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Heraclius, Emperor of Byzantium

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Heraclius saved the Byzantine Empire from sure destruction at the hands of the Persians, only to be confronted by the onslaught of Islam in the early seventh century. Piecing together Heraclius' life and remarkable achivement from fragmentary sources is no easy task, but Walter Kaegi has succeeded in creating an account of Heraclius that will long remain the oft cited standard. Critics will find details to quibble about, but what book is beyond criticism? In fact, Kaegi demonstrates the art of the careful and critical historian, sifting through pieces of evidence to arrive at well balanced judgments. His extraordinary handling of the Greek sources is matched by that applied to the Arabic (how many western historians can say that?), and his knowledge of the Armenian and Syraic sources is no less inferior. Moreover, Kaegi is among the few historians who has ever set foot in the area of Syria and Palestine where the critical battles between Byzantines and Persians/Arabs occurred, not to mention Iraq. Kaegi takes the reader through all this and shows just what can be known in a sure handed way, so that even the novice reader can learn of the heroic Heraclius and the great events of his day.

This work depicts the trials of a man placed at the helm of one of the most tumultuous times in history, and is a must read for anyone interested in the Middle East. Most fascinating is Kaegi's depiction of the rise of Islam, which greatly diminished the massive Byzantine Empire and changed the history of the world. Kaegi not only examines why the Byzantines lost to the invaders, but also tries to understand Heraclius' role as an effective military leader. Kaegi makes the history come alive to the reader, but does not overstep the bounds of reality by creating fiction. All of his claims are cited and well-reasoned.
Besides being the first major comprehensive biography of Heraclius in the English language and being a compelling read, this is a work to be emulated. Walter Kaegi examines myriad Arabic and Greek primary sources, while also providing a thorough examination of secondary sources and arguments from academia. He does not stop there. His research into libraries throughout the United States, Europe, and the Middle East is then coupled with his on the ground research in both North Africa and the Near East. Walter Kaegi actually visited the sites about which he writes, and knows well the geography.
I strongly recommend this work for both experts and non-experts alike.

Readers with a special interest in seventh-century Byzantium will find that Kaegi has saved them much work. By extracting and synthesizing the best from the assortment of contemporary and later works on this period, the author has provided a comprehensive as well as deeply probing historical analysis. Even better, his frequent footnotes and ample bibliography point the reader to a variety of primary and secondary sources. Kaegi's work is therefore a springboard toward understanding this complex, tumultuous, and ultimately tragic era in Byzantine history.

Of course, as the title promises, the narrative centers on Herakleios, but his life is itself a study in Byzantine political and military history. Kaegi paints for the reader a thorough portrait of this remarkable emperor and the incessant struggles that plagued his reign.

All that said, I do have to agree with those reviewers who criticize Kaegi's writing style. Frankly, one has to be genuinely interested in the subject matter in order to get through this book. Kaegi's sentence structure is often clumsy, and his division of paragraphs sometimes appears to defy logic. Particularly curious - especially for a historian - is his frequent omission of the pluperfect where this tense would seem to be required. Also, as one reader has remarked, Kaegi's speculations sometimes become annoyingly lengthy and even repetitive. One needs a fair amount of patience to read through some of the chapters.

However, none of the shortcomings in Kaegi's writing should discourage devotees of Byzantine history taking up this well-researched work.

This is a good sound academically written book. It addresses a little known personality whose life reads like a Greek tragedy; triumph, defeat, triumph again and finally ignominous failure. Keagi has, I'm sure, mined the available ancient texts but the repetition of his speculations, naturally without recorded foundations, does get a bit tedious. Still, he makes a convincing case that Heraclius was no First Crusader, as another book on this emperor implies. That was simply because the Byzantines did not quite understand the religious implications of the Muslim movement in the beginning. I recommend this book for all history buffs of this era and this empire.

