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How Hitler Could Have Won World War II: The Fatal Errors That Lead to Nazi Defeat

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Many people feel that D-Day was the decisive turning point of the war. Others feel that Barbarossa deserves that honor.

After reading this book, however, I tend to agree with the author that the African campaign now deserves the title of "the one that got away".

From a strategic standpoint the Mediterranean was ignored, not only by Hitler, but by most history-buffs as well. Even as late as 1943, had Hitler diverted attention from the Balkans and attacked Malta, moved into Egypt and grabbed the Suez - bye, bye England. Bye-bye launch pad for D-day. Even Churchill, who had a very acute eye for strategy, most of the time, felt that Africa was his biggest nightmare.

A point to remember when reading this book - it is not a 'what-if'. It is a lesson in defeat, basically, what it takes to lose a war. We all know Hitler's ideology and blind hatred of the Slavic people, in attacking Russia, cost him ultimate victory. What we don't always remember, or even want to admit, is that Germany had the greatest military the world had ever seen. Even in 1942, after the biggest chances for victory in Russia were over, the Wehrmacht was still capturing hundreds of thousands of Soviet prisoners in encirclement battles. Imagine if Hitler had listened to those that knew best. Of course, had he been a personality that listened to advice, chances are he would never have come to power in the first place. The ultimate conundrum.

This is a well written, easy to read, overview of the critical military decisions in Europe and North Africa during World War II. What it is not, as some might surmise from the title, is a "what if" text that reviews the alternative outcomes of the decisions not made.

The author does an excellent job of reviewing the various opinions offered Hitler by his various military advisors, and he does an excellent job of outlining their merits. Furthermore, at every turn he makes a compelling case for what he considers to have been the proper course of action. Unfortunately, Alexander frequently bogs down in narrative of the various battles, and loses his focus on the critical decisions not made. Furthermore, with a few notable exceptions, he generally does not project these alternate decisions into a long term view of the war.

This is an enjoyable little book, that offers an excellent overview of some of the critical German military decisions of WWII. However, anyone looking for a more serious work would do well to consider Murray & Millett's outstanding "A War to Be Won".

Despite my attempt at a witty review title, I did enjoy reading this book. I most say, however, that I am probably the poster child for the target audience of this book. I am a reader of mostly non-fiction with a predilection for military history, and I am a bit of a Germanophile, which I find to be common in other readers of the same bent. Also, I have played my share of wargames, and can appreciate, to some extent, how the Axis may have won WWII. So, I SHOULD really like this book. A whole lot. Well, I just can't say that I do. This book could have been better, and this is somewhat bothersome to me, as I think the author really missed what was an easy mark, and I was really looking forward to a good read. As other reviewers have said, Alexander wrote an excellent "big picture" overview, discussing several crucial points where the course of the war may have taken a different turn, occupying maybe a third of the book. Alexander then sinks into re-telling European WWII in extreme tactical detail, especially in his treatment of the North African and Italian theaters. This detail is actually interesting for what it is, and even somewhat on-point as it deals with Allied and German blunders which may have effected major battle outcomes, but it drags down the book. My attention began to wander and I kept waiting to get back to the what I thought was the thrust of the book - what Germany could have done to win the war. What I continually was presented with, however, was how the Allies failed to exploit some tactical victory somewhere, or mis-used their armor in some minor battle - a sort-of Allied "bloops and blunders" which simply indicated to me that Germany would have lost sooner, if not for these Allied mis-steps. That's not where I thought the book was going to take me, and not where I wanted to go. The book is a little schizophrenic, not really sure what it is trying to be. Alexander had a chance to write a good discussion of German "opportunities lost", with maybe some new insights, which is what his title suggests. He chose, instead, to write a battle diary with a really good forward. In spite of all this, I am glad I read the book, as I did enjoy Alexanders battle narratives and what insights into German strategic thinking he actually did provide. It is easy to capture my attention and interest with books of this genre, and Alexander comes close, at times, to maintaining my keen interest. He always seems to bog down, however, and forget his overall objective with this book. I am just disappointed Alexander, who is clearly quite capable, didn't provide the book I expected and to which I looked forward when I purchased it. I would still buy this book, I would just be prepared for the detailed battle accounts which wait like minefields to destroy your attention span.

