In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan [Hardcover]

Seth G. Jones (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: July 6, 2009 | ISBN-10: 0393068986 | ISBN-13: 978-0393068986 | Edition: 1

A definitive account of the American experience in Afghanistan from the rise of the Taliban to the depths of the insurgency.

After the swift defeat of the Taliban in 2001, American optimism has steadily evaporated in the face of mounting violence; a new “war of a thousand cuts” has now brought the country to its knees. In the Graveyard of Empires is a political history of Afghanistan in the “Age of Terror” from 2001 to 2009, exploring the fundamental tragedy of America’s longest war since Vietnam.

After a brief survey of the great empires in Afghanistan—the campaigns of Alexander the Great, the British in the era of Kipling, and the late Soviet Union—Seth G. Jones examines the central question of our own war: how did an insurgency develop? Following the September 11 attacks, the United States successfully overthrew the Taliban regime. It established security throughout the country—killing, capturing, or scattering most of al Qa’ida’s senior operatives—and Afghanistan finally began to emerge from more than two decades of struggle and conflict. But Jones argues that as early as 2001 planning for the Iraq War siphoned off resources and talented personnel, undermining the gains that had been made. After eight years, he says, the United States has managed to push al Qa’ida’s headquarters about one hundred miles across the border into Pakistan, the distance from New York to Philadelphia.

While observing the tense and often adversarial relationship between NATO allies in the Coalition, Jones—who has distinguished himself at RAND and was recently named by Esquire as one of the “Best and Brightest” young policy experts—introduces us to key figures on both sides of the war. Harnessing important new research and integrating thousands of declassified government documents, Jones then analyzes the insurgency from a historical and structural point of view, showing how a rising drug trade, poor security forces, and pervasive corruption undermined the Karzai government, while Americans abandoned a successful strategy, failed to provide the necessary support, and allowed a growing sanctuary for insurgents in Pakistan to catalyze the Taliban resurgence.

Examining what has worked thus far—and what has not—this serious and important book underscores the challenges we face in stabilizing the country and explains where we went wrong and what we must do if the United States is to avoid the disastrous fate that has befallen many of the great world powers to enter the region. 12 maps and charts

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

Since 2001, RAND Corporation political scientist Jones (The Rise of European Security Cooperation) has been observing the reinvigorated insurgency in Afghanistan and weighing the potency of its threat to the country's future and American interests in the region. Jones finds the roots of the re-emergence in the expected areas: the deterioration of security after the ousting of the Taliban regime in 2002, the U.S.'s focus on Iraq as its foreign policy priority and Pakistan's role as a haven for insurgents. He revisits Afghan history, specifically the invasions by the British in the mid- and late-19th century and the Russians in the late-20th to rue how little the U.S. has learned from these two previous wars. He sheds light on why Pakistan—a consistent supporter of the Taliban—continues to be a key player in the region's future. Jones makes important arguments for the inclusion of local leaders, particularly in rural regions, but his diligent panorama of the situation fails to consider whether the war in Afghanistan is already lost. (July)
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Review

“No one understands the successes and failures of American policy in Afghanistan better than Seth Jones....If you read just one book about the Taliban, terrorism, and the United States, this is the place to start.” (Jeremi Suri, Professor of history, University of Wisconsin )

“A deeply researched, clearly written, and well-analyzed account of the failures of American policies in Afghanistan, In the Graveyard of Empires lays out a plan to avoid a potential quagmire. This timely book will be mandatory reading for policymakers from Washington to Kabul but it will also help to inform Americans who want to understand what is likely to be the greatest foreign policy challenge of the Obama administration.” (Peter Bergen, author of Holy War, Inc. and The Osama bin Laden I Know )

“Seth Jones has the answer to the million-dollar question….until Seth Jones, nobody actually sought an empirical answer. Nobody crunched the numbers.” (John H. Richardson - Esquire )

“[Jones] zero[es] in on what went awry after America’s successful routing of the Taliban in late 2001. His narrative is fleshed out with information from declassified government documents and interviews with military officers, diplomats and national security experts familiar with events on the ground in Afghanistan.” (Michiko Kakutani - The New York Times )

“This is a serious work that should be factored in as a new policy as Afghanistan evolves.” (Jay Freeman - Booklist )

“Readers keeping up with the wars in the region will want this [book].” (Library Journal )

“Gauging whether the US and its allies can succeed in Afghanistan is only part of what Jones’s excellent book is about.” (James Blitz - Financial Times )

“A useful and generally lively account of what can go wrong when outsiders venture onto the Afghan landscape. Those ventures have generally not turned out well…This is ominous, because [Jones] knows too much about recent interventions for his pessimism to be disregarded.” (Steven Simon - Foreign Affairs )

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Hardcover: 448 pages
• Publisher: W. W. Norton & Company; 1 edition (July 6, 2009)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0393068986
• ISBN-13: 978-0393068986
• Product Dimensions: 1.5 x 6.2 x 9.5 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.7 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.2 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (31 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #124,550 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

Seth G. Jones serves as an advisor and plans officer for the Commanding General, U.S. Special Operations Forces, in Afghanistan. He lives outside of Washington, DC, and contributes regularly to the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post. Jones was named one of 2008's 'Best and Brightest' young policy experts by Esquire.

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

63 of 67 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars Good general review of OEF 2001-2008 June 23, 2009

By Adam Strickland

Format:Hardcover

As a military professional with more than a general understanding of Afghanistan and the current operating environment, this was a "must purchase" for me. While the book did not provide me with any NEW insights into the operating environment, it did not disappoint as a very clearly written and detailed overview of US operations from 2001-2008. This will become a must read for members of my staff trying to develop an understanding of the problem-set in Afghanistan.

