Hume's Abject Failure: The Argument Against Miracles [Paperback]

John Earman (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: November 23, 2000 | ISBN-10: 0195127382 | ISBN-13: 978-0195127386

This vital study offers a new interpretation of Hume's famous "Of Miracles," which notoriously argues against the possibility of miracles. By situating Hume's popular argument in the context of the eighteenth-century debate on miracles, Earman shows Hume's argument to be largely unoriginal and chiefly without merit where it is original. Yet Earman constructively conceives how progress can be made on the issues that Hume's essay so provocatively posed about the ability of eyewitness testimony to establish the credibility of marvelous and miraculous events.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Unlike so many who have gone before, Earman does not merely intend to expose Hume's fallacies. His aim is to sketch an epistemology that allows for both the possibility of miracles and a healthy skepticism toward miracle claims--twin goals that many theists also embrace. As a whole, this is a very good book."--Philosophia Christi

"[the] argument itself is very clear, very cogent, and very apposite to present debates."--Mind

About the Author

John Earman is at University of Pittsburgh.

Product Details

• Paperback: 232 pages
• Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA (November 23, 2000)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0195127382
• ISBN-13: 978-0195127386
• Product Dimensions: 6.1 x 0.7 x 9.2 inches
• Shipping Weight: 12.6 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.4 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (9 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #631,143 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

31 of 41 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Excellent Application of Probability Theory June 5, 2006

By John DePoe

Format:Paperback

John Earman has written a wonderful book that shows the value of using the precision of probability theory to bring clarity to a murky issue. Long have certain philosophers marvelled at David Hume's essay, "On Miracles," supposing it to be an original and creative refutation of believing in miracles. Earman shows that Hume's arguments are neither original nor sound at establishing his pessimistic outlook on miracles. Moreover, using probability calculus, Earman is able to establish clearly that Hume's argument is a failure. In fact, Earman shows that many of Hume's contemporaries were familiar with probabilistic reasoning and were able to demonstrate Hume was wrong within in his own lifetime. So, not only was Hume wrong, but his failure cannot be attributed to the lack of development of inductive reasoning in his time. Earman works hard trying to understand what exactly Hume meant by examining Hume's personal letters and the developments of Hume's essay as it was published in various editions. After several attempts to read Hume charitably, Earman finds Hume's application of probabilistic reasoning is muddled and confused, at best. Furthermore, Earman shows that if Hume was right, this would spell disaster for inductive reasoning that confirms (or disconfirms) scientific reasoning. Those who endorse Hume's argument against miracles are supporting a line of reasoning that would eqully undermine science.

Earman's book is commendable for a number of reasons. First, it is a first-rate work in philosophy that is written clearly. Earman's rigor coupled with his readable prose make for a rewarding study. Second, this book makes significant contribution to Humean scholarship where Earman convincingly argues for various ways to interpret Hume, which he substantiates with cross-referencing the work of Hume and his interaction with his contemporaries. Third, the book is a powerful lesson in probability theory (especially Bayesianism). Some background in probabilistic reasoning may be needed to understand parts of the book, but even a cursory knowledge of probability theory will be nourished by Earman's work. Fourth, this book puts forward some substantial theories relevant to philosophy of religion, especially the nature of miracles. Fifth, the second half of the book is filled with important sources on the 18th century deist controversy, which are invaluable to studying probability and confirmation of miraculous events by eyewitness testimony. For those who find these issues to be important and wish to get a better handle on how to think clearly through these issues, this book will be a welcome piece of scholarship.

45 of 61 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars A Very Badly Needed Book December 18, 2001

By Prof. Dr John Warwick Montgomery (London, England et Strasbourg, France)

Format:Paperback

Introductory philosophy courses in college or university invariably include Hume's argument against miracles in the philosophy of religion unit to convince students that one cannot use evidence of miracles (such as the resurrection of Christ) to argue for metaphysical truths. Of course, Hume's argument SHOULD be included in the course--but in the LOGIC section as an archetypal piece of bad reasoning. Finally, a professional philosopher--who is by no means a Christian believer--has done a thoroughgoing scholarly critique of Hume's argument, showing beyond all question that the argument is perfectly circular: Hume, with a pre-Einsteinian, 18th century mindset, assumes that "uniform experience" exists against miracles and concludes--surprise, surprise--that no evidence can ever be effectively marshalled to prove that a miracle has really occurred. This book should be read by every naive philosophical rationalist. It will open epistemological doors to a new appreciation of the potential of miracle arguments as a prime support to claims for a genuine, historical incarnation.

14 of 19 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Outstanding Piece of Scholarship May 17, 2007

By Reader From Aurora

Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase

In Hume's Abject Failure - The Argument against Miracles, John Earman offers a cogent and comprehensive refutation of Hume's argument against miracles originally published as "On Miracles" in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.

Hume's contention is that given the "unique" nature of miracles no human testimony can suffice to render them credible - i.e. day-to-day experience necessarily trumps claims of the miraculous or novel. This argument has provoked interesting and occasionally heated discussion throughout the years. While containing some apparent truisms - such as the need for good reasons in an evidentiary construct and the gullibility of people- Hume's claims are generally viewed as being overstated. In criticising Hume, Earman is not arguing for the truth of any alleged miracles, rather he is contending that Hume's attempt to dismiss miracles a priori is unwarranted. It is interesting to consider the implications of Hume's assertion if it were true - much modern scientific theory such as quantum mechanics or Darwinism would be decimated. Some commentators have tried to minimize this logical extension by arguing that science deals with a different subject matter and as a consequence is immune from this criticism- this seems contrived and unconvincing.

Though not original in his assessment of Hume's failure, Earman's exposition of the issue is the most comprehensive and well articulated that I have encountered. He highlights two important factors that likely contributed to Hume's failure, an inadequate understanding of inductive argumentation and wishful thinking. With regard to former, Earman highlights many of Hume's shortcomings and in the process does a nice job in explaining Bayesian probability.

While, in regard to wishful thinking, seeing what we believe is not unique to Hume. It seems evident that reason can be skewed by belief and emotion. Arguments concerning ethics or faith issues are particularly notorious in this regard. As Earman notes, faith positions (e.g. naturalism or atheism) often seems to play a role in defences of Hume's argument against miracles. It is interesting that at the outset Earman feels compelled to state his lack of theistic belief - in an apparent effort to diffuse similar criticism.

This small book (approx. 200 pages) is divided into two parts. In the first part, Earman lays out his case, while the second part is comprised of various historic writings that pertain to the issue. These extracts include "On Miracles" and various other historic criticisms of Hume's. I find this structure very helpful - not having to go back and forth to primary sources. Aside from the lucidness of Earman's argument I was especially impressed by the quality of thought exhibited by some of Hume's early critics whom I had not previously encountered, Price is especially impressive.

Overall, this is an outstanding book. I highly recommend it to students of philosophical history and the philosophy of religion.