Customer Reviews

How Great Generals Win

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The choice of Generals to review did span much of recorded history, but huge chunks of history were missed. The first third of the book covers only 3 generals in all of recorded history up to 1800. Then the rest of the book (disporportionaly) covers the last 200 years. The review of campaigns was interesting, but some maps showed the flow of battles and others seemed to just be filler. The final two chapters on Rommel and MacArthur were done in too much detail. It became a deluge of unit identifiers and was hard to follow. All the recounts prior to these last two included not just historical review of engagement, but included analysis of what made the generals great -- not the last two recounts. I completely missed why reviewing and repreatedly reminding the reader of MacArthur's grand failure made him a great General? Finally, why were no naval and aviation generals included? Perhaps the book should have been "How Some Great Generals Won Some Ground Wars".

Bevin Alexander's book may redefine the meaning of "great" commander for some of its readers. A lot of readers are in the same classroom as I when it comes to military history. I grew up accepting that the generals presented to me in history class were the best because my betters said they were. Especially,when it came to the Civil War. They don't cast bronzes of incompetents, right? Maybe, maybe not, but Mr. Alexander did a convincing job explaining why some of history's spotlights are on the wrong statues. A lack of military history won't prevent anyone from reading and enjoying his book. He will set the stage for each adventure and allow the reader to be swept along by the likes of Hannibal, Lawrence of Arabia and Erwin Rommel without loosing him. These stories are real, first class, adventures and that's how Mr. Alexander's book comes across.

Alexander has written a nice overview of some of military history's best generals. His overall thesis was certainly proven well, and he chose those generals who best proved his point. I particularly liked the chapters on Hannibal/Scipio, Genghis Khan, Sherman, and Rommel. This work could have been a five star book; however, his chapter on MacArthur was where the book lost me. Militarily speaking Alexander continued as he had throughout the book, but his political overview of the Communist threat was almost as ridiculous as was Toland's in 'In Mortal Combat', which dealt with Korea. Hence I do concur with one of the other individuals who reviewed this work that his objectivity is lacking in his more modern chapters. Nonetheless, save for the last chapter, this was a good overview for someone starting to learn about miliraty history and strategy, or it is a nice refresher.

This is the best written compilation of short histories of many pivotal battles in world history that I have ever read. The chapters on the Civil War and Hannibal are outstanding. I appreciated the maps with each chapter, but many geographic points the author thought were important enough to put in the narrative were not put on the maps, such as Sherman's multiple column routes through the Southern states (some shaded or dotted map arrows would have added to the story).

This book takes the reader through time and history as the author describes why certain generals won, or lost their wars. In particular, the author tries to show how certain techniques or tactics used from Ancient Rome to Genghis Khan to Napoleon are still applicable today in the modern world. Indeed, when these tactics are not used, in Korean for example, the author reveals how he feels the generals have let down their men; and their country.

As a primer, this book is good. The author has a good grasp on basic tactics and very interesting facts about history. For example, when fighting armies who have elephants, the Romans had bells with them which they would shake, scarring the beasts and making them useless for the battle.

As I said, overall this book, as a basic guide, is very good. It is not for those who have a solid background in this area already. For me, though, it was very interesting. I particularlly like the earlier chapters. In my view, as the booked came closer to present times, the author's emotions and personal feelings made him less objective. This took away somewhat, from his conclusions but, overall, the book was still a fun read.

While Mr. Alexander writes in an colorful and gripping style, and the book is an enjoyable read, the few new insights he offers are often on the based on the most frivoulous ground, or simply untrue. For example: hie posit that a naval blockade was what ultimately defeated Germany in WW I is patently false. Germany had for centuries been the 'land power' of Europe - free of any need for supply from precious colonies - while Britain was Europes 'Sea Power.' Even before Bismarck unified Germany, she was quite self-sufficient in the vital raw materials that kept her war machine alive, (albeit vulnerably dependent upon weak allied states for some of these materials,) and in no way shared Britain's vulnerabilty to naval 'strangulation'. It was no accident that the overpopulated Island had long maintained the World's most Powerful Navy, or, that Kaiser Wilhelm II's rash attempt to challenge Britains dominance of the seas was a major contributing factor in Britain's entry into the War. Yet Mr. Alexander mentions 'naval stangulation' as the principle cause of Germany's defeat in WWI, in a short footnote in a chapter detailing Britains ultimately successful campaign against the Turks in Paalestine!

Sherman is his choice for the Unions best General - he is derisive in his treatment of Grant - yet he fails to recognize that the strategy that sent Sherman plunging deep into the South and destroying her capacity to wage war was one formulated by both Grant and Sherman, or, that Johnston's smaller and much more easily outflanked army, was hardly comparable to Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, nor that Grant largely followed same strategy of outmaneuvering his outnumbered opponent, until he had forced Lee to retreat to the Gates of Richmond. Also, with John Bell Hood appointed as the Confederate Commander in the South and Johnston relieved - as Sherman assembled before Atlanta - Sherman faced a rash General that destroyed large parts of his Army in repeated, blundering assaults. One might mention Grant's foolhardy and costly assault at Cold Harbor, yet Grant learned from this mistake - and with Lee Penned within the Richmond/Petersburg defenses - he skillfully expanded his breastworks around Peterburg until the smaller Confederate force was forced to retreat, leading durectly to Union victory. Sherman - while a brilliant General - faced no such tactical genius as Lee, and took Atlanta with comparative ease...

Such is the nature of the book: Mr. Alexander makes passing points - which are enormously debatable or simply false, (i.e., Britains naval blockade of Germany as what ultimately won WW I for the Allies,) or he simply rehashes famous military campaigns. All in all a work of mediocrity.

