Customer Reviews

Hitler's Panzers: The Lightning Attacks that Revolutionized Warfare

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Dennis Showalter, a professor and noted author, has written a well researched and interesting book on the history of German panzers and the subsequent war doctrine that was built around this lethal weapon. The history starts at the beginning near the banks of the Somme in WWI and deliberately evolves through the dark days of the 1920s and into the 1930s when Hitler's influence escalates. The author develops the history of the panzer, its war doctrine and follows the evolution of new models and their increasing capacities as well as the increasing popularity and recognition of the value of this "new" weapon.

Guderian may have been the most vocal proponent of the panzer but there were others, like Volckheim, Rabenau and Fritsch, that promoted panzers and mobile warfare. With each new panzer model, Volckheim would critcize the gun barrel for being too small and puny. The large barrel panzer that had power and distance would win the war. He would be proven right. By 1939, Germany had an arsenal of Mk IIIs and some Mk IVs to deploy and a blitzkrieg doctrine that would conquer much of Europe and intimidate most of the world. (I've wondered what would have happened, if it would have made a big enough difference if Guderian had Panthers instead of Mk IIIs driving toward Moscow in late 1941 or Hoth driving north toward Stalingrad in 1942.)

The author doesn't present a daily chronology of battle events but does provide an interesting overview of how tanks or tank commanders influenced key battles of the war. Some of the key battles include Kiev, Moscow, Tunisia, Voronezh, Stalingrad, Rostov, Kursk, Korsun, Vitebsk, Brody and the Ardennes Offensive. Some of the key commanders discussed are Guderian, Hoth, Hoepner, Kleist, Kluge, Model, Manstein, Rommel and Rundstedt. Some of the key panzer units were also discussed: Das Reich, Totenkopf, LAH, Lehr and others.
The Spanish Civil War is also included as a training program for German tank commanders as well as the Russian side of tank warfare. The author compares the strengths and weaknesses of the Sherman against the Panther, Tiger and T34. The author even mentions the German prototype called the Maus that weighed 188 tons and sported 10 inch armor. The author also discusses the psychological makeup of Hitler and how he influenced the extravagant designs of the Panther and Tiger.

Sorry to say there are no illustrations or photos of the different tanks discussed. There are only five general large scale maps but no specific maps of the battles discussed. There is also no Notes or Bibliography which is surprising and disappointing. Even though the presentation is excellent, there isn't any ground breaking new material in this volume so people who are already well read on the war or on tank doctrine may not learn a lot but it would be a terrific book for beginners, intermediates or collectors.

The story of the tank force of Nazi Germany is an often told one within postmodern historical narratives. The reasons for this are ample: fascination with the machinery itself, fascination with the offensive operations early in WWII and lastly, fascination with psychological impact of mechanizing warfare on a previously unimagined scale. As such however, there has been very little effort to produce a scholarly synthesis of these various areas of research regarding the Panzers.

As such, for that minority of you reading who, like myself are graduate students in history, desiring a narrative full of primary sources and notes to follow the trail of Dr Showalter's research, this book probably isn't for you.

The good news is that for those of you who are simply curious about the development and use of the Panzer arm of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS, this is well worth your time as a first read on the subject. Stylistically speaking, the book is quite well written and combined with solid editing, it is a very easy read. The events are described in a chronological manner which certainly helps the flow of the narrative-there are few flashbacks for the sake of starting a new topic.

The weakness of this book is, as mentioned above, a nearly complete disregard for the conventions of historical writing that is inexplicable by most standards. For the sake of 'reader friendliness' Showalter eschews the notes and bibliography which could have made this book an indespensible overview of tactics, operations and the psychology of Panzer warfare, as developed by the Germans. Furthermore, it could have served as a fantastic introduction to the development of the weapons systems themselves. Towards this end, even the inclusion of 20-30 photo plates would have gone a long way towards improving the book. Also a further set of 4-5 more operational maps would have made following the eastern front campaigns much simpler an act. Lastly, the possible inclusion of charts of organization for the panzer, motorized infantry and panzer grenadier divisions would have been quite helpful in following their evolution.

