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"... elegant and provocative... Exhibit[s] a subtle mastery of Heidegger's works." —Review of Metaphysics
"... splendidly precise study of Heidegger... to be recommended not only to Heidegger scholars but also to those interested in the question of what philosophical thinking has as its task in the modern technological world." —Religious Studies Review
"... indispensable to understanding the later Heidegger." —Choice
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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
10 of 11 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A Life-altering tour de force,
By
This review is from: Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy (Paperback)
Reiner Schürmann's anarchic reading of Heidegger provides a formidable response to the hermeneutical dilemma of how to read Heidegger. In reading Heidegger backward, from "topology of being" back to "history of being" back to the "Existential Analytic," Schürmann gives us a Heidegger that, admittedly, the man Martin Heidegger would not have approved of. The humble title of the English translation (altered from the original French, "La princile d'anarchie: Heidegger et la question d'agir") does not really mark the originality of Schürmann in setting to work an epochal theory that announces the withering of normative-legislative-predicative holds of metaphysics. What is in fact more important about this book is that Schürmann provides us an "actable" theory, not in the sense of ideological prescriptions or revolutionary cookbooks, but in a way that resuscitates within us a sensibility toward the irreducible plurality of manifestations of being and prepares us to respond to such irreducibly varied manifestations in an anarchic way, in the spirit of freedom that denounces hegemonic principles. The delicate complexity of the arguments made in this book does not allow for profound reflections on its merits in such a limited space. Let it just be said that the book provides an excellent opportunity for thinking beyond the tedium of "what is," the matter-of-factness of the actual. It allows us to think and act based on the clearing of the possible. Schürmann calls us to prepare for modes of thinking and acting that have not founding First--and as such remain forever an-archic (without a First).
7 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Radical Phenomenology and Philosophy,
By Joseph Martin "pomonomo2003" (NJ, USA) - See all my reviews
This review is from: Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy (Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy) (Hardcover)
We have all heard it said that Heidegger had no great followers, only great apostates. The list of those influenced by him, and impressed by the quality of his thought, but nevertheless refusing to simply follow him includes Arendt, Derrida, Gadamer, Kojeve, Lowith, Marcuse, Merleau-Ponty, Rorty, Sartre and Leo Strauss. Schürmann is a rarity; a genuine follower of Heidegger who is also a thinker in his own right. Now, I do not maintain that Heidegger himself would agree with everything that Schürmann says of him and his 'radical phenomenology' but I do think that this is easily among the most serious and thoughtful accounts of what we might call the later Heidegger's final position. People only familiar with Heidegger's early work (such as 'Being and Time') tend to read him as a practical, existential or political philosopher actively interested in the 'human things'. Schürmann considers this a profound mistake.
Allow me to begin with a long quote: "The 'intrinsically manifold state of affairs which is that of being and time' prohibits referring the epochs and their closure, let alone the 'event', to some figure of root, of the One, of man. It is because of this anti-humanism that Heidegger's concept of epoché has nothing to do with Husserl's. The phenomenology of the reversals in History follows the trail of the regimes to which unconcealment gave 'sudden birth,' but which have folded up their order to withdraw again into concealment. The genealogist seeks to understand this phenomenon of an encompassing, although precarious arrangement as it comes about and recedes. The birth of such an arrangement is 'epochal,' since in it presencing as such 'withholds' (epechein) itself. Thus what establishes us in our precarious dwellings is not some thing, it is nothing - a mere coming to pass. In the deconstruction of the texture or text of Western history, phenomenology remains transcendental in that it looks for the context which is the world; it is however dissociated from all a priori reference to the subject as text-maker. The principle of an epoch is a factual a priori, finite and of non-human facticity. It exhibits the paradox of an 'ontological fact.' What bequeaths the historical epochs and their principles, the 'event', is itself nothing, neither a human nor a divine subject, nor an available or analyzable object." (Schürmann, On Being and Acting, p.57.) I follow Schürmann in this understanding of Heideggerean Being; the 'gift' of Being does not come from a subject nor is it a 'History of Reason'. It is fundamentally just whatever Happened to Happen. That is, it is pure contingency. Again: not only is there not a Subject but this pure contingency is absolutely not a history of Reason. It would seem that whatever 'reason' is in the world is itself only a temporary affair, waiting to be overthrown by the next epoché, or gift, of Being. But since what is unreasonably given is always (eventually) unreasonably taken away one ends up wondering precisely why Heidegger so often speaks of 'gift' here... In any case, by the curious phrase 'ontological fact' Schürmann is conceding that Heidegger's 'gifts of Being' are little more than Necessary Irrationalities. So you see that the 'Truth of Unconcealment' equals exactly the 'truth' of circumstances. While Concealment always remains precisely Nothing. Note that Man is in no sense, for either Heidegger or Schürmann, a 'maker' of the text of the World; no, Man is merely the reader of (or powerless Witness to) the succession of Epochs that make up the text of world history. Thus it is not, in my opinion, that Heidegger's philosophy in any way 'predestines' him to be a Nazi, rather, his philosophy provides no resources to oppose it. Or, more clearly, to oppose anything. The Epochs are given and withdrawn without any reference to human values or needs. But we must never forget that whatever happens to happen is always, I mean eventually, at least for historical Man, a catastrophe. Thus Heidegger's oft referring to these happenings as 'gifts' is but another example of will-to-power. One can say anything about these 'ontological facts' that one chooses, absolutely anything at all. Heidegger, at times, elects to say 'gifts'... But it really has become impossible to discuss Heidegger without discussing the relation between the Nazi period and the later position. If you will allow me a few more words on this contentious topic there is a little vignette in Chamfort which I would like to share that might be apposite here: "The Curé of Bray had moved three or four times from the Catholic to the Protestant faith, and his friends expressed surprise at his indifference. 