informative and entertaining read, I recommend this book for everyone interested in the relationship between morality, society and our brains!

Tancredi projects that by 2100 the major mysteries of the brain will be solved. He presents what is known to date. Research points to a person's moral determinism seated in the composition of the brain. While biology holds sway, nurture has a role. Connections can be built or strengthened through experience, practice or learning.

The author illustrates this research with examples from his clinical practice. If the areas of the brain that supply the emotions of compassion and guilt cannot be accessed, other passions may rule unchecked. Risk takers do not store and/or access information on past consequences, those we call accident prone are fated to be so because they (chemically) cannot learn from past mistakes and criminals do not see the lines they are crossing.

In the future, will this science be used to absolve all guilt? When sources of addiction are uncovered will we have an addiction free society? Will the brain chemistry be altered for prevention and/or rehabilitation? Voluntarily? Involuntarily?

This book gives an overview of what science is finding in how the brain prescribes the moral lives of individuals. Hopefully a society will evolve a proper ethical framework to deal with it and can keep ahead of the science.

The author listed a resonable amount of facts and, I think, demonstrated convincingly that our actions (including decision making) are at least to a certain extent influenced by biological and physical factors (viz. how the brain is wired, what the levels of chemicals that bathe the brain are). Here are some evidence that the book lists:

- a defective gene that reduces an enzyme (MAO-I) confers a risk of aggressive and violent behaviors, particularly if the person affected is abused in childhood
- damage to a particular part of the brain, the amygdala (as in Kluver-Bucy Syndrome), can cause hypersexuality
- the levels of dopamine D2 receptors are reduced in sufferes of addcitive habits

The author also quoted the experiments of Benjamin Libet (i.e. subjects are asked to "decide" to lift up their finger; a "readiness potential" can be detected 300-400ms before the subjects subjectively experience the desire to act). This is used to cast doubt on the validity of the concept of free will. However, the author does not indicate that this interpretation is in fact controversial.

One salient conclusion (or perhaps corollaries) made from the above observations by the author was "free will, if it exists at all, has a minor role in behavior" (pg. 167). Whilst this conclusion may not be false, it is not commonsensical. I am sure astute readers can see a way out (i.e. free will is still a coherent concept even in view of the biological constraints to our actions and behaviors).

A truely informative and authoritative work (the author is a psychiatrist-lawyer). Five stars.

If you want to read one book that gives a comprehensive, understandable overview of how modern neuroscience is contributing to our understanding of human morality, this is the book to read.

Laurence Tancredi writes lucidly. His images of the brain are excellent and his glossary is very helpful.

His perspective on "Hardwired Behavior: What Neuroscience Reveals about Morality" can be summarized in his words found on page 81 of the book: "Advances in neuroscience and cell biology . . . strongly back the . . . theory, which holds that our brains possess all the built-in options for mental capacity and development. The environment, through instruction, merely selects, but does not alter, options already built into the brain. An environmental challenge, or signal, at an appropriate time triggers the brain's capacity to engage in moral thinking."

I came across this book accidentally, and am delighted that I did. It is a well written, easy to read, and thorough treatise on the creation of moral human beings from the combined effects of nature AND nurture. This book should be required reading for all who are, or intend to become, parents as well as anyone who has to deal with other people in life. In other words, everyone can benefit from the understanding that we are our brains, and our brains are what we were born with PLUS EVERYTHING we experience. The title Hardwired Behavior might scare off some who would assume that the position of the book is to declare that each of us is nothing but a prewired, and therefore predestined, machine. But that is not Tancredi's point at all. The Hardwired is at a macro level for all humans - the basic human "instincts." It is the case that, due to the diversity of the reproductive process, there is great diversity in each individual's hardwiring, but Tancredi makes it very clear that that initial hardwiring is extremely plastic, so that early experiences are critical in establishing the "hard" part of the wiring. Even as adults there is still much plasticity, but it becomes more hardwired the older we get. The book also gives a good overview of the history of morality, its definitions over time and its probable evolutionary origins.
Bottom line, the book is an excellent blend of philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, social science and law, with examples of real world cases Tancredi has been involved in.

Trancredi provides an excellent example of the confusion that the therapeutic class inflicts on those it presumably tries to help. As a physician, he joins biologists in finally accepting that nature acts through nurture (although he cannot bring himself to say so in these words), not as two separately and distinctly antithetical influences that his field's pioneers have done for over a century. As a psychoanalyst, he still mistakes correlations for causation, and resorts to clusters of descriptive metaphysics as diagnostic of mental conditions. But the DSM-IV is the Bible of Mental Conditions that neurosis, affective, and psychotic disorders seem unable to describe.

