Although this is a long book, it is also a quick read due in no small part to the author's crisp writing style, which holds the reader's interest. This is a very engaging biography of a great American general.
The best part of this book is its beginning. The author immediately puts the subject matter of this biography in context by pointing out that "heros" are really not part of the American culture, and generally those who experience acclaim in their lifetimes are later the subject of criticism and revisionism. Thus US Grant had a drinking problem, Lincoln did not free the slaves as quickly or as completely as he ought, etc. Thus it is with Eisenhower as well. While "Ike" received adulation in his lifetime for leading the Western armies to victory against Germany, revisionists have been at him ever since criticizing his "broad front" strategy against Germany, his alleged "hands off" leadership style as both General and President, etc. The famous "Eisenhower grin" is taken by revisionists as nothing more than evidence that Ike was a shallow chap who made it to the top by virtue of a pleasant personality. Nothing, the author points out, was more predictable than that this type of revisionism would occur.
This biography makes the case that Eisenhower was in fact a remarkable man with numerous gifts including intelligence, integrity, and the ability to gain the confidence of superiors by his exercise of these traits. One also discerns that Eisenhower had the ability to see through detail to find and solve the main component of a problem.
This biography makes it plain that Eisenhower was identified by several powerful Army generals fairly early in his career, as someone destined for high rank and great responsibility. First General Conner (who I had never heard of) groomed Ike and saw to it that he attended the Army's Command and General Staff School and other schools that Army "comers" seek to attend. Conner brought Ike to the attention of General Marshall, who no one has ever accused of being subject to influence by someone's vapid "nice guy" personality. In a very short time Marshall saw to it that Ike was placed in charge of implementing America's plans to defeat Nazi Germany. The rest, as they say, is history.
Korda's analysis of Ike's performance as Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe is very interesting. Unabashedly pro-Eisenhower, Korda makes the case that Ike had some learning to do on the job (his performance in North Africa was far from perfect) but that he learned quickly. Indeed, the entire American Army was essentially green and not battle-tested; Ike was far from alone in this regard. North Africa served to blood and harden the American Army, including its commander, Eisenhower. It also taught Ike and the British how to fuse two (three, counting the French) armies into a single fighting force.
Korda's thesis of Ike as a General is essentially to liken him to Ulysses S Grant. Korda argues that Eisenhower deduced that to defeat the Germans it was necessary to essentially keep throwing Allied manpower and equipment against them, keeping them engaged, thereby maximizing the Allies' advantages of material, which derived from America's overwhelming economic-industrial superiority. This strategy mirrors Grant's successful strategy against Lee in the US Civil War, and Korda makes a good case that this strategy, employed by Eisenhower, was the correct one. The British, of course, favored a narrower thrust in the north aimed at Berlin and the German coastal cities (which, by no coincidence, would have meant that Montgomery would lead the main Allied thrust). The reader can make up his or her own mind on this point, but I would argue that Ike's broad front strategy seems to have worked, and it prevented the Germans from attacking the Allies on the flank worse than they in fact did in the Battle of the Bulge. (This was Ike's main argument against the narrow front strategy.)
The author makes a good case that Eisenhower did a good job commanding Allied forces during the Battle of the Bulge, and that this battle in fact was consistent with Ike's strategy of engaging the Germans to the maximum extent possible. (Better to engage them in a mobile battle than to fight dug-in German formations at the Siegfried Line.) In any case, within a month the German Army was soundly trounced by largely American arms, and every soldier in both armies knew that the defeat of Germany was now only a matter of time.
One theme that recurs throughout Korda's analysis of Ike as General is the famous Kay Summersby relationship. Was it innocent, or was it not? The author does not purport to tell us, but does provide the reader with a great deal of insights into this somewhat unusual question.
The book's analysis of Ike as president is much less detailed than the rest of this piece, but is not bad for all that. It paints Ike as a competent president who was largely in tune with the American people, and who led them largely in the direction where they wanted to go, and where the national interest required, i.e. a strong defense against Russia, and avoidance of nuclear conflict.
This is a very good book. I gave it five stars because it is unusually well-written, and it eschews engaging in trendy revisionism of a man who, in fact, dominated the world stage for many years to the very great benefit of America, her allies, and the world.
