Customer Reviews

Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath

5 star:		(9)
4 star:		(7)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(3)

 

 

As the grandson of a good man who died at Pearl Harbor on the U.S.S Utah, in his sleep, I have a special interest in this topic.

Firstly, did we know about the attack before it occurred? Secondly, how did our government deal with the uproar of the time that enraged our nation and drove us into the Pacific War with a blood-lust for vengeance. The shout of "Remember Pearl Harbor" was our Battle Cry and for good reason.

Thirdly, I have found this book to be very specific and detailed, with information I had not previously been able to acquire, I.E: Interviews with the Naval Intelligence Officer who actually translated the Japanese "Winds" code prior to the attack, and who was prohibited from testifying at the Official Congressional, Army and Navy Hearings that comprise the "official" record as we have been handed it.

This is a book that helps us all make our own minds up about who was responsible for the fact that we were caught sleeping, literally, when war was imminent and on the way to our Pacific outposts in early December of 1941. I give it 5 Eagle, Globe and Anchors for the Pearl Harbor History Buff in search of the "real" story that led us to War in the Pacific.

Ronald Hinton USMC/Retired

My opinion differs from many of the others here. I don't think that one needs to draw any conclusion from the book. Indeed, I don't think you can. Accept it for what it is, a well written story that pokes holes in the accepted wisdom. Given the amount of time that has passed and the deaths of all the principles, it is unlikely that we'll ever "know" the whole truth. But in showing us that we can never know, Toland has performed a valuable service.

I agree with those who have already noted John Toland's superior research and writing skills, which are very much in evidence in this gripping, masterful account.

But as a lawyer I wanted to highlight how enjoyable and fascinating are the behind-the-scenes accounts of the various Pearl Harbor tribunals, which pinned guilt perhaps wrongly on some of the accused. I was particularly interested in famed Boston attorney Charles Rugg's defense of Admiral Kimmel, and the legal tactics employed to best make use of the otherwise secret cables and testimony that Rugg assembled on Kimmel's behalf.

A great account, and an inside look from a master historian of WWII, this one is a no-brainer for anyone interested in WWII history.

When Mr. Toland's book Infamy was first published it caused a stir, and it still leaves a sting! Sometimes truth hurts. Mr. Toland's earlier book, The Rising Sun ( a Pulitzer prize winner ), presents a different picture from that in Infamy and perhaps more in line with textbook thinking. But deeper research into the subject forced him to the conclusions he drew in Infamy. If it is shocking that's good, because that is how one can learn from history.

Toland is an excellent historian. He's put together a lot of different lines of evidence to insinuate that the United States was indeed aware of the Pearl Harbor attack before it happened. That's the gist of this book.

Does he prove it? No. There is no absolute evidence that proves FDR and the State and War Departments knew that Pearl Harbor was about to be hit. Toland's circumstantial evidence IS very strong, though, and if what he writes here is true (and he documents it all), then it is very difficult not to reach the same conclusions he does. I've always found it difficult to believe that, with the threat of war obviously hanging over the United States and Japan, we had no idea where the Japanese Navy was. But, again, there is no absolute proof, no documents that say "FDR knew." But no other historian, not even Prange, brings up the evidence that Toland does.

FDR apologists will hate this book. FDR haters will believe Toland has proven his case. Fair readers will wonder. Historians (and that's the way I make my living) will conclude Toland hasn't proven his point. Not absolutely. But he does do very good investigative work. We'll probably never know for sure what FDR knew or when he knew it.

John Toland has done an excellent job in punching holes in the U.S. cover-up about Pearl Harbor. While it is still unproven that FDR positively knew, it is becoming harder to believe he did not. The Japanese did not maintain radio silence as Toland proves, and Robert Stinnett's "Day of Deceit" leaves no more doubt on this subject. Why people here appeal to the "authority" of Gordon Prange is beyond me. His stonewalling is simply unconvincing and written before much of the Pearl Harbor material was de-classified. Not to mention the fact that Gordon Prange was dead before his books were published! Or even finished! Ghost writers helped that project out. We'll know more when the government finished de-classifying. And if they have nothing to hide, WHY is so much material about Pearl Harbor still classified? The mere fact that Roosevelt moved the Pacific fleet from its normal anchorage on the west coast to Hawaii in 1940 (over the objections of some admirals) has got to make you wonder too.

This was a very interesting book as to the real truth behind the attack of Pearl Harbor. History says it was a surprise attack however, Washington "knew" that something was going to happen and chose not to tell the commanding officers of the Navy & Army in the Pacific about it. It was a very interesting book however, with so many people named in the book, it at times was hard to remember "who was who". The book also covers the scapegoats and "their day in court" to let the truth out to the general public. I would by this book again.