This book pays scant attention to what one would conclude to be its central premise -- what decisions were taken (and thus, which options were rejected) and how they could have changed the outcome if different choices had been made.

In the preface and a one another place in the early part of the book, the author presents perhaps 10-15 pages on a fundamental mis-application of forces and targets which, in his view, could have led to victory. As with the rest of this work, this point is cogently argued and enjoyable to read. But the rest of the book is merely a summary of what the German army did in the war. My complaint is that the title clearly implies the main thrust will be something other than a recitation of what the Germans actually did. And, even though the author's recitiation is insightful and well written, it's bound to frustrate those who quite logically expected something else when purchasing the book.

Another flaw is a common one for Western writers -- disproportionate attention is given to the North African campaign at the expense of the Russian front, where about 80% of German casualties were suffered and where Hitler unquestionable lost the war. For individual desert offensives, we get detailed information on particular fieldpieces used by each side while the decisive German operations in Russia that most agree ensured their defeat are glossed over with lesser attention.

I gave up the book when the fighting moved to Tunisia in early 1943 -- a point at which German military victory was impossible -- disappointed that the author didn't turn his considerable gifts to the subject of his title. At that point no author based in reality could make the case Hitler could have won the war short of political dealings (i.e., making a separate peace with Stalin) which there was never any chance of as long as Hitler was running the show.

Although that's the title, it isn't actually the focus of the book itself. Alexander starts out decently - in the prologue he states how he believes Hitler could have won the war (by focusing on North Africa and the Middle East and not attacking Russia). After that, however, things go downhill.

The bulk of _How Hitler Could Have Won World War II_ is a survey of the war itself, from the invasion of France to Germany's surrender. During parts of the narrative, there are connections made to the book's subtitle: "The Fatal Errors That Led To Nazi Defeat." Alexander takes a critical look at many of Hitler's military decisions, especially those that brought him into conflict with his generals. Although these "fatal mistakes" are mentioned, not much more is said about how Hitler could have won World War II.

Even as a history of the war, Alexander's book doesn't stand up very well. It is short (300 pages paperback) and is only able to give a cursory glance at much of what went on in the European theater. The Pacific theater is ignored. Alexander tends to focus disproportionately on events in North Africa and Italy, without giving the other fronts all the attention they deserve. This could be excusable if he used the opportunity to elaborate on his theory of how Hitler could have won - but unfortunately he does not.

Personally, I felt that _How Hitler Could Have Won World War II_ was a decent book, but I felt it could have been better. It takes shape as little more than a brief history of World War II, and there are other books that do a much better job with that topic (like _The Second World War_ by John Keegan). This book strikes me as one that should be borrowed from the library and read; if I were able to do it all over again, I probably wouldn't choose to buy it.

"How Hitler Could Have Won the War" takes as its basis Hitler had basically won the war in 1941, and through poor strategic decision making, lost it by 1943. Churchill's famous comment about "the terrible if's" not withstanding, the author does some excellent political-economic analysis, basically concluding that not "finishing off" Britain before turning on the USSR doomed him to defeat. In the author's estimation, pursuing the war in North Africa would have brought Britain to its knees, thus freeing up German forces to concentrate on obtaining "Lebensraum" in the East.

Such analysis was fairly commonplace in the West in the mid-1980s, especially from British historians. With the opening of archives in former East Germany and the USSR though, a different proposition for German victory is apparent-and this author doesn't discuss it. One needs to look at the strategic situation in 1941, not through Anglo-American but German eyes. Most of Europe is directly allied, occupied or politically associated with Nazi Germany. Britain has NO military forces that may directly threaten either German operations in theater, or the homeland (British strategic bombing killed more aircrews than civilians and did negligible damage to German industry in 1940-42). The only continental threat remaining IS the USSR. A war with the Soviets, before the US could enter in strength, would achieve German aims for European (not World despite Allied agitprop) domination. As far as the 1941 campaign in Russia, it DID in fact achieve its aims: Stalin tried to negotiate a "Brest-Litovsk" in 1941, and offered to cede territory conquered in the Winter War back to Finland. Only Hitler's strategic intransigence and obsession with Aryan racial supremacy prevented a settlement.

