Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence In World War II [Paperback]

DAVID KAHN (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: June 2000

A German patrol wiggles through Russian lines to return with details of Soviet defenses. An expert Luftwaffe interrogator teases secret information from downed Allied airmen. Two spies steal ashore in Maine and make their way into New York City. Filled with episodes of intrigue and adventure, Hitler's Spies reveals the workings of German intelligence—the famed Abwehr, the dreaded SD, the codebreakers, the spies, and the intelligence gatherers of the Foreign Office—and explains its failure to best the Allies. Draws on original documents and extensive interviews.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"A serious book, clearly: handcrafted, meant to last." -- New York Times Book Review

About the Author

David Kahn spent eight years researching and writing this book, including a year in the German military archives. He holds a Ph.D. in history from Oxford and is also the author of the acclaimed best-seller The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing. He lives in Great Neck, New York.

Product Details

• Paperback: 671 pages
• Publisher: Da Capo Press (June 2000)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0306809494
• ISBN-13: 978-0306809491
• Product Dimensions: 8.8 x 5.8 x 1.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 2.3 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (11 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #727,874 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

David Kahn, a recently visiting historian at the National Security Agency, is the world's leading expert on the history of cryptology, and the author of Hitler's Spies, Seizing the Enigma, and Kahn on Codes, as well as articles in numerous popular and technical journals. He holds a Ph.D. in Modern History from Oxford. An editor at Newsday, he lives in Great Neck, New York.

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

41 of 43 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars German Military Intelligence from A to Z, February 1, 2001

By 

R. A Forczyk (MD, USA) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)    (TOP 500 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence In World War II (Paperback)

In 1978, David Kahn attempted to write the first comprehensive history of German military intelligence in the Second World War. There results are mixed. The author is to be applauded for shedding considerable new light on this heretofore-neglected subject. However, this is an anecdote-driven study, not a comprehensive history. To be sure, Kahn covers virtually every aspect of intelligence collection and analysis in the Third Reich. In itself, the scope of this work is impressive and the reader quickly gains an appreciation for the amount of research required to produce this result.

Organizationally, the book is divided into three main sections. After a sixty-page prologue that outlines the origins of German military intelligence, the first section details all the various collection agencies in the next 300 pages. Everything from agents, to radio intercept units, Luftwaffe interrogators, aerial and tactical reconnaissance is covered, each in its own chapter. The second section, of 69 pages, covers the various organizations that analyzed intelligence in the Third Reich. The final section, 75 pages long, analyzes three case studies (Operations Barbarossa, Torch and Overlord) where German intelligence failed. A 20-page conclusion outlines Kahn's theories on why German intelligence failed in its mission. There are also many useful extras, including excellent photos, original documents and a 1943 intelligence organization chart.

While most sections are usually interesting to read, the anecdote-driven nature of this work is a severe detractor. The chapters bounce around chronologically, with Kahn typically providing an anecdote from the 1940 French campaign, then the Russian Front and then one from the Normandy campaign. This is a potentially misleading method for painting the portrait of an entire organization, by attempting to draw general conclusions from a few specific examples. Kahn consistently paints a picture of a fumbling, inept German intelligence effort, while ignoring similar Allied and Soviet intelligence failures in 1940-1942.

Kahn's conclusions are very contentious. While grudgingly admitting that Germany was able to score some tactical intelligence successes that aided the early blitzkriegs, he blames the failure of strategic intelligence on five factors. Somehow, Kahn sees "unjustified arrogance" as a peculiarly German trait that caused the Wehrmacht to slight intelligence. Kahn's pro-British bias is striking; did not British General Browning ignore repeated indications that German armor was deployed near Arnhem in 1944? Kahn makes a great deal of one episode in 1945 where a dejected Hitler sweeps aside aerial photos indicating the coming Soviet offensive against Berlin, but Browning did virtually the same thing when shown low-level photos of SS panzers near Arnhem. The British Army also had a long history of arrogance leading to disaster at places ranging from Yorktown, Isandhlwana, Gallipoli, the Somme to Arnhem. A second poorly argued factor is the supposed greater need for intelligence on the defense. Knowledge of the terrain, weather and enemy dispositions is equally important on the offense or defense. While Kahn is correct in asserting that Germany's sudden entry into aggressive war did not give the Abwehr sufficient time to establish spy networks in England, the rest of this argument is founded on half-digested readings of Clausewitz. A third argument, that Nazi anti-Semitism "deprived German intelligence of many brains" is downright silly. Kahn infers that German intelligence, particularly code-breaking, would have been enhanced if Jewish mathematicians had not been purged. This ignores the fact that Allied breakthroughs were made by non-Jews like Turing and exaggerates the impact of a minority to alter the character of a dictatorship. The Third Reich had plenty of gifted individuals, many of whom gave their all for the regime. It didn't matter.