As a theorist, he is surprising sloppy with language, confusing "delusion" for "illusion" -- an unforgiveble error by an expert who should know better. As an author he forgets to tell his readers what his subject is: "morality," the chief topic of his book. Never defined, nor outlined, nor described. And as one who ventures into philosophy's domain, he certainly is ill-equipped to integrate its criticisms of his field into his unscientific narrative.

The starkest defect is the failure to identify what Trancredi means by Morality. Morality is a Judeo-Christian concept, granted, with unsuccessful Enlightenment revisions (Kantian, utilitarian, benevolence). In philosophical literature, morality is proscriptive, deontological, universal, and objective norms of social behavior. In contrast, Ethics, which Trancredi never mentions, is prescriptive, teleological, situational, and subjective.

Dr. Trancredi might be surprised to learn that many axiologists deem "do no harm" to be the sole moral imperative, in which case, he never addresses the title his book presupposes. Disputes do arise among axiologists over whether "harm" to others and harm to self is a distinction worth making; Trancredi ignores it entirely. Ethics is not mentioned, which, given Trancredi's complete misinterpretation of Greek Classical Thought (Chap. 11) is probably to be desired. While ethics and morality are often conflated in and outside philosophical discourse, the omission of all ethical dimensions and failure to describe what Trancredi means by "morality" illustrates his total impoverishment of subject.

His first-two chapters are deliberately obfuscatory, which the specialist alone is likely to detect. The cover-up of Harvard's Marxist Biologist defending their messiahs rather than accept Darwinian biology has been exposed by sociologists that our author prefers to conceal (see, Segerstrale: Defenders of the Truth, OUP). Hardly his only concealment. But it is significant in that their other messiah, of course, was Freud, both of which Darwin completely undermines. Maybe that explains Trancredi's deliberate omission of "Darwinian Psychiatry" (OUP, 1998), while cherry-picking some of sociobiology's insights -- an otherwise significant work in the very field Trancredi claims some expertise.

Psychiatry, unlike its stepchild psychology, comes with a basic-science requisite, and psychotropics increasingly demand a biological explanation to be incorporated in its various hypotheses. As critics remind, which theory of psychiatry are patients to consider viable? psychoanalytic, sociocultural, behavioral, biomedical, chaos, transformative, Esalen, Eclectic theories-plus? No such theory from Trancrendi, only a thesis based on specious correlations.

As numerous critics have -- and continue -- to indict the Psyche gurus: it lacks a single, testable, coherent, and evidentiary-based theory, research, and demonstrable therapeutic modalities. But how else can SSRIs, Benzos, antipsychotics achieve Big Pharma dominance without a biomedical explanation? And in Trancrendi's able and elegant expository writing style with highly-selective biological, philosophical, and concealed subjects, he boasts psychiatry "starting in the last two decades of the twentieth-century, [has shown an] interest in biology and genetic of mental illness . . . [that] provokes another shift in focus from external ones to internal one arising from the biology of the afflicted person" (p. 146). Get those prescription pads out. Get those forensic psychotherapists defense stories readied. Get those Dr. Phil's and Dwyers into high gear with new solutions to the old problems.

Actually, Trancredi's solution is already known as the Twinkie Defense (1978), in which an all-American ex-cop assassinated his mayor and former colleague because he ingested too many Twinkies that caused his blood-sugar to drive him 15 miles back home, find and load a pistol, drive back 15 miles, crawl through City Hall's basement windows to escape public metal detectors and police scrutiny, and then unload his weapon in the mayor and supervisor of San Francisco.

If Trancredi's thesis is right, Dan White's Twinkie Defense was right, and we are wrong to hold a chemically-imbalanced murder to account for killing politicians. After all, White could not help himself, overloaded with sugar from too many Twinkies ingested the weeks before his murderous actions. The jury was right to convict him of voluntary manslaughter, not the more serious first-degree murder, sentencing him to five years in a minimum security facility to correct his chemical imbalance, not taking his life for the two he killed. And the WhiteNight Riots that erupted upon the jury's verdict in a rage of injustice apparently should have been dispensed benzodiazapines or major tranquilizers, rather than express rage and anger (or was that a chemical imbalance expressing itself in the masses?)

Not even the defendant Dan White bought into his own Twinkie Defense, much less the psychoanalysts' narrative of chemical imbalances as the "cause" of his murderous rampage. Instead, White put a gun to his own head, not for committing his murderous crime, but for the injustice of his psychoanalysts getting him off for murder with a mere five years in minimum security country club prison.

