Customer Reviews

A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections

5 star:		(10)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(3)
1 star:		(5)

 

 

The book is distinguished by at its balance. Strengths and weaknesses in commanders, strategies, training, organization, intelligence gathering, and tactics are well critiqued in both the Pakistani Army and in its main adversary - the Indian Army. The post mortem of the 1965 War was splendid as were the actual accounts of battle. The establishment of the political and international context was another strength. The evolution of the Army through the years was well tracked. However, I feel, that the description and evaluation of the role of COAS after Aslam Beg did not perhaps receive due attention. (Though the personalities of the COAS were discussed.) A couple of almost insignificant factual mistakes: a) The author states that General Ayub Khan was 42 in 1958 when he assumed power - he was actually around 52, b) The author states that General Rahim Khan was the son-in-law of Gen Zia ul Haq - actually the former's daughter is married to the latter's son. I think that, despite the pervading objectivity, the author's regard and warmth for the institution and several of its commanders shine through. This adds the necessary animation to a commendable work of scholarship. I relished the book and could not put it down.

I've been looking for an unbiased and objective book written on this very important, but very under-reported, topic of Indian-Pakistani conflict - and I found it. It is an excellent book; very thorough, well researched, balanced, extremely readable, comprehensive, and very objective.

Anybody who wants to understand the political dynamics of the South Asia must read this book. It does not just narrate the history of the region, it also provides a great insight about the forces behind it and offers remarkable analysis. This book is a must read for anybody interested in understanding the nuclear flashpoint of Kashmir.

I think one Pakistani general summs it up quite well when, after reading the book, he tells the author, "what worries me is that how much you know about us".

This is a very serious and thought provoking book on not just the Pakistan Army but also Indo-Pak relations.

This is quite an interesting book, though, not quite recommendable. I do find author's account of military conflicts quite accurate. In my view it is important to give out details of military formations - divisions, corp.'s etc, which some people have objected to. The numbers give you a feel of the strenght of the troops and the structure of forces.

Author's contemptuous attitude towards politicians in general and Indian politicians in particular was quite irksome. His fondness of Pakistani Generals in spite of their flaws also begs reason. In authors view sending of regular and irregular troops in 1999 over to Indian side was an aberration. I would like to point out that it is the third time it has happened in a short span of 50 years. It seems more like a pattern.

Mr. Cloughley recommendations on structure of armed forces were interesting and though provoking.

It is an excellent work. A Must read for the students of Pakistan and the subcontient.

As a source of information I would rate the book 3 star but would rate it lower as far as ease of reading is concerned.

Neither the Indian nor the Pakistani Government controlled press gave the true stories on the wars of '65 and '71 to the people of the respective countries. Being an observer from a different country who does not have the emotional baggage of thousands years of history, the author has tried to do a good job of calling a spade, a spade. Though the author has never denied his close association with the Pakistani Army and because of that perhaps sometimes expressed opinions which are not exactly his own but reflects the minds of his friends at the army. This is also evident in his ease of expressing harsh opinions about Pakistani politicians but apparent hesitation in expressing anything harsh regarding the members of the armed force. This is a good book on the Pakistani Army written from some of the armymens' perspective. The research work done by the author deserves a lot of praise but perhaps the kargill section and the post Zia section deserved more attention. I wish the author had similar level of contact with people from Indian army and the Bengali officers of East Pakistan, because in most of the assessment of the wars of '65 and '71, the author has presented great details from the West Pakistani side only which leaves the comparision incomplete. Though the chapters on wars are well written but the chapters on insurrections are inadequate. After all, the period under Ayub, Yahya and Zia were much longer than the wars. How did the army do when there was peace?

I've been looking for an unbiased and objective book written on this very important, but very under-reported, topic of Indian-Pakistani conflict - and I found it. It is an excellent book; very thorough, well researched, balanced, extremely readable, comprehensive, and very objective.

Anybody who wants to understand the political dynamics of the South Asia must read this book. It does not just narrate the history of the region, it also provides a great insight about the forces behind it and offers remarkable analysis. This book is a must read for anybody interested in understanding the nuclear flashpoint of Kashmir.

I think one Pakistani general summs it up quite well when, after reading the book, he tells the author, "what worries me is that how much you know about us".

One of the few objective histories of the Pakistan Army, and of its wars with India. Written by an authority with first hand knowledge of the thinking processes of Pakistani general officers, and with access to primary Pakistani source documents not readily available to the general reader.

The recent military coup was supported by 75% of Pakistanis in and out of the country as per various polls. The press became more liberated as manipulative actions against anti-government papers undertaken by the Sharif government ceased. Rather than announcing support to any Islamic fundamentalist groups, the General said Islam was the religion of tolerance and peace and said that all minorities would be equal citizens in letter and spirit. Forces were withdrawn from the border with India. And to give substance to his urgings for accountability, the General declared his own assets and tax returns publicly. This Martial Law did not fit the paradigm of any known to the West and the initial myopic views of Western government and press were absolutely out of sync with aspirations of the Pakistani people. Now the views are softening and becoming more realistic. I wish more people had read this book and therefore understood better what the Army is all about and why it stepped in and why it has such overwhelming support. If in a referendum tomorrow, 75% of Pakistanis say they want the current setup - that would really strain Francis Fukuyama's "End of history and the last man view." While perhaps lending some credence to the Samuel Huntington view of civilizations to the extent that biolerplate Western concepts do not apply universally. General Musharaf is a soldier's soldier who always shunned ostentatious civilian interaction for himself and the Army. Nobody could have judged that he would want to step in. But the thing is he did not want to step in - he had to. And who could have predicted the state of affairs that Mr. Sharif would bring the country to. One of the things one admires in the General is decency. Let us maintain this decency in our reviews and Internet correspondence even if some hot buttons are hit.

Brian Cloughley falls into that category of "experts" who happily serve as mouthpieces for the Pakistan Army. He is neither an expert on South Asia, nor a scholar, and his book is not an objective attempt to examine the Pakistan Army.

Given his own history, and the volume of his editorials in Pakistani newspapers, where he has ever shown himself ready to defend Pakistan and its Army against any and all criticism, as well as promote the Army's opinion that its control of Pakistan is superior to any rule by politicians or mere "civilians", the contents of his books should be examined from the perspective that this is how the Pakistan Army views itself and would like others to see it.

For a much better, but still sympathetic treatment, of the Pakistan Army look to Pakistan Army.