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57 of 59 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Goes Down Good With Free On-line Course, September 30, 2007
This review is from: Heidegger's 'Being and Time': A Reader's Guide (Paperback)
'Heidegger's Being And Time' by William Blattner is an instalment in the Continuum series of readers guides - intended as a companion to reading Heidegger's Being and Time.
This is a nice small text (under 200 pages), Blattner has a strong grasp of Being and Time and is particularly helpful in decoding much of the abstruse jargon used by Heidegger. Blattner also comments on some of language used in standard English translation of Being and Time by Macquarrie and Robinson. Being and Time has come to be recognised as one of the more important and influential philosophical texts of the twentieth century. Despite its importance, however, for the non-Heideggerian it can seem impenetrable - stylistically speaking, it represents some of the worst aspects of German philosophy writing; verbose, rambling and ambiguous.
I read this text in conjunction with Hubert Dreyfus's UC Berkley course and found it very useful - enjoying Heidegger more than I previously have. Dreyfus's Being and Time couse is available free at itunes/UC Berkley/humanities. Dreyfus also has a Being and Time commentary that is worth a look.
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27 of 28 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
A good Heideggarian overview with an Analytic bent..., November 16, 2008
This review is from: Heidegger's 'Being and Time': A Reader's Guide (Paperback)
Analytic philosophers half a century ago would probably find the recent "acceptance" of Martin Heidegger into their ranks a base repugnance. But here we stand in the twenty-first century with proponents of the Analytic school researching, teaching, and writing books on this once scourged Continental outcast. This somewhat begrudging acceptance seems to originate with Heidegger's radical perspective on epistemological issues. William Blattner, author of this book, one of numerous reading guides to Heidegger's 1927 magnum opus "Being and Time," attended Herbert Dreyfus' Heidegger classes at Berkeley. Dreyfus penned one of the most acclaimed American commentaries on "Being and Time" and hails predominantly from the Analytic tradition. It should come as no surprise that one of his star students, Blattner, should approach Heidegger from within more or less the same framework. "Heidegger's Being and Time" shines brightest when dealing with aspects closest to the Analytic tradition.
The book comprises four main chapters. The first, "Context," contains a brief biography of Heidegger's life from his birth in 1889, his religious early years, his subsequent abandonment of theology in favor of philosophy, tutelage and mentorship under Husserl, "Being and Time," fame, his turn towards the "later Heidegger" in the 1930s, his nefarious affiliation with the Nazis throughout World War II, up to his death in 1976. Chapter two, "Overview of Themes," outlines Heidegger's attitude towards the subject-object philosophical tradition, which he depicts as a distortion of human experience. Here Blattner outlines the structure of Being and Time, namely, its two divisions. This reader's guide, he says, will cover the bulk of Division I, but only segments of Division II. Blattner finds Heidegger's view on temporality and being in that division "almost certainly unsuccessful." Later on he claims that most don't read past section 65 of "Being and Time" and calls the succeeding arguments weak, obscure, radical, and not influential. As such, those looking for help with Division II should look elsewhere.
"Reading the Text," the third chapter, makes up the vast majority of the book's content. In short, it's the meat of this guide. Blattner breaks this relatively enormous chapter down into seventeen sections, each dealing with salient Heideggerian themes: Heidegger's conception of Ontology, phenomenology, Existence (Dasein), "Being-in-the-World," The self and the "Anyone" (usually translated as "the They"), Disclosedness and the "There" (ontological versus geometrical distance), Disposedness (mood), Understanding and Interpretation (contrasted with cognition), Language (discourse and assertion), Realism and Idealism (Heidegger's responses to epistemological skepticism and the ontological problem, namely, does the world depend on our experience), Heidegger's notion of truth, the everyday, owned, and disowned life, falling, Anxiety, Death, Guilt and Conscience, and resoluteness and self-ownership. A short fourth and final chapter deals with Heidegger's reception in Continental (Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer) and Analytic philosophy (debates with Cassirer, Carnap, and subsequent dismissal from the Anglo-American school over interpretations of Kant).