In North Africa, staff studies commissioned in 1940 showed that to maintain a mechanized operations tempo and achieve a strategically viable result, i.e. seizing the Suez Canal, would require at least 4 Panzer/Panzer Grenadier divisions plus Corps-level assets. The study further revealed that existing supply infrastructure could not adequately sustain such a force for any length of time. The harsh reality of geography and British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean made such a campaign unlikely at best.
"How Hitler Could Have Won the War", is well-written with some very good analysis of Hitler's political objectives, but ultimately falls into a familiar "Hitler fought a two-front war" theme, and doesn't examine contemporary evidence to the contrary. Recommended for anyone looking for background in counter-factual WW2 subjects.

One of the most favorite games among the historians I know is "What If?" It allows one to indulge one's intellect in a rational speculation, use the tools of historical analysis in which one has been trained, and above all, to stretch the imagination. In the case of an Adolf Hitler, the "What If?" game also takes the place of the good old campfire horror story.

And Bevin Alexander has us around a roaring campfire for his re-telling and shaping of "What If?" into a minor masterpiece. Just why did Hitler, with the world's most powerful army at his disposal and riding the wave of victory in 1940, committ not not one blunder, but a series of such that effectively snatched defeat from the jaws of victory? How close were the Nazis to victory?

Alexander attempts to answer the speculation by probing into Hitler's personality; that his paranoia mortally did in his political acumen.

But I have a "What's If?" that has been bothering me since I opened this book. What If . . . Hitler was simply the most overrated personage of the Twentieth Century? What if he were simply a case of the wrong man in the right place at the right time? Looking at the leadership of the Nazi Party during the twenties and early thirties one sees a lack of focus in its leadership -- except for one man, Hitler. It is possible that Hitler, by dint of his extraordinary focus (A product of paranoia?) was able to persevere where his peers failed. Nazi Germany during the thirties was no economic or political marvel, as social histories of the periods written by those who survived attest. What Hitler was most remembered for during the war was sacking generals who disagreed with him and ignoring the rest. The ultimate "What If?" question is "What if Hitler had let his generals fight the war?" But then Hitler was pursuing his own Wagnerian Gotterdammerung for Germany.

I had many other "What If?" questions, all inspired by this book. And that is the ultimate reward of this book: the power to inspire imaginative reflection in its readers. As only a few books have this power, I can recommend this volume wholeheartedly.

On the whole, I find this book fairly interesting, but perhaps its key theme, that Hitler couldve won the war in the Middle East, is in my view, highly implausible At its core, the author suggests that Hitler couldve won by focussing on driving his forces into the oil rich regions of the Middle East, and would thus gain three key objectives, (1) obtaining all the oil he could ever use, (2) cutting off Englands use of the Suez Canal, and (3) closing off the southern transportation routes into the Soviet Union.

While the strategy clearly makes sense at first glance, I think the author gravely underestimates the obstacles to such a plan. There are many, but Ill list a few (1) Just to get past Egypt, hell not only have to cross the Nile, but the Suez Canal as well, and then will face a bottleneck in the Gaza area (2) IF, and I do mean if, the German forces couldve gotten through the British defenses there, German forces would then have to slug their way through some of the most defensible terrain on the planet in the region that is modern day Israel, Jordan and Syria (3) And after that, there will be hundreds of miles of Arabian desert before you reach the key oil areas in Iraq, Iran, Western Arabia and the gulf states Not even considering the defenses they wouldve had to overcome, the supply problems alone in such an endeavor our humongous.

Assuming they were able to achieve this though, they would then face the monumental problem of getting the oil from these remote areas to Germany itself. IF history is any guide, Germanys ability to increase its oil production from occupied territories is spotty Germany occupied oil regions in the Eastern Ukraine, but they did not have the resources to produce much more than a few drops from those fields.

Assuming they could reach the Arabian oil fields and actually pump sizable amounts though, they would have to fend off British counter attacks from India, from Southern Africa, and their exposed flank in Northern Africa, as well as the British Navy, who couldve harassed both shipments to and from the Middle East back to Europe. And to make matters worse, the locals might not be all that thrilled with the enlightened occupation policies of Hitler, particularly Jews in the middle east, and you could count on the Soviet Union making it difficult on the Germans once they began to threaten their Southern trade routes.

Add all the problems inherent to this though, and it takes Hitlerian rose colored glasses to even think of pursuing this strategy..

