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Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb

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I totally disagree with Professor Takaki. I am a Japanese American like he is and I was subjected to racial discrimination just after Pearl Harbor perhaps not as much as he had (if he was born then) because I lived in Hawaii and not sent to internment camp. Nevertheless I felt the sting of discrimination. I was a military member of the military intelligence service assigned to ATIS a division of General MacArthur's G2 or Intelligence Section.

We saw many highly classified documents at the headquarters and involved in numerous translations of enemy documents. We were also sent on temporary duty assignment on special missions to the frontline units and engaged in scouting and capturing enemy soldiers and interrogating them. I had experience at the lowest and the highest level. Therefore, I have my own perspective of why the A bomb was dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The casualties for both cities exceeded 210,000 people. The strategic bombing of Japan in six months exceeded 300,000 casualties and millions homeless. Invasion planners stated blockade of Japan chokes but does not kill. The bombing destroys cities but not the army. General Eisenhower agreed. General MacArthur was for the invasion and use of the A bomb for tactical purpose. Subsequent data showed he was wrong.

Operation Olympic the invasion of Kyushu was to be launched in November 1945. I was scheduled to be assigned to the 1st Corps to invade Miyasaki, Kyushu by the 6th Army under Gen. Krueger. The XI Corps to land at Ariake Bay to the South and the Marine V Amphibious Corps to land on the southwestern shore. We would have faced 790,000 Japanese versus our 550,000 troops. Operation Coronet was the invasion of Kanto Plain near Tokyo with an invasion force twice as large as Olympic and scheduled for April 1946.

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Postwar: I read Ketsugo the Japanese defense plan. The Japanese had not only the kamikaze aircraft, but piloted bombs, piloted torpedoes, suicide speedboats in the thousands, mini suicide submarines and four thousand scuba divers to blow up the troop transports . The beaches were mined, spiderweb network of machine gun nests, hidden artillery behind 50 meter high hills. There were 12700 kamikaze aircraft to be launched from partially hidden runways from underground installations. The Japanese estimated about 50% of our troops to be killed. Our estimate was between 20% and 30% but postwar information revealed it to be much higher. The cave networks were designed from lessons learned in the Pacific war. General Marshall estimated a million Americans would perish. Omaha World Herald in their editorial stated, "These plans that called for the invasion of Japan paint a vivid description of what might have been the most horrible campaigns in the history of man." Prince Fumimaro Konoye said Japan would be a nation without cities. A whole nation and culture would vanish.

The Supreme Council of Japan felt that unconditional meant the elimination of the Emperor. The Emperor also felt that he would be eliminated. President Truman felt less than unconditional would result in future problems if the Japanese armed forces were not eliminated. They may rise again like the Germans. The bomb also saved Japan from being divided into north and south like Korea with Russian participation.

I was one of the first to occupy Japan. I saw caves and caves everywhere and other fortifications. Civilians began to appear two weeks later and I asked what are those caves for? They all said to hide in them and attack us at night. I asked with what? They showed me bamboo spears, bows and arrows, pitchforks, knives, samurai swords, sickles, etc., etc. There were 28 million civilians in a unit called the National Volunteer Combat Force. They were trained in guerilla warfare and attack at night. Women and children ages 15 to 50 were recruited. Everyone I interviewed told me that they will fight for the Emperor and not for the military. They consider him a descendent of God. The history of Japan would show this. This sentiment to save the Emperor was unanimous. Millions of Japanese would have died and that is not counting the suicides expected like in Okinawa. President Truman was concerned with history repeating itself. His decision was based on saving lives both Americans and Japanese and not based on racial prejudice. President Truman and his cabinet although not perfect were honorable men. It is incomprehensible that racial hatred was the basis for dropping the bomb. I was there, I saw and talked to the people. The bomb saved me and my fellow soldiers and millions of Japanese. Takaki is dead wrong including those that said the bomb should not have been dropped. These are people who were not involved and based their conclusions on assumptions and had not read Ketsugo nor saw the fortifications and talked to the people.

This review is concise because of limitation on number of words; otherwise, it would have filled five pages.

Like other GIs I was delighted when I heard the news of the atomic bombing of Japan. Within a year or so several articles appeared that described the deaths and sufferings of the innocent Japanese civilians in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These articles caused many people to have second thoughts as to the wisdom of the decision. In the 70s I read Gar Alperovitz's book, "Atomic Diplomacy", and was convinced the bombing was a mistake. I was shocked by the Smithsonian controversy--an honest portrayal of both sides of the subject could not be shown. During the periods mentioned I was exposed to writers who discussed various aspects, pro and con, of the bombings.

Although I had previously read quite a bit on the subject, I decided to read "Hiroshima" because I wanted to refresh my knowledge of the bombing, I had read a most favorable review of the author, and the book was small--I could read it in a short time.