First off this is the best book out there on Heraclius. Second, that's a very sad thing. I don't know what's wrong with Walter Kaegi because he's a brilliant historian but he cannot write for squat. This book is probably the most disorganized and disjointed book I've ever read. That bits of brilliance still peek through is a testament to the depths of his scholarship but would a little editing really have hurt? It's over 300 pages long so it's not like it was done so quickly it didn't have time to be reviewed before publication. The number of times that this book repeats itself is horrifying. Not just a summary either, Kaegi actually includes the same material multiple times throughout the book. Between the repeats the text is dense and confusingly worded with sentences that need to be translated. I have to wonder, is English this man's native language? Why didn't he have a proofreader go over it before he published it. A little bit of editing could have made this book a masterpiece.

Good news though: once you get past the difficult wording and the repeated information the information is quite solid and insightful. Of particular interest is the discussion of the importance of intelligence in Byzantine warfare and the strength of North Africa during the 7th Century. This is good information and displays a solid analysis of the facts. So there are some real gems here that make it worth picking your way through the entirely unnecessarily complicated text. Also of interest are the slim facts presented dealing with Heraclius' personality. The man doesn't seem to have been a particularly nice man which wouldn't be a surprise except for the way he's been romanticized over the years. The account is not lacking in sympathy however. It would take a pretty heartless biographer to feel nothing when confronted with the tribulations that confronted Heraclius during his time as Emperor. The book is not really a biography in the strictest sense since most of Heraclius' life outside his actions as Emperor is rather obscure. Kaegi wrote two other books on the Arab conquest, Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests and Muslim Expansion and Byzantine Collapse in North Africa. I haven't read the second one but the first one is a more detailed look at the events in Syria that are described fairly briefly in this book. If you liked this book then I can recommend that one for sure. I'll check out the third one but I suspect it will be more of the same.

Those looking for a popular history of the time would be better suited reading Geoffrey Regan's The First Crusader. I can't say that's a great book either but it is more easy to understand. If you want a serious and detailed look at the Emperor's life then this book here is your best bet. Hopefully someday someone will write a masterpiece on Heraclius. Until then this is the best you're gonna get.

In some ways, this can be considered a prequel to Kaegi's Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests as it is an extensively detailed history and biography of the dominant figure in Byzantium during the early part of the seventh century, focusing primarily on Herakleios and the war against the Persians. As usual, Kaegi starts off with a solid discussion of the sources and the problems that they pose. The next chapter goes on to discuss Herakleios' early life in Armenia and Africa, as well as the rebellion against Phokas and the difficulty in knowing much about the early years of Herakleios' reign. The combination of the success of the Persians during that time and the extensive taint of the later sources by Herakleian propaganda tend to make that time quite obscure. Kaegi makes some interesting points about Herakleios' involvement in religious affairs and his attempt to make his mark on the city. The next chapter turns more directly to Herakleios' role in the war against the Persians and begins in 622, demonstrating how Herakleios now had a solid enough base to personally move out against the Persians, the first emperor to directly head for war with the intention of fighting in it since the time of Theodosius I at the end of the fourth century. The next chapter deals with Herakleios' dealings in Armenia with the Kok Turks and Armenians and his preparation to deal with the Persians, as well as the Persian siege of Constantinople. The political wranglings that took place in Armenia are particularly interesting and I have not seen them covered so well before. The following chapters deals with the actual invasion of Mesopotamia and the peace settlements made with the Persian commanders after Herakleios' victory and the fall of Khusrau II. Here Kaegi does an excellent job of piecing together events that are rather confusing in the sources. The next chapter deals with a variety of things - the change in Herakleios' title, things that he built, the persecution of the Jews, and the triumph motif that appears in the sources. The last two chapters deal with Herakleios and the early Arab conquests. They are a good companion to Kaegi's other book on the subject, which I mentioned above. There is a great deal of important content in this book, and by no means is it just a rote history of the reign. Kaegi's analysis is excellent, even if major questions are sometime left unanswered. There is no doubt that this will be the standard work on Herakleios for some time to come.

