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Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism

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This book changed my mind. This is a excellent, balanced, and scholarly analysis of the literature and the decision making concerning the use of the atomic bombs. It thoroughly debunks the standard revisionist myths: of Japan being willing to surrender, the expected light US casualties, and the unwelcome nature of the Soviet entry into the war in the Pacific.

This book systematically undermines the arguments of the main anti-bomb proponent, Gar Alperowitz, who is exposed as someone who manufactured evidence to fit his argument.

This is achieved through a collection of essays, each of which examines a different aspect of the topic. The first part of the book deals with the arguments of Gar Alperowitz (probably the most famous anti-bombing proponent). These arguments are exposed as distorted, and Alperowitz is accused of academic dishonesty in his use of quotes and sources. The evidence provided is convincing, and Alperowitz's argument is wholly undermined as a result.

The second essay deals with the Japanese reaction to the dropping of the atomic bombs. Using diaries, personal accounts, and documentention the essay demonstrates that the Japanese were not willing to surrender unconditionally, and that it was only with the dropping of the second bomb that the government changed its position (after the intervention of the Emperor). This evidence is tied in with the consequences of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, and the impression is that it was the combination of these events that forced the Japanese decision.

The next three essays deal with planning for the invasion of Japan and the expectations of the likely casualties. A very detailed argument points out the casualties on both sides from the fighting on Japanese Islands, and the likely consequences for the US and Japan if the invasion had gone ahead. In light of the evidence, the 500,000 Allied casualties predicted for the invasion of the island of Kyushu seems frighteningly reasonable as an estimate. Further, the deaths from all sides engaged in the war in the Pacific were averaging about 50-75k per week: that was without the invasion of Japan. These chapters point out that at best, not dropping the bomb would have meant the war lasting until the end of 1945, or even into the late spring of 1946! That might have meant an extra 32 weeks of war.

The next chapter deals with the post war survey by allied bombing command. This survey drew the conclusion that conventional bombing would have been sufficient to end the war. However, this seems largely to have as its justification massive expenditure on an enormous and less than effective large fleet of bomber aircraft.

The last three chapters peter out a bit, when compared with what came before. They are still worth reading. Perhaps the most interesting is the internal debate in the National Air and Space Museum over an exhibit about the dropping of the bombs. This debate became dominated by a less than helpful dogmatic view of the bombings that had little to do with evidence.

The last essay criticizes the book Racing the Bomb. Though the criticism is not as harsh as that reserved for Alperowitz, it is harsh. However, the criticism is reasonable given the evidence.

On the whole this is an outstanding addition to writing on this subject. Despite being academic, it is accessible to us ordinary mortals and presents the arguments and evidence very thoughtfully and clearly.

As editor of Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism, Robert James Maddox directly challenges the school of "Hiroshima revisionists" who insist that the atomic bomb was dropped for motives ulterior to the ending of the war against Japan. Within the nine articles that comprise this single entry is the desire to dispel what the various authors, as well as Maddox, consider to be long-standing myths about issues surrounding the dropping of the atomic bomb. These revisionist fabrications are best described in one of the included articles by Robert Numan, and include: claims that Japan was ready to surrender in early 1945; that the United States rejected peace with Japan only because the latter wished to retains its emperor; that the numbers of suspected casualties during an invasion of Japan were created after the war; that the Soviet Union played a huge role in the Japanese decision to surrender; that the decision to drop the atomic bomb was merited by political considerations regarding the Soviets, instead of military considerations regarding the Japanese. The articles in this volume offer a prompt and utter squashing of all these assertions to which recent literature has subscribed.

Robert James Maddox is Professor Emeritus of History at Pennsylvania State University, and is the author of numerous books on the subject of the atomic bomb, including a 1995 solo entry, Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later. The contributing authors represent a wide assortment of professors and military historians who have previous experience with various relevant subjects including American and Japanese history, the Pacific War, the atomic project, and biographical sketches of American and Japanese leaders.

The ability of the various contributing authors to sift through archival documents and personal memoirs in order to tackle the various claims cannot be overstated. One of the most glaring accusations made against the revisionist school is that their conclusions, which under a definition of revisionism should encompass some sort of originality or new revelation, are not original or revealing at all; most of the revisionists, it seems, are simply rehashing criticisms made by a particular author, Paul Nitze, in 1946. On top of that old framework, many of these authors challenge, revisionists throw on claimed evidence revealed by `new', `recently released', or `secret documents', most of which have in fact been declassified and available - by law - since the 1970s. As one example of these accusations, Maddox uses the introduction to his compendium to slam popular revisionist Gar Alperovitz for malicious misuse of these `new documents' and discredits his historiographic methodology.

