Customer Reviews

Hegemon: China's Plan to Dominate Asia and the World

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The Chinese keep threatening while their apologists keep denying the threat.

Steven Mosher's Hegemon: China's Plan to Dominate Asia and the World is still relevant in the post-9/11 world.

The Islamofascist terrorists can hurt us, China can destroy us and actually aims to do so.

Chinese Maj. Gen. Zhu Chenghu warned in July 2005 that if the U.S. interfered in a Chinese attack on Taiwan it could lead to a Chinese nuclear attack on U.S. cities.

Gen. Xiong Guangkai, the Chinese Army's second highest ranking general, made the same threat ten years earlier in 1995, saying that Americans "care more about Los Angeles than you do about Taipei."

I'll believe the threats of Chinese generals over the self-serving denials of their stooges here in the West.

This is an extremely important work on China. It seems to be saying, among other things, that an independent Taiwan is in the interest of the United States. I have long shared the misgivings of others regarding China's motivation for military modernization and the true objective of its foreign policy. Dr. Mosher provides a well crafted overview of a historical basis to question where China is going. At times the thesis of the book is stretched but the basic logic is consistent and well argued. It seemed to me, that one might argue that its the Chinese Communist Party we need to fear vice, "China" itself. The only criticism I might have, is that it lacked the personal perspective that enlivened most of Dr. Mosher's previous works. Overall, an excellent read, and a very important work for those interested in the future of Asia and the US.

According to the Chinese strategic literature, Chinese strategists believe three things. First, they believe that war with the United States is inevitable, as China's defense minister has recently stated. Second, they believe that China can win such a war. Third, they believe that by the middle of the next century one country--a hegemon--will come to dominate the world, and that this hegemon will be China.

Hegemon, Steven Mosher's new book on the China threat, makes it clear that China wants to organize the world the way it has for 2,000 years. It wants China as the center, surrounded by kowtowing tributary states. That is the very meaning of the country's name in Chinese: Zhongguo--the kingdom in the middle. But Mosher tells us that there is another name, even more revealing, that the Chinese have for their country. They call it Tianxia--all under heaven. A fitting name for a once and future hegemon, a manifest ruler of the world.

This is a must read for all those concerned about China's growing stature in the world, and what America must do to forestall the China threat, and promote human rights and democracy in that vast and powerful country.

Waiting until China attacks Taiwan will be too late. America needs to wake up to a new and chilling reality.

Reviewer: Chuck DeVore is a candidate for U.S. Senate in 2010, a California State Assemblyman, he served as a Special Assistant for Foreign Affairs in the Department of Defense from 1986 to 1988, retired from the Army National Guard as a lieutenant colonel, and is the co-author of "China Attacks."

I was rather skeptical of this book. I thought perhaps it was of the mindless "China bad" variety aimed at paranoiacs and/or Americans who sense China is a threat but aren't sure precisely why. My skepticism, as it turns out, was unwarranted. This is a very good book and could have been excellent with a bit of tweaking. To begin with, Mosher understands the Chinese mindset. The Chinese don't possess, for example, a linear view of history and they still consider themselves culturally superior to everyone everywhere. They were once a mighty empire and so will they be again. Or so they believe. The twentieth century was just a temporary setback, etc. China deeply resents the West, and the US in particular, and Mosher explains in detail why. This book is also jam packed with military information - statistics galore and loads of factoids about the modernization of the PLA. Ideed, it reads like a briefing in places. The volume of research is wholly impressive, however, and helps to concretize the writer's central claim. There are weak points, though. The author engages in some slippery slope thinking (first, China would reclaim nation/territory X, and then go on to nation/territory Y) and he employs "us and them" rhetoric too often in his narrative, i.e. 'We need to (do A) to prevent them from (doing B).' I don't think this is helpful, nor is it very academic. There are also several unqualified claims, and a few other problems, but overwhelmingly the book works.

When casual observers and leaders in the West begin commenting on China, they seldom have any idea what they are talking about. Westerners tend to view China through a filter, applying their own system of thought to a culture and psyche they have little grasp of. What Mosher is especially good at is getting you to see the Chinese perspective. Although he never says so explicitly, a point he is trying to make is: it doesn't matter what the West thinks of China (friend, foe, other), it only matters what China thinks of the West. And they (especially the government) don't think very much of the West. To find out why, read this book.

They say the best books tell you what you already know, and so admittedly this added to my reading enjoyment. After living in the Chinese world for years, I had come to many of the same conclusions. Hegemon ought to be a handbook for government officials and heads of state - if it isn't already.

Troy Parfitt, author of Why China Will Never Rule the World

Steven Mosher’s presentation provides a capable 183-page primer for the reader that wishes to rapidly rev to speed on China. “Hegemon” provides an excellent thumbnail approach to China from roughly 2200 BC to today’s tumultuous politics and globalized economics. Read it all and the reader is a leg up on 95-percent of Americans.