The focus on the military narrative, however, means that if we consider this to be a biopgraphy, it is not well-balanced. Major questions are only dealt with superficially or left unanswered. Kaegi seems to have little interest in Herakleios' marriage to his niece Martina, despite the sources' frequent condemnation of this act. Did Herakleios have some political motive, or was it really done out of affection? Kaegi provides no insight. He also fails to fully address the question of Herakleios' threat to the people of Constantinople that he would move the capital west. Kaegi calls it a ploy, but Constans II moved the capital to Syracuse briefly later in the century, so it was clearly a realistic possibility. As many other reviewers have mentioned, Kaegi's writing is quite bad. He repeats himself, changes themes frequently, and often gives important topics too little discussion. While it is extremely important and useful, this book is a tedious read and is not for the casual reader looking for a general biography of one of Byzantium's most recognizable names.

This is a disappointing book. The author contrives to make the amazing, dramatic events of Heraclius' reign banal, even boring. No doubt the source material is sparse and unreliable and this is some excuse. Regretably there is no serious attempt to assess the military resources and tactics of the participants in the struggle; the Avars come on to the scene and depart from it undescribed. The question of how Heraclius managed to maintain his army so long in the formidable mountains of Eastern Anatolia is not adequately addressed.

The reign of Heraclius is very important; its consequences reverberate down to the present day, but unfortunately it still awaits treatment in extenso by a scholar who is endowed not only with diligence but with literary talent as well.

This is the first biography of Heraclius in over a century, and the first ever in English. That a biography was worth writing should be clear from the book's cover note:

"This book evaluates the life and times of the pivotal yet controversial and poorly understood Byzantine Emperor Heraclius (AD 610-641), a contemporary of the Prophet Muhammad. Heraclius' reign is critical for understanding the background to fundamental changes in the Balkans and the Middle East, including the emergence of Islam, at the end of Antiquity."

Though few in England know of him, Heraclius is one of the most astonishing figures in history. Except they are true, the facts of his life read like something out of legend. He seized power in 610 just as the Persians were turning their war with the Empire from a set of opportunistic raids into an attempt at its destruction. During the next ten years, every Imperial frontier crumbled. After a thousand years of control by Greeks, or by Greeks and Romans, Persia and Egypt fell to the Persians.. The Slavs and Avars took most of Greece. The Lombards and Visigoths nibbled away at the remaining European provinces in the West. Africa aside, the Empire was reduced to a core that covered roughly the same area as modern Turkey.

Suddenly, after a decade of seeming inactivity, Heraclius went on the offensive and struck deep inside the Persian Empire. In a series of brilliant campaigns, he shattered the Persians and won everything back. In 629, he went in triumph to Jerusalem and restored the fragment of the True Cross that had been taken by the Persians. It seemed to be the start of a new age of Roman greatness, in which its absolutely triumphant Emperor - the new Alexander - could remake the world as he pleased.

Five years later, and without warning, the Moslems streamed out of the desert and took Syria. Another few years, and they took Egypt. By the time he died, Heraclius had lost nearly every one of the regained territories. And these were now permanently lost. From the ashes of the Eastern Roman Empire would emerge the Byzantine state and society in much the same form as they preserved down to 1204.

You can hardly go wrong in telling the story. Gibbon did it well. So did Finlay. So did Oman. So did many in the 20th century. I have now written six novels set in seventh century Byzantium, and you really have to work hard not to convey something of how remarkable the age was. Yet, for all his undoubted mastery of the sources in at least four languages, Walter E. Kaegi makes an embarrassingly good effort at draining all sense of wonder from the story.

