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How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War

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This is a brilliant analysis -- and only incidentally a narrative -- of the military side of the Civil War. It should be read along with a companion volume, "Why the South Lost the Civil War," co-authored by Herman Hattaway, who also co-authored this book. The starting point for the book is a thorough understanding of mid-nineteenth century military theory, especially as expounded by the Swiss writer, Jomini. Briefly, the authors contend that the formations (corps/divison/brigade, etc.) introduced by Napoleon gave mass armies unprecedented tactical flexibility. At the same time, the rifled musket extended the infantry's reach. The result was that armies could be maneuvered so rapidly and put out so much defensive firepower that it was impossible to destroy one unless the opposing command made exceptional mistakes. Pemberton made such a mistake by bottling himself up in Vicksburg and something similar happened at Fort Henry. Otherwise, not ever the worse mauling could destroy the ability of a well-equipped army to stage a strategic retreat. This practical invulnerability explains why the long list of major battles in the East -- Gettysburg, Chancellorsville, Second Bull Run, Fredericksburg, the Seven Days, etc. -- had little effect on the war. (Even Lee once commented on the "curiously hollow" nature of his victories.) In short, the great battles of the war -- long the focus of Civil War history -- decided little or nothing. The stalemate in the East was the result not of inept leadership (e.g. Burnside) but of the real inability of either side, regardless of how led, to fatally damage the other. The war in the West was different because there the Union could take advantage of riverine communications. Nothing more clearly illustrates the old saw that "Amateurs talk strategy and professionals talk logistics." Union command of the Tennessee allowed deep and successful penetration into the Confederacy by first Halleck and then Grant. But, as soon as those riverine lines were not available the Union bogged down and an eastern-like stalemate prevailed. Neither side could really annihilate the other. The authors also argue: 1. The blockade was virtually meaningless. 2. The division of the Confederacy at Vicksburg was, likewise, meaningless. The one tactic that did work was that of Grant and Sherman and it involved massive raids into the Confederate interior. Sherman's march to the sea is the best known, but his subsequent northern march to North Carolina was just as destructive. In these massive raids it was not necessary to engage the opponent's armies (which couldn't be destroyed, anyway.) But, the authors argue, what made the massive raids effective was the blow they dealt to Confederate morale. And, here, we reach the nub of their argument. Why did the Confederacy surrender? Not, the authors say, because it was defeated. It still had armies in the field and an organized government (albeit one on the lam.) It was defeated because Confederate "nationalism" was fradulent from the start. They compare, briefly, the ready Confederate surrender in 1865 with the guerilla fighting during the Peninular War in Spain. They also, briefly, allude to the American effort in Viet Nam. In the end, the Confederates (like the South Vietnamese) found so little real difference between themselves and their opponents that a scorched earth guerrilla war was never a viable option. After all, the North and South shared the same history, language, political system, religious outlook, and traditions. When faced with military reverses in the field, southern nationalism was insufficient to support southern political pretensions. This is a brilliantly argued book. It is not, however, for the Bruce Catton fan. It is, rather, a dispassionate analysis of nineteenth century military capacity. Its dismissal of landmark battles as largely irrelevant will anger some Civil War buffs. Its scorn for such longtime standbys as the blockade as the source of Confederate defeat will, likewise, draw protests. And, the authors rehabilitate despised commanders, such as Halleck. These, they argue, did rather well under the circumstances. For instance, Meade's refusal to pursue Lee is seen as the right decision: Lee's army could be turned back but not destroyed. Lincoln and Halleck knew that the war could not be won in the East. Stalemate was inevitable. It could be won in the West, due to the wild card of the western rivers. In Halleck, and then Grant, the right commanders were found. When Grant came east, he hit the same wall in his Overland Campaign that his predecessors ran into. A modern army simply could not be annihilated. But, the morale of the people could be broken. The North won because the South was willing to lose. In the end, its fradulent nationalism could not support the bloody and destructive guerrilla war that might have won real independence.

Amongst the hundreds of civil war titles I have read, this is the standout, because it shows why the war ended the way it did.