I was, however, troubled on pages 46-47 when Mosher completely misinterpreted the Korean War. He clearly stated that when the Americans reached the Yalu (21 Nov 50), China with wave after wave of attacks drove the Americans back to “a tiny enclave centered around the port city of Pusan.” The Pusan Perimeter (Sept 50) was early in the Korean War. The Chinese came later (1 Nov 50) and before being thrown back to a line north of Seoul, they never went further south than the Osan-Samchok line (25 Jan ’51)...nowhere near Pusan. And the surprise Inchon landing (15 Sept 50) was not directed at the non-present Chinese but at the North Koreans. These Mosher bloopers unfortunately make the aware reader speculate as to what else in this work is fact or fiction; the plethora of footnotes suddenly become less authoritative.

There are occasionally skewed political barbs, e.g., Mosher trumpets on pg. 142 that Alexander Haig resigned from Reagan’s cabinet to work for United Technology where he could sell arms to China! Al Haig was working for United Technology when President Reagan designated him secretary of state, i.e., he left his home at United to go to Washington and, upon resignation as secretary, he returned home to United. Nothing ominous, but it calumniously hints of improper ethics. Also, if trading with China puts America’s national security at risk, then Congress should obviously make it federally illegal, certainly not the citizenry.

Helter-skelter throughout the book Mosher, mentions a profusion of Chinese missiles. It would have been helpful to have packaged them and their capabilities on a small half-page table for the reader’s ready reference. Ditto for pg. 102 “Taiwan is extraordinarily dependent upon its three main ports and four airports.” To identify these ports and airports with place-names would benefit the curious reader. Mosher erred again on pg. 111 when he stated the Chinese Navy operates from a “base” in Myanmar’s (Burma’s) offshore islands (also pg. 114). What’s the port’s name and what does Mosher consider to be a working naval base? Will it accommodate motorboats, subs or an aircraft carrier? Mosher initially and correctly describes the Paracels and Spratlys as a few dozen rocky outcroppings, no population, no drinking water, and for the most part, completely submerged at high tide. Surprisingly he goes on to pg. 105 to state that there are “…eleven Chinese naval bases to date,” Once again, we wonder what in Mosher’s mind constitutes a viable naval base in these minuscule and tidal coral outcrops.

I certainly agree with Mosher’s concept that both the Chinese economy and military are rapidly growing and that by 2020 should realistically reach parity with America. As it stands geopolitically, Northeast Asia presents a dazzling and insidious problem. Unfortunately, Mosher jumps on the consensual groupthink bandwagon. It's the easy uncontroversial way out and is currently favored by most in media, academia and government, i.e.,to simply “contain” the Chinese and watch the docile monkey slowly become the raging gorilla in our backyard. “Hegemon” made me feel as if I were being banished to the Colosseum to docilely await the roaring Chinese lions. Instead of this constant defeatism or passing the “gorilla” buck to the next generation, I would find it refreshing if some courageous innovator broke from the “group” and independently forged a viable solution: A solution to the gorilla problem while he’s still small. Further on, a strengthen China will not readily listen to reason. And as experience has taught us, “make bold decisions when strong, not when weak.”

For example, it would be possible to have an Asian Treaty Organization much less cumbersome than complicated NATO, a multilateral military entente, with only the major nations: Russia, China, Japan and America as members. These would serve as a regional security blanket and none of the four would be preeminent. Each major member in the jointly-operated organization would police the others with any misunderstandings promptly settled. Give Taiwan a 50-year hands-off status. If Asia were stabilized in such a pragmatic straightforward way, economy could flourish throughout Asia with no care of regional war. The beauty of this organization would be that Asia’s smaller nations, e.g., Laos, Mongolia, Singapore, Thailand could function with no cash takingmilitary requirement. They could devote their surplus national monies entirely to national infrastructure. And there would be no dominant Pacific hegemon.

Mosher presents many interesting problems toward the end of his book but offers no solutions. Still, his work is refreshing and pokes at the mind that workable solutions demand immediate attention and that America must wake up re its relationship with China. Europe will currently take care of itself; Asia should be America’s most urgent planning priority.

The Cold War is over, the Soviet Union, history. But a new power is rising, one that has 5 times the population of the old Soviet Union -- and a growing economy -- and territorial designs on its neighbors.

China has a long and proud history. Dr. Mosher properly puts this into perspective, showing readers that, except for very recent history, China has been bigger and stronger by far than any of its Western counterparts, such as the Roman Empire. The Chinese have a keen sense of this history, as well as their recent (past 150 years) humiliations at the hands of the West and Japan.

This book is a must read for all those who think that trade with China can somehow buy off the ambitions of the Chinese leadership to rebuild their empire; their hegemony over Asia and the rest of the world.

