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Howlin' Mad Vs. the Army : Conflict in Command, Saipan 1944

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Marine Corps Lt. Gen. H.M. "Howlin' Mad" Smith, Commander of V Amphibious Corps on June 15, 1944 lead the assault against Saipan in the Marianas. Ashore was the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions, who suffered sufficiently heavy initial casualties to commit the Army 27th Division. The three divisions advanced eastward across the waist of the island. Leaving only two battalions of the 27th (one said to be under strength) to destroy the enemy in the southeastern part of the island, H.M. Smith pivoted the two Marine Divisions and the bulk of the 27th in a line advancing north. The 27th was now assigned the center of the line facing the central highlands. By the eighth day of the battle for Saipan, the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions had advanced rapidly on each side of the island. The 27th lagged far behind, creating a "U" shaped front and the threat of open flanks for both Marine Divisions. The elements of the 27th left in the southeast were likewise making little progress. Whether these developments were due to the Army facing the enemy on far more difficult terrain and defended by greater numbers, is the subject matter of Gailey's book. On June 24, H.M. Smith, without any reconnaissance by members of Corps staff, relieved his subordinate, Maj. Gen. Ralph Smith. The resulting furor in the media caused a firestorm and increased the inter-services resentment.

Tracing H.M. Smith's bitterness to his earlier experience with the 27th on Makin, Gailey skillfully builds a case against Howlin Mad. In fairness, this book should be read together with H.M. Smith's "Coral and Brass". That autobiographical work was written largely as an explanation of the dismissal. It is beyond the scope of this review to compare the two divergent views but, by and large, one is left with the conviction that the accepted historical view is based more upon the preconceptions of the Hearst Newspapers and Time Magazine and not fact. Like MacArthur, it would appear that Howlin' enjoyed the favor of the press.

H.M. Smith was a genius at training, tactics and logistics. His service to his country and the Corps can not be overstated. His ability as a field commander is not as clear. Gailey has done much to restore the name of Ralph Smith and the men of the 27th Division who subsequently had to carry the stigma of cowards when they later fought on Okinawa.

Harry Gailey has authored an articulate expose, really, which peels away the years of distrotion and myth that have grown out of this unfortunate incident (the Smith vs Smith controversy, in which Marine Lt General Holland Smith relieved his subordinate, Major General Ralph Smith, USA, of command at Saipan). Orignially Gailey had heard from Edmund Love, the 27th Infantry Division historian, that it was common knowledge amongst those of the 27th that MG Ralph Smith was unjustly relieved (the 27th ID was Ralph Smith's division). Without going into detail about the how's and why's of the book, suffice it to say that this book gives a revealing critique of the marine General, the events leading up to Saipan which shaped his opinions, and a systematic demolition of the rumor that the 27th troops were cowardly and inept. It also provides the day-to-day history of the fighting, the heaviest of which fell on the 27th. This is a true story of interservice hatreds and should be back in print.

Charles ziembo misses the point of why Professor Gailley wrote this book. Prior to "Howlin' Mad Versus the Army", people who wrote about Saipan accepted HM Smith's version of Saipan as the one true version of Saipan. No one ever cited any Army source, such as Edmund Love's history of the 27th Infantry Division or tried to talk to any Army officer involved in the incident.

As Professor Gailey points out, HM Smith had never commanded troops in battle prior to Saipan, made a number of errors on Saipan, and blamed the Army Division and its Commander for everything that went wrong on Saipan.

I first learned of this book as a History Book Club selection almost 20 years ago, although I didn't purchase it at the time. Oddly enough, the subject of the dispute over the relief of Army General Smith on Saipan by Marine General Smith is discussed of all places in David Hackett Fischer's excellent book on American cultural patterns, Albion's Seed, which I recently read. My interest was heightened when I checked the short treatment of the episode in Forrest Pogue's authoritative biography of General Marshall. As a result, I obtained Gailey's book in used form and I wasn't disappointed.

