This historic book may have numerous typos, missing text, images, or index. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. 1902. Not illustrated. Excerpt: ... has checked our philosophical ambition. We have, it may be, too much sense of humour not to be even pusillanimously afraid of the ridicule which awaits the daring adventurer when he falls back to earth from attempts to soar above the atmosphere. One consequence is that, in England, attempts at a priori philosophy have taken the form of an appeal to common sense. We cannot be exposed to ridicule when we are ostensibly endeavouring to confirm everybody's opinion. A thoroughgoing scepticism is from this point of view more absurd than the most daring dogmatism. The sceptic who could be rightfully challenged to run his head against a post, must be, it seemed, a greater fool than the philosopher who lost his head in the clouds. This thoroughly English conviction, which thus tries to convert titjevoxjoopjiLi i^n t.hp vox Dei, seems to have been first made popular in the eighteenth century by Shaftesbury.1 We shall hereafter have to consider his application of the principle to ethical problems. Certainly there is no sphere of thought more carefully to be guarded from the attacks of the sceptic, or the treacherous support of the dogmatist, than the sphere of human conduct. Moral truths must be preserved at all hazards from the sceptical assault. Shaftesbury's influence was direct and important in this department of thought. Hutcheson transplanted his doctrine to Scotland; and Eeid, though far from sharing in Hutcheson's ethical views, takes a somewhat analogous position in philosophy. 61. The genesis of his own theories is clear and independent. At one time, he tells us,2 he had been a disciple of Berkeley's. He was alarmed, however, by the logical consequences which followed when Berkeley's method was systematically carried out by Hume. Startled, like Kant, by ...