Within its Analytic framework, the book presents a great overview of Heidegger's basic ideas. Throughout, it gives valuable context and background on much of what Heidegger's philosophy reacts to. In this it excels. That said, some rough exigetical spots crop up when Blattner deals with what he calls Heidegger's "existential" side. The sections on ownedness (often translated as "authenticity"), fallenness, and anxiety suffer slightly from too much Analytic-speak. They also suggest that Heidegger fits more comfortably within the existentialist school than is actually the case. Plus, Blattner's equating "anxiety" with what we would today call "depression" may furrow some brows. Blattner also takes much umbrage in the sixteenth section of chapter three with Heidegger's dismissal of ethics, which he also finds potentially anti-semitic and burdened by the worst side of Nietzsche's thought (i.e., disdain for "the rabble"). Though not everyone will agree with his interpretations on these points, the bulk of the book remains a readable, challenging, and informative guide to arguably the twentieth century's most influential philosophical text, "Being and Time." Expect to work. Nothing about Heidegger, even introductory books about his work, resembles dainty strolls through the park. Sharpen the brain and dive in.
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17 of 22 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
"Being" is a revealing way of seeing; it is world disclosive, December 30, 2008
This review is from: Heidegger's 'Being and Time': A Reader's Guide (Paperback)
I read this book for a graduate seminar on philosophy. William Blattner's book helps to illuminate one of the most influential philosophical books of the twentieth century, Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time," which deconstructs phenomenology. Heidegger's kind of phenomenology has to do with the idea of phenomenon, which means something that appears and shows itself. His criticism of traditional philosophy is that it gets started with categories, concepts, and notions, departing from the way human comprehension of this world first shows itself. This is Aristotelian and Aristotle is an enormous influence on Heidegger.
Yet, there is something very radical going on here, and that is the idea of "being" is connected to meaning and negativity. In the history of philosophy, being has a positive concept, something that "is" thus, the opposite of being is none being. Heidegger wants to show how the meaning of being is distorted by this understanding of being as a purely positive concept, as a "thing" a full present entity. For Example, he also very much critiques in modern art, the modern conception of objectivity, the world is transformed into an object independent of art, of its significance, its meaning, or interest in it. This was due in large part because of modern science, and its strong sense of objectification converting nature into a set of mere objects, time, and space that are measurable and analyzable through scientific means. Meaning, importance, and significance for Heidegger equals value; science and nature have none of this as pure objects. Therefore, anything of meaning, and of significance would be transferred into the subject it would be simply the human estimation, nature itself has no meaning or significance in that respect.
Heidegger critiques this scientific model. As he says in his phenomenology, "Well how is it that human existence first understands itself? Here he is talking about things that are very ordinary and complex. We are in a world that has significance, it is meaningful to us, it matters to us, it fits into our interests in such a way that we are absorbed into its significance. So, when we come across the world, first and foremost it is not a mere object that is standing apart from us or our mind, but rather it has significant elements of our environment that fit into our lives. Some things are significant, or they are useful, or dangerous, or satisfying, etc. What Heidegger wants to say in his phenomenology is we have to pay attention to this way of being. Therefore, first and foremost he says "being" matters, it matters to us. "Being" is a significance, it is not just a bare object or a bare fact. Heidegger doesn't accept this idea of subject on one side and object on the other side, that means that when humans have their understanding of the world, it is not just a human projection, it is not just a human construction. It is a revealing way of seeing; it is world disclosive. The meaning of the world wouldn't happen without us, because we are the ones that find it meaningful. Therefore, it is most important to understand that for Heidegger there is no object subject distinction. The term he uses to illustrate his idea is "Dasien" which means "human existence," Heidegger chooses it because he doesn't want to deal with the subject, or mind or consciousness, he wants to use a word that does not subjectivefy things. He uses "Dasien" as "humans being there" in this world and not just staying apart from it.
