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3.0 out of 5 stars
Clarifications and Omissions, January 25, 2008
This review is from: A History of the Kennedy Space Center (Hardcover)
If you are interested in the politics between KSC and the Headquarters and other NASA Centers during the Shuttle Program, this book provides a good insight. If you are interested in understanding how the KSC operated and made a success of several prior programs and the early Shuttle Program, this is not the book. This book portends to be "A"" history of the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). However, it is really the politics of the Shuttle Program during the initial planning and after its arrival at KSC in 1979. It document this history to a degree. However, due to some very serious omissions of content, it is not an overall history of KSC. Some of these omissions are: (1) The Gemini Program which was assigned to KSC in 1965 and the effect that it had on the follow-on programs such as Apollo and Shuttle was mentioned only in passing; (2) expendable Launch Vehicles that were launched from the Cape Canerval Air Force Station that supported the unmanned science are barely mentioned, (3) the European Space Agency's (ESA) Spacelab comes in with little history although KSC contributed a considerable amount of engineering and operational experience to the ESA; (4) during the Shuttle facility development period, the Design Engineering Directorate under Ray Clark provided the primary KSC technical support to ground systems development, design, and installation but very little is said of the tremendous effort required to accomplish that task: (5) the contribution of the Shuttle Project Office and its leader, Dr. Robert Gray or "Mr KSC", to the external interfaces is not mentioned.. This office managed not only the development and construction of all of the Shuttle facilities at KSC, but also drove the design of the flight hardware / ground system interfaces through extensive involvement with the very cooperative Shuttle Program Office in Houston from 1971 until delivery of the flight hardware to KSC; "Bob" Gray was the driving force at KSC throughout the entire Shuttle development; and (6) the Spacecraft Operations Directorate, and its leader, John Williams, that planned and conducted the checkout and preparation for the Gemini and Apollo Spacecraft Missions and early Shuttle Planning is not mentioned. To not mention these individuals if like writing about the Battle of Chancellorsville and not mention Stonewall Jackson. These are grievous errors of omission in a history.
During the Apollo era, there were two distinct programs, the Launch vehicle or Saturn, and the spacecraft, Apollo, which consisted of the Service Module, the Command Module and the Lunar Module at the KSC. This is the origin of the two different philosophies discussed in the book. Too often in the text, no differentiation is made between the two programs and the associated personnel nor a concise description of the differences, if any.
In addition, there are several errors. The Mercury Program had no association with KSC, it was a project of the Space Task Force and the Manned Space Center, later, the Johnson Space Center (JSC)). It was during these programs that the KSC Spacecraft method of doing business was developed and used on Gemini, Apollo, and early Shuttle. The method is not described but has many negative commends directed toward it. Had it been understood by the authors, it would have cleared up or eliminated a considerable amount of text in the following chapters.
In the Introduction, the book defines the geographical and organizational differences between the NASA KSC, which is really the upper end of Merritt Island, and the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, which is normally referred to as the "Cape" but says they are used interchangeably. Only people that are not associated with KSC make that assumption. To often in the text, the "Cape" means "KSC".
The term "Hands On" is used throughout the book and gives the impression that NASA personnel were in deed turning the wrenches, screwing the screws, and operating the ground equipment. Nothing could be further from the truth except maybe for the early days when the launch function was an arm of the Army. In general, KSC has always had a contractor performing the tasks with NASA providing detailed requirements and oversight. Other terms are used, like Ship and Shoot, but are not defined other than the title.
The book implies that there was considerable German influence on all programs at KSC. That is not the case. It may have influenced the Saturn launch vehicle to a degree but the spacecraft programs were all influenced by the rules established by the Space Task Group and the efforts of the personnel trained at the American missile manufacturers. I worked there twenty years and the only German that I knew was Gunter Wendt (Author: The Unbroken Chain ), a contractor.
Too much is made of the conflict with the other NASA Centers. KSC participated in the various Design Reviews as the Shutter was developed. The comments were evaluated on their merits. Undoubtably, many proposed operational changes were rejected by the design centers, not by a desire to be uncooperative, but under the constraints of time, weight, and money. To make an issue of these differences is to ignore the facts and present only "sour grapes". As the loss of two orbiters illustrates, there was not enough money or time to do the real important things that needed fixing, let alone the items that make it easier to process the equipment.
The "Ship and Shoot" concept has always been an accounting dodge, like the "160 hour turnaround" and was intended to reduce the costs in the outer years of the funding proposal. Most rational engineers were/are "non-believers " and never expected "Ship and Shoot" to be incorporated into the Shuttle Program or any other significant program. The risks are too great. However, had the Gemini Program been discussed, it would show it to be partial example of this proposal as the integrated vehicle required only integrated testing at the launch site prior to flight. Components were not tested individually before being mated to the launch vehicle
In the section devoted to making the Shuttle work like a commercial jet, the people that are quoted aren't the ones that are signing the Discrepancy Reports (DR) that assure that the vehicle is safe for flight. That is the job of the System Engineers, Contractor and NASA, and there used to be only two signatures, not a dozen, to accept the responsibility. There may be more today but the two mentioned represent the majority opinion. To quote "Easy to use, is easy to say".
If you are looking for a political history of the Orbiter, other Shuttle items, Space Station at KSC, this is a good reference. However if you are looking for a complete history of KSC, you will have to find it in other documents.
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