I don't know many historians who would disagree that FDR and Winston Churchill's primary strategic stratgy was to get the US involved in a War against the Axis. With that in mind, the argument is not that we should have defeated Hitler and Tojo, but a clarification of the "facts". Notwithstanding that past Presidents have resorted to deceptions to increase enlistments to the "cause", from Lincoln to GW Bush, it is not impropable that the disaster at Pearl Harbor was a PR stunt gone wrong, in the sense that a small and less damaging attack, not necessary at Pearl was contrived along the lines of the Luisitania, which was an accident bound to happen given the actions of Anglophile President Wilson.

In 1940, as in 1916, Wilson and FDR had promised to keep the US out of the conflict. Yet a year later, we found ourselves fighting wars that both Presidents were secretly attempting to portray us as the righteous victims and morally responsible for killing the enemy.

Perhaps the most salient undeniable fact is the removal of 4 star Admiral Richardson, who fought with FDR over the Defense of Pearl. Richardson was an outstanding officer, who feared the attack. Washington politicians had previously demoted Billy Mitchel who tried to warn that Pearl would be attacked by Japan. Since our country's military is run by civilians, they have the authority to fire. Regretfully, they do not always know how to best fight a war, or how not to get the US into the War. Like Mitchel, Richardson was fired by FDR, and replaced by Adm Kimel, a 2 Star given a temp promotion to 4 star. As a result, Kimmel was under more pressure to keep his 4 stars by avoiding conflicts with FDR. Kimmel's politics may have been bad, but he did not deserve the blame for the disaster.

If History, like solving a crime. Motive and Means must be present to commit a crime, in Politics, the same rules apply. FDR had the motive, get the US into a War, where the enemy fires the first shot. And the means in the structure of civilian control over the Admirals and Generals. If FDR had to pick a place for the first shot, Japan was the most likely contry to provoke. Germany did not want to repeat WWI. They attempted to avoid conflict in the Atlantic as much as possible. The fact that the US was already involved in the Atlantic against Germany, as they had been in WWI. Although there were minor actions against the US in the Atlantic, FDR knew that Japan had not experienced defeat, and were the most likely to overextend itself, and was more likely to strike the first blow, as it had against the Russians in 1905.

FDR's popularity and death in 1945, and Democratic control of the Congress during the first investigations, would not seem to lead to an unbiased search for the truth. Admiral Kimmel and General Short were easy targets. Many of the first disasters in the first year of war, were caused by Generals and Admirals lack of leadership and unfortunately were men who were often chosen for poltical, rather than military expertise.

Almost as many "conspiracy" books have been writen as who shot Lincoln and JFK. The attack of Pearl was the actions of two governments, and numerous politicians. Lincoln and JFK were shot by crazed individuals. The reposniblity for the disater at Pearl is a a complex subject with many events and individuals. Half a century later, there is a reasonable doubt that Richardson and Kimmel were the fall guys for an action that a major strategic strategy that cost the lives of a relatvely few, and loss of outdated Battleships. Churchill was willing to sacrifice Coventry to keep the Germans from learning they had broken their codes. Sacrificing a few lives to save many is not new to war. But after 60 years, the reasons for hiding the facts are long gone. The prinicpals involved are long dead, and only a few surviors remain.

The December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor was hardly over before the public began to wonder how the US could have been caught so unawares. The Roberts Commission investigation (Dec 18, 1941 to Jan 23, 1942) concluded that General Short (Army) and Admiral Kimmel (Navy) were derelict in their duty and blamed them. But almost immediately questions arose about facts that didn't add up. By the end of May, 1946 a total of 9 investigations had taken place with differing and alternating conclusions each time, and yet questions still abound today.

John Toland looks at each of the investigations and discusses the evidence and testimonies presented. He focuses on a large amount of evidence that many in Washington knew beforehand that an attack was "imminent" and also that it would occur at Pearl Harbor. Some evidence pinpointed the exact date and other evidence the location of the "missing" Japanese fleet. He even presents communications that foreign dignitaries passed on information, and that those in top levels of American government had more than enough knowledge beforehand that could have prevented (or at least minimized) the attack. The only ones who knew almost nothing were Short and Kimmel.

This book was originally published in 1982 so it's possible there may be newer information, and apparently it is a bit controversial in its conclusions. Toland claims that Admiral Stark (Chief of Naval Operations) and General Marshall (War Dept. Chief of Staff) in Washington had enough corroborated information that - at a minimum - a clear warning should have been sent to the commanders in Hawaii. He speculates that part of the reason they might not have intervened was because they didn't want the Japanese to know the US had broken their code and were reading all their messages (but he also presents evidence that the Japanese suspected as much). And while he doesn't directly condemn President Roosevelt, he certainly casts a shadow by claiming that FDR also had access to the information. He cites speculation that FDR allowed the attack to happen as a way to win support from the American public, over half of which opposed intervention into the war in Europe, but his criticism seems somewhat muted.

