Customer Reviews

Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy)

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1 star:		(2)

 

 

I write this review to counterbalance the arrogant schmuck who calls Unger's excellent work an "insult to reason". Unger is wrong, I think, and more than a little wacky. But *reason* involves certain intellectual virtues, one of which is fairness; it is not fair to a book, or its author, to dismiss it on the basis of its dust jacket--at least not if the author is a well-respected philosopher, as Unger is.

As someone who has read *past* the dust jacket, I can say unequivocally that Unger is a first-rate philosopher, and this book is a first-rate defense of radical skepticism. Philosophical dogmatists of all stripes (and I include myself here) should be willing to test their mettle against the skeptic, and no-one else that I know of has presented the skeptical stance so forcefully and uncompromisingly as Unger, including even Sextus Empiricus. Of *course* Unger is well aware that his position may seem self-refuting, and he tries to deal with that problem in the book. One may judge his defense inadequate, *if one has read it*. But even if Unger's position turns out to be self-refuting--which I think is not at all obvious to anyone who actually reads the book and understands his views--his skeptical arguments confront all the rest of us non-skeptics. (I won't try to summarize these arguments here, for that would do injustice to their subtle presentation in the book.) Maybe *all* current positions are self-refuting (including mine). Maybe *every* current and past philosophy ends up undermining itself. Maybe, as Unger argues, the very notions of truth, reason, and knowledge are incoherent. If so, it's cold comfort if Unger's position is self-refuting. Unger's book is a call--whether well-founded or misguided--for radical reform of our basic philosophical ideas, theories, and practices. Unger may be wrong--if so, we can always disagree with him--but he is not obviously wrong. Since philosophy has not been a smashing theoretical (or practical!) success to date--philosophers can't seem to agree amongst themselves about anything to speak of, after all--it seems hasty to dismiss such a call out of hand. After all, our attempts to understand the notions of truth, rationality, and knowledge to date have run into numerous paradoxes and contradictions. Maybe these notions *don't* make sense. Maybe radical change is called for, and Unger has the key to it. Even if this is not so, we do not lessen Unger's abilities by insulting them. We merely lessen ourselves.

I read this book as an undergraduate philosophy student when it was published, and I give it four stars because it is well written, entertaining, and a thorough, rigorous, and unflinching defense of scepticism. If you subscribe to the metaphysical dogmas of "ordinary language analysis" and fellow-traveler schools of epistemology, you will get a kick out of this book.

As a guide to the issues of what we know and how we know it, I would class this book as an excellent example of why so many people think philosophers are over-educated idiots wasting time by blowing hot air. The book is totally within the confines of a certain way of doing theory of knowledge, the dominant way among English-speaking philosophers. That doesn't mean it's the RIGHT way! As with much in the history of philosophy, I believe that this topic will gradually be addressed by more scientific approaches (physics used to be philosophy, too!) and this abstract, logic-based analysis will give way to real investigation and experiment. This means that we will begin to redefine the term "knowledge" by examining how organisms that appear to know things actually get that way.

Like most philosophers, Unger assumes he knows what knowledge is, and he goes on to demonstrate how we all "know" nothing. Perhaps so, but hardly relevant if the definition of "knowledge" is arbitrary or wrong to begin with. The traditional dichotomy between knowledge-belief isn't germane if you examine the question from the standpoint of evolution and neurobiology.

This book, like most treatments of the topic, assumes that animals know nothing (Can a dog know how to do a trick? Is a dog subject to this sceptical nihilism? If there is no knowledge, why does a dog "learn" to do tricks anyway?) and that the only kind of knowledge worth talking about is logical propositions, e.g., "There is a table there." I recall making the objection in my class that Unger's arguments were irrelevant regarding the statement, "I know how to walk," and being treated to a condescending reply along the lines of, "Well, that's not what we're talking about here." Maybe we should be.

Following Russell (Human Knowledge: its scope and limits)I agree that

all knowledge is of an approximate character and always will be. But

I think that something like Pascal's wager can be applied here. Pascal

suggested that there was little to lose if you were a theist and proven

wrong but much to be gained if proven right. Conversely, there

was much to lose if you were an atheist and proven wrong but little to

gain if you were an atheist and proven right. Similarly, I would argue

that in being a skeptic there is little for you to gain if you are right

or wrong. On the other hand, if you are a scientific realist and proven

wrong you lose nothing you wouldn't lose anyway. But if you are a

realist and proven right there is all of modern science and technology.

It doesn't matter what is behind appearances, be it quarks, strings,

or demons. In both cases we are seeking ways of manipulating WHATEVER

is out there for our own advantage. If fuzing atoms and moving charges proves useful I'll "believe" in physics. If bringing sacrifices and

making prayers works I'll "believe" in demons/gods. I choose science

for the time being because moving charges is working for me. What is

lacking in Unger's book is any way in which his skepticism can work for

me. Which sacrifices should I bring to which god? How can I get the

mad scientist to do for me what I want him to? The question for

skepticism is, "What's in it for me?"

The book description gives it away: "Unger argues for the extreme skeptical view that, not only can nothing ever be known, but no one can ever have any reason at all for anything." Good, so there is no reason to read this book. Further: "he argues that no one can ever believe, or even say, that anything is the case." In which case he has nothing to say. To pass off such absurdity as intellectualism is an insult to anyone with a brain, so spare yourself.

I read the book description.

....Unger argues for the extreme skeptical view that, not only can nothing ever be known, but no one can ever have any reason at all for anything.......

Why the hell would I ever have any reason to spend my money on this book? S. Guha obviously did and told us the rest of us can't be fair unless we read this book. There are thousands of books to be read. A book with this absurd claim (and how could the author know anything if nothing can be known, and how can S. Guha know anything?) is not worth the expenditure of time or money.

Readers who defend this kind of crap .... keep going.

There are lots of Kool-Aid drinkers who will believe you.

Stephen Struk

(my real name)

Wyckoff, NJ