It was a good decision. The book packs a tremendous amount of pertinent information within its short length. Besides the decision itself it explores factors that might have influenced that decision. These would include: the desire for revenge of Pearl Harbor; to impress Russia and make her more manageable; the racism that existed in Truman and America and was exacerbated by the war; the masculinity factor of a new president who wished to show he was no wimp.

One gets to see that there was considerable disagreement before and after the bombing as to the wisdom of the decision. The dissenters were not a bunch of revisionist historians but many prominent Americans in the military, government, science and the media. The names include Generals Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas McArthur and Admiral William Leahy-many who would be considered conservatives if they were alive today. We can not return to the past to alter that decision, We can only speculate as to what might have occurred. There is evidence that had the Japanese been offered the peace terms that were eventually given them-maintaining the emperor instead of unconditional surrender-THE WAR COULD HAVE ENDED SOONER THAN IT DID. It was unconscionable not to have at least given the Japanese the option to accept an offer of peace--on the terms we subsequently accepted--before considering using the bomb.

If your knowledge of this historic event is limited and you desire to get an overall view of this tragedy read this book.

Like many people, I managed to exist my formal schooling knowing very little about the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In preparation for an extended trip to Japan, I wanted to learn a little more about this important event.

Ronald Takaki does an excellent job encapsulating the political climate in the U.S., Japan and Russia of 1945. The death of Roosevelt and the elevation of Truman to the presidency had a profound impact on world events. These presidents had different philosophies concerning the use of atomic weapons, and the world might be a very different place had Roosevelt lived to see the end of the war. Truman and Stalin provided a smooth transition from World War II to the beginnings of the Cold War.

Ultimately, I left "Hiroshima : Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb" with a better understanding and appreciation of why America decided to use atomic weapons against Japan. Takaki provides motivations for most of the key players, along with supporting evidence. The book is extremely readable, and was as captivating as any novel.

Whether or not dropping the bomb was "good" or "bad" is left up to the reader. Honestly, I have yet to decide.

Takaki's book gives a good introductory account of the actions which led to America's use of atomic warfare. For someone looking for a quick overview of the American rationale for destroying two cities, it's a good read. However, it will ignite further interest as there is much more to be said and read on the subject. This is good, it is a subject more Americans need to learn about.

I used "Hiroshima" in a high school history class and found that the students could access Takaki's ideas, sources and themes fairly easily. His summary of Truman's insecurities from boyhood throuh his term in office had an impact on the students in my class. I would recommend this book for those who have at least some degree of knowledge regarding World War II and the era. Some of Takaki's points make use of obscure evidence that may seem unapproachable to the lay reader. However, to someone versed in the topic, "Hiroshima" is a fresh look at the American motivations behind dropping the bombs.

The most compelling part of Takaki's book is his description of the a-bomb's power to catastrophically destroy life. His descriptions of the personal stories cross the barriers of nationalism and racism. Some of the stories can make for difficult reading, but in his way, Takaki promotes the importance of peace and non-violence.

While I respect Takaki's viewpoint regarding the morality of using the a-bomb, I did find his presentation skewed with not enough fair discussion on what the effects of alternative courses of action would have been. Nevertheless, Takaki shows how easily and how dangerously war can erode our sense of humanity.

This book really helped me write my history paper. I was assigned to write an argumental paper about anything. I thought of writing about the atomic bomb, and I found this book.
The information on the book was what I exactly wanted to know to write my paper. I argued that atomic bomb was militarily unnecessarily to end the war against Japan, but U.S. used it for other reasons, such as to threat the Soviet Union, racism toward Japanese, and personality of Truman.
My term paper went successfully. Even if you are not writing a history paper, you should read it anyways becasue it really helps you learn about the decision under atomic bomb. It really worth reading and is trully interesting

This book is one of a seemingly endless series of drivel that attempt to discredit the decision to use the atomic bomb on Japan. By claiming there was no military necessity to use the bomb, these books invariably offer any number of conspiratorial theories to explain the decision. Ronald Takaki takes the anti-bomb genre to new lows of ridiculousness by arguing that the real reason Hiroshima was destroyed can be found inside Harry Truman's pants.

Like a TV sitcom, this book follows the standard formula for its' genre: To wit, claiming that there was no military necessity for using the bomb by selectively quoting various authorities who state that the U.S. could have been victorious without it...emphasizing Japanese attempts to negotiate a peace by using the Soviet Union as an intermediary, distorting their intentions and elevating their seriousness to a much higher level than was ever the case...giving no real explanation of why these peace initiatives failed to end the war, other than blaming our policy of unconditional surrender and hinting that Truman didn't want the war to end until he had a chance to use the bomb...relying on speculation about what might have taken place and presenting it as fact...and above all, never laying any of the blame on the Japanese. After it appears as if all common sense explanations for the use of the bomb have been eliminated, the author can insert his own pet theory.

