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History of Warfare: The Wars of the Ancient Greeks

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The series of Cassell's History of Warfare, edited by John Keegan, started coming out a couple of years ago in an oversized hardback format encrusted with graphics and large type in the style of the age. Thank God that Cassell has reissued Victor Davis Hanson's excellent contribution in this new compact trade paperback format. Most of the illustrations are gone, the remaining ones are well chosen, and compared with the hardback version I believe that all of the maps have been retained. In addition, the book is really well bound and promises to hold up.

Hanson, for those who somehow have missed him until now, is a professor of Classics at California State and also is a part time farmer, both of which have contributed to his writing as a military historian. As a classicist, Hanson is well versed in the sources in their original Greek, and as a farmer he understands how agriculture affected the experience of the Greeks at war. For it was the farmers of the early Greek polis who developed modern western warfare. Unlike other cultures, the Greek farmers couldn't afford to support professional armies or hire mercenaries, and they couldn't spend a great deal of time away from their farms campaigning. The Greek way of war was to gather up the militia, which comprised all the able bodied men of property who could afford the armor and equipment of a hoplite, march out to a convenient flat field to meet the men of the polis they were warring with, and in a matter of hours, get it over with in quick, brutal, decisive battle. Expounded at greater length in Hanson's ground-breaking "The Western Way of War," Greek battle is covered well here, from its earliest heroic developments in the Bronze Age, through the classic Greek era of the democratic polis, the Persian and the Peloponnesian Wars, and finishing with Alexander, the misnamed "Great." Important battles, including Marathon, Plataea, Delium and Gaugamela, are covered in depth.

Anyone interested in the ancient Greeks owes it to themselves to read this and, if possible, "The Western Way of War." It is utterly impossible to properly understand Hellenic culture without understanding how and why they fought. I recall with some hilarity the introduction to a book of poems by a well-known feminist writer who proclaimed that America must choose to be either Sparta or Athens, her obvious thesis being "Sparta - Warlike! Bad! Athens - Peaceful and Artistic! Good!" It's not that simple. Sparta admittedly was fascist, but pretty much stayed at home oppressing the helots, while Athens became a predatory imperialist democracy, bringing tragedy on itself and the Greeks in the process. It's also important to remember, as Hanson points out, that the great artists, writers, and philosphers were warriors at need. It may be hard to imagine Socrates or Aeschylus in the bronze panoply of a hoplite, but it happened.

This book is a great value in this format and at this price. It needs to be in the collection of anyone interested in military and/or classical history. And here's hoping that Cassell releases the rest of this series in this format!

This is an excellent summary of Victor Davis Hanson's views on Greek warfare presented in the format of a coffeetable-style book. This volume is superior to most books of this type because Davis Hanson's analysis is really a social history of Greek warfare, not the usual compendium of battles, campaigns, and military technology. Davis Hanson does a very nice job of presenting the historical development of Greek warfare from the emergence of citizen hoplite militias associated with the classical polis to the large standing armies associated with large Hellenistic states. For Davis Hanson, Greek military history is a key feature of classical history. The hoplite militia and hoplite battles are the ultimate expression of the relative egalitarianism and solidarity of the polis. Changes in military technology become semi-independent forces in classical history and an important aspect of the development of the polis and its replacement by authoritarian Hellenistic states. This book is a clear digest of Davis Hanson's very interesting views of classical history. His analysis is bold and largely convincing. One area, however, where I think he is on shaky ground is his assertion that the Greeks invented heavy infantry combat and set the pattern for Western warfare. He asserts further that this is distinctive feature of Western culture. While it is true that military innovators of the early modern period did draw on classical models, it is much more likely that the development of assault infantry in early modern Europe is re-invention, as opposed to re-discovery. Similarly, heavy infantry assault was independently developed by disparate non-Western societies such as the Zulus and the medieval Japanese. I think Davis Hanson has identified something that is characteristically human, as opposed to characteristically Western.

This book examines the development of war in ancient Greece through the dark ages after the collapse of Mycenean civilization and through the Classical period, Hellenic Period and up to the conquest of Greece by Roman Legions.

First of all it is important to be aware that the author assumes the readers knowledge of primary texts of the era. He refers frequently to books such as Herodotous Histories, Thucydides Peloponnesian war, Xenophon's Anabasis and the works of Plutarch, Arrian, Polybius and Xeno amongst others.

Victor Davis Hanson believes that the way we fight today is a direct descendant of the Greek method of fighting. He contends that the successes of the Greeks against Persian armies dictated the development of war down to the present day.