This is the first book I read on war strategies. It is really a fascinating read, and in a way reads like a thriller. The battlefield is like a chess game, with opponents trying to outsmart and deceive each other. The book offers the reader a fascinating journey through the minds of some of the most famous generals in history. Readers will be introduced to the strategies of Hannibal, Scipio Africanus, Genghis Khan, Napoleon Bonaparte, Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, William Tecumesh Sherman, T. E. Lawrence, Sir Edmund Allenby, Mao Zedong, Heinz Guderian, Erich von Manstein, Erwin Rommel, and Douglas MacArthur.

The author points out the exceptional as well as the bad choices that generals make. The reader will learn many war strategies which are fascinating to say the very least. For example, when fighting armies with elephants, the Romans shook bells, scarring the elephants and making them useless for battle.

Generals can succeed in one war but utterly fail in another. MacArthur is referred to by the author as the Jekyll and Hyde. In the Pacific theatre, MacArthur gained fame as an invincible general. However, during the Korean War, he made one mistake after another, and exposed his armies to unnecessary danger. Despite his tactical disasters during the Korean War, his fame and legend led the Truman administration to approve his disastrous strategies (as a footnote, many historians note that the United States has not won a single war since World War II!).

Deception is the main key to victory. Hannibal took his army through the formidable swamps of the Arnus River in Tuscany in 217 B.C. rather than face the Roman army directly. Not expecting such a move, the Romans left the route open, permitting Hannibal to emerge behind the Roman army with a clear road to Rome. This forced the Romans to abandon their strong position and rush after the Carthaginians. Hannibal ambushed the dislocated Romans at Lake Trasimene and destroyed nearly their entire army. Almost 70 thousand Romans dies that day!

The Carthaginians in Spain believed Scipio Africanus would strike at their armies and left unguarded their capital and principal port, New Carthage. But Scipio had deceived his enemies. He seized New Carthage in 209 B.C., cut off the main sea connection with Carthage, caused several Spanish tribes to come over to the Romans, and abruptly threw the Carthaginians on the strategic defensive.

Genghis Khan was another master of deception. He focused the attention of the Khwarezmian army by fierce attacks on cities along the Syr Darya in Turkestan in 1220. He then led a Mongol army across the supposedly impassable Kyzyl Kum to seize Bokhara, far in the enemy rear, isolating the Khwarezmian capital of Samarkand and blocking reinforcements from the south. In a single quick campaign, the Mongols captured Samarkand and destroyed the Khwarezmian Empire.

By demonstrating with part of his army at Valenza on the Po River in northern Italy in 1796, Napoleon convinced the Austrian commander this was the sole French target, drawing Austrian defenders to that point. Napoleon then marched the majority of his forces downstream to Piacanza, thereby turning all possible enemy lines of defense, and forcing the Austrians to abandon all of northern Italy except the fortress of Mantua.
When strong German forces attacked Holland and Belgium in 1940, British and French mobile forces rushed northward to block the advance. Erich von Manstein, knowing this would happen, sent his panzers through the supposedly impassable Ardennes to seize Sedan, which was defended only by second-rate troops. When this occurred, the German panzers had a clear path westward to the English Channel, trapping the Allied armies that had rushed into Belgium and ensuring the defeat of France.

The last chapter of this book covers the lessons learned in the war campaigns of the last 2,000 years. The author points out that war remains an art rather than a science, despite the immense amount of invention, industry, and technology lavished on war since the beginning of organized society. He further adds that although the principles of war are simple and can be learned by anyone, the application of each principle requires much care, skill, and caution.

I personally enjoyed the chapters on Hannibal, Scipio Africanus, and Genghis Khan the most. But let us not forget that war is a dirty business, and people die! It would be better to compete at chess games or at the Olympic Games. There are many none aggressive and none destructive ways to show one's talents for strategy. Hitler should have spent his days playing war games on his PlayStation 3 when he was not earning a decent living. I am against glamorizing war. The irony of life is that one is sent to the electric chair for killing another in cold blood in a dark alley while one is glamorized and hailed for bombing an entire city, killing thousands (the allied bombings of German and Japanese cities during World War II).

One minor issue I have is that I did not like the cover of this book. I read the July 1995 Avon Books edition. The cover portrayed the generals in a cartoonish manner. For the scope and seriousness of the book the cover did not do justice to the book.

Bevin Alexander's book is an easy read, and he does a solid job supporting his theses about why certain General's were very successful. I doubt that anyone will agree with everyone of his selections of Generals and campaigns, but this book can serve as a good starting point for discussions about strategic planning for success in warfare.

I had some problems with the authors selections (of course who are the great generals throughout the ages is a matter of opinion), and some of the overall conclusions in certain campaigns. For example, Mr. Alexander states that Lincoln would not have won re-elction unless Sherman captured Atlanta before the election without fully supporting the argument. Instead, he simply states this opinion as fact. Also, the maps were a little lacking at times. I agree with a previous reviewer that more detail on the maps would have helped.

Despite these shortcomings, I recommend this book for any military history bookgroup looking a book to generate discussion about military strategy, or anyone looking for a nice addition to their military history library.

This is a superbly written book by my favorite military history writer. Alexander writes in a very readable style. Additionally, the maps and charts are easy to understand and complement each chapter. Of particular note are the chapters on Hannibal and then Scipio Africanus (the Roman General who beat him) and Lee (or how General Lee should have fought the Battle of Gettysburg).

This is basically a rehash of the concepts given in B.H. Liddell Hart's Strategy. The examples are different, for the most part, but the conclusions are exactly the same - almost word for word. Strategy is much better for the money.