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Himmler's Bosnian Division: The Waffen-SS Handschar Division 1943-1945

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One of the paradoxical aspects of Hitler's "elite" Waffen-SS was that more than half of the estimated 900,000 men that served in its units were not full-blooded Germans, and this fact interested me enough while attending university to write a paper on the subject. It was, therefore, while doing the research on these non-German "volunteers" that I came across George Lepre's Himmler's Bosnian Division, which documents the story of the 13th Waffen Gebirgs Division der SS "Handschar" (hereafter Handschar). In its original form as a thesis, this work was awarded the Sydney Zebel History Award from Rutgers University.

The first divisions of the Waffen-SS were essentially purely German in manpower, but starting with the 5th SS Panzer Division "Wiking," the Germans began to draw on foreign volunteers from occupied countries. Initially, only Nordic volunteers were accepted, but as the war progressed, and manpower shortages became more acute, the Germans began to broaden their definition of "acceptable races" to encompass just about every race except Africans and Jews.

The Head of the SS, Reichsfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler, was, in fact, fascinated by the fighting capabilities of certain non-German peoples, and this included the "Islamic faith, which he believed fostered fearless soldiers". He envisioned the creation of a Bosnian SS division constituted solely of Bosnian Muslims in a manner similar to the Bosnian divisions of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. Hitler, however, does not appear to have been so enthusiastic about such an undertaking, and it took some time before he finally permitted the division to be created.

The approval came in February 1943. By mid-April, approximately 8,000 men had volunteered for service with Handschar and three months later the number had only risen to 15,000. As this was still far short of the number required for a full division, recruiting of ethnic Albanians was begun, and finally the incorporation of Croatians--approximately 3,000--was permitted.

Training continued until mid-February 1944. Handschar was then returned to Bosnia where it was assigned the task of securing the northeastern region of Bosnia bordered by the Sava, Bosna, Spreca and Dvina Rivers. Anti-partisan operations commenced almost immediately, and these were carried out successfully. One of the largest was Maibaum, which was conducted in late-April against the Partisan III Bosnia Corp. After several days of fighting, one German report claimed that close to 1,000 partisans had been killed.

As was always the case, however, the setbacks that the partisans faced was not permanent. While successful, Maibaum did not fully rid the northeastern section of Bosnia from partisan activity in general, and by early June the partisans had regrouped and were on the offensive again. Heavy fighting took place at Lopare on June 8, 1944 and units from Handschar positioned there were overrun. In total, the division sustained just over 200 dead and a further 600 injured--the most serious losses to date.

For the rest of the summer, Handschar conducted further anti-partisan operations and by the end of the summer it was worn down and the morale among the men beginning to decline. During this time there were plans to form another Bosnian SS division (23rd Waffen Gebirgs Division der SS "Kama"), and officers and men were transferred from Handschar to facilitate this.

At about this same time, Handschar began to experience organizational and morale problems that were instigated by rumours that the unit would soon be leaving Bosnia. During the autumn of 1944, therefore, Handschar was plagued by desertions, and so Himmler decided that it and the still-forming Kama would be reorganized into two "small" divisions of 10,000 men each. However, on October 17, shortly after Handschar had been transferred to Zagreb (which resulted in more desertions), the men of Kama mutinied and shortly afterward it was disbanded.

It was now becoming quite evident that to the Germans that their Bosnian volunteers were becoming unreliable and as a result many were disarmed. To compensate for the loss of manpower, local Croatians were pressed into service, but this did little to enhance the fighting capabilities of Handschar, which, in mid-November, finally left Bosnia for Hungary, where it fought against the advancing Soviets.

For the rest of the winter, Handschar occupied three defensive positions--Margarethestellung, Dorotheastellung, and the Reichsschutzstellung--and were successful at slowing the Soviet advance in mid-April. It was all, of course, for no purpose as the war ended several weeks later.