This is a huge contention and one that I believe he fails to support. He speaks at length about the "Western way of war" without establishing how this differed significantly from other military systems. His contention that it was only in Greece that shock battle developed is flawed. Shaka, king of the Zulu nation, independently developed shock battle tactics, and he can be only one of many who came to the same end result from different starting points.

At times I felt that Hanson was trying to be sensationalist in making contentious statements that are ill supported by argument. Some examples of this tendancy are the following brave assertions!:

"The great Chinese military strategist Sun-tzu is sometimes cryptic, often mystical, and always part of some larger religious paradigm."

"Too many scholars like to compare Alexander to Hannibal or Napoleon. A far better match would be Hitler...."

"[The Hellenic Siege engine] was impractical gigantism on a magnitude comparable to the contemporary B-2 American bomber...."

However, in the end of the day what this book does give the reader is a well detailed account of some of the most important battles of the classical Greek and Alexandrian campaigns. Hanson focused primarily on infantry actions and comments little upon the naval engagements. But his analysis of battles involving heavy infantry phalanxes is detailed, interesting and enlightening. The illustrations of key battles serve as a useful visual guide to walk the reader through the events in sequence. And good use is made of contemporary illustrations from vase painting and sculpture to support the analysis.

A useful read for those with an interest in military history who want to concentrate on battles and the tactics involved.

Professor Victor Davis Hanson has written a broad but vivid account of the Ancient Greek Military Legacy, covering a millennium of warfare from the development of the city-states, to the Persian War; from the Peloponnesian War to the late Hellenistic states; to the coming of Rome. It has good and unique insights of Greek Military development right from Mycenaean Greece to the Revolution of Philip II of Macedon.

Weaponry, body-armor, field tactics and the unique Greek (Western) cultural background were discussed along the way to chart the course of this military development. Tracing the evolution of Greek fighting from Homeric times, where military confrontation was still a matter of raiding and plundering (also a possible reference to the Trojan conflict?), the many huge Mycenaean palaces were seen as a defensive dead-end strategy. After the dark ages, Hanson gave detail foundation for the coming of the Hoplite, mainly the agrarian duels between small `polis' settlements driven by it's many political and cultural dimensions. Arguments and reasons for the rise of the Hoplite is put forward and these are provoking and should be of interest to any military enthusiast. Description of the Hoplite battle formation and fighting are thoughtful and full of insights. Warfare as an integral part of Greek lifestyle is skillfully pictured with mentions of famous names like Sophocles, Socrates to Aeschylus who at one time or another fought as a Hoplite. There is even a list of clearly `defined rules" of fighting presented which is a pleasure to read.

Hoplite technology and thereby the Western mode of warfare finally came of age with the emergence of Athenian and Spartan military power, especially seen in the successful defense of Greece against the Persian invaders. Unfortunately, this soon cumulated into the disastrous Peloponnesian War and gave birth to the new concept of `total warfare' - warfare that is singularly decisive, destructive and overwhelming in death toll and the scale of participant's resource. The second evolution is that of the Macedonian phalanxes, refined by Philip and Alexander into an all-conquering army. Not too much new material is given here as many of the battles and details are well known but the graphics are well illustrated and clear. Yet for all the smooth flowing of this book, there are lacks. The development of warfare in other city-states like Thebes and the late Hellenistic kingdoms are not given enough attention. Naval warfare tactics featured little in this book as seen in the battle of Marathon and Plataea being well illustrated and discussed but not the sea battle of Salamis. The end conclusion of Greek warfare in relation to Western military cultural is engaging but too short thereby needing further elaboration. Still, it's an excellent reference of Ancient Greek warfare given the extensiveness of the scope.

This handsomely produced book is lavish with illustrations and diagrams. Pictures of Greek panoply and other weapons, as well as diagrams of phalanx warfare all contribute to a vivid portrayal of ancient and classical Greek warfare. Victor Davis Hanson is in usual form here providing a convincing over-view of Greek Hoplite warfare, while re-stating many of his controversial opinions that have appeared in his other books.

VDH believes Greek Hopilte warfare to be the natural evolution of the free Greek city-states. Other contemporary cultures were primarily dynastic and centralized, while Greece developed into 1,000 independent Political entities. Geography and climate clearly played some part in this development, but it was also the unique outlook and desire of the Greeks themselves to resolve warfare quickly and decisively. VDH provides his usual pro-Occidental outlook in comparing Greco-Western martial developments to their less effective Eastern and Asian counter-parts. Again, many Liberal and Politically-Correct minded persons might take offensive here, and pehaps there are holes in some of these arguments. Still, one can't help but admire VDH's bold and controversial statements. Unlike so many today he is not affraid to make harsh judgements which are quite down-to-earth, but often not very subtle!