The argument made that Grant and Sherman invented a form of warfare new to the Civil War--the strategic raid--and that such raids were what ended the war, is overwhelmingly convincing.

The attention to military matters, particularly logistics, explains so much that has always puzzled me.

The judgments concerning character are always interesting, even when I disagree, and the evidence is given so fairly, that in many cases view contrary to those of the authors are as strongly supported as their own.

Particularly useful is the evaluation of Grant and the evidence (as I read it) of Lincoln's utter focus on public opinion, that directly caused so much military horror (a view evidently shared by Halleck: one wonders whether it was shared by Halleck's men, Sherman and Grant).

What is surprising are the evident but trivial flaws in the book. Occassional horrible writing, that any editor, or grammar checker should have corrected; occassional sentences that directly contradict previous conclusions, thus being as wishy washy as a Union general with the slows, suggest some problems in the writing of the book, perhaps between the authors. But these lapses are so obvious and easy to correct (by the reader) that they hardly detract from the power of the book.

I cannot imagine someone thinking the same way about the Civil War after he reads this book.

Apologists for the Confederacy usually emphasise the difficulties the South faced in building up a nation in the throes of a War of Independence. However, they often minimise the advantages which also accrued to the South. In fact it could be argued that the North faced the much more difficult task of conquering the South, and not only conquering it, but subjugating it thoroughly - something which (for example) the British Empire failed to do with the nascent USA in the 18th century and again with the Boers and Irish at the start of the 20th century. Jones and Hattaway outline the strategy which finally (after some initial stuttering) won the war for the Union. In the process, they rehabilitiate only Grant but Henry Wager Halleck, usually dismissed as a dull bureaucrat, but appearing here as a sound strategist and shrewd selector of subordinates. Hopefully, some enterprising biographer will soon fill out this picture of Halleck. This book was also very important in bringing Grant back into focus as the North's most visionary and most successful general. They point out that the destruction of Confederate logistics, and the preservation of the Norths', ensured Union victory. However, this is more than a dry recitation of dull facts and statistics. It is a full and lively military history also. Highly recommended, and worthy to sit on anyones shelves besides the works of the great historians of the Civil War - McPherson, Foote, Catton, Nevins & Co.

Hattaway and Jones have written the best military history of the Civil War, one that makes many other studies, including ones published ater HOW THE NORTH WON appeared, outdated. Those interested only in "gun & trumpet" history instead of real military history should be warned, however, that Hattaway and Jones properly devote time to crucial issues such as logistics, organization, and administration--this is not simply a "battle narrative" of the war but sound and provocative military analysis.

There are many great books on the Civil War particular specific battles or campaigns but this book is a wonderful full view of the Civil War from virtually the commander's chair. Hattaway and Jones give you this big picture view of the war without minute detail but the concepts and plans that makes a difference. They provide an engrossing and very readable study of the factors that present the differences between the Union and Confederates. The big picture includes a study of leadership styles such as the contrasting of Lincoln and Davis to the emergence of competent generals such as Henry Halleck. Surprised about Halleck? Although not an inspiring leader, Halleck is a great military organizer and administrator. Although somewhat abusive of Grant, even Grant recognizes his skills when he becomes commander of the armies. The best part of the book is how they present the grand campaigns analyzing what each side is trying to accomplish and with simple but very helpful graphics, demonstrate how they were executed. What you get from this book are the two diverse strategies that culminate in the successful grand Union strategies of simultaneous movements against Southern territories that actually make the anaconda like pressure that old General Scott first suggested. Stymied by political generals though much of the war, competent Generals are in place as Grant final starts the Petersburg siege. The advantages of railroads, telegraph, supply systems, materials, geography and the difference in population all weigh heavily against the south. By the end of the book, you'll appreciate all the great "turning movements" made during the war, such as the Lee-Meade dance after Gettysburg, and you will appreciate the references to their European roots. For an intellectual overview of the war without bias, at least none that I could detect, this book will give you an honest picture from the war room's perspective.