Most of the articles contained within Hiroshima in History deal with specific details of the debate: a new look at the estimated military casualties for Operations Olympic and Coronet, the twin invasions of the Japanese homeland; an investigation into the details of the reports of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, which has long been a popular source for revisionists; an overview of declassified intelligence reports regarding troop movements and government communiqués in Japan, including the all-important cabinet (responsible for the decision to continue/end the war); a reassessment of Secretary of War Henry Stimson; and a reflection on the Enola Gay exhibit debacle.

While the articles vary in how they actively refute revisionists, they all add a nearly unquantifiable amount of data, sources, and thought to the discussion, and so provide the possibility to change perspectives and correct attitudes. In all honesty, no review can do sufficient justice in describing the amount of value contained within these pages; due to the dedication of the nine contributing authors of this vastly important book it may not be too much of a stretch to say that, short of an equally critical and judicious work by a member of the revisionist school, the best possible case for the decision to drop the atomic bomb might now be available.

An eye-opening, informative, and well-researched discussion of the issues with excellent suggestions for further reading. A bit pricey, but very much worth the price.

The "revisionism" of the title is the position that the sole or primary reason that the United States dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a political one having to do with its future relationship vis-a-vis the Soviet Union rather than a military one having to do with hastening the end of the war (i.e., Hiroshima was an exercise in "atomic diplomacy"). Leading proponents of this view or variants thereof have been P.M. Blackett, Gar Alperovitz, Martin J. Sherwin, and the staff responsible for the controversial script for the proposed 1995 "Enola Gay" exhibit at the Smithsonian National Museum of Air & Space.

Revisionism rests on a number of propositions of historical fact, chief among them: 1) In early August 1945, Japan was on the brink of surrender, and dropping the atomic bomb was wholly unnecessary to end the war (rather, all the U.S. needed to do was drop its demand for unconditional surrender and assure the Japanese that they could retain their emperor); 2) Statements by Truman, Stimson, and other administration/military leaders that they expected American casualties from an invasion of Kyushu to be 500,000 to 1,000,000 or more were after-the-fact lies, as evidenced by internal military planning documents with casualty estimates as low as 100,000; 3) Further, statements by Truman and other administration officials (Byrne, in particular) reveal an overriding desire to keep the Soviets from entering the war and to demonstrate America's new-found atomic might for purposes of the upcoming "war" against communist expansion.

The hey-day of revisionism was probably the early 1990s. Since then, careful examination of the sources for the revisionists' propositions of historical fact together with newly discovered or newly appreciated evidence has seriously undermined the revisionist position, arguably even toppled and interred it. Each of the three propositions cited in the above paragraph has been debunked. HIROSHIMA IN HISTORY: THE MYTHS OF REVISIONISM consists of nine essays that address one or more of the components of the revisionist argument and, with varying degrees of persuasiveness and literacy, discredit them.

The best essays, substantively and from the standpoint of well-written presentation, are the following three.

"The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan's Decision to Surrender--A Reconsideration", by Sadao Asada. Asada contends that American historians, in the main, have neglected the Japanese side of the picture. So he examines, in detail, Japanese records of meetings and discussions from August 6 through August 14, and concludes that the Hiroshima bomb set in motion (or greatly accelerated) the peace process within the Japanese ruling hierarchy, implicitly rejecting the notion that on August 6th Japan was on the brink of surrender.

"'A Score of Bloody Okinawas and Two Iwo Jimas': President Truman and Casualty Estimates for the Invasion of Japan", by D. M. Giangreco. Giangreco discusses the June/July 1945 estimates of American military casualties from an invasion of Kyushu; low internal military estimates are convincingly explained away on a variety of grounds, and the figures of 500,000 to 1,000,000 American casualties that Truman later referred to in defending the decision to drop the bombs are substantiated (indeed, at the time Truman had received well-considered casualty estimates that ranged significantly higher).

"Hiroshima and the Trashing of Henry Stimson", by Robert P. Newman. In this superb article (the best of the bunch), Newman explains how the revisionist position originally got its legs, he attacks the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey "Summary Report" (which contains a statement that probably is the revisionists' single strongest piece of evidence), and he gives a very sympathetic portrayal (and defense) of Secretary of War Henry Stimson.

I have mentioned only several of the historical or factual issues discussed in HIROSHIMA IN HISTORY. The book does NOT address the moral issues surrounding the dropping of the bombs -- or, for that matter, the program of bombing the Japanese mainland with incendiaries, a tactic that had been ongoing and would have continued, perhaps in intensified form, had the atomic bombs not been used. Nor does it address, except very tangentially, the point that for me is the most significant: under every other plausible scenario by which the Pacific War might have been concluded, casualties among Japanese civilians (without regard to Japanese and Allied military) would have been many times what they were in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.