Two final contributing factors are more pertinent. There is no doubt that the authority structure of the Fuehrer state inhibited the proper analysis of information as Kahn asserts. Hitler was a megalomaniac who increasingly rejected information that contradicted his view of "reality". However, the larger assertion that the culture of the German officer corps was endemically hostile to intelligence is weak. It is obvious that Kahn has never worked as an intelligence officer on a military staff, because he puts great stock in German regulations that state that the "intelligence officer works for the operations officer". One hears such attitudes in every army, including the US Army, and it is not due to intrinsic German factors. Furthermore, Kahn's assertion that Allied staffs were more efficient is laughable; the Allies based their staff methods on earlier German staff methods, but lacked the professionalism added by a General Staff cadre. Finally, the assertion that the General Staff officers assigned to intelligence were "second-rate" is oxymoronic, since these officers were the top 5% of the Wehrmacht.

Despite thorough research, it is obvious that Kahn does not really understand intelligence operations. Crucial concepts like the intelligence cycle of task-collect-analyze-disseminate are never really discussed, but every phase counts. While Kahn continuously pounds on the Germans for poor efforts in collection and analyzing, he ignores tasking and dissemination. Did the Germans ask the right questions? It appears not, since although their various collectors gathered huge amounts of data about the enemy, there seemed to be no specific priorities. Much of intelligence work is separating the volumes of chaff from the small amount of wheat but the Germans clearly failed in this crucial task. As for dissemination, Kahn does not address this issue, but it would be interesting to know how much the "I've got a secret club" prevented crucial information from reaching the troops in a timely manner.

This book should be on every professional intelligence officer's shelf, but taken with a grain of salt. Broad generalizations about ethnic tendencies or factors intrinsic only to one army should be viewed critically.

17 of 17 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars A good book on two levels....., October 2, 2000

By 

J. Michael Showalter (Nashville, TN United States) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)   

This review is from: Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence In World War II (Paperback)

Kahn's book can be read on two levels. On the first (the more shallow) it provides a few great stories about SPIES, which, as any student of war should be able to indicate, are just fun. Kahn capably points out such horrendously important information as at what stores German agents shopped at, and where German contacts lived in New York City. Which is an awful lot of fun, and that one can say that about an academic author writing a credible book deserves credit into and of itself.

Secondly, it is the probably the most well constructed book in English talking about German intelligence in the Second World War. Certainly, by this point, many books have been written and become popular illustrating the history of the OSS (the US spy agency) and MI-6 (the British one) but this is the first uber-credible account of German intelligence that I have ever stumbled upon (not that I've spent a great deal of my life looking....) Kahn capably illustrates the structural strengths and weaknesses of the system, and also does a thourough job of in dealing with the personalities that made them better (or worse) than they should have been. He does a good job of discounting the popular conception that only generals win battles: intellegence, in the case of this war, if used properly could have stopped Hitler from making several of his most egregious errors.

People who like this book might also like a book that focuses a tremendous amount of it's words on Admiral Canaris called "The Unseen War in Europe" although it's largely about how the US and the UK used intellegence to their benefit during the war.

10 of 10 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Indepth look at German tactical intelligence during WWII, March 25, 1998

By 

[e-mail] (Salado, Texas) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II (Paperback)

Commanders in military history often get too much credit for their tactical decisions. Intelligence often gives one the boldness to act decisively on the battlefield. David Kahn's indepth study of German military intelligence provides useful insights to the complex business of collecting, analyzing and assessing information on the enemy. The "mosaic" work, a term Germans used to describe their bringing together all the pieces, illustrates the use of air reconnaissance, radio intercepts, prisoner of war, and ground patrols for assessments upon which German commanders made their decisions. This easy read is an exceptional and interesting book on the state-of-the-art for military intelligence during the Second World War.