How the North Won is perhaps one of the most polished, informative books on the American Civil War. Considered a standard on Civil War military history, it has been embraced by readers, historians, and scholars across the country. Hattaway and Jones have produced possibly the leading work on Civil War logistics, planning, and administration.

This book examines the basic concepts of the war with its conduct, management, and support as its central themes. Both authors have decided to focus more on logistics and strategy over tactics. For those Civil War readers who believe that the Union won because of its superior numbers and resources will instead find out that the outcome of the war had little to do with size and strength; it was better management and strategy from the Union high commanders that beat the Confederacy.

Perhaps the best achievement of this book is its assurance that those armies who fought on the defensive side generally won. The analyses of World War I and other previous wars strengthen their argument. This is a definite addition to any military or Civil War library.

I found the authors' explanations of strategic concepts like turning movements and interior lines very useful. This book provided an overview of the War that made sense out of many things I'd not understood previously.

I won't go into great detail as other reviewers have already done that. I will say that if you haven't read Jone's other book, The Art of War in the Western World, you should. In this book on the Civil War, Jones discusses the war by applying all the concepts and strategies he describes in The Art of War. In fact, the appendix in this book appears to have been lifted from the previous book. No matter. In the book he succinctly disects the causation and effects that bore on both sides and the resulting outcome. A well written and scholarly book looking at the war from a different perspective. It could be a textbook.

This book will probably disappoint most Civil War buffs. The reason is that it talks more about strategy rather than the actual course of the various battles. Most of the battles are described very briefly with little comment on the force disposition and how things progressed.

Having said that the book is both interesting and new. The authors see the development of the rifle as something which gave a huge advantage to the defense. The authors in fact have some tables at the end which show that most battles were won by the defending forces. They argue that the use of the rifle meant that defending forces could fire at longer ranges against attacking infantry. This also lead to cavalry being reduced to a scouting and raiding role rather than a battlefield role. Taking cavalry out of the equation meant that defending troops also did not have to concentrate and were much less vulnerable to artillery fire than in Napoleonic times. The fact that units did not have to concentrate into large formations also meant that the defense was more maneuverable and it was practically impossible for an army to flank another army on the field of combat. The defender could simply increase the length of its line.

Even if one side lost a battle defeats never led to the complete shattering of the defeated army. Most could retire and live to fight another day.

The authors suggest that the success of the defense shaped the way that the war developed. The union of course had a huge advantage as it had about 2 and ½ the population of the South. It also was richer and had access to most of the Manufacturing industry. In the East the North had to advance in a rather narrow theatre. Lee the Southern Commander was generally able to maneuver his army in such a way that the Union would have to attack him and they generally failed to win. It was the West where there was more room for maneuver that the Union had the advantage. They were able to use their numbers to gain control of territory and to squeeze the South out of existence. Lee was able to hold out till the very end but it was Sherman advancing from the west who spelt the death of the Confederacy.

The tactics the South used in the West was that of raiding the Union system of supply. This was reasonably successful and the North had about as many men guarding its railways as they had at the actual front. Later in the war it used liberated slaves to guard its communications and was able to develop a military preponderance.

Sherman having a large numerical superiority over Johnson and Hood was able to outflank them first conquering Atlanta and then marching to the sea. The junction of his army with that of Grant ended the war.

One has some slight doubts about the thesis. The Prussians in 1865 were able to defeat the Austrians. Of course they were able to quickly mobilize a well drilled army and concentrate it quickly. The Prussians were able to fight an aggressive war in 1865 and also in 1870. Although of course in 1870 there were developments in artillery that shifted the balance back to the attack.

One of the strengths of this book is that it explains that the United States only had a standing army of 10,000 prior to the war and part of the task for both sides was to build large armies and to train and equip them.

I've read many Civil War history books. Most focus on the battles and the people involved, which is understandable since those are some of the most interesting aspects. This book focuses on the over-arching strategies used by the North and South, how those strategies were set, who set them, and the results and battles that followed. It's very well written and a very interesting read.