14 of 14 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars The Mullah's Garden of Good and Evil November 26, 2009

By Keith A. Comess VINE™ VOICE

Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase

Seth Jones' analysis "In the Graveyard of Empires" has made a timely appearance, as it fortuitously coincides with the Obama Administration's review of the current US/NATO approach to the twin issues of "nation-building" and security in Afghanistan. While about half the book recapitulates history aptly summarized elsewhere (Rashid's, "Descent into Chaos" and "Taliban", Coll's, "Ghost Wars" are three recent and outstanding examples), the synopsis is necessary background to the analysis that follows. The second half of the book relies heavily on Jones' original "on-site" research and extensive interviews conducted with a variety of sources (mostly Western). This section of the book objectively summarizes the facts, places them in context and clearly identifies opinion. In short, "Graveyard" is an excellent introduction to the topic and supplies the reader with sufficient information to permit the development a genuinely informed opinion on a very complex issue.

First, why exactly is Afghanistan called the "Graveyard of Empires"? Jones begins his history with Alexander, extends it through the Persians, the British, the Russians and focuses finally on the U.S. His argument, in brief, is that Afghanistan is a tribal society with a "warrior" tradition. It has numerous ethnic groups with enduring and ancient rivalries. There are numerous languages. The borders were artifically drawn (by Britain; the so-called, "Durand Line") and specifically created to divide various tribal groups to facilitate colonial control but create internecine friction. It lacks a history of a strong central government. It has a history of sustaining fractious warlords. It is Islamic. It is mountainous and surrounded by neighbors with a "interest" in the area and a penchant for meddling in Afghan affairs. It is (to cite another favorite trope), the land of "The Great Game". Due to this long and disputatious history, its hardly suprising that the U.S. did not receive bouquets of flowers and lots of "warm fuzzies" after the Taliban was booted from power.

Second and maybe most importantly, what does this background portend for the U.S.? The answer to this question comprises the second part of the book. If only one pithy phrase was to be selected on this topic, it would be "mission myopia". Originally, the Bush Administration's goal in Afghanistan was the elimination of Osama bin Ladin's terror network. This group, as is now universally known, was headquartered in Afghanistan and strongly supported by the Taliban government. The Taliban was (and is) a viciously fundamentalist organization which shared (and still does) a consanguinity of interests with the equally vicious, revanchist, Islamist Osama group. For opaque reasons, the U.S. mission initially focused exclusively on elimination of Osama and company and, once Osama trotted across the porous border with Pakistan, the U.S. essentially lost interest in the Taliban. Unfortunately, the contemporaneous situation in Iraq further distracted U.S. interest and absorbed many resources necessary for stabilizing, clearing and holding Afghanistan. By committing insufficent resources (financial, personnel), by failing to maintain historical perspective (see above) and by dint of a recalcitrant ideology (see Donald Rumsfeld's obtuse remarks on "nation building" and NATO scattered throughout the book), the U.S. and its benighted allies set the stage for the ensuing debacle. Naturally, the corrupt and inefficient Afghan government aggrevated the situation and, into the power vacuum stepped the toxic mixture of warlords, drug barons, Pakistani ISI operatives, Iranian Revolutionary Guards, resurgent Taliban and, of course, Osama's minions, too.

Finally, what to do about it all. Here is where the real problem lies. Until a communality of interests and goals by the NATO allies can be established; until adequate resources for clearing, holding and building (David Galula's and Roger Trinquier's classic formulations) are committed; until the Afghani government can rid itself of corruption and develop a "service" perspective and approach and, most crucially, until Pakistan can be convinced to "leave Afghanistan to the Afghans", nothing the U.S. favors will happen. Jones makes all of this crystalline clear, so failure cannot be based on the pretext of ignorance.

What are the shortcomings of this book? Frankly, very few. Some of Jones' characterization of combat commanders are a bit too adulatory (all U.S. commanders are "brillainte", "tall", "committed", etc, etc). There is a small element of Tom Clancy-like reverence for high-tech war implements. That's about it.

In conclusion, this book includes all the necessary background required for understanding the current dilemma in this remote but critically important corner of Southeast Asia. It is entirely self-contained (i.e., no background knowledge is required to understand it). In other words, its well worth reading.

11 of 11 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars Rumsfeld's Orphan April 22, 2010

By Reader VINE™ VOICE

Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase

"In the Graveyard of Empires" is a workmanlike study of America's failed enterprise in Afghanistan. The basic story is well known: After the Taliban were toppled in 2001, the Bush Administration and the Pentagon were eager to move on and invade Iraq. Afghanistan became a low priority. Too few troops were deployed to stabilize the country, and too little development aid was committed to rebuild the economy. As a result, the central government never establshed its writ outside the major cities. The Taliban had time and space to regroup, and they eventually moved into the power vacuum. Now 100,000 U.S. troops are fighting a serious insurgency in a land notorious for casting out foreign invaders. Every American should read the book, especially Republicans who think Bush and Cheney "kept us safe" after 9/11.

I knocked off one star because the book is based overwhelmingly on U.S. government sources. A few paragraphs even read like USG power point presentations! The sad truth is that U.S. diplomats, spies, and soldiers are at sea in a country like Afghanistan: they arrive with little area expertise, rarely stay for more than a year, and recycle second- and third-hand information from a narrow range of local contacts. (Ambassador Khalizad was an exception -- but he was pulled out of Kabul to serve in Baghdad!) These limitations are a fact of life in the foreign policy bureaucracy, but a book should be better than that. Any serious study of the Afghan war must include information culled from local and, particularly, Taliban sources. Yet Afghans rarely appear in "In the Graveyard of Empires."

It's too bad. It keeps this good book from being a great one.