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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
8 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
More than a chronicle.,
By
This review is from: Harpers Ferry Armory and New Technology (Paperback)
Merritt Roe Smith's 1984 book, Harper Ferry Armory and the New Technology; the Challenge of Change, on its face chronicles the rise, existence, and demise of the national armory located at Harpers Ferry, Virginia. However there is much more to it than that.
A common understanding of American industrialization derives from the scarcity of labor. As a result, so the reasoning goes, Americans adopted and adapted to the use of machinery more willingly and with fewer problems than other places. On the contrary, during the course of his research Smith found that at Harpers Ferry, for example, this was not the case. Persistent conflict was the norm rather than harmonious progress. Thomas Jefferson's vision of an agrarian democracy conflicted with George Washington's views as a landowner and a businessman. The "middle landscape" that Jefferson saw at Harper's Ferry was to Washington an avenue for trade and development. Washington, according to Smith, is the main force behind the Armory. Washington argued that the availability of water, the furnaces and forges nearby and because of its more secure location, Harpers Ferry should be the location of a new arsenal. Problems of transportation, remoteness, labor and "a social milieu [not] adaptable to change and regimentation"(33) contrasted sharply with the armory at Springfield, Massachusetts. Residents at Harpers Ferry saw their local priorities as more important than the armory's national purpose. Herein lies the basis for Smith's thesis: "The story of Harpers Ferry, most notably the efforts of its inhabitants to preserve accustomed life styles and practices in the wake of accelerating technology, presents a microcosmic view of the industrial revolution which is perhaps more suggestive of America's bittersweet relationship with the machine than many historians have heretofore recognized."(21) In expanding on his thesis, Smith discusses the development of technology in early America in relation to the rifle, the development of a factory system, machinery used in the factory, the impact of this machinery on people, the inventiveness and entrepreneurial successes and failures of people, the evolution of the "American System" of interchangeable parts, and the applicability of information and resources, including labor. Smith contrasts the Harpers Ferry and Springfield armories. The need for national armories stemmed from the inadequacy of the contract system, which had previously furnished arms. Early on a new rifle was developed at the Harpers Ferry armory. The Model 1803 "short" rifle was unique in its aesthetics and historical significance "as the first regulation rifle to be manufactured at the government armories."(56) Its character is reflective of Pennsylvania craftsmanship derived from armorer Joseph Perkins' design and the skilled workmen he brought with him. Early gunsmiths were craftsmen who worked under the highly individualistic "task-oriented" labor system. Because of the craft traditions at the Harpers Ferry armory, armorers and supervisors, according to Smith, "found it extremely difficult to adjust to the increasingly specialized demands of industrial civilization."(67) Another source of conflict came with the appointment of James Stubblefield as superintendent. Ostensibly in control, the War Department recognized Samuel Annin, paymaster, as senior administrator to Stubblefield. During his tenure Harpers Ferry persistently under performed in comparison to Springfield. Reasons given were the greater variety of weapons manufactured, managerial shortcomings, unhealthy conditions, craft traditions and local customs and "the baneful influence of several families who owned and controlled the town of Harper's Ferry."(76) Springfield consistently out produced Harpers Ferry and its arms were more uniform. The "uniformity system" became the watchwords of Colonel Decius Wadsworth and his assistant and successor at the ordinance department Lt. Colonel George Bomford. At first their objective was cheaper and more uniform weapons, but ultimately the goal became the production of arms with interchangeable parts. To succeed, they realized that arsenals had to be willing to adapt and innovate. One did and the other did not. For example: The barrel-turning lathe ultimately adopted at Springfield in 1818 consisted of a Wilkinson engine equipped with Nash's steadying supports and Dana and Olney's carriage guides. No similar mechanical synthesis occurred at Harpers Ferry. Stubblefield seemed perfectly satisfied with the unaltered version and continued to rely on it as late as 1829. (124) For another example, Thomas Blanchard's invention of a gun stocking lathe and other inventions were thwarted by attitudes of workmen and Stubblefield's brother-in-law who resented "Yankee-notions." Smith notes that while the opening of lines of communication between the armories increasingly made available the transfer of technical knowledge to Harpers Ferry, it was not always "awaited eagerly nor accepted with enthusiasm."(139) In addition to contrasting the Springfield and Harpers Ferry Armories on technical matters, Smith contrasts the personalities who hindered or enhanced innovation and inventiveness. Stubblefield and an oligarchy, or Junto of a few related families controlled the town of Harpers Ferry. Entrenched resistance to change and the retention of position and privilege served to perpetuate the established order. Stubblefield, like a patrician, saw himself more in a paternalistic role, than a business leader. In stark contrast John H. Hall epitomizes the persistence and focus of an individual driven to succeed even over the objections of the Junto. The major elements of Hall's system included metal machinery, gauges, and drop forges. Not an agreeable person, he nonetheless placed the national interest over his own interest. Smith pays him the highest of compliments: "John H. Hall stood foremost among those who combined inventiveness with entrepreneurial skill in blending men, machinery, and precision measurement methods into a workable system of production. The achievement formed the taproot of modern industrialism." (219) Hall produced the first weapons made with interchangeable parts. Though located in Harpers Ferry, his "Rifle Works," keystone in the development of the system of interchangeable manufacturing, was a thorn in the side of the Musket Factory located on the other side of the arsenal. The significance of Harpers Ferry, in the view of Merritt Roe Smith, comes from the understanding that a local culture opposed to technological innovation can retard growth and development. Change was not readily accepted, but instead feared. The conflict that Smith describes microscopically manifests itself macroscopically when divisions between the North and South culminated in the sacking of the armory and the relocating of its manufacturing capacity to Richmond, Virginia and Fayetteville, North Carolina during the Civil War.
3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Superb history on a challenging subject,
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This review is from: Harpers Ferry Armory and New Technology (Paperback)
Smith's research and analysis on a topic with few records and nearly 200 years in the past in a remote rural community is an extraordinary achievement for any historian. Smith takes a deep look at one of George Washington's poorer ideas, establishing the second national firearms manufacturing operation in a remote small town in Virginia, next to a swamp so malaria is an ongoing major problem and workforce (and workforce housing) are always difficult to find and keep as well as Philadelphia being the closest relevant industry hub. It's a study of the fiesty craftsman approach (Harpers Ferry) vs solving challenges with new machine tools (Springfield Armory) common to all manufacturing then and now so the lessons are relevant to anyone in manufacturing today. The quest for quality, interchangeable parts, worker training, developing new models (Lewis & Clark get their rifles here, the Hall Breechloader is developed mostly here and one of the team goes on to create the Sharps rifle), productivity (Springfield Armory outproduces them tremendously, inventing milling machines and multi-spindle lathes along the way.) It's a great book for anyone interested in 19th century gunmaking, manufacturing in general, rural economic development strategies, workforce training, implementing new technologies with existing workforces (always an adventure and often a failure), or even those who wondered why John Brown thought seizing it would immediately facilitate a widespread slave uprising.
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