With that said, the weaknesses of this book, although significant are not insurmountable. How the inclusion of a 5-10 page bibliography reduces 'readabillity' is beyond me and HOPEFULLY Dr. Showalter will see the light on this and include it as well as endnotes in subsequent editions of this book. With those items included, even the armchair historian can verify points of particular interest within secondary sources. For the trained historian the value of this book would be much greater and need not be beaten to death here as well as the point that Dr. Showalter can only make assertions without these critical tools to effective history writing. A few relevent examples of where his book could improve with these tools in place include, but are not limited to:
His analyis of the the concept of the Blitzkrieg drawn from the Polish Campaign (pp. 86), German emphasis on Race as a significant factor in the defeat of France and its significance to those involved in planning the war(pp. 132), and lastly Dr. Showalter's summarizing of the issues and limitations of an 'operations' focussed Wehrmacht within the context of a 'strategic' war against the USSR(pp. 178-79).

In short this is a well told story. It could however with a few important fixes be a GREAT overview with all kinds of relevence to the armchair historian and serious history student alike.
PLEASE MAKE THE CHANGES DR SHOWALTER!

While this book does present a reasonably good overview of the history and use of Wehrmacht armour, Showalter's writing style overshadows and dominates. In short, this book is poorly written - a jumble of convoluted word order, needless hyperbole, and far too much personal opinion presented as fact with no references, discussion, or justification. If the purpose of writing is to clearly communicate the facts, and perhaps one's analysis and conclusions, then this book fails miserably. Many passages have to be read and re-read, and even then it is not clear exactly what Showalter is trying to say. So eventually, you just give up and gloss over the claptrap. Moreover, one cannot be sure of the facts, as very few references are provided. In summary, this book does present an interesting point of view that could perhaps lead to interesting debate, but that debate would be a much better learning experience if it was backed up by clear references to documented facts, or at least supported by a well written logical analysis.

Panzers: Bulwark of the Wehrmacht.
Dennis Showalter's Hitler's Panzers is an excellent primer on the history of panzers in the Wehrmacht before and during WW2. To more fully understand the European side of WW2, one must understand what the panzers were, how they were used, and how they shaped overall Axis and Allied military ideology. Mr. Showalter does a good job of building the historical and ideological foundations for the dominance of the panzer during WW2. He begins with WW1 and traces the panzer's technological evolution along with its tactical and strategic ideological development. By 1939 the panzer was evolving into the bulwark of the Wehrmacht. By the conclusion of the successful invasion of Western Europe in 1940, the panzer had solidified itself, through the famed concept of Blitzkrieg, as the foundation of the German army's warfare doctrine. This mechanized doctrine would be put to a severe test during the massive invasion of Russia in June of 1941.
Put to the ultimate test during Operation Barbarossa, the panzers performed magnificently driving to the suburbs of both Moscow and Leningrad and the shores of the Sea of Azov adjacent to the Black Sea. Then the immensity of the Russian frontier coupled with logistical problems, men and material fatigue, and further hampered by German High Command leadership confusion led to the inevitable German retreat. Still the panzers carried the load and proved to be the ultimate stopping weapon of choice. Eventually, the beleaguered Wehrmacht, and in particular the panzers, were worn out. Still the Wehrmacht battled to the bitter end with the faithful panzers leading the way. Mr. Showalter said it best, "Whatever their images, Hitler's panzers are best described and understood as a technocracy--not merely in terms of material but of mentality." The panzers were the heart and soul of the WW2 Wehrmacht. It was upon these mechanical beasts of burden that the German High Command, and in particular Adolf Hitler, rolled the strategic dice. Despite the incredible performance of both men and machines, the fate of the Germany was sealed with the invasion of Russia in June 1941.
All in all a solid recommend for Dennis Showalter's Hitler's Panzers. It is not a myopic tactical rehash of WW2 but more of a "big picture" view of the war from the vantage point of the German panzer. Mr. Showalter shows how German strategic warfare doctrine evolved to one of mechanization resting primarily on the panzers. He also painstakingly shows the technological evolution of the panzer and its various mechanized subsets (anti-tank weapons and mechanized assault guns). The panzer was more than just a machine, it was a way of thinking. As such, it increased the tempo of warfare to an amazing degree and in turn almost cost the Russians to lose the war. In the end the vastness of Russia was just too much even for the panzer. Mr. Showalter's easy writing style will keep the reader engaged. Several major notes: 1. I highly recommend the reader have a WW2 atlas handy. Mr. Showalter includes 5 generic maps in the front of the book but for the more intense reader more maps would help. 2. Definitely have a picture book of WW2 fighting vehicles handy. Mr. Showalter mentions quite a few mechanized armored vehicles of all types and it would be worth the reader's while to see these pictorially. I recommend Amber Books' Tanks and Armored Fighting Vehicles Visual Encyclopedia (see my review). It is an amazingly complete book on all the Allied and Axis armored vehicles before, during, and after WW2. The more than 1000 color illustrations with terrific thumbnail sketches is a must have for any WW2 buff.

