Customer Reviews

Human Knowledge and Human Nature: A New Introduction to an Ancient Debate

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"The overall conclusion of this book" (p. 193) is a defence of empiricism against rationalism, a conclusion which Carruthers immediately undermines as follows.

"Indeed, there is a strong case for saying that an empiricist should now accept the existence of innate information-bearing mental structures ... as well as the innateness of at least some concepts and some knowledge. Yet empiricism may still retain its traditional opposition to platonism, and more generally to the idea that we can obtain substantive knowledge by reason alone." (pp. 193-194).

This seems nonsensical. Isn't the virtual definition of innateness that "we can obtain substantive knowledge by reason alone"? Let's look at the argument behind these claims.

The argument is that "empiricists should have no objection to evolutionary versions of nativism" (p. 143), but that Carruthers cannot see how rationalist claims can be secured in evolutionary terms. Now, this could be due to a problem with *either* rationalism *or* Carruthers' armchair evolutionary theory. Since Carruthers naively assumes his evolutionary theory to be perfect, blame falls on rationalism.

For example, the rationalist is challenged "to provide a naturalistic account of how the process through which we acquire beliefs about the abstract realm may be a reliable one" (p. 145). It is assumed that a failure to do so is a failure for rationalism, not a failure for Carruthers' amateurish evolutionary theory. The type of "account" Carruthers has in mind is something like this: "it might be said that mathematical truths ... [may] enable you to work out what would be a sufficient store of food to see your family through a winter" (pp. 149-150).

But why should selection for mathematics have to do with some easily specifiable food problem? Why should the selection not be some complicated interaction involving several factors such as reproductive games which are known to be extremely complicated? Why indeed should evolution operate only in steps that small minds like Carruthers' can grasp?

Carruthers' entire argument is based on the assumption that his amateurish armchair evolutionary theory says everything we could ever know about human nature and innateness. If this assumption is removed, nothing remains of his argument. This is essentially conceded when it is argued that classical rationalism was defendable given "the poorly developed state of science at the time, in particular from the absence of any sort of theory of evolutionary selection" (p. 143). But the possibility that Carruthers' own brand of armchair evolution is "poorly developed" is never considered.

Having read numerous philosophical books on epistemology, I can confidently say that Carruthers' book is among the best. Written with startling clarity and minimal philosophical jargon, Professor Carruthers offers a compelling naturalistic approach to epistemology based on a foundation of evolutionary nativism. He shows how traditional empiricists such as Hume unnecessarily rejected innate structures shaping knowledge acquisition only because the theory of Darwinian evolution was not yet available. The book considers the nature and origins of knowledge, provides careful critiques of traditional rationalism and Mathematical Platonism, and a convincing naturalistic resolution to the problem of induction. He ends supporting an empiricist epistemology which incorporates innate structures guiding knowledge acquistion (specifically inference to the best explanation). Carruthers powerfully demonstrates how evolutionary ideas can provide resolution to deep philosophical issues that have engaged philosophers since antiquity. The book is a gem.

Yon Fishman, PhD in Neuroscience