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Influence Of Seapower Upon History, The

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Mahan's work is great for those studying the development of US sea power. However, NuVision has managed to take this great historical work and turn it into the worst published book I have ever seen.

It seems as though they printed out the book directly from the OCR with little or no proofing. They apparently had no interest in meeting a reader's most modest expectations. There are frequent obvious readability-compromising typos, for instance the date 1607 on page 117 should be 1667, and 'the' substituted for 'time' on the same page (this particular OCR typo occurs throughout the book). There is even an inexcusable typo in a chapter title - BATTLE OP MALAGA. The missing periods are particularly annoying. There are no chapter titles at the top of the pages making it difficult to see where chapters begin and end, there is a detailed table of contents (not shown in the Amazon preview) that is not formatted at all and virtually useless, and quoted passages are not even indented. All paragraphs are separated by a full blank line throughout the book with no variation, thus there are no breaks mid-chapter. It is amazing how tedious reading becomes due to this little defect. Even the title on the binding of the book does not have enough contrast so is difficult to read. There is no index.

There was no care given to making this book, no pride in the work. Nobody read through it to proof it. I have never seen anything like it.

Mahan uses some detail and technical language to demonstrate particular naval engagements from 1660-1783, but apart from being just a lecturer on naval warfare and an analyst on tactics, he demonstrates how the use of the general navies, or the strategy of using a strong navy to protect the fleet of an aggressive merchant marine, is the single most important root cause of advancing economic and therefore military prosperity in any nation. Using Great Britain as his main example, he also details the Dutch fleets to demonstrate their reason for becoming a European superpower in their own right. Later he identifies the presence of the French navy, apart from any material success in its engagements, as one of the determining reasons why America had a chance to win its independence. Finally, as he hints of the supreme commercial and military importance of the proposed (Panama) canal, against the declining state of the American navy and the paltry condition of its merchant fleet, he urges that America's prosperity if not survival depends on the powerful revival of its sea power.

An excellent read, a great general history book, and very lucid explanations, easy for the layman. If you enjoy history you'll enjoy this.

In this book, U.S. Navy Captain Alfred T. Mahan presents what he considers the six key elements of sea power and shows the impact their application or misapplication has had on history. Citing numerous historical examples, he shows how nations have prospered or suffered through use or misuse of their naval assets. His book is rightfully considered essential reading for any historian of naval warfare. However, its impact does not stop there.

Mahan shows how nations thrived or declined during the 17th and 18th centuries through prudent or imprudent application of naval power. He contends France, Holland, Spain, et al. prospered until they allowed their naval power to dissipate. Meanwhile, Britain became mistress of the seas. British colonies provided raw materials for her industries, while her armed fleet insured uninterrupted commerce. He equates Britain's loss of her American colonies with inappropriate deployment of her fleet, contrasted with France's skilled strategic use of her own. This section will interest readers of American history schooled only on Washington's land campaign at Yorktown.

Mahan's book has had a tremendous impact on history. It unquestionably shaped the imperialistic policies of pre-World War I and pre-World War II Germany and Japan respectively. Students trying to ascertain why leaders of those nations acted as they did should read this work.

The elements of sea power are the same today as in 1900 when this book was first published. With a world economy as interdependent as today's, Mahan's principles are as valid as they were in the 1600's and 1700's, perhaps even more so. German war philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz's classic treatise, "On War," is considered a must read for every Army officer. Mahan's work is to the sea-battle as von Clausewitz's is to the land. Historians, military strategists, and architects of America's foreign, economic and national security policies should read this important work to gain insights on the necessity of protecting vital and vulnerable sea lines of communications worldwide.

Despite the other reviews of this book offered above, with which I must disagree, for the serious student of naval history and tactics, this is a classic, and required reading if for no other reason than to understand the influential thinking of the naval tacticians and strategists of the early 20th century. Mahan was to naval warfare as Von Clauswitz was to land warfare. While the reading is not easy for a late 20th century casual reader expecting thrilling tales of Hornblower, it is true grist for the mill of the serious student of naval history. I disagree that the work is outdated because it deals with pre-steam naval warfare. The fundamental concepts are as applicable as Sun Tzu to land warfare. Mahan is not the end of the analysis, but was a tremendously important influence.

Granted Mahan is out of date as some of the other reviewers state. Additionally, he is a hard read and it is often said that most people only read the first chapter (which outlines the basic principles) and skip the rest. Nonetheless, the book has value as a historical document. For good or ill, Mahan had a profound influence on the formulation of American Naval Policy. Today's Blue Water Navy (most recently promoted by former Navy Secretary John Lehman as the "Six Hundred Ship Navy") is built around the fundamental Mahan principle of building a fleet to destroy the enemy's fleet on the high seas. The U.S. Navy, one hundred years after Mahan, is only now adopting a new, littoral strategy fundamentally different from Mahan's.

The work of Admiral Mahon is now largely forgotten. With the passing of empires his doctrines became obsolete. He discussed the history of the British Empire in its struggles with France prior to the napoleonic period. He was of the view that the possession of a large fleet with secure bases was the key to retaining a large empire. An empire in turn was the key to the wealth of nations.

His writing contributed to the development of the German navy at the beginning of the century and indirectly to the tensions which led to the first world war. The history of Japan between the wars was characterised by a whole hearted adoption of his ideas.

An examination of his work is a key to understanding much of what happened in the twentieth century.

Mahan was a lecturer at the U.S. Naval academy at the end of the nineteenth century. His books was on the compulsory reading list at the U.S. Naval academy for many, many years. It remains a very fine text. Although another reviewer has indicated that this work is obsolete, the principles set forth, and the observations made by Mahan have reflect great insight. It is a superb text, recent issues being thoughtfully illustrated as well. Cross Reference: Frederick Thomas Jane, one of Mahan's contemporaries, who had an encyclopaedic knowledge of maritime affairs.

In reading Mahan, I felt his exposition overreached the applicability of his theory. His selection of evidence seems motivated by a hidden agenda. The meaning he asserts seems to go beyond what that evidence can support. But I have to be forgiving. History isn't science.

We rely on the experience, knowledge and intuition of a grand expert of naval strategy. We haven't the opportunity to replay Trafalgar a hundred times to harvest its truths. We can't really know whether the French had the intrinsically superior strategy and the English dominated merely by favorable throws of fortune's dice. Did Mahan really see the British navy would have an American successor?

I note the Prime Ministers, Presidents and Princes of the First and Second World Wars relied on this expert. Thus Mahan's book itself is a subject of history, an event that shaped the great saga of nations. For this reason, one can't understand naval history without reading Mahan.

Introductory chapter provides classic overview of importance of naval power and is alone worth the price of the book. Historical chapters are perhaps less relevant today in an era of air and space power, as they were written during the transition from sail to steam navies. Introductory chapter provides inspiration for "out of the box" thinking about strategy, political