First, there is the writing of the book. It begins well enough - even if the discussion of possible Armenian origins soon outstays its welcome. After a few dozen pages, though, the narrative breaks down into a mass of repetitions. Look at this:

"Both antagonists remained on the battlefield after the combat. Byzantine cavalrymen watered their horses to arrow-shots' distance from the Persian horsemen, who watched over their dead until the seventh hour of the night. (p.162)

"At the end of the battle of Nineveh, after the stripping of the dead, and while the Zoroastrian Persians watched over their dead for a minimal observance of respect, the Byzantines, at a distance of two arrow-shots (approximately 266 or 600 meters), watered and fed their horses." (p.163)

"After defeat, the Persians, in what was a kind of standoff, having lost 6,000 men, kept a watch over the corpses of their dead..., following Zoroastrian strictures, but for a more limited duration, for one-fifth or so of a day (probably an abbreviated watch for military exingencies). (p.169)

These repetitions are carried to the point where I suspect that Professor Kaegi, over many years, jotted his thoughts onto postcards, and wrote his book by arranging the cards into loose order and not revising anything at all. Apart from looking incompetent, he manages to ruin any sense of narrative.

Then we have continual assertions of what might have been, but for which we have little or no evidence. For example:

"Heraclius probably used the threat of abandoning Constantinople for Africa to help persuade the Patriarch Sergios and the clergy and the Constantinopolitan public to accept, or be resigned to, the forced loan of ecclesiastical plate and to accept other extraordinary governmental measures." (p.111)

This might have happened. There is nothing wrong with asking what might have been in history. I do this all the time in my novels. I see no reason why historians should refuse to speculate. For Professor Kaegi, however, it seems to have crowded out many things that should have gone into his book.

He does not give a clear overview of the Orthodox and Monophysite dispute about the nature of Christ. Nor does he show how the Monothelite compromise was an attempt at shutting down almost two centuries of rancorous debate. The omission is a grave fault, as there was no boundary in this age between religion and politics. Possibly one reason why Syria and Egypt fell so easily once the Persians broke through the frontiers was that the Semites largely believed in a single nature for Christ and the Greeks did not. Each side saw the other as heretical. This may also have allowed a shared outlook with the Arabs when they invaded. Why Greek hegemony collapsed so easily in Syria and Egypt cannot be explained by any single cause. But religion was one of the important causes.

Again, there is no systematic or ultimately meaningful discussion of how the Empire twice managed to survive the loss of Syria and Egypt. These had always been rich territories, contributing much in taxes and manpower. And Egypt, for over 600 years, had been sending around seven million bushels of corn every year, first to Rome, then to Constantinople. The corn was sold or given to the people. It fed armies on campaign. It was handed out as bribes to allies or enemies. How did the Empire get over this loss? What effect might it have had on the population of Constantinople? How far might the numbers have declined? To what extent might the Imperial capital have become less parasitic?

Above all perhaps, there is the brief mention of an anomaly that I have long wondered about, but no discussion of how this might transform our understanding of Byzantium during and after the reign of Heraclius. Back in the third century, the undivided Empire had faced increased pressure on two fronts - the arrival of the Goths on the Rhine and Danube, and the Persian revival in the East. By and large, the frontiers were held. But there was a fiscal crisis that led to debasement of the silver coinage. Though the frontiers simply collapsed after 602, the gold coinage was not debased. Indeed, in 615 - between the loss of Syria and of Egypt - the silver coinage was stabilised for the first time, and the new standard lasted for centuries. What was going on? The established narrative is one of catastrophic decline, only briefly arrested, and only finally overcome by internal recovery and the decay of Islamic power. But hard money has no place in this narrative. Professor Kaegi writes much about forced loans of plate from the Church, and secular confiscations. But I do not see how these could account for a bimetallic stability that lasted though all the interlocking crises of the seventh century and beyond.

Now, my credentials for announcing new theories are slight. I am a novelist. I have not spent a lifetime studying Byzantium. On the other hand, I am reasonably competent in the two classical languages, and have read all the Greek and Latin literary sources, either in the original or in translation. I have read my way through most of the Dumbarton Oaks conference papers, and dozens of other journal articles. I have read many of the relevant archaeological reports, and the main overviews of the numismatic and epigraphic sources. In saying what I think, I have some right to a hearing.

