Customer Reviews

A History of the Peninsular War: September 1, 1812 to August 5, 1813 : The Siege of Burgos, the Retreat from Burgos, the Campaign of Vittoria, the Battles of the Pyrenees

5 star:		(2)
4 star:		(0)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Sir Charles Oman's comprehensive seven volume history of the Peninsular War is the yardstick by which any other history of this theatre must be measured. It is exhaustive in detail and in breadth of coverage. If it happened, it is in one of these volumes. Napoleon may have considered Spain a side show, but as results turned out it was a bleeding ulcer. French losses here, combined with the 1812 campaign, placed a strain on the Empire which could not be overcome by even the best generalship. Any true student of the Napoleonic Wars should find these books and read them. They are essential to a complete understanding of the conflict.

In Volume VI of Charles Oman's definitive study of the Peninsular War, the end game for control of the Iberian Peninsula begins. The Duke of Wellington's magnificent victory at Salamanca and the subsequent liberation of Madrid shocked the French Imperial Armies into finally concentrating their scattered contingents. In the face of this mounting danger, Wellington uncharacteristically lost focus. Leaving a portion of his army to cover Madrid, Wellington became engaged in, even obcessed by the siege of a minor French fortress at Burgos. While Wellington loitered at Burgos, the separated halves of his army were each menaced by larger, gathering French formations. Wellington, coming alive at last to the danger, skillfully withdrew his army onto safer ground on the Portuguese frontier. The numerically superior French were unable to force a decisive battle.

Oman suggests that Wellington lacked the forces to truly follow up on the operational possibilities open to him after Salamanca. It appears also that the siege of Burgos was one of the very few occasions during the Peninsular War when Wellington's intelligence operations failed to provide timely warning of French movements. Despite the apparent setback, Wellington saved his army to fight another day, while the French lost control of much of Spain in concentrating against his army in 1812.

In the spring of 1813, Wellington flanked the French out of their positions in central Spain and into a wholesale retreat to preserve their lines of communication with France. The retreating French forces stood at Vittoria, where Wellington's Anglo-Portuguese-Spanish Army inflicted another major defeat.

By this volume, Oman is a polished master of both his subject and his prose. His examination of Wellington's generalship is forthright and balanced, highlighting both his skillful operational planning and his less than sure hand conducting sieges. A highlight of this volume is Oman's account of the Battle of the Pyrenees, almost unique for its clear narrative of a confused multi-day fight along the mountainous Spanish-French border. This volume and series are highly recommended to dedicated students of the Napoleonic Wars. The casual reader without background in the conflict may find this volume a challenging read.