China has all the potential to make the Cold War with the Soviet Empire look like a walk in the park.

Steven Mosher is to be congratulateded. In Hegemon he has brilliantly summarized 2,000 years of Chinese history, a history which is based on the notion that China is the center of the world--and should be again.

The China Threat is large and growing. China's Minister of Defense, Chi Haotian, recently remarked that "war with the United States was inevitable." These are chilling words, and make it clear that China is prepared to eject the U.S. from Asia by force if necessary, just as they have threatened Taiwan with the use of force unless it "returns to the embrace of the motherland."

Steve Mosher's book, Hegemon, is a brilliant essay on the logic of China's historical domination of Asia, and what this implies for the future of Asia and the World. He isl careful to differentiate between the Chinese people, for whom he expresses great admiration, and the Chinese government, which is undeniably one of the most brutal in the world.

He proposes a sensible policy for the U.S. and other Western countries to pursue vis-a-vis China--promoting bot only economic reform but also human rights,in the hope of China's peaceful evolution into a free market democracy. Everyone interested in world politics needs to reed this book.

A very inciteful picture of where our world, and the United States in particular, is headed. God forbid.

Mosher's appallingly two-dimensional representation of China sufferes from consistent used techniques that are outright bad. Shoddy evidence is used to support his "hegemon" thesis, which is badly constructed in its own right. That deserved its own review, as does his use of "evidence."

Chapter 1 relies on torturously selective and parsed quotes, unconfirmable and vague anecdotes, and outright cliches. He also relies on the use of personification ("China" this; "China" that) to characterize a huge country with a linguistically, ethnically, and culturally diverse population. His most clear effort is to conclude that China's resentment of US policy is demonstrative support for his thesis that China is the Hegemon. Most countries resent a thing or two about the US, so one can see right off the bat how insufficient that is.

Chapter 2 begins his attempt to use an astoundingly self-serving journey through Chinese history to characterize what he absurdly calls China's "cultural DNA." The despotic Qin First Emperor is the model on which the rest of his thesis implies, detailing the Emperor's internal (Legalism) and external policies as the framework within the conclusions of the book are then cast.

Chapter 3 treats Mao's approach to politics and his understanding of history and the Legalist tradition; with Maoism cast as hegemonism (the COMINTERN, for instance). He begins referring to Mao as "Emperor" as a way to show continuity of the PRC with China's imperial past.

The weakest section of the chapter is emblematic of the weakness of the book: Mosher's hapless attempt to stylize Mao's military campaigns as ultimately hegemonistic are stretches of the imagination that rely on anecdote and selective history. It takes two to fight a war, and Mosher has a void in place of the motivations of other countries and the context in which many conflicts took place. Ultimately, border conflicts do not a hegemon make. Perhaps the "bloody borders" have more to say about China's numerous neighbors and vague territorial demarcations after WWII, then about China.

Mosher attempts to frame all Chinese strategy as implicitly hegemonistic, while providing no evidence of continuity. Instead, he kidnaps Sun Tzu in these crucial moments, and attempts to imply that the absence of any discernable strategy implies it exists; a technique worthy of Michel Foucault. The constant painting of Chinese strategists as ten-feet tall is coupled only by a few parsed quotes from low-level speeches and a single Defense White Paper. Mosher selectively takes Chinese propaganda as literal declarations, when anyone who has read much propaganda from the PRC, USSR, and North Korea knows how comically overblown it always is.

In Chapter 4, Mosher attempts to frame Deng as a internal Legalist, and so concludes that his external motivations are therefore purely hegmonistic. His evidence is China's bellicoisty towards Taiwan --which is infinitely complex-- and Mischief Reef. Mosher posits the Mischief Reef facilities as credible installations. Anyone who has seen pictures of them know them to be highly vulnerable structures with poor defenses that could be erased in about two-seconds. Their purpose is more symbolic, and the recent multilateral attitude of China towards the South China Sea does not go far in confirming Mosher's point.

Page 75 begins his quagmire into "Great Han Chauvinism." There is no doubt that nationalism is increasingly used in China as a tool for legitimacy, but there is little evidence --and Mosher certainly provides none with his selective quotations-- that it is premised on Han ethnicity. Quite the contrary, really. That is why by Page 82 he is busily changing the subject to China's military modernization and the Cox report. That report's credibility has suffered greatly since its publication; and it is Mosher's only real attempt at empirical grounding.

Chapter 5 is a return to the Qin paradigm, and begins the most absurd discussion on China's path to hegemony. Since the book has so far done absolutely NOTHING to demonstrate China-as-Hegemon, his three scenarios are implausible ruminations, bad anaologies, and argument from possibility, rather than any measure of probability. His whole strategic argument is that China is a threat to the US; the threat to Taiwan is really to an "isolated" Taiwan, which it is not (101-2); therefore an absence of the US is the greatest danger. Yet the absence of the US is used to support a conclusion that the US is threatened. It makes no sense.