VDH has particular wrath to vent toward the conquests of Alexander whom he credits with ushering in an era of warring Hellanistic dynasties that would utilize resources from the conquered Persian empire to wage total war that was unknown to the earlier Greek Polis state. VDH considers Alexander a drunkard and thug! Pretty strong language to describe one of the universial Western images of classical times. Perhaps Alexander's army was brutal in conquest, but probably no more than any other great empire. VDH's obsession with making him out to be Hitler in Antiquity seems a bit odd and threatens to unbalance his narrative at times. We can deffinitely see that VDH has an aggenda here, to downgrade Alexander as a Western icon of Hellenistic culture. True, the Romans probably did make him into the larger than life conquerer that we know today. Still, with the steady development of Greek warfare it's difficult to imagine that someone sooner or later would not have become a conquering Alexander. VDH seems to mourn the loss of the tradtioanl culture of Hoplite warfare, that well ordered slaughter between neighboring city-states, but its development into an imperial system was bound to take shape sooner or later. Otherwise the Greeks themselves would have become victem to eventual conquest by an outside empire, as was the case later with the Romans.

If you don't mind VDH's tirades against Alexander, then this is still a most excellent work with great illustrations and diagrams which help to bring a vivid impression to life of warfare in ancient and classical Greece. The book does make you want to read more, including the primary works of the period.

Hanson does an admirable job of explaining the development and rise to prominence of the Greek military machine. He details the evolution of the early Greek warrior from the farmer-soldier hoplite to the professional mercenary phalangite. A lot of historical, social and economic material is breezily presented in an easy to understand manner which makes reading this scholarly work more like enjoying a good novel.

Hanson will take a stand on the actions of the Greeks he's reporting on as well. His attack on Alexander the Great's campaign in Persia makes one rethink the popular view of the famous general ("an alcoholic murderer").

The book also contains many pictures of Greek weapons and armor along with detailed graphics of the movemnt of armies in some the the more significant Greek battles. This is a handsome and informative book for anyone interested in military history.

The full title of this book is `The Wars of the Ancient Greeks and their Invention of Western Military Culture', a theme that the author has been preaching since his first book - The Western Way of War in 1990.

The Contents are
P017: Introduction - The Greek Military Legacy
P030: Early Greek Fighting (1400-750) - The collapse of Mycenaean Greece; plundering and raiding in the Greek Dark Ages; The Homeric battlefield.
P048: The Rise of the City-State and the Invention of Western Warfare (750-490) - The coming of the hoplite; the agrarian duels; the emergence of Athenian and Spartan military power.
P082: The Great Wars (490-362) - The defence of Greece; The Peloponnesian War; an army to remember.
P136: The Second Military Revolution (362-336) - Philip of Macedon and the reinvention of Greek warfare; war as a specialized science.
P166: Alexander the Great and the Creation of Hellenistic Warfare (335-146) - marching through Asia; total war; the Successors, the coming of Rome, and the collapse of Greek warfare.
P204: Conclusion - The Hellenistic Legacy
P208: Glossary, Further Reading, Statistics, Index
18 maps, mostly 2-pagers

From the Introduction - "The military mastery of the Greeks can be summarized broadly by eight general military customs and beliefs which are unique to the Hellenic and indeed later European tradition, and which remain thematic throughout the four-century life of the city-state (700-300):
1. Advanced technology
2. Superior discipline
3. Ingenuity in response
4. The creation of a broad, shared military observance among the majority of the population
5. Choice of decisive engagement
6. Dominance of infantry
7. A systematic application of capital to warmaking
8. A moral opposition to militarism"
I am just quoting the titles here - these are expanded on in the text.