Although this book is nearly 350 pages it's a much quicker and easier read than that number might suggest. It was also more interesting than a dry and detailed accounting of the investigations might sound. Toland obviously places an emphasis on exonerating Kimmel and Short but does a good job piecing together the chronology of the intelligence that was gathered and known in the weeks and days leading up to the attack (he doesn't cover the attack itself). He discusses those who changed their testimonies as well as the documents which appear to have disappeared (such as the infamous "winds" message). For the most part Toland keeps the information from becoming overly tedious, but the main difficulty I had was with the VERY extensive "Cast of Principal Characters." They are listed at the beginning of the book but my interest was more casual and I didn't make the effort to keep everyone as straight as I might have. Still, I found it to be an interesting read and disappointing to know that maybe there was more "infamy" behind the scenes than we were led to believe.

U.S.N. Commander Laurance Safford's stubborn, selfless lifelong quest - which clobbered his marriage & sank his brilliant naval career - to prove that Admiral Husband Kimmel & General Walter Short had been scapegoated for the Pearl Harbor disaster, lends Infamy an irreversible credibility - that the author himself almost wrecked.

INF suffers from:

1) A clumsy chronological & narrative structure;

2) A noticeable decline in writing quality & manuscript editing expertise (compared to his previous superb histories: No Man's Land, But Not In Shame, & Ships In The Sky).

A basic writing error of judgement is also appallingly evident: Toland, on too many occasions, ineptly champions the people whom he feels had been given a raw deal.

If the reader is bludgeoned by an author's premature & strident opinions in the middle of various narratives, the sympathy rightly felt for the wrongly accused now is endangered by the reader's irritation, unnecessarily created by the author.

Toland, all too often, is the equivalent of an overzealous prosecutor who, in the middle of a trial, jumps to his feet and delivers his closing summary against the accused - who is still on the witness stand.

Why Carolyn Blakemore & Ken McCormick, Toland's editors, didn't perceive the obvious - & then persuade Toland to restructure his manuscript, so that his opinions would mostly be restricted to the conclusions in the final chapter - is a mystery.

3) The inexplicable lack of an exact date chronology (always necessary, but now absolutely indispensable, due to the first listed liability); &

4) The absence of brief biographical sketches of the 103 generals, admirals, politicians, & others who are, instead, perfunctorily listed in a "Cast of Principle Characters."

A note on the "star" rating system. I gave it four stars because the book has inherent & commendable merit in its own right. To deduct stars for Infamy's serious deficiencies, listed above, would warn off readers who otherwise would profit from reading the book.

"It was a tragedy that men like Stimson, Hull, Knox, & Forrestal felt obliged to join in the cover-up & make scapegoats of two innocent men, Kimmel & Short."

(Respectively: Henry, Cordell, Frank, & James - Secretaries of War; State; the Navy; & the Navy (succeeding Knox) & later, of Defense; p. 323.)

My father was Frank Knox's nephew; he mourned his uncle's death in 1944. Later on - possibly in 1960 - I had been caught in a childish lie (it hadn't occurred to me that trying to blame someone else for one's own mistakes is a preposterous defense for an only child).

He pulled Daphne du Maurier's novel, "The Scapegoat," down from the book shelf. Fiercely pointing at the book's title, he then lectured me quite audibly & sternly that what I had done was despicable.

Of course, he was right. But in retrospect, the issue - certainly a legitimate one - didn't seem to merit the level of his explosion of concern about this specific ethical issue.

For it wasn't like him to lose his temper. He handled pressure well & his ongoing, low-key tolerance for the unusual, the off-beat, & the creativity that fuels artistic & scientific achievements was quite remarkable. In this respect, few men were his equal.

Something really must hit a nerve.

I could be wrong, dead wrong. And the facts will never be known (he died in 1967, without having discussed in any detail his relationship with his famous - & to some, infamous uncle). So all I can do is pose the thought in the form of a question:

Was he having a flashback to what Toland would later describe in 1982 (above) as a "tragedy"?

Clearly, he was justifiably irate that an eight-year-old would attempt to cover his little ass by unjustly blaming someone else for what had gone screwy.

But the memory of the depth of his passion led me to wonder, tonight, after having finished Infamy:

Is it possible that the issue triggered a vehement resentment he still harbored towards an adult - his own deceased relative - who, my father might have discovered as a journalist during or after WWII, had scapegoated two honorable men in the aftermath of the event that had galvanized America's entrance into the war?