'Indifferent?' said the Curé. 'Inconstant? Not at all. On the contrary, I don't change at all. I want to be the Curé of Bray.' (Chamfort, Products of the Perfected Civilization, p. 226)" All the various ontological 'regimes' of History are 'gifts of Being'. In the end there is absolutely nothing we can do about this. One can only accept what is. When Heidegger thought that the Epoch he lived in was one of 'fascistic' authenticity he embraced it. Later, realizing his mistake, he supposed that the next 'unconcealment' to be revealed would be an ontological 'quietism' that many today read in an ecological 'new age' manner. But in reality Heidegger never changed his mind, he only wanted to see the World in its giveness, not as human needs and values would have it, but as it was. And he wanted to accept whatever his phenomenological method revealed to him. Thus there is from this perspective, for Heidegger, no truly fundamental difference between his early and late position; he always wanted to see the World phenomenologically - that is, exactly as it was. There is an apatheia at work here that at first glance reminds one of the ancients but is truly modern. Ancient apathy was aimed primarily at the emotions; but what one could (be perhaps forgiven to) call Heideggerean apathy is aimed at theory or belief. But what of the practical or 'political', that is, nature and technology? "... political thinking consists in weighing the advantages and drawbacks of one theory or another. Nothing of the kind occurs in Heidegger. The pertinent question is therefore not of knowing whether technology may be counteracted, mastered, surpassed, sublimated; whether nature, given over to the rule of reason for two millennia and summoned to surrender its energies to the reign of comfort for two centuries, may be 'restored', whether man can be 'reconciled' with it. About matters such as these the deconstruction has nothing to say." What askesis (training) will be necessary for us today to achieve such distance from older conceptions of theory and practice! The 'radical phenomenology' (or 'deconstruction', in Heidegger's sense, not Derrida's) of the later Heidegger, and also Schürmann, is this very training... Radical Phenomenology, as here conceived, is the science of circumstances. Fundamentally, it neither predicts nor learns; it sees whatever happens to be. More clearly, its learning and predictions are based on what it sees, and not the other way around. This also means that every one of its results (i.e., 'discoveries') will be 'falsified' in time. Knowing circumstances doesn't tell you what to do, not ever. All evaluation is beyond the ability of any phenomenology. (On this also see Heidegger on Nietzsche, especially the fourth volume: Nihilism, for his denunciation of values.) Thus even the decision whether or not to write a book on phenomenology is made for extra-phenomenological reasons... Now, if we are past the regimes of Principles, as Schürmann here argues, - well, what exactly are we to understand that to mean? Those regimes, where action was based on 'metaphysical' principles, are the regimes that were initiated by philosophical interventions. After the regimes of Principles pass we will live in an 'anarchic' (i.e., no metaphysical Principles) world. This can be understood to mean that there will be no philosophical artifacts (that is, no post-Platonic monotheism, Christianity or Islam, and no modernity -Liberalism, socalism, etc., at all) once the latest 'unconcealment' (i.e., the anarchic unconcealment our author here defends) is fully apparent. Properly speaking, this is where the 'conservatism' of the later Heidegger is most obvious. It is tempting to say that what the later Heidegger is, in effect, prophesying (or making) is a world in which pre-philosophical 'traditional' societies rise again. Note that a 'pre-philosophical' world will likely be one that is, among other things, bereft of modern technology. One wonders if John Zerzan, perhaps even unbeknownst to him, is another one of the later Heidegger's acolytes? Note that by 'Anarchy' Schürmann does not mean the political movement known as anarchy, rather he says anarchy because there is no longer an arche (ultimate underlying principle or substance). When the regimes of Metaphysics (the Principles) fall what will be left is a world without said principles; it is only on this sense that the world will be 'anarchic'. Now, Schurmann does not mean that everyone will do their 'own thing'. Far from it! Doing ones own thing is also a product of the history of Metaphysics... As Schürmann says "...'in principal' all men do the same thing." This is so whether they are all worshipping the One True God or 'hanging out' doing their own thing. But, I would argue, when we look at how men lived in pre-philosophical civilizations there too we find that 'all men do the same thing.' Now, what is the relation of philosophy to this radical phenomenology? But let's start with another question: Why did phenomenology, the ability to see circumstances, have to arise? It turns out... Read more ›
2 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A Life-Altering Tour do Force,
By
This review is from: Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy (Paperback)
Reiner Schürmann's anarchic reading of Heidegger provides a formidable response to the hermeneutical dilemma of how to read Heidegger. In reading Heidegger backward, from "topology of being" back to "history of being" back to the "Existential Analytic," Schürmann gives us a Heidegger that, admittedly, the man Martin Heidegger would not have approved of. The humble title of the English translation (altered from the original French, "La princile d'anarchie: Heidegger et la question d'agir") does not really mark the originality of Schürmann in setting to work an epochal theory that announces the withering of normative-legislative-predicative holds of metaphysics. What is in fact more important about this book is that Schürmann provides us an "actable" theory, not in the sense of ideological prescriptions or revolutionary cookbooks, but in a way that resuscitates within us a sensibility toward the irreducible plurality of manifestations of being and prepares us to respond to such irreducibly varied manifestations in an anarchic way, in the spirit of freedom that denounces hegemonic principles.The delicate complexity of the arguments made in this book does not allow for profound reflections on its merits in such a limited space. Let it just be said that the book provides an excellent opportunity for thinking beyond the tedium of "what is," the matter-of-factness of the actual. It allows us to think and act based on the clearing of the possible. Schürmann calls us to prepare for modes of thinking and acting that have not founding First--and as such remain forever an-archic (without a First).
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