If We Can Keep It is the latest in the series of monographs sponsored by the Straus Military Reform Project of the World Security Institute's Center for Defense Information. Unlike other publications now coming out on the Iraq War and the counterinsurgency campaign there, retired Air Force Col. Chet Richards rejects the notion that policy-makers can predict how well any such effort will work. The track record of military occupations in culturally and religiously alien lands in modern times is not good in terms of the end result for the occupier, the effects on the indigenous population, and the standing of the occupying nation and army in the eyes of the rest of the world. The next U.S. administration, whether Republican or Democrat, should not think that we have discovered, with the Pentagon's counterinsurgency doctrine, an effective policy tool for reshaping the world, or even the rogue nations in it. Richards explores alternatives to the invade-occupy-fight paradigm and draws some surprising, important and instructive conclusions about what future forces and weapons should look like if America is to survive on its own terms in the world.
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By John Robb
The US spends more on defense than the rest of the world combined: a staggering sum of more than $0.75 Trillion (on an "all in" basis that includes hidden costs like the care of veterans) a year. It also, given the extremely competitive global economic environment we find ourselves in, runs counter to the great lesson of the Cold War: you cannot sacrifice long term economic success for short term military superiority (as the Soviets found out).
So what should the right size of the US Defense system be, given the threats we currently face today and may face tomorrow?
Chet argues that the amount of conventional military force necessary to defend the US is substantially smaller than it is today. All of the tasks we may undertake, from war with other states to counter-proliferation to counter-terrorism to counter-insurgency, require only a small fraction of the military forces we currently field.
He does make one exception though: wars of national liberation. He argues that wars of national liberation to oust foreign occupiers (where we are the occupiers) is the only scenario where large armies are required. However, since his review of the historical evidence demonstrates that these wars cannot be won by the occupier and that there is little to be gained by doing so in the first place, we should configure our foreign policy to avoid them. If we do so, we would then be free to right-size our forces to meet the real threats to our national security.
In his final section, Chet makes the case that a much small conventional force (Marines + special ops + air assets + some strategic) in addition to beefed up diplomacy and intelligence functions would cost much less than what we are currently spending (~$300 billion a year) but offer us much more security.
So what should the right size of the US Defense system be, given the threats we currently face today and may face tomorrow?
Chet argues that the amount of conventional military force necessary to defend the US is substantially smaller than it is today. All of the tasks we may undertake, from war with other states to counter-proliferation to counter-terrorism to counter-insurgency, require only a small fraction of the military forces we currently field.
He does make one exception though: wars of national liberation. He argues that wars of national liberation to oust foreign occupiers (where we are the occupiers) is the only scenario where large armies are required. However, since his review of the historical evidence demonstrates that these wars cannot be won by the occupier and that there is little to be gained by doing so in the first place, we should configure our foreign policy to avoid them. If we do so, we would then be free to right-size our forces to meet the real threats to our national security.
In his final section, Chet makes the case that a much small conventional force (Marines + special ops + air assets + some strategic) in addition to beefed up diplomacy and intelligence functions would cost much less than what we are currently spending (~$300 billion a year) but offer us much more security.
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