Humans are a being in the world, a term he uses is, "we dwell" in the world, we don't come across it as some bare thing in the world we "dwell" in it. Therefore, "meaningfulness" is a primary notion of being. Secondly, the meaning of "being" is connected with the notion of negativity. This is the notion of "being" moving toward death, and anxiety. Thus, the way that humans understand being is in part because of opposite of non-being and death is a perfect example of that. Humans are distinct because we understand that we are mortal, that we die. We are aware of death even when we are not in danger, which means we understand being and our world. Heidegger made a lot out of the fact that the Greeks understood this, that they were mortals, and that was no accident he thought. That death is a primary aspect of what it means to be human. If you are aware of death as he says, then you can be aware of the meaning of life. The meaning of life comes to us because we understand that we are finite, that we are mortal and not in control.
Another way to understand Heidegger is a wonderful analysis of the idea that the word "being" has become a noun in philosophy, like first things of beings, or things that are. Yet Heidegger says in the Greek language and other western languages this idea of "being" grammatically in language is derived from a verb, the primary verb "to be." Moreover, as a verb it is tensed which means it has to do with time. All verbs are tensed, even Aristotle said, "That is the difference between a verb and a noun." The difference between a verb and a noun, a verb is something that has to do with time, not just action, but time. That is why all verbs are tensed as future, and past. The very fact that time is another perfect indication of negativity, because time is ever changing, ever moving, and when we are in the present, the past is time of negativity it is no longer. When we are in the present, the future is kind of negative it is not yet. Yet we understand these negatives as meaningful, that is why we can get upset about the past that it is not happening anymore, and why we can become excited about the future even though it hasn't happened yet, they have meaning to us.
Another important feature of Heidegger's book is where he takes on the notion of skepticism. Skepticism is a classic problem in philosophy, it is really fostered by Descartes and Hume, and it has to do with the subject/object division. Skeptics argue that the mind is on one side of the fence, the outside world is on the other side, and the mind is something that comes across the world and just processes it, according to its categories of thinking, this is a very common modern construction of skepticism. If this skeptical construct were true, then it is very possible for someone to ask the question; "well how do we know that our minds that are on this side of the fence can ever really know that it is accurately talking about what is on the other side of the fence? If it is separated like this, how can we be sure that what we think about is actually the case? Heidegger is not talking here about ordinary skepticism, like wonder or "I am not sure" kind of skepticism; but what Heidegger argues against is the kind of radical skepticism, which asks, can we be sure of any of our knowledge. This idea plays on two objects, the subject object divide if we are on this side of the subject how can we ever know we are accurately talking about something. Secondly, is the certainty because the skeptic is someone who says well, "I really want to find with 100% certainty, and if I can find any reason for doubt then I am not going to commit. Heidegger says this is a classic philosophical problem that doesn't make any sense whatsoever. Because, no existing human self could ever radically call into question its environment and this world. It doesn't make any sense. You can call into question this or that aspect of it, but never the whole thing and never to say; "well it's possible that what humans say about the world may not have anything to do with the world." Even Descartes and Hume knew this was perverse, but they said this is what philosophy has to do. Radical skepticism is perverse to Heidegger. Skeptics like Descartes and Hume if right why are they writing to an audience. The very practice of skepticism undermines the idea of skepticism. Heidegger says, "Well if our practices betray the project of skepticism, which even Hume admits, he says I would go mad." You can't live as a radical skeptic. This skepticism can apply to things like morals and beauty values and artistic things, because they don't satisfy strict standards of knowledge and certainty.
To reiterate, it is important to know that Heidegger primarily wants to say that the meaning of being, is something that humans are involved with in a significant meaningful way, and it can't be either subjective or objective, those two ideas he says are polarizations that both account for how the world matters to us. The fact that it matters to us means it can't be a pure objective thing. Secondly, the fact that what matters to us is our world not just our opinions and our inner dispositions mean it can't be just a subjective thing. We are absorbed in the world; we are caught up in it. Heidegger's phenomenology wants to give voice to these notions rather than start with the modern categories of subjectivity and objectivity.
I recommend this work for anyone interested in philosophy, epistemology, and ontology.
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