Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) [Paperback]

Peter Unger (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: January 8, 1979 | ISBN-10: 0198244177 | ISBN-13: 978-0198244172

In these challenging pages, Unger argues for the extreme skeptical view that, not only can nothing ever be known, but no one can ever have any reason at all for anything. A consequence of this is that we cannot ever have any emotions about anything: no one can ever be happy or sad about anything. Finally, in this reduction to absurdity of virtually all our supposed thought, he argues that no one can ever believe, or even say, that anything is the case.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Oxford University Press has done well to reissue Ignorance, Peter Unger's first book in epistemology. Unger follows the argument to great depth, wherever it may lead, and the reader who follows along will be amply rewarded, which shows how impressively fresh and relevant this work remains after all these years."--Ernest Sosa, Brown University and Rutgers University.

"A powerful and profoundly original skeptical challenge. What you have to know-but if Unger is right, you don't-about ignorance. Anyone serious about epistemology should read it."--Fred Dretske, emeritus, Stanford University.

"A profoundly rewarding work, this is one of the most important studies in epistemology of the last fifty years. It should be read by any serious student in that field."--John Hawthorne, Rutgers University.

"Ignorance is, in my opinion, the best book in epistemology to appear in the last thirty years. It would be good for epistemology if every graduate student entering the field read and studied this classic."--Keith DeRose, Yale University.

About the Author

Peter Unger is Professor of Philosophy at New York University. He is the author of Philosophical Relativity (1984, OUP 2002), Identity, Consciousness, and Value (OUP 1990), and Living High and Letting Die (OUP 1996).

Product Details

• Paperback: 323 pages
• Publisher: Clarendon Press/Oxford (January 8, 1979)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0198244177
• ISBN-13: 978-0198244172
• Product Dimensions: 9 x 6.1 x 0.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (5 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,051,003 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

34 of 38 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Skepticism, No Holds Barred, January 11, 2004

By 

S. Guha (Redmond, Washington United States) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism (Clarendon Library of Logic & Philosophy) (Hardcover)

I write this review to counterbalance the arrogant schmuck who calls Unger's excellent work an "insult to reason". Unger is wrong, I think, and more than a little wacky. But *reason* involves certain intellectual virtues, one of which is fairness; it is not fair to a book, or its author, to dismiss it on the basis of its dust jacket--at least not if the author is a well-respected philosopher, as Unger is.

As someone who has read *past* the dust jacket, I can say unequivocally that Unger is a first-rate philosopher, and this book is a first-rate defense of radical skepticism. Philosophical dogmatists of all stripes (and I include myself here) should be willing to test their mettle against the skeptic, and no-one else that I know of has presented the skeptical stance so forcefully and uncompromisingly as Unger, including even Sextus Empiricus. Of *course* Unger is well aware that his position may seem self-refuting, and he tries to deal with that problem in the book. One may judge his defense inadequate, *if one has read it*. But even if Unger's position turns out to be self-refuting--which I think is not at all obvious to anyone who actually reads the book and understands his views--his skeptical arguments confront all the rest of us non-skeptics. (I won't try to summarize these arguments here, for that would do injustice to their subtle presentation in the book.) Maybe *all* current positions are self-refuting (including mine). Maybe *every* current and past philosophy ends up undermining itself. Maybe, as Unger argues, the very notions of truth, reason, and knowledge are incoherent. If so, it's cold comfort if Unger's position is self-refuting. Unger's book is a call--whether well-founded or misguided--for radical reform of our basic philosophical ideas, theories, and practices. Unger may be wrong--if so, we can always disagree with him--but he is not obviously wrong. Since philosophy has not been a smashing theoretical (or practical!) success to date--philosophers can't seem to agree amongst themselves about anything to speak of, after all--it seems hasty to dismiss such a call out of hand. After all, our attempts to understand the notions of truth, rationality, and knowledge to date have run into numerous paradoxes and contradictions. Maybe these notions *don't* make sense. Maybe radical change is called for, and Unger has the key to it. Even if this is not so, we do not lessen Unger's abilities by insulting them. We merely lessen ourselves.

2 of 3 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Excellent Explanation of a Dead End View, June 10, 2008

By 

Lichanos - See all my reviews

This review is from: Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) (Paperback)

I read this book as an undergraduate philosophy student when it was published, and I give it four stars because it is well written, entertaining, and a thorough, rigorous, and unflinching defense of scepticism. If you subscribe to the metaphysical dogmas of "ordinary language analysis" and fellow-traveler schools of epistemology, you will get a kick out of this book.

As a guide to the issues of what we know and how we know it, I would class this book as an excellent example of why so many people think philosophers are over-educated idiots wasting time by blowing hot air. The book is totally within the confines of a certain way of doing theory of knowledge, the dominant way among English-speaking philosophers. That doesn't mean it's the RIGHT way! As with much in the history of philosophy, I believe that this topic will gradually be addressed by more scientific approaches (physics used to be philosophy, too!) and this abstract, logic-based analysis will give way to real investigation and experiment. This means that we will begin to redefine the term "knowledge" by examining how organisms that appear to know things actually get that way.

Like most philosophers, Unger assumes he knows what knowledge is, and he goes on to demonstrate how we all "know" nothing. Perhaps so, but hardly relevant if the definition of "knowledge" is arbitrary or wrong to begin with. The traditional dichotomy between knowledge-belief isn't germane if you examine the question from the standpoint of evolution and neurobiology.

This book, like most treatments of the topic, assumes that animals know nothing (Can a dog know how to do a trick? Is a dog subject to this sceptical nihilism? If there is no knowledge, why does a dog "learn" to do tricks anyway?) and that the only kind of knowledge worth talking about is logical propositions, e.g., "There is a table there." I recall making the objection in my class that Unger's arguments were irrelevant regarding the statement, "I know how to walk," and being treated to a condescending reply along the lines of, "Well, that's not what we're talking about here." Maybe we should be.

0 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Is skepticism useful?, October 18, 2006

By 

Robert Jones (Emporia, Kansas USA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) (Paperback)

Following Russell (Human Knowledge: its scope and limits)I agree that
all knowledge is of an approximate character and always will be. But
I think that something like Pascal's wager can be applied here. Pascal
suggested that there was little to lose if you were a theist and proven
wrong but much to be gained if proven right. Conversely, there
was much to lose if you were an atheist and proven wrong but little to
gain if you were an atheist and proven right. Similarly, I would argue
that in being a skeptic there is little for you to gain if you are right
or wrong. On the other hand, if you are a scientific realist and proven
wrong you lose nothing you wouldn't lose anyway. But if you are a
realist and proven right there is all of modern science and technology.
It doesn't matter what is behind appearances, be it quarks, strings,
or demons. In both cases we are seeking ways of manipulating WHATEVER
is out there for our own advantage. If fuzing atoms and moving charges proves useful I'll "believe" in physics. If bringing sacrifices and
making prayers works I'll "believe" in demons/gods. I choose science
for the time being because moving charges is working for me. What is
lacking in Unger's book is any way in which his skepticism can work for
me. Which sacrifices should I bring to which god? How can I get the
mad scientist to do for me what I want him to? The question for
skepticism is, "What's in it for me?"