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How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War

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Bonekemper has written a book that many Civil War history buffs will find outrageously controversial. His thesis, that Gen. Lee lost a winnable war through incompetent leadership, is broken down into the following claims:

1) By taking the war into the North, Lee followed an ill-conceived strategy that had no chance of ultimate success. He could not maintain himself in supply at that distance from his base. He would eventually have to retreat, making it seem like he had been defeated, whether he had been or not. Further, he was making poor use of the two strategic advantages that the South had: a) they did not have to conquer the North in order to win the war, they only had to outlast them; and b) with their internal lines of communication, they could shift men and resources to the places where they most needed them.

2) Lee's strategical viewpoint was influenced by his focus on the war in the East, and particularly the war in Virginia. He demanded and received the best of everything the South had to offer, and used it to fight for Virginia rather than for the South as a whole. He ignored important developments in the West, and denied that theatre resources that might have prevented its collapse. This myopia eventually allowed his own forces to be cut off and surrounded.

3) Lee's strategy was made even worse by his preference for being on the offensive tactically. He failed to grasp that technological changes in weaponry had made massed charges on well-prepared defensive fortifications tantamount to suicide. He sent his soldiers into numerous assaults on Northern positions, that, even when they succeeded in driving back the enemy, were using up his manpower resources at an unsustainable rate.

4) Compounding the above errors, Lee was not good at managing his army. He failed to provide himself with an adequate staff that could oversee the carrying out of his orders. His orders themselves were often vague, discretionary, and delivered verbally so that they were subject to misinterpretation and distortion.

Anyone who is not wed to the image of Lee as a brilliant military commander will probably find himself being swayed by Bonekemper's arguments. Although born and raised in the South, my opinions on the Civil War make me an honorary Yankee. Therefore, I was entirely open to reading criticism of Lee, in spite of his iconic status. I found that at some point, though, I began to lose confidence in Bonekemper's objectivity. No possible objections to his viewpoint are presented or answered. He sets up the facts he want the reader to focus on, and ignores everything else. Nowhere does he mention that the idea of an invasion of the North was promoted by Johnston before Lee ever took command, or that it was also floated by Jackson at the end of his Valley campaign. Nowhere does he mention that the weight of public opinion in the South was completely opposed to a defensive war, and would probably have forced the resignation of any general who attempted to fight in that manner. (Lee could hardly have argued in favor of a defensive war using the prestige that he only enjoyed due to his willingness to go on the offensive.) Nor does Bonekemper mention the material advantages in resources and advanced weaponry enjoyed by the North that would have made a defensive war unlikely to succeed. Although weaponry made great technological advances during the war, the South did not possess the advanced weaponry as soon or in the same quantity as the North. For example, the South's retreat in the face of McClellan's advance during the Peninsula campaign was necessitated by their lack of long range guns that could respond to an artillery bombardment by Northern batteries.

That said, I think there is some truth in Bonekemper's book, even if he does overstate his case. The South did not lose solely because of the decisions of one man, but Lee does bear some of the responsibility for the loss (not that I would have wanted the outcome to be different). Had Bonekemper tempered his arguments and taken into account some of the possible objections, this would be a much stronger book. Even so, I think it is worth reading for those who already have some knowledge of the issues. It is not a good book to start with in learning about the Civil War, though, and it is definitely not the last word on its subject.

I found Mr. Bonnekemper's theory as to the weaknesses of generalship as he applies it to General Robert E. Lee a refreshing new viewpoint. Author Bonnekemper has done his homework and authenticates well, the failings of General Lee's strategy and tactics. If one can get past their preconcieved notions about the greatness of General Lee, this book makes a significant contribution to the study of the history of our Civil war. Mr. Bonnekemper does not degrade General Lee, he simply states the facts; that General Lee's excesses in committing troops to battle may well have resulted in opportunities lost. General Lee will always be revered as a fine gentleman, a man of honor, dignity and great personal courage. This book will not change that. It should be read for what it is, a scholarly contribution to the study of American history.

If you're interested in this book, you should also read "Confederate Tide Rising" for well researched counterpoint. I enjoyed both perspectives. A warning about this book: you'll want to have a Civil War era map to refer to while reading since the descriptions of army movements/battle logistics gets very dense. It would have been better if the book included such maps since the author goes into blow-by-blow accounts of several battles. I don't see how he could expect normal readers to keep up with the information without some visuals aids. I give 4 stars for the author's competent writing--not necessarily for his conclusions. Some reviewers gave this book a bad review because they disagree with his conclusions which is o.k. but that doesn't mean the book is written badly.

This book will be of interest primarily to those readers who have some basic grounding in Civil War history. As much as Mr. Bonekemper's conclusions have upset a number of other reviewers, in many instances the statistics speak for themselves. I do not feel that Bonekemper denigrated the sincerity, courage or devotion to the cause of either General Lee, or any of the other Confederate officers and men. My major objection to Mr. Bonekemper's writing was his continual misuse of the word "reticent" when he meant "reluctant."