Dennis Showalter is a renowned World War II scholar and his unparalleled depth of knowledge on the subject at hand is clearly evident in this book. I have been avidly reading military history for four decades and while I am not as familiar with the Eastern Front and Spanish Civil War as I would like, I could not find fault with Showalter's research. Showalter's tremendous breadth of knowledge translates into accounts of battle that explain why events began in a certain manner, how those dynamics influenced engagements during battle, and what occured in the wake of a particular fight. His command of both descriptive writing and analysis is impressive. An example might suffice better than my own description of this book's contents:

On the Fighting around Gembloux during the 1940 campaign in France between Erich Hoepner's XVI Panzer Corps and General Rene Prioux's French Cavalry Corps(p. 118 - 20):

"Rene Prioux had nothing of Joachim Murat or Jeb Stuart in his professional makeup. He was too worried about the Luftwaffe and his own lack of air cover to undertake even the limited spoiling attacks originally enjoined by his superiors. The result was a head-on, two day encounter battle that began around the village of Hannut on May 12. In a fashion prefiguring the behavior of Israeli armor in the early days of the Yom Kippur War, 4th Panzer Division attacked with more energy than tactical sense, and took heavy losses from French artillery fire and armored ripostes. The SOMUAs in particular, boldly handled in company strengths, proved an unpleasant surprise as the greenhorns of the 3d Light Mechanized Division came away victors on points from a good day's work. Fuel shortages also hampered the German deployment to a point that Hoepner, instead of continuing to probe opportunistically for weak spots, decided to reorganize, resupply, and mount a two-division set-piece attack the next day.
A ball peen hammer is a good tool. A nine-pound sledgehammer is also useful. Guderian might have done it with more finesse, but beginning a little after noon on May 13, 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, around 560 tanks all told, struck 3d Light Mechanized Division on an eight-mile front. There was bitter fighting in defended villages, with riflemen clearing strongpoints and tanks bypassing them whenever possible. Survivors of disabled French tanks fought on with pistols against armor plate. A captain of the 35th Panzer Regiment described two observers in a water tower engaging tanks with rifles until "shot full of holes like sieves." It was not until 3pm that the German tanks reached open ground, only to face a series of armored counterattacks. French tanks seemed to be everywhere at once, bypassing the panzers and engaging the infantry, forcing the tanks to turn around and bailout their comrades. The close-gripped seesaw fighting featured small German armor-piercing shells ricocheting harmlessly off French turrets and hulls. The 6th Panzer Regiment and a company of antitank guns hit every tank in a retiring French column with everything in the inventory, including 75mm rounds. The vehicles just kept moving, with one crew eventually counting 15 antitank hits and 42 bullet scars.
The tactical differences were coordination and cooperation. The Germans fought in combined-arms teams, with towed antitank guns supporting the panzers under a consistently effective air umbrella. The French fought exposed to the sky, in compartments, each arm on its own. The German tankers fought by battalions; the French never went beyond company levels. Even individual French tanks often failed to support each other. Their lack of radios required at least one company commander to transmit orders by running from tank to tank under fire. Their small turrets in practice made tank commanders no more than gunners once combat was joined.
The 3d DLM, moreover, fought alone against superior numbers. The 2d Light Mechanized Division remained in its positions all day, facing front and fixed in place by German infantry, force-marched forward. As the Germans freed themselves from the melee and resumed their advance, Prioux, his local reserves exhausted, ordered a withdrawal to the main positions by now established around Gembloux. The cavalry force had done its job; no reason remained to risk an elite force in an isolated forward position.