Lepre relied almost entirely on primary sources in order to write Himmler's Bosnian Division and, as he explains in the preface, even these were scarce, and those that were available are "notoriously inaccurate". One has to wonder what information is not available and the implications that this has for our understanding of the true conduct of Handschar in its prosecution of its anti-partisan operations. But in terms of the book being a "chronicle of the birth, life, and ultimate death" of Handschar, the author has done an excellent job, and one hopes that it will lead to a better understanding of the paradoxical "volunteer" aspect of the Waffen-SS and the nature of the war in the Balkan Theater.

Undoubtedly the most complete study concerning this obscure formation of the Waffen SS (the military branch of the SS organization) ever published. George Lepre, an american historian, tells us in details, the creation, the training and the military records of the 'handschar' division.

Raised in 1943, when Nazi germany was facing a manpower shortage, the 'handschar division' was the first Waffen SS unit, in a nazi point of view, made of 'racially inferior' elements (as Slavs were considered to be...). Thus, this mountain division (13th of the armed SS) was combining an 'all german' staff (officers and ncos) with a muslim-slav infantry (some muslim-albanians from kosovo were also accepted although). The fact that the nazis, known for their strict atheism (Hitler was the only 'God' they were encouraged to praise...) were willing to accept in their ranks, for the first time, some very religious muslim-slavs is another evidence of how bad the military situation had turned for them...

Fully trained and well equipped, the unit, according testimonies of some of its german officers, could not be compared to a german division of a similar nature. In spite of that, the Handschar was involved from february to september 1944 in several anti-partisan operations in which, it gained many successes but also some serious setbacks... In overall, that unit, thanks to its superior german leadership and its heavy armament, was a deadly opponent to the partisans. Lepre doesn't hide the atrocities the unit was accused to commit against christian-serb civilians and partisan members during some operations... Needless to say, such ugly things probably happened (for further details concerning war crimes commited by some of its members, see 'the Waffen SS' by George H. Stein), and were made by all sides, as usual in a civilian and ethnical conflict. It has to be told that counter-insurgency operations are often characterized by such excesses...

The increasing of desertion rate (about three thousands of men, in a total of about eighteen thousands, according to the author), made a reorganization of the unit necessary. Several thousands of muslims, considered as unreliable, were dismissed, or transfered to labour units in october 1944 (It has to be told that most of the deserters joined Ustasa or muslim militias whereas several hundred of them choosed to fight alongside the partisans!). The few remaining, would eventually fight until the end of the conflict in hungary, very far away of their homeland they were promised to protect...

Lepre, in his study, tells us some reasons why the 'handschar division' was finally a failure : the constant opposition of the so-called "Independent State of Croatia" (in reality, no more than a puppet in german and italian hands) toward the 'muslim division', the never solved shortage of officers and ncos, the generally bad relationships between german personnel and muslim-slavs. Moreover, for many german officers and ncos, a transfer to such units wasn't a thing they were enjoyed. To them, 'Handschar' couldn't match the crack elite divisions 'Das Reich' or 'Adolf Hitler'... Last but not least, the military situation, for the germans, worsened inside and outside yougoslavia...

To conclude, this book is a must read. Some may see a pro-muslim point of view. True or not, one should consider that the author, using both german and yugoslavian official sources, has made a very complete research about this 'unknown' unit. Lepre shows us how and why thousands of muslims of the south-eastern europe decided to join nazi germany between 1941 and 1945... This a is a true historical masterpiece for everyone eager to understand what occured in Croatia during World War II.

George Lepre's book reflects a fine studied and detailed work and represents one of the unknown subjects of WWII with a neutral and well balanced view. It also gives us the opportunity to judge present events in a point of view more realistic and to restore the recent historical background of Balkan conflict. George Lepre used a lot of unused photos wich makes the book more interesting and attractive. For me, as a turkish reader of Yugoslavian origin it was very interesting to notice political background and served me to make some flashbacks. I higly recommend this book to everybody interested in WWII.