I recently came across this book, but have long agreed with it's premise. I think that the others reviewers who call this book revisionist, or monday morning quarterbacking are missing the point. First, Lee missed the biggest and most obvious military lesson from a man to whom he was related by marriage - George Washington. Washington was not the tactician Lee was, but he understood that in fighting for independence from a numerically superior foe, all you need do is survive long enough to tire out the enemy. You don't even need to win any battle, just make sure that your army stays in the field. Even territory, for the most part, is irrelevant, except in a symbolic sense. Some people may not see it, but the Revolutionary War, was largely a guerilla war. Northern opinion was sharply divided throughout the was and the South really never took advantage of this fact.

Second, the revisionist history is that which was propagated soon after Lee's death by the anti-Longstreet cabal, led initially by Gen. Early. That is what has become accepted as "history", in spite of all the evidence to the contrary, because the South needed something coming out of the was to have pride in. Lee sybolized that.

I do, on the other hand, think that the author's anti-Lee attitude comes out a little too much. His cause would have been better served with a more neutral tone. I disagree with his idea that Lee should have resigned in late '64, when it was apparent that a military defeat was inevitable, especially after Lincoln's re-election. That thought pre-supposes modern values that did not exist in the mid 19th century. The idea of the cavalier fighting the good fight was still a very real ideal at that time. There was no way Lee was going to walk away while the cause still possessed the ability to fight on.

However, in spite to the tone, I found the book to be mostly well reasoned, and supported by the evidence. Either way, a definite read for any Civil War enthusiast. If nothing else, it's great conversation fodder.

Robert E. Lee is not the reason the South lost its war. Aside from that, Bonekemper shows, in numbers, why Lee failed to win that war. This is an argumentative book, a myth-buster assaulting one of the great Legends of the War of the Rebellion between the States, Robert E. Lee. Bonekemper repeatedly pounds home the same points, campaign after campaign, battle after battle. Tactically, (1) Lee too often attempted head-on attacks, rather than follow "Stonewall" Jackson's adaptation to the superiority of the defense by maneuver and out-flanking (cf. W. T. Sherman). (2) He did not supervise well the execution of his plans, they were overly complicated, and too subject to interpretation to boot. Strategically, (3) Lee was too aggressive by invading the North, when the South only had to not lose. (4) I found his most striking point to be that Gen. Lee was a general from Virginia and for Virginia, begger the Confederacy. Lee sucked the western Confederacy dry of food and men, even as it collapsed under the pounding of Grant and then Sherman, who kept their eyes on the big prize. Bonekemper's points are strong and forcefully expressed. Not only does he analyze Lee against his four criteria, but deals, in an appendix, with the creators of the myth and legend of Robert E. Lee, as a cover for the incompetence of two of his corps commanders. The other conclusion of interest to me was his characterization of Gen. John Bell Hood as a disciple of Lee, who took Lee's military vices to their greatest extreme. Hood lost more Rebels in a frontal assault on a single day at Franklin, TN, than did Lee on the 3rd day of Gettysburg, and then lost the last western Rebel army to successive, massive flank attacks at Nashville.

This book is original in its construction but not in its sources, which are all secondary or tertiary. That is not really a problem, since Bonekemper is constructing a singular hypothesis. He does supply illuminating anecdotes while also using actual statistics compiled after the war. The one on which he keys his conclusions is the loss/kill ratio: not the absolute numbers of killed, wounded, and captured, but the relative PERCENTAGES of Confederate vs, Union losses in each battle and overall. His central proposition is that losses were almost always unfavorable to the aggressive Rebels, who could least afford them simply because of their smaller population, only 1/4 that of the North. He hints how close the South came to unseating Lincoln, if only they had had the men to persevere, abetted by pacifist McLellan and his Democratic and press backers. Bonekemper has more felicitously developed the themes he began here in later books on Grant and McLellan.

This book is written in the style of an amateur enthusiast, and published by a small press almost as if from a home printer. It contains a few contemporary illustrations, and tables of data, but no maps (consult for example, H. J. Holmguist's Battle Maps of the Civil War, Yucca Tree Press). It only makes sense if you already know a bit about the Civil War, or have an adulatory account of Lee as a foil. This slim volume is the springboard from which Bonekemper has gone on to fuller studies of the participants, issued from bigger publishers, with maps.

How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War by Edward H Bonekemper is an interesting book whichgoes too far to prove its point. In overstating his case that Lee was responsible for the Confederate failure, Bonekemper belief that Lee was not the military genius that history has made him is lost.

The central thesis is that Lee's offensive strategy, combined with overly complicated battle plans,led to the destruction of the Confederate Army and their inability to respond to Grant's offensive

strategy in '84 and '85. There is much evidence for the proposition that the offensive strategy bleed the Confederacy to the point where Lee was forced to retreat to Richmond. There is also much evidence to support the proposition that most of Lee's victories resulting in a higher percentage of casualties then suffered by the Union were phyric, at best. The most obvious fact is that the Union could absorb the losses and the South could not.