More than the extensive treatment of the tactical issues involved in the relief, I was fascinated by the author's fine discussion of the interservice differences and problems of command and coordination. In the Smith-Smith conflict, these were much exacerbated by the choleric temperment of Marine Gen. Smith as contrasted with the more phlegmatic disposition of his Army subordinate. Gailey is quite clearly a partisan of Army General Ralph Smith, but always states his case fairly and with abundant evidence and documentation. Importantly, Gailey never allows his arguments to degenerate into an attack on the Marine Corps, although he decidedly sees Gen. Holland Smith's overidentification with his own branch of service as a marked handicap in his ability to credibly handle large units from both services optimally.

Two individuals who receive notable secondary praise are General Marshall and Admiral Nimitz, each of whom approached the dispute reasonably and temperately in an effort to contain its explosive adverse potential and prevent future recurrences to the detriment of the war effort. This is contrasted with the author's view of Admirals King, Spruance and Kelly Turner (and perhaps General Richardson), each of whom is portrayed as engaging in partisan turf protection, although in Richardson's case, justifiably so. Reading Howlin' Mad vs. the Army led me to appreciate how much better interservice relations have been managed since 1944 by MacArthur (in both the latter part of the Pacific War and Korea) and Gen. Schwartzkopf in the First Gulf War. There is a fundamental difference of philosophy and many attitudes among the Army and Marine Corps, but cooperation is as possible as it is necessary. Harry Gailey's book demonstrates what can happen when that necessity falls victim to other considerations, particularly service chauvinism.

I encountered CORAL AND BRASS before "HOWLIN' MAD" VS. THE ARMY, and gave both a thorough reading. Despite his advanced age, Holland Smith did not bring wide command experience to the Pacific. Stronger in theory than in practice, his approach to actual combat suffered, accordingly. He showed poor judgment at Saipan, and at Iwo. I agree completely that Ralph Smith was treated shabbily. He was the better field commander. Gailey's work, here, is superb.

Jim O'Dell
Military Historian
Camarillo, CA

I went into Howlin' Mad Vs the Army with a bias against Gen H. M. Smith - I was familiar with his reputation for having a nasty temper and I was unimpressed with what I had read of his part in the battle for Iwo Jima (refusing to commit the reserve as a unit when it was requested). However reading this book had the opposite effect on me: I was annoyed by the obvious bias in favor of the hapless General Ralph Smith and the author's lack of knowledge of combat command requirements. A combat commander is responsible for the performance of his command, period. H.M. Smith was responsible for the rapid and complete seizure of Saipan. It and the other islands of the Marianas were needed as bases to attack the Japanese mainland and waiting and "starving the Japanese out" was never an option. If H.M. Smith had tolerated an unaggressive commander, he would have been derelict in his duties. I also have absolutely no doubt that H. M. Smith would have relieved any Marine commander who didn't perform.

The author confuses amphibious training with combat training. He describes the relatively good amphibious training the 27th received in Hawaii and en route as if it was everything that they needed yet there is no discussion of the training that they should have had as infantry. They started out as a guard force on Hawaii - where and when did Gen. Ralph Smith ensure that they built their basic skills as riflemen or fire supporters or as integrated companies, battalions, or regiments? From their combat history, it is apparent that the 27h was deficient in training but long in excuses.

The author never compares the day-by-day casualties sustained between the regiments as a measure of their comparative intensities of combat. The author never interviewed any of the Marine commanders. All the author did was take the side of the aggrieved 27th and General Ralph Smith and litter the story with innuendo against General H.M. Smith and alibis for the slow progress of the army units.

Sorry - I'm not buying it. I'll look somewhere else for the definitive treatment of this conflict in command.

I read this book right after I had read "A Fighting General" by Norman Cooper, a bio of General Holland Smith. Mr. Gailey's book is a fine description of both Generals Smith and the problems and bad feelings between the army, navy and marines in the pacific during the war. However, I found Mr. Gailey tended to favor army general Ralph Smith's side over that of general Holland Smith. Perhaps this was due to the author's having had the chance to personally interview Ralph Smith but not Holland Smith. Gailey's admiration for Ralph Smith is apparent throughout the book. If you wish to get both sides of this story and learn the real reason Holland Smith relieved the army general I recommend Dr. Cooper's bio of Holland Smith. He devotes many pages to the controversy and presents both sides of the argument. Both books are well-worth the read. And, if you're really into this, by all means read Holland Smith's "Coral and Brass."