Admiral Leahy's opinions are enlisted to inform us that a naval blockade by his forces could have ended the war. There is no discussion of how long this operation might have taken to have the effect intended or of the massive starvation and death it certainly would have caused. Leahy's belief that the bomb would never work and his desire to use a third one on Tokyo (shared by Carl Spaatz) after he was proven wrong are also never mentioned. Eisenhower is said to have attended the Potsdam conference and asked that the bomb not be used. In reality he never attended the conference, and his after the fact recollections of speaking out against the bomb at this time are unconfirmed and contradicted by other sources. Finally, General Macarthur, who later wanted to nuke the Chinese when they interfered with his plans in Korea, is portrayed as some sort of peacenik.

Certainly it was clear to Allied leaders that Japan had lost the war. However the Japanese leadership was highly reluctant to accept this reality and surrender on our terms. The Japanese insisted on preserving their emperor not as a figurehead but as the actual ruler of Japan, thereby avoiding any admission of defeat. This is a pivotal fact the book ignores entirely.

Like the book as a whole, Takaki's treatment of the Allied policy of unconditional surrender reveals a deep lack of understanding of the subject and a highly selective use of information in order to support a predetermined conclusion. The policy is falsely said to have been nothing more substantial than a campaign slogan, and almost all of its' main purposes are simply not mentioned.

Roosevelt and many others drew lessons from the history of World War I, when a negotiated peace gave rise to the belief in Germany that the war was lost as a result of political backstabbing, not military defeat. The Nazi's exploited this belief to the fullest during their rise to power. More than anything else, the Allied policy of unconditional surrender was meant to prevent a third world war by demonstrating beyond any doubt to the people of the Axis countries that militarism leads to total disaster. The peaceful nature of Germany and Japan since 1945 has proven the wisdom of this policy. Roosevelt also wanted to avoid the event of one country in the Allied camp coming to terms with the enemy on their own and then dropping out of the war.

None of these basic facts are ever touched upon by Takaki, who prefers to spend the majority of the book reviewing America's treatment of Indians, slaves and Japanese immigrants - and then linking these events to Truman's childhood insecurities and use of racial epithets in private conversation. It is suggested that the most important factor in Truman's decision making is that he didn't want to be a sissy. The desire to intimidate the Soviet Union and the tremendous cost of making the bomb, among other things, are given lip service as additional factors in the bomb's use, presumably to give the book a veneer of balance.

There is little doubt that hatred towards the Japanese was widespread in America during World War II. However it was far from the decisive factor in our conduct of the war, much less the decision to use the atomic bomb. And Takaki is wrong again when he claims that the practice of collecting the ears of dead Japanese soldiers would never have been repeated in Europe where our opponent was white. In fact this practice did occur there as well.

The use of the term "racist" has great cache these days, and pseudo-psychological analysis can be amusing, but neither of these things can redeem this book. It's best quality is it's mercifully short length - you'll only have to waste about an hour of your life reading this one. A better idea would be to read the even shorter article by Robert Maddox on the subject in the May/June 1995 issue of American Heritage magazine. Here is a publication known for its' objectivity and high standards - qualities that are glaringly absent from this deceptive little book.

Biased, poorly researched book related to the boombing of Hiroshima. The bias begins on the dust cover (insinuating that Truman knew this would be the start of the Cold War). The book goes downhill from that point. selecting the low estimates of US losses and providing a revisionist view of the bombing (guess what--the Japanese approach to existance where the country supercedes self was real hence kill the 'Round Eye' who are invading our country) and would have resulted in horrible US losses. As is often true about revisionist history, no real attempt is made to project what would have happened if the war draged on and the Soviets participated in the proposed invasion of Japan. It is hard to comprehend how such a poorly written book made it past any editorial staff.

Author's account of events surrounding the nuking of Hiroshima and Nagasaki does not do justice this book.Neither erudite nor analytical the book mostly reads like a Truman apologia.Book does not contain any fresh insights and is just a rehash of what has written earlier by other historians.

Whatever arguments Truman and his team have resorted to justify nuclear bombing does not carry weight upon a closer analysis.There was no need for Americans to invade Japanese mainland.Japan was pulverized from the air by American bombers and US Navy subs had imposed a virtual maritime blockade so much so that ordinary Japanese had started feeling the pinch.If Americans had kept up this devastating attacks for a few more months ,Japan would have collapsed.This has also been the opinion of America's leading soldiers.However President and his men had no patience for this form of warfare.

If the decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan was prompted by a desire to intimidate Soviet Union ,as author has endeavoured to show ,then one must admit that incident backfired.Stalin saw to it Soviet Union was not subjected to an American nuclear blackmail by quickly developing a nuclear deterrent.

Japan was willing to surrender despite opposition from die-hard militarists. But only obstacle was they sought clarification about Emperor's status;never wanted emperorhood abolished.President thanks to media propaganda had a warped view about Japanese;considered them scounderels for launching a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor thus deserving terrible punishment.If Truman had endorsed this Japanese demand which he later accepted the horrible human tragedy could have been averted.

Conditional ultimatum while issuing Potsdam declaration would have ensured Japan's surrender.