Professor Hanson is an expert on the period of Greek hoplite warfare, and it shows in the relevant chapters here. However, his chapters on the pre-hoplite period are a bit bland, and the chapters on Philip and Alexander are nothing more than an extended rant - page 138: "Philip's solution was to create a professional army of predators, whose constant military aggression would pay for the costs of its own operation... the state was a mere ancillary to the army, and was therefore organized on the sole principle of providing manpower, labor and capital to ensure that the Macedonian phalanx would be fuelled for further aggrandizement to the south. Even the old constraints of time and space in agrarian warfare were now irrelevant, as Philip's hired killers fought all year round..." Page 150:"Philip's destructive mechanism for conquest and annexation was a radical source of social unrest and cultural upheaval, not a conservative Greek institution to preserve the existing agrarian community. Philip's territorial ambitions had nothing to do with a few acres outside the polis, but rather encompassed a broader vision of mines, harbours, and tribute-paying communities that might be his solely to fuel his rapacious army... Against Philip's trained hired killers, the reactionary militiamen of the polis had little chance... The Thebans' Sacred Band, of course, stayed put on the right, killed to the last man. They were to be interred under the proud stone lion that still stands beside the modern highway - a reminder to the Greeks that about all that brave hoplites could exact from Philip was a limestone beast over their corpses." Page 188: "Alexander the Great's legacy was to leave the Hellenistic world with generations of would-be Alexanders, who practiced their master's savage brand of political autocracy and butchery of all under suspicion. The army in the West was now not to be a militia or even a professional force subject to civilian oversight, but, like the later Nazi military, an autocratic tool that would murder at will far from the battlefield, friend and foe, soldier and civilian alike... Too many scholars like to compare Alexander to Hannibal or Napoleon. A far better match would be Hitler... Both Alexander and Hitler were both crack-pot mystics, intent solely on loot and plunder under the guise of bringing `culture' to the East and `freeing' oppressed peoples from a corrupt empire. Both were kind to animals, showed deference to women, talked constantly of their own destiny and divinity, and could be especially courteous to subordinates even as they planned the destruction of hundreds of thousands, and murdered their closest associates. In sum, Alexander's decade-long expedition to the Indus resulted in death and displacement for millions, and the enslavement of thousands more, earning him rightly a place amid the worst monsters history has to offer. Western warfare now to be total: killing men in the field, on the run, in their homes, families and all - killing even one's own lieutenants if need be, killing relatives, friends, anyone at any time at all. In the end, the legacy of this drunken brawler is one of murder, ethnic cleansing and genocide, and we would do well to remember his dead - always the dead. Under thirteen years of generalship of Alexander the Great, more people were killed through his use of western warfare than had died in all the Greek battles in the century and a half from marathon to Chaeronea. And his successors were eager to continue." And so on. I'm not saying that he is wrong in his assessment, just his approach seems rather over the top. See John Grainger's more academically disdainful way of saying much the same thing in his Alexander the Great Failure: The Collapse of the Macedonian Empire (Hambledon Continuum), for example.

The good professor sees the early Hoplite age as a Golden Age of middle-class farmer (American?) militias, going out to defend their land and homes from neighbouring and foreign (British?) despots, and who were eventually betrayed by the democratic politicians who created a military-industrial complex that was in turn subverted by power-hungry dictators, the principles of which still dominate the world today.

Note - weight of hoplite armour: Professor Hanson is of the traditional opinion that hoplite armour was extremely heavy - weighing in at about 60 pounds. Peter Krentz in New Perspectives on Ancient Warfare (History of Warfare (Brill)) having examined surviving pieces of hoplite armour, and checked on re-enactors modern equipment manufactured using classical processes, finds that the weight is closer to 20 pounds. He also found that the modern writers who made the claim that the armour weighed 60 pounds were based on no evidence other than guesswork.

Further reading:
The Other Greeks: The Family Farm and the Agrarian Roots of Western Civilization
Alexander the Great Failure: The Collapse of the Macedonian Empire (Hambledon Continuum)
Dividing the Spoils: The War for Alexander the Great's Empire

Recently, my wife and I traveled to Greece and visited several historical sites of military importance. Upon reading this book, my experiences have been enhanced. I know have a better understanding of these early events in world history. This book is a welcome addition to my understanding of the ancient Greeks.

I concur with a previous reviewer in that this book is well planned, researched, and provides excellent minutiae into the thoughts, background, and impetus of the Greek Hoplite. The background on armor and the social constraints leading to tactics and order of battle are excellent.

However, the book was almost ruined for me as I read the closing pages of what can only be explained as a politically correct condemnation of Alexander as a degenerate alcoholic who was essentially lucky enough to inherit his father's army. I can't help but wonder how his prejudices might have affected his lack of depth and battle analysis concerning Alexander.

His comparison of Alexander to Hitler left me dumbfounded. To hold ancient generals and politicians up the niceties of modern social standards is absurd.

This book would have received 5 stars if the author had left the moralizing out of an otherwise excellent book. Having got that off my chest, I must recommend the book for the reasons stated in paragraph one.

The only thing I can add to most of the foregoing reviews is that, in spite of this book's careful analysis of developments in heavy infantry tactics in Greek warfare, I think the Assyrians have as much claim to the invention of heavy infantry assault as do the hoplite warriors of the Greek poleis. It could therefore be argued that if the Greeks invented disciplined heavy infantry tactics, then it was in fact a reinvention and I think it follows that this phenomenon has taken place several times since. I would still recommend this book highly for its valuable content and quite readable style.