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Heidegger (Great Philosophers (Routledge))

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Jonathan Rée. Heidegger. Editorial Norma, Bogotá, 2000. Traducción de Magdalena Holguín. 81 páginas.

Inserto en una colección sobre `Los grandes filósofos', este libro presenta a Heidegger a través del tema "verdad e historia en Ser y Tiempo" (la traductora recurre a la versión castellana de esta obra elaborada por Jorge Eduardo Rivera y publicada por la Editorial Universitaria de Santaigo de Chile). Rée incursiona en Ser y Tiempo de una manera notable. En pocas páginas toca sus grandes temas, escoge textos esclarecedores, interpreta con una mezcla de audacia y moderación para, finalmente, ofrecer al lector una excelente introducción a este libro fundamental de la filosofía (no sólo de la del siglo XX). Contrapone la concepción cartesiana a la de Heidegger. Para Descartes el hombre es res cogitans. Para Heidegger, el hombre es, ante todo, Dasein, alguien inserto en un mundo, proyectándose desde su facticidad, tratando con útiles y obras (prágmata) , conviviendo esencialmente con los demás desde una disposición afectiva, temple o talante. También contrapone sus distintas interpretaciones del espacio. Frente a la res extensa, está la espacialidad del Dasein, "situación humana finita que comprende espacios cualitativamente diferenciados, en lugar de un espacio geométrico homogéneo que llenaría un cosmos infinito" (p. 31).
Rée insiste en que la disyunción entre verdad e historia aparece en Heidegger como una conjunción. Para la tradición filosófica, lo verdadero no es histórico y lo histórico es la sucesión de los errores. La verdad -la ciencia, por tanto-, era antitética con el tiempo del hombre. De ahí el choque entre el racionalismo -que buscaba salvar la verdad (presuntamente absoluta) a costa de la existencia humana efectiva-, y el relativismo -que renunciaba a la verdad (absoluta) para rescatar la vida del hombre de carne y hueso-. Como Ortega en El tema de nuestro tiempo, Heidegger pensaría que "nuestras peculiaridades individuales no son una crisálida que debemos dejar atrás para elevarnos al exaltado ámbito de la verdad, sino el origen y el ancla de todo nuestro conocimiento" (pp. 10 s.). Esto no significa que coincida ni con el con el historicismo de Ranke ni con el de Hegel, quien interpretó la historia como obra de `lo negativo', que requiere que avancemos fatigosamente de error en error, hasta llegar eventualmente a la única gran verdad. Para Heidegger, el motor de la historia no es el `tremendo poder de lo negativo', sino la callada fuerza de lo posible (pp. 77 s.).

Jorge Acevedo
Director
Departamento de Filosofía
Universidad de Chile

Martin Heidegger, infamous for his Nazism and his subsequent lifelong silence on the subject, remains a pivotal figure in twentieth century Continental philosophy. In 1927, before Hitler seized power in Germany, the "Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Forschung" published a philosophical masterwork. Now known in English as "Being and Time," this 400 some page essay established Heidegger as one of Europe's most bold and original thinkers. With abstruse and obscure language, it claimed to put philosophy back on the track that the classical tradition had derailed it from following the Ancient Greeks. This track was "the question of the meaning of being." Heidegger found this question ignored and neglected and from this stance sprouted a branch of thought that would later inspire "existentialism" and subsequent phenomenology. Inspired by the work of his mentor Husserl (who Heidegger later betrayed to the authorities), "Being and Time" attempts to place philosophy in the framework of everyday life or "everydayness." Unfortunately, the text itself presents almost insurmountable challenges to the uninitiated. Many wisely read about "Being and Time" before diving into its turgid turbulent pages. This small book represents a great start along the path of understanding; a kind of dainty big toe tipping in the pool. Nonetheless, its 56 pages alone will not prepare newcomers for Heidegger's text, which presents a quagmire of prickly wordplay even for translators.

This small book by Jonathan Rée, who once gave up his teaching post so he could "have more time to think," provides a 100,000 foot view of "the first half" of "Being and Time." Of course Heidegger never completed the other half after securing a coveted chair at Freiburg (which is why he ultimately sat down to write it in the first place). This tiny summary begins by discussing the historical prejudices that led to the neglect of "the question of the meaning of being," an analysis of the question itself and the questioner, and an explication of the ubiquitous "Dasein." In other words, what is the question and Who asks it? The question is "being" and the asker is "Dasein" or "a being with an ontological attitude," or "entities that are nothing but understandings and misunderstandings of the world." Through further analysis, or hermeneutics, we discover that "our existence has no basis but itself." But Daseins also have a place in history, or "historicality," that defines them. As Daseins we are always "already in a world," which teems with "ready-to-hand" equipment. We take some equipment, such as our hands, the sun, the phone, etc., for granted until it stops functioning, as such they have "presence-at-hand." The ready-to-hand equipment only exists socially, or "Dasein-with." Similarly, "Being" is "being-with." We don't exist as isolated pre-defined egos. Sometimes Daseins confuse themselves with ready-to-hand equipment and our authentic "being-with-others" degenerates into inauthentic "being-among-one-another." This introduces Heidegger's famous concept of "the They." Sometimes we forget our Dasein-ness and compare ourselves to "the great mass." Though this sounds like a normative gesture, Heidegger claims that inauthenticity, or muddling in "the They," remains a necessary part of existence. How do we become authentic? Through "anxiety" (angst) when we see "the inherent instability of our existence." Our lives have a sense of permanence to them but they will nonetheless come to an end. This comes about via a false analogy of time as a "flowing stream." As such, once time goes, it's gone for good. But Heidegger points out the silver lining in this scenario: time also gives. After all, it takes time to build up to our most cherished experiences. Thus the passing of time brings both pleasure and pain. Time neutralizes. In the end, Heidegger conceives of Daseins as beings who live in the light of their temporal existence, understand and misunderstand the world, and open up history to the future. We do this through asking "the question of the meaning of being." By these means we also ride a straight path through Absolutism and Relativism. Ultimately, we are our own ontologists.

As convoluted and incomplete as the above probably sounds to a newcomer, it has provided vast impetus for twentieth century work in Continental Philosophy. Heidegger philosophized about "life," a concept that many analytic philosophers find difficult to work with. Heidegger thus remains more or less a stranger to that tradition. Of course Nazism also hangs above his oeuvre, especially following closer scrutiny of his life and his insidious involvement with the Third Reich through his academic post. In light of this, some even question his work's validity. Regardless how that debate concludes, Heidegger's influence remains unquestionable and likely indelible. But this book does not delve into biography. Other books do that. Instead, this book tries to delineate the main points of Heidegger's masterpiece "Being and Time." In this it excels, but, given its size and limitations, it should be considered only as an appetite whetter, not as adequate preparation for soaking oneself in Heidegger's writings. And though it has its difficult parts it nonetheless presents a great starting point for the curious to peek into the chamber of curiosities - not to mention horrors - of Heidegger's thought.