Now as a counterpoint, Hitler mightve had a chance in Barbarrosa, but his initial plans, and the irrational optimism brought about by their early success in the Soviet Union sank them The book is right, in that primarily, the three simultaneous goals, Leningrad, Moscow, and the Ukraine, were far beyond the Wehrmachts capacity Taking Leningrad was idiotic as the book attests, but the recommended drive to Moscow is also not the right move My primary reasoning behind this is that, (1) even if you take Moscow, the Soviets wouldnt cave, because I believe they knew time was on their side, but (2) Taking it would be difficult, as the terrain, weather, and rabid defense of the city wouldve been costly, even in a successful capture of the city, and (3) You would leave the Soviets with still vast Industrial capacity to continue the war.

For Germany to have to defeated Russia, the only way I believe wouldve been a southern sweep through the Ukraine, into the Caucuses, and then, possibly north to the beginning of the Urals This might, and I emphasized MIGHT, have worked for a couple of reasons (1) the large east to west marshy area north of Kiev wouldve created an effective defense on the German left flank. (2) it wouldve meant the complete capture of the Ukraine, the primary food source for Russia in the winter, (3) It wouldve cut off Russia from many of its great industrial areas, (4) The taking of the Caucuses would cut Russia off from its oil, and (5) at least a partial advance toward the Urals couldve destroyed the transportation links the Moscow are had with Siberia.

Now for the German army, thats sounds like a pretty ambitious goal, but they nearly obtained all those territories in reality, and did it while also expending huge forces on ill fated drives on Leningrad and Moscow. Had they concentrated everything on the Southern drive, leaving just enough forces in the North for feints and defense, they might have pulled it all off before the onset of winter. Then come the Spring, they mightve had the chance for a massive encirclement of the Moscow region, and the simultaneous isolation of the Siberian region. Or perhaps more likely, Stalin might have caved and signed a peace deal, giving Hitler vast territories in Western Russia along with all the southern areas.

It would've also helped to have routinely changed the secret codes more often, so Britain wouldn't be reading my most secret messages so much... And I also would've planned my logistics a lot better than Hitler did... It takes a lot of transportation assets to Invade Russia effectively, and relying on horses and carts is insane, especially come winter time.

But anyway, had I been in charge, I wouldve skipped the whole damn thing My plan might have worked, but invading Russia is just plain crazy. Ask Napolean.

Alexander caught me a bit off guard with this one. From the title of the book and the synopsis on the back cover, I was expecting a broad, tactical overview of where Hitler went wrong at various points during WWII. While there is some analytical content of this sort at the very beginning, the book soon transforms into a rather dense narrative examination of the major campaigns and theaters. The portion on Africa is especially well detailed.

While I probably would have better enjoyed a "what if" type of approach to the subject matter, I certainly cannot fault the thoroughness of Alexander's scholarship. Anyone looking for a comprehensive overview of the Africa campaign, Stalingrad, the Normandy landings / breakthroughs and the Battle of the Bulge should enjoy this work. That having been said, the last portion of the book which deals with the Eastern Front post-Stalingrad and the fall of Berlin would have benefitted from additional detail and attention. In fact, the ending of the book is rather abrupt with no summary or concluding remarks. Still, a highly recommended resource for any budding WWII scholar. The well crafted maps alone are worth the price.

This book in an interesting read because 1) Alexander has a fine writing style and 2) it has a brilliant, well paced review of the Mediterranean conflict. However, the book never clearly delivers on its title. Like so many books and documentaries it isn't really about how Hitler could have won, but more about the mistakes that led to defeat. On the one hand appears Herr Hitler, a fool making one poor decision after another. On the other are his brilliant generals who can clearly win the war. The line between these two dots simply isn't clearly presented here. Still, there is much to read. Anyone interested in this topic will find the writing style to be enjoyable, especially Rommel's romp in Africa. On reading, one must wonder why the Allies just couldn't get it with Blitzkrieg or the use of aerial and field artillery. This inept understanding of modern warfare and a total inability to conceive appropriate strategic response would force the conflict into a long war of attrition. In the end the Allies are victorious but only because of overwhelming numbers and natural resources. Perhaps, somewhere between the lines, Alexander is making his statement. Hitler never took advantage of the Allies learning disability, and this is where he could have won WWII. Perhaps!