When losses were tallied, 3d DLM had accounted for 160 German tanks at the cost of around 100 of its own. It was true that the Germans held the field, and so were able to recover and repair a good many of their own losses. It was true as well that casualties had been absurdly light by Great War standards - only 150 total in the entire 4th Panzer Division. Nevertheless the consciousness of superiority recorded in the corps war diary did not translate into immediate pursuit in a deepening twilight, where all tanks seemed to look alike.
For Erich Hoepner it had been a good day's work. Committing his panzers en masse had paid off despite the losses. German tanks might be inferior in a stand-up fight, but thier mobility and skill of their crews and commanders had set the stage for the next scene: breakthrough at Gembloux. Preliminary orders went out at 3 AM; the French spent the next 18 hours executing a fighting retreat that tied the panzers in knots and completed the cavalry's delaying mission. Instead of overrunning the gap before the French could assume the position, Hoepner's corps confronted a solid defense manned by three first-class divisions: 1st Moroccan and 1st and 5th Motorized Divisions, with Prioux's tanks deployed by battalions to their rear. A few tentative probes were so strongly recieved that Hoepner ordered his advanced units to fall back and prepare for a coordinated corps-scale attack the next day.
The resulting engagement of 15 May was the first time the panzer divisions were used to break through a major, prepared defensive position......."

Showalter's analysis of Kursk, and especially the oft celebrated battle of Prokorovka, is equally compelling. Before one gets the impression that this book focuses on the victories of Germany's panzer arm, let me explain further that Showalter examines its weakenesses along with its strengths. The last chapter "Finale" is particulary instructive as unsparing analysis illustrates how far the panzers had fallen by the time of the Anglo-American invasion of France on 6 June 1944. This is one of the best single references published on the panzers, although its lack of photos and maps will force readers to buy other books to supplement Showalter's work.

After reading one of the reviews, I was hoping for a detailed description of tank battles during World War II between the Germans and the Russians and US.

Yes, that happens but really only twice that I can determine. Once, when the author describes a battle between the French and Germans in May, 1940 and another time at Kursk. (I did like these two descriptions.) However, whether these descriptions are accurate, especially Kursk since he mentions that very few Tiger tanks were destroyed there, is questionable because the author really doesn't do a good job of providing sources.

Most of the book is an overview of panzer operations in World War II at a division level and there is really nothing new here.

This book starts very well with a nice history of the development of the Panzer forces and doctrine in the interwar period. Showalter provides a good narrative and analysis of how the German Army pursued armored warfare. This is in several respects a typical story of technological innovation. As is often the case, the inventors of a new technology, in this case the British, were not the ones to develop it and implement it effectively. Driven by the limitations imposed by the Versailles settlement and the overwhelming fact of German defeat in WWI, the German Army had very strong incentives to pursue innovative approaches. All the major interwar powers, and some of the minor ones, made some efforts to develop armored forces but the Germans went the farthest in developing the integrated combination of tanks, infantry, and air support needed for this type of dynamic warfare. Showalter demonstrates the relatively large number of German officers involved in this transition and their continuous interaction with theories and advances in other nations.