Whether a change in strategy would have resulted in a Confederate victory is an open question. However, given the political nature of the war, and the Northern war weariness, Lee's ability to continue to bleed the North could not have helped Lincoln get reelected.

Lee forgot that he did not have to win, just not lose. If there had been more Frederickburgs and less Chancellorvilles, both Lee "victories", Lee may have not lost. Bonekemper does a fine job bringing these issues to the forefront. If for only this reason, this is a worthwhile book.

Southerners should read this book -- and weep. It finally tells the truth about Lee, who was a mediocre General, at best. If you want to understand why Lee was a terrible general, take a look at Malvern Hill, a battle in which he was decisively crushed because he had no understanding whatever of offensive tactics. Lee marched light infantry uphill against an entrenched superior enemy with concentrated artillery and lost thousands of men in the process. Did Bobby learn anything from this decisive defeat? Why, no, not at all; he repeated exactly the same mistake at Gettysburg, with even more bloody, devastating consequences.

Lee's "perfect battle," was of course, Stonewall's perfect battle, and what it demonstrates most clearly is that it's better to be lucky than it is to be good. Lee was forced to divide his force in the face of a superior enemy at Chancellorsville because he foolishly allowed himself to be surrounded. Luckily, he was saved by the fact that Joe Hooker was thoroughly concussed early in the fight, and company and brigade level commanders in his rearguard were completely incompetent. Had they heeded the warnings of their pickets and scouts that Stonewall's Corp had divided -- against all sound military tactic and common sense -- and were coming into the backside of the union army, the war would have ended in the East right then and there.

Longstreet -- Lee's best general -- summed Lee's limitations up perfectly: "He was matchless in defense." Of course he was: military dogma in the 19th century (perfected by Napoleon) demanded that attacking armies possessed 3-4 times numerical superiority over defenders, a numerical supremacy never enjoyed by Northern forces. And note the condemnation of thundering silence in Longstreet's assessment of Lee's offensive capability. Of _course_ Lee looked great on defense: with the advantage of home turf (huge in days without effective communications and no GPS or satellite), interior lines, practical -- if not actual -- tactical numerical superiority, and largely dilatory or cowardly opposition until Grant arrived, only a complete boob could consistently have lost. But strategically, Lee was a complete failure. Failing to understand the limitations of his army and his Corp Commanders, to say nothing of himself, he repeatedly attacked Northern Armies in situations with little or no strategic value, and when he finally encountered Grant -- a man willing to do what was necessary to win -- his overreach was disastrous as he repeatedly attacked a superior enemy driving him deeper and deeper into a trap. Make no mistake: contrary to what some revisionists have argued about Lee wanting to spare his men further hardship at Appomattox, such was NOT in the LEAST the case. Lee had ONE, and only one alternative to surrender at Appomattox: annihilation.

Lee's own gracelessness is best described by Bobby Lee himself. Asked who his greatest adversary was he replied "McClellan, by all accounts." A mean-spirited low-life to the end, Lee would never admit that the man who had thoroughly kicked his butt, US Grant, was by far the greatest general of the Civil War.

This and subsequent books by this author attempt to rectify a terrible injustice which Northerners allowed to be inflicted on America: that to the extent that the slavemasters had failed, we could afford to be magnanimous, allowing them their illusions. We should not have. Much of American History has been falsified by Shelby Foote and his kind. The South lost the war, and Robert E. Lee was one of the reasons.

A very good look without the usual contant of how great R.E. Lee was. The book delevers an inseight to the way Lee wasted his army by envolvement in a war he tried to General that had weapons and methods that he did not adapt himself needed to win the war. Lee used attrack when he should have used defend. Lee viewed the North used deadly frontal attcks time after time and did not learn the death and destruction of this, he then used the same methods to use up his Army and the South. Before reading the book it was felt that Lee was questionable but after the book his actions are now confirmed that he did not belong as the leader of the south. Feel strongly thathe relationship between Davis and Lee is what keep Lee in command.

After reading "How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War" you'll know a lot about the key battles and military leaders in the American Civil War. As the title promises, you'll also come away from the book knowing why the South lost. The author makes his arguments convincingly, laying out numerous examples of how Lee's aggressiveness led to a prolonged battle of attrition that the Confederacy was destined to lose. Civil War buffs and neophytes alike will probably enjoy the summaries of the main battles in the war: Seven Days', Antietam, Gettysburg, etc. But truth be told, this enjoyment may have its limits, as some of the descriptions can be quite hard to follow.

I think the strongest part of the book is its first appendix: "Historians' Treatment of Lee". The author demonstrates a broad understanding of the conclusions, both positive and negative, that other historians have reached regarded General Lee. In eight tight pages you'll get a sweeping and very educational lesson about the 135 years of written analysis on Robert E. Lee. The remainder of the book is interesting, but it left me wishing that I had read a more balanced analysis. I don't doubt that the author's arguments are sound. I just wished that there were a few more counter-arguments to help keep things in perspective.