Customer Reviews

Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War (New Studies in European History)

5 star:		(1)
4 star:		(0)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

As someone who has read extensively on the causes of the 1st World War, whatever knowledge I knew of Helmuth Von Moltke came from two classic books from the 1960s - Correlli Barnetts's - "The Swordbearers" and Barbara Tuchman's - "The Guns of August". Both authors painted a less than flattering portrait of Von Moltke as a weak, indecisive, and unfit for the position as Chief of the German General Staff. How could he have risen to command of the most powerfull army in the world based on this evaluation of his abilities ? Ms.Monbauer's excellent book gives new and realistic insights to Moltke's characther, reasoning and mindset in relation to the pressures he faced. Some of Moltke's characther traits - his introspectve nature, pessimisum and fatalism would seem to be at odds with his position but they were more than offset by his devotion to his profession, arrogance, ambition and faith that military solutions could resolve Germany's political and strategic problems. The author makes a reasoned series of arguments that it was a combination of his {and his military subordinates} world view, fears, Prussian Militaristic Traditions and the Imperial General Staff's disdain and mistrust of the civilian government which made the Wilhelmian Empire primarily responsible for the 1st World War to begin in August 1914. The Kaiser despite his bellicose posturing had consistantly shrank from precipitating a war from 1905 despite favorable opportunities. Von Moltke had lamented the lost opportunities - in particular the Austrian / Serbian crisis of 1908-09 and had no compunction to delberately manuver around him as circumstances dictated. More than any other individual / responsible leader, it was Von Moltke who was fixed in his conviction that a early /preventive war would be an acceptable risk for Germany and he had advocated for prevenative war at {in his view} every favorable opportuinity from 1908 on. This, despite moments of clarity when he had doubts that the war would be the short one that was planned for. While the five other European great powers had {in varying degreess} these civilian / military disputes and problems to leverage a supposed / temporary superiority into the political equation only in Imperial Germany did the Army Chief of Staff and his military subordinates have the immense prestige, independent status and cool audacity to keep secret much of its tactical and strategic planning from the Kaiser and his civilian ministers - even to the planned "Coup De Main" against Beligum's Liege Fortifications by keeping 5 1/2 brigades at 100% war readiness a secret from the Imperial Civilian government and their "Supreme Warlord" Kaiser Wilhelm 11. The sudden attack on the Liege forts was considered to be critical to the sucess of the German Army's great wheeling move thru Beligum and this "trigger loomed large in Moltke's pushing for early mobilization / war in July 1914. Much of the general information that the author relays is not new, such as the Kaiser's critical political role and command power, the makeup and functions of the Great General Staff, its politics, the contrast and differnces between between Von Schlieffen and Von Moltke and the adaptation and changes that Von Moltke made to the Schieffen Plan after 1906 - Ms. Mombauer concisely and expertly weaves these issues into the narrative. Von Moltke greatly overestimated what his army was capable of and displayed wishfull thinking in disregarding that breeching Beligum neutrality and the very probable British entry into the war that would add 230,000 to 250,000 more troops into the line of battle would be of marginal difference in affecting his armies great outflanking move. In retrospect, Moltke's arrogance is astonishing in his reasoning. The failure of Von Moltke to coordinate with his Austro -Hungarian allies is almost beyond comprehension given that the German plan of campaign by concentrating 7/8s of the Imperial Army against France absolutely depended on a Hapsburg Army of 40 divisions being able to fend off off 50-60 Russian Divisions long enough for Germay to win in France and then turn eastwards. Moltke didn't have a lot of faith in the Austro- Hungarian Armies capacities so why would'nt he try to maximize this valuable resource by some joint stategic planning ? By not trusting and displaying sufficent candor with his Austrian allies, Moltke's actions and mindset seem to indicate that he thought Germany could "go it alone" in the plan to win a short / quick war - a fatal overestimation of the German Armies capability's and strenght. Von Moltke's and most of the General Staff's narrow military mindset and paranoia of "Military Necessity", their absolute assertion that the longer Germay delayed going to War when circumstances were {in their view} favorable, the more she risked defeat at some future / unspecified date is the central and critical to the author fixing the blame to Moltke and the Great General Staff as being primarily responsible for starting the 1st World War. Far from being weak and vacillating, Von Moltke and the General Staff are shown by Ms Mombauer in being the main protagonist's who thru narrow military logic deliberately manuvered Germany into war in 1914. Nothing is more telling than in Moltke's and the General Staff's detirmination that Germany must fight showed in how they thwarted, misinformed and withheld / manipulated information from the Kaiser thru-out July 1914. That Von Moltke in late July started to have doubts about the wisdom of going to war is a moot point since he had called for war consistantly from 1908. His constant view was we are ready and "The sooner war comes the better for us". No other Great power was so willing to risk the prospect of a European and World War based on their judgement that the military balance vis a vis our potential opponents will decrease our chances to win a war in 1916 or 1918 so "it was now or never" coupled with a military plan that even they realized was a gamble to succeed. The need for a quick and unimpeded [by civilian interference} mobilization of the army was a "military necessity" that affected their civilian counterparts ability to try to broker a diplomatic solution later in July. There is a brief synopsis and analysis of the campaign in the west and how Moltke coped with the strains and pressures of supreme command. Ms.Mombauer goes into some detail about Moltke's alleged August / September breakdown and concludes that the incidents {as described} were greatly exaggerated by certain staff officers after the war primarily to discredit and blame him for the Schifflen Plans failure. I was surprised to discover how ambitous Von Moltke was and how hard he fought to be reappointed as Chief of the General Staff after his replace ment in September by Eric Von Falkenhayn. The author shows / documents quite clearly that Moltke and the Great General Staff once the Kaiser gave Austria- Hungary the "blank check" of support on July 6th wanted war then and now and were not inclined to accept any interference from the Kaiser or civilians to stop the war or on how they conducted it. The flawed and fragmentary goverment structure of Imperial Germany,the lack of coordination between the civilian and miltary branches coupled with an unstable and indecisive monarch was a opportunity for Von Moltke and the military to set and control the adgenda. The revised Schlieffen Plan combined with a rigid mobilization schedule and complete lack of flexibility in its options {made worse by Moltke in the 1913 war plans removing the alternative of striking Russia first while staying on the defensive against France} which made it imposssible to do anything except strike at France thru neutral Beligum which would almost certainly bring Britian and her Empire in against Germany. This didn't deflect Von Moltke to opt for war as a "military necessity" in what he deemed was a favorable moment in what he knew "would be a game with open cards". This is a well researched, concise and lucid book. Not everyone will agree with the authors conclusions but I believe that she makes a very strong case for Moltke and the German ruling elites as primarily responsible for starting the war of 1914 and I strongly concur with her conclusions. This book is geared towards the specialist reader that has some knowledge of European diplomatic, social and military history between 1890 and 1914. I highly recommend this book and give it a five star rating.

Students of WW1 should keep a few things in mind when reading Mombauer.
Annike Mombauer swallows hook, line, and sinker, the Fischer absurdity that Germany started WW1 for the purpose of "securing for Germany a position of dominance both within Europe and ultimately world-wide." For this reason, according to Mombauer, Germany chose to attack an enemy which was superior in virtually every respect, with England thrown in for good measure. How bad is Mombauer, really? She posits that some German leaders simply wanted "war for war's sake." Yes indeed! Germany was so eager to play soldier that she even started a war which she had every chance of losing. Better lose than not fight at all, eh Annike?
Serious students of WW1 are well-advised to give Mombauer's extreme Germanophobia a pass.