Most of the book, however, is a narrative of Panzer actions across WWII. Showalter covers all the major theatres in which the Germans were involved. The invasion of France, the Soviet Union, the grinding combats of the Eastern Front, and the Western Allies invasion of Europe are all covered. In addition to overviews of the actions, Showalter discusses the evolution of equipment and tactical changes across the war. This is generally done very well and demonstrates Showalter's impressive knowledge of WWII. Showalter is a good, though sometimes hyperbolic, writer.

Almost none of this narrative, however, is novel. The general themes are very well known. The German advantages in tactics and the general ability of their officers, the major problems with the German war-time economy, the consistent mismatch between strategic reality and German capabilities, Hitler's recklessness and rigidity, the erosion of the German war machine on the Eastern Front, the division of the German Army into a fist of elite mechanized divisions and a much larger body of conventional forces, etc. At the same time, Showalter doesn't provide enough of the important background. The nature of the German war-time economy and its production difficulties are not discussed, even though they had a major, major impact on both the amount and type of equipment the Germans could produce. Similarly, the polyocratic nature of the Nazi state is never discussed. The campaign narratives are solid overviews but a more detailed analysis of some small unit and higher level encounters would have given a better idea of how the Panzers worked in the field.

As commented by other reviewers, the lack of a bibliography and footnotes is a major defect, particularly since Showalter clearly has a comprehensive knowledge of the enormous secondary literature. His guidance on this literature would be very, very useful. It would also have been appropriate to provide some tables or quantitative data. The mechanized forces were a relatively small fraction of the German Army, but how small? What was the proportion in each major campaign? How about some German production figures? This would all be crucial to complete understanding of the role of the Panzers in WWII.

I think this book originated as recordings of lectures. The sentences are so involved you have to reread them 3 or 4 times to get the point. Sometimes the grammar doesn't make sense. Two examples: page 141 "From Stalin's perspective it made the sense of desperation to maintain an armed truce with Hitler as long as possible." I have reread that sentence many times, and still have no idea what it means. Page 257: "As for what would come next, sufficient unto the day was the evil thereof." Mr. Showalter obviously knows military history and tanks and wrote this book for someone with existing knowledge of both. For example page 238: "The complete worthlessness of the Maus as a fighting vehicle in the context of WWII needs no elaboration." There are no pictures, and only 5 very simple maps. There are no references, as if Mr. Showalter is reciting from memory.

I am on the other end of the spectrum from Mr. Showalter and was looking for an introduction to the reasons for the German victories in WWII, and details of the Eastern Front beyond a `march to Moscow`. The books' title suggest the lightning attacks revolutionized warfare. There is no doubt German panzers revolutionized the second world war, but he never answers the question of how they did it as the Allies had tanks also, and in the end, the panzers lost. The book is about the Russo-German war; Generals being replaced, lack of logistics, and incredible losses on both sides. That's not to say the story is not true, but the title is misleading. Is it revolutionary if you lose? The battle of Kurst during July 5-17, 1943 needs more detail, if as Showalter says: "The battle of Kurst established the conditions for the rest of the Russo-German War." (Page 253). And on page 268, Prokhorovka was "the greatest armored battle in history" (Showalter disagrees with this) a little more description of the battle would have been nice. I also had to look up Bocage to realize what he was talking about.

Mr. Showalter raises as many questions as answers. Such as: why wasn't German logistics better able to support the tanks? What aspect of war was revolutionized by the panzers? Why were the panzers sent to occupied France for refitting? Where did all those endless Ivan bodies come from that overwhelmed the lightning attacks? "Massed infantry, massed armor, and massed artillery hammered at the same points time after time, until nothing and no one remained to send forward..."(Page 275). What was the Russian battle plan for the KV-1 monster tank? Was the capture of Moscow irrelevant as he says, or would it have ended the war on the Eastern Front? Would the allies have won if Russia had sued for peace in 1943 (page 254), and Germany could then send its armies to the single front in the West in 1944? Was all the replacing of Generals justified, or did it just lead to confusion, and more involvement by Hitler?