On 102 he continues the bad immediate inferences by using the '79 China-Vietnam war as indicative of hostile intentions (hence a threat to Taiwan), AFTER he had already drew out how decisively China had been knocked around in that war. That conflict was a failed land invasion against an isolated peasant-based regime; hardly support for the likelihood of an amphibious invasion against a modernized military supported by the US!

On 105 he again presents Mischief Reef as a viable military installation. By 106-7, he is positing that border diputes are a calculated strategy, rather than an outcome of complicated relationships and bad policies. He then uses that to support a conclusion of "the ideological justification for Beijing's intervention in the affairs of neighboring states is the unquestioned superiority of the Chinese way of life." That is a VERY questionable conclusion, given Mosher's decisive lack of support. Pages 110-11 present a bizarrely pessimistic understanding of Korea, given China's (albeit inconsistent) involvement in stabilizing the Korean peninsula. Page 112: "Taiwan is increasingly anxious not to offend China;" hardly a resounding demonstration of hegemony. By 114-15 he is theorizing on the possiblity of China forging an alliance with Russia deeply ignores bilateral history he himself points out; then he posits a Chinese alliance with JAPAN! Such implausible notions ("emphasizing their cultural affinities" Is he joking?) are presented contrary to the good sense of Japanese policymakers, let alone the history between the two countries. One has to wonder why he works so hard at attempting to confirm his pessimisms with such logically contorted theorizing.

Mosher significantly never discusses the behavior of other states and the effects on China. Proliferation and nuclearization are significant issues, yet Mosher is trapped by using anecdotes and bad analogies that are typically thirty of more years old. He seems incapable of assessing China's intentions and capabilities vis-a-vis those of other countries. Such a limited scope is mind boggling given the complexity of his topic.

His most plausible treatment is of the demographic expansion into Siberia and elsewhere. This however, hardly justifies his advocation of NMD, outright containment and confrontation, and paranoid hedging. The modernization of China's military is indeed strategically troubling for the US, but not indicative of a trend to be Hegemon that goes back to the Qin. Instead, China's rise is more indicative of industrialism and the remnants of Twentieth Century international power politics. China's current modernization is far more emblematic of China's weaknesses than it is of their strength.

This book is a poor basis --on so many levels-- on which to form conclusions of China's motivations and intentions.

I find Mr. Mosher's book deeply troubling and disturbing, not because of how it "exposes" the "China threat" but because the abundant misrepresentations that many readers seem to take seriously. What Mosher essentially does is reduces 4000 years of Chinese history and tradition to a charicature of Sun Zi (Sun Tzu). Few would agree that American politics can be portrayed monolithically (are all Americans really like Bill Clinton?); at the same time, one must understand that there exist a variety of traditions in Chinese political or strategic culture, and that a culturally chauvanistic China that understands itself at the center of a Sino-centric world order is only one of many interpretations. Alongside what some may characterize as the hard realpolitik paradigm of the Legalists and Sun Zi is the Confucian-Mencian traditions that emphasize harmony, order, and a defensive as opposed to offensive military culture (see Fairbank). On the other hand, there is evidence that realism guides Chinese foreign policy, but in no different manner than it guides other nations', such as America's (see Allen Whiting). My point is that culture is much more complex than it may seem, you just can't caricaturize it. Another point that Mosher misses is that cultures do evolve and change. Some scholars (such as Iain Johnston) point out that China's integration over the past two decades into international economic and multilateral institutions have reduced the emphasis on zero-sum realpolitik in Chinese strategy in favor of multilateralism. Indeed, China today may even be more multilaterist than the current US administration, which tends towards hard-nosed in-your-face unilateralism. I'd like to point out too that China has signed the Comprehensive (nuclear) Test Ban Treaty, the same treaty conservative Republicans in the US Senate ceremoniously canned in 1999. The tendency toward US unilateralism and all this talk of the "China threat" in the US will only damage US interests by reinforcing those hardliners in Beijing like Li Peng who are asking for conflict with the US. Discussion of such issues are notably absent from Mosher's monolithic portrayal. In addition, notably absent from Mosher's bibliography are numerous important works by recognized scholars (such as Fairbank, Johnston, Hunt, Whiting). Simply mentioning their works, even if only to reject them, would add some credibility to Mosher's book. Mosher's decision to conspicuously leave them out reinforces the notion that Mosher wrote this book with a political agenda in mind, as opposed to giving a reasoned case as to why China may be a threat. Perhaps Mosher is just bitter that he was kicked out of China and Stanford University for taking research funded by foundation grand money and selling it for profit as opposed to using it for what your supposed to use foundation grant money for, dissertation research.