This book is by far the most detailed work in the English language on this division, and helps fill a very important gap in today's often highly contentious historiography of the former Yugoslavia. All concerned with the background of the current crisis in the Balkans, especially the conflicts in Bosnia-Hercegovina, will benefit by reading this work.

Absolutely ssential volume for those interested in foreign enlistment of the Third Reich. George Lepre's history of the 13th SS Mountain Division truly is a labor of love. Lepre has meticulously tracked down veterans, orders, documents and many previously unpublished photos.

Also has tantalizing references to liasons with Cetniks and the Zeleni Kadre.

Docked one star for a somewhat sympathetic portrayal of the Handschar Division, Lepre unfortunately does not delve into their documented history of atrocities.

Mr. Lepre's "Himmler's Bosnian Division" deserves a "10" rating as a thoroughly researched and well presented history, and it should also be required reading of those who guide our dealings with the former Yugoslavia. The religious conflicts that hamstrung Germany's efforts to unite these faiths and factions exist today.

These are conflicts beyond American understanding. During WWII and the Korean War, I served in the Navy with Catholic, Jews, Protestants, and others without observing religious differences as being a factor. Mr. Lepre's work illuminates an entirely different attitude in the Balkans that should be understood by those who would keep American bodies between these factions. The most serious disputes (between sects) in my naval service were heard in protest of meatless chow on Fridays.

Read this book and feel like an eye-witness to a methodical German approach to a military operation... from beginning to end!! No wonder they were hard to beat!

Mr. Lepre has certainly done his homework...

Stanley P. Frankoski

Himmler's Bosnian Division: The Waffen-SS Handschar Division 1943-1945 by George Lepre is the most important book in english on this Bosnian Division of Waffen-SS; well written and information is supported by documents, veterans,... It's also "most have" for everyone, who is interested in military history of World War Two in this part of world.

An interesting history of the 13th SS Mountain Division that was formed by the Germans from Bosnian Muslims in 1942. The division was initially well-armed and quite strong for a mid-war formation: about 20,000 troops. Lepre outlines how troops were recruited for the division and trained in France and Germany. However the Germnan selection process did not weed out all malcontents and consequently, a mutiny broke out during training in France and several German officers were murdered before the ringleaders were caught. Unfortunately, Lepre never gives us a complete breakdown of the organization and equipment of the division, particularly in comparison to other German mountain units. Nor does Lepre discuss the German occupation in Bosnia prior to 1942 or Muslim cooperation with the Germans in 1941. Another weakness is inadequate maps. The division did well in initially fighting against partisans when first committed to Bosnia in early 1943, but losses and declining morale ate at the unit by late summer 1943. By September 1943 the unit began to disintegrate with heavy desertions and fell apart completely when exposed to real combat in 1944. A core of German officers and NCOs, as well as some Bosnians, fought on as a battle group to the end of the war. The best part of the book is the first six months of the Handschar division's deployment into Bosnia and the depiction of SS methods in attempting to suppress insurgency in the region. Since the SS Handschar division occupied roughly the same area as currently occupied by US forces in Bosnia, this book is an interesting historical introduction into the wartime complicity of Bosnian Muslims with the Third Reich.

This work provides much needed insight on little discussed aspects of WWII history. During Hitler's invasion of Yugoslavia, several collaborationist divisions were formed from the large pro-Nazi communities in that country. The vast majority of these Nazi allies came from the Croatian and Bosnian Muslim communities. The SS Handzar Division in Bosnia was well regarded and took part in numerous atrocities against Serbian civilians. More insight should have been spent on the role of Croatian Nazi in this division. The book is important in that it helps explain the real fears of the Serbian community who found themselves minorities in Bosnia and Croatia after their secession from Yugoslavia. Hopefully more work will come out on the much larger support role for the Nazi war effort which came from Croatia. Several large Croat divisions were actually sent to fight alongside their Nazi German allies on the Russian Front. The Croats were said to have performed brilliantly in their fight for fascism and the Fatherland.