Even with the grammar, and raising questions that no one can answer, I would highly recommend this book. It completely changed my perspective of WWII. And for someone with a background in the subject it would have been an easier read.

As an avid reader of Eastern Front and WWII literature I was looking forward to reading this look at Hitler's armored forces throughout WWII. Unfortunately, I was thoroughly disappointed by all but the first chapter. As an historian it is simply criminal to write anything that has to do with history and leave out both endnotes/footnotes and a bibliography. But this is exactly what the author did here. According to him, it was done for "reader-friendliness." How exactly endnotes would have taken away the "reader-friendliness" is anyone's guess; if you're too lazy to go and look at the back of the book, that's your problem. But there's no reason that someone's laziness and nonexistent curiosity should impede those readers and researchers who do have an interest in where all of the information presented comes from. There are references to several historians, Citino, Bartov, Glantz, Van Creveld, Zaloga and Heinz-Frieser, as well as the multivolume set "Germany and the Second World War", but aside from that, we can only guess what sources are being used.

Leaving the above aside, there are interesting arguments offered within this text. But immediately two problems arise: are these arguments original and what sources are their foundations based on? Thus even if there is something of interested offered, no one can say if it is original and merits the purchase of this book. Looking solely at the Eastern Front, which I'm most familiar with, there is nothing original. There are, however, multiple mistakes from misspelling Zhukov's name throughout the text as Zukhov, to giving incorrect losses for the Red Army, claiming the 1st Tank Army contained 5 mechanized and armored Corps during Kursk, generalizing both the Red Army's abilities and weaknesses throughout the text, and so on. While the narrative is mainly focused on the Panzer arm of the Wehrmacht, that does not preclude the author from doing his research when he wants to discuss the opponents the Wehrmacht faced. While the product description for this book purported an "unbiased study of Nazi Germany's armored forces" one cannot help but notice the author fawning like a school girl over Rommel. There are other inconsistencies throughout the text; I would argue the only unbiased account is when referring to the tanks themselves, not the men who were using them. The detailed background information for each tank and self-propelled artillery piece is nice in the general context of the Wehrmacht's history, but banal and inundates the reader with numbers, ranges, and countless letter variations. Interesting for those who enjoy such details, but at times unnecessary when there are literally hundreds of histories of these models already available. In the end, it appears that if anyone was given the opportunity to become part of Germany's armored forces, be they tank or self-propelled artillery, they automatically become Germany's greatest warriors who inflict amazing amounts of destruction on their enemy in exchange for their own limited losses.

While I was fascinated by the historical background offered in chapter 1, the arguments in respect to the intertwining nature of Wehrmacht ideals and that National Socialism, and the idea that the only time the Waffen SS made a lasting impression on their Wehrmacht comrades was when given the use of the latest equipment, including tanks (example given is the retaking of Kharkov in 1943), in the end these are all assertions with no offered source base. But I will say that in regards to the last argument, it makes some sense, as earlier Waffen SS histories highlight their aggressive/fanatic behavior and high losses for limited gains when compared to what the Army was able to accomplish. Finally, the operational abilities of the Wehrmacht were overwhelmingly evident in 1941/1942. By 1943 Wehrmacht hubris could hardly keep up with rising casualties and the growing Soviet proficiency on the field of battle. While tactical victories throughout Ukraine might yield higher kill to loss ratios, they won't win the war. This book, sadly, has 0 value for historians and only limited value for those seeking 'reader-friendliness.' The exaggerations, omissions, and at times too limited space devoted to the Third Reich's opponents make for a skewed view of Hitler's armored force.