I suspect is that the seventh century was far less disastrous than the subsequent historians have claimed. The real collapse happened in the middle of the sixth century, when bubonic plague killed over a third of the Mediterranean population. It was now that Syria and Egypt lost their Greek elites, and ceased to contribute anything meaningful to the Empire. They remained attached only so long as no other power was able to detach them. The Empire itself retreated into its "Turkish" core. Within this, a largely Greek and mostly Orthodox population slowly recovered. It was barely touched by the Persian and Arab wars, and was always able to provide sufficient armies and taxes to defend the core. Syria and Egypt could be recovered from the Persians because they were overstretched, and Heraclius was clever enough in the end to defeat them inside Persia with minimal forces. Recovering territory from the Arabs was another matter - but the Arabs never broke for long into the core.

If we assume that the mediaeval Byzantine Empire had already come into being by the time Justinian died in 565, the reverses of the next century were less a disaster than somewhere between an embarrassment and a blessing. Perhaps the currency was never debased because no one in government was that concerned about the lost territories.

But let me return to the book in question. It would have been useful had it contained a discussion of the decay of Latin in the Empire, and its replacement by Greek as the official language. Professor Kaegi does mention the change in the Imperial titles from something long and pompous and very Roman to the simple Pisteuos en Christo Basileus. But there is no sense here of how one civilisation is giving way to another. George of Pisidia is used as a source. But we are not told that he wrote his epic in iambic trimeter rather than the traditional hexameters. That would have led us into the interesting matter of how Greek was spoken in the seventh century, and the relationship between the living and the increasingly distant exemplars on whom they tried to base themselves. I suppose you can find all this in Warren Treadgold. You can certainly find it in the Dumbarton Oaks papers. But a biography of Heraclius without any of the cultural background is of doubtful value.

To be fair, the book does have its good points. There are excellent notes and a comprehensive bibliography. Also, Professor Kaegi tells me things about the campaigns in Persia that I did not know. He locates and describes the battlefields. No one else has done this. Also, I had supposed that Heraclius won annihilating victories. In fact, he won a series of what amount to skirmishes, relying on diplomacy and the terror of his name to bring an already exhausted Persia crumbling into dust. And, better than anyone else has, this explains why he failed to stop the Arabs. Unlike the Persians, they needed annihilating defeats that were not possible given the resources available. Or their generals needed to be bribed or tricked into treason against the Caliph in ways that the fellowship of early Islamic civilisation made impossible. If you persist with this book, you will not come away empty handed.

On the whole, however, the book is disappointing. It could have been so much better. Perhaps it will be - if only it can be rewritten for a second edition.

Emperor Heraclius entered the fray during a time very similar to when Emperor Constantine The Great did: the Empire was teetering on the brink of destruction from internal strife as well as external forces.

Heraclius was a fascinating man who asserted himself during a fascinating, once-a-millenium epoch: the 7th Century AD/CE. It was a time when usurpers to the throne in Constantinople were killing their predecessors to obtain (for a short, bloody time) what they were wholy undeserving of. Heraclius emerged as the next in this line of usurpers, when he toppled the rule of the unpopular Emperor Phocas.

From that point on, Heraclius -- during a time of unbridled pessimism -- did the impossible: he invaded the encroaching Persian Empire while the Persians themselves laid siege to Constantinople. Eventually, he pushed the Persians not only out of North Africa, but out of modern-day Syria, Palestine and most of Jordan, as well. He saw the final breaking of the Persian Empire, which decades before, was seen as an impossible dream. However, for anyone who studies the history of the Romans, you also know the 7th Century to be the rise of Islam.

This was an unbelievably-informative history of those complicated times. The reign of Heraclius is not a well-documented one, as many extant sources have been lost. However, this book does a great job of attempting to fill-in some of the lost information, while effectively educating the reader as to the documented events. I have read several histories of the Romans of the 7th Century, and this was by far, the most educational.

This is a good book for those who are looking for in-depth analysis of the life and times of Heraclius. The narrative does not lend itself to a good read, so for the person with a casual or intermediate interest in Heraclius who may be looking for a good story this book would not be a good fit. I certainly couldn't read it cover to cover. But the research is very valuable and all the information is well documented to primary sources. So this book certainly has it's place. It also leaves room for a readable biography.