Customer Reviews

Infleuence of Darwin on Philosophy (Great Books in Philosophy)

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I am a big fan of John Dewey's work. Like many other Dewey readers, I find his work frustratingly hard to penetrate. This book is a bit more readable than most collections, but is still quite difficult.

First, all of these essays speak on the common theme of pragmatic metaphysics (epistemology?). This alone is a difficult (but immensely rewarding) subject. Fortunately, two of the best essays here ("Nature and its good" and "A short catechism concerning truth") are in dialogue form - something Dewey did only twice.

Other than those two there is some brilliant - and tedious - philosophy here. Of course, the title article needs no introduction - it is a standard and rightly so. "The experimental theory of knowledge" and "The intellectualist criterion of truth" both go far in explaining how Dewey breaks the dualism of real/ideal in metaphysics. "Beleifs and Existences" is also a great essay for understanding how Dewey looks at beliefs, not objects, as the 'creator of the world'.

Overall, I have to say that, in honesty, the book gets quite repititious about 2/3rds through. The basic gist is that the essays here map out Dewey's 'experimentalism' by showing how both the intellectualist idea of a priori or absolute truth 'out there', and empiricist concept of passive experience, are both flawed. Dewey outlays his brand of pragmatism, stemming from the naturalism touched on in title essay.

For Dewey fans, this is a great read. For those semi-interested and versed in Dewey, recommended but possibly after you've read "Quest for Certainty" (which, I think, is a more 'important' and even 'inviting' book). For the novice to Dewey, this is not the book to get. Read 'The Essential Dewey: vol. 1" first.

Whatever one's views of Dewey one has to wonder if the confusing influence of Darwinism is partly responsible for the inability of pragmatism to generate any real philosphical lift. Dewey's work seems to clock the approximate point at which everyone fell for the new Darwinian foundationalism, unless it was Nietzsche, or else Marx/Engles, who was the first. Does it never occur to anyone that philosophy should produce a critique of Darwin? The onset of idiocy here goes a long way toward explaining the decline of twentieth century philosophy.