But if Trancredi's thesis is right, we should pity the assassin and beware of biochemical imbalances -- the new Psyche disorder that exonerates the guilty, counters personal responsibility, negates culpability, and anesthetizes the masses with Big Pharma's psychotropics or pays the Therapist his $165 hour. For What? Excuses? No. For the disregard of "morality," whatever "morality" might be -- once the therapeutic class determines what "morality" is from the philosophers. In the meantime, "chemical imbalance" worked for Dan White; Laurence Trancredi suggest a whole range of new Twinkie Defenses (at the forensic, not therapeutic, rate).

What a very different book and perspective Trancredi could have achieved with knowledge of Darwinian (evolutionary) psychiatry and emergent phenomena as complexity science reveals the brain-mind relationship. But then he'd have to call the "unconscious" into question, and despite no empirical evidence for such an entity, it is the root of all psychological explanations.

Exploring an apparent shift in emphasis away from the mental processes and cultural determinants underlying our understanding of moral stances, and instead focusing upon the biological processes involved in the regions of the brain directly involved with moral decision-making, Tancredi presents here a refreshingly realistic neurophilosophy of mind and human behavior. Across 12 chapters, the reader is taken from the earliest religio-philosophical thinking concerned with moral education, through evolutionary psychology, and towards recent findings of brain functional imaging studies, in explaining cases of pathological moral situation management. And although essentially materialistic in causal explanation, the author achieves this without denying the significance of individual responsibility.

Indeed, both as a professional psychiatrist within legal practice and significant academic reputation, Tancredi neither denies that 'immoral behavior' exists, nor that those so afflicted with strong dispositions are necessarily without responsibility for their own individual behavior. Using case studies of real convicted killers as examples, the author uses the lives of the behavioral psychopaths that he introduces to illustrate the effects of both the ontological nature and nurture factors which can affect brain and consciousness changes (and especially so the loss of inhibition). The significance of such developmental experiences will be familiar to most readers of this book by now, but what may prove to be refreshing for many unfamiliar with developmental neuroscience, it to be able to read here of some of the most significant findings of modern brain research normally to be found only in specialized psychology and brain science journals. Although by no means complete (much recent work concerned with the neurological correlates of gambling behavior, for example, are of much relevance to the arguments outlined in this book, yet not included), the discussions occurring throughout several of the chapters concerned with causal explananda re psychopathology are finally coming to be associated with increasingly specific brain regions and predictable focal network dysfunctions.

This said, it is certainly not the case that Tancredi wishes to deny the significance of, for example, instances of personal socio-sexual abuse in explaining the historical development of psychopathology. In fact the author takes such examples to the very heart of his explanations, going further than previous writers, in presenting the biological significance of (for example) sexual abuse for the very reason that such events/experiences are now known to change the brain's structure and function (often permanently), and in significant and particular (possibly predictable) ways. It is this argument more than any other that many will find most useful for the practicing psychologist or psychiatrist engaged in legal work; but the more sociologically inclined reader may take Tancredi to instead be implying (especially given his rather colloquial writing style), that the homicidal psychopath is already intent upon committing a murderous act, and thereby 'intends' to use his known history, or known alcohol consumption intolerance to facilitate his/her ability to commit the act. However such ideas are intended to be read (see esp. Ch.5), the current reviewer agrees with the author's concluding statement such that the very content of thinking is [necessarily] affected [if not determined by] the brain.

With regards the core biological basis, and neurophilosophy of moral reasoning, I would like to have read Tancredi's opinion of, and distinctions from, Churchland's Neurophilosophy (1978) and the differences inherent in her 'eliminative materialism' in explaining his new stance on moral behavior, and moral decision-making in particular. Another curious omission occurs early in the volume during the developmental behavior factor discussions -- we appropriately learn about the significant contributions of the work conducted by (e.g.), Freud, Piaget, Kolberg, and Bowlby, but no mention is made of the work of Stanley Millgram, and his pioneering work on obedience and authoritarian figure response learning -- a body of research I would have thought clearly relevant to our understanding of societal compliance, and moral choice formation. Indeed, although the 'abuse of Iraqi prisoners by American soldiers' is cited as an example of "immoral behavior" possible explainable by biological factors rather than 'conscious intent' (see Preface p.X), Tancredi unfortunately does not return to this issue later in the book.

Overall, this volume deserves its place as a landmark presentation of a much misunderstood, often conflicting, and thus difficult-to-summarize research (and fast changing) literature concerned with the neurobiological bases of decision-making and choice selection, albeit directly addressing issues of personal or social and moral responsibility. Some of the most important (selected) references are provided for the reader wishing to study the primary sources for many of the research finding claims made throughout the book, and are listed in the numbered 'notes' section at the end. However, given the speed and depth of new neural findings being published every month (especially with regards the function of the nucleus acumbens), I would not be too surprised to see an update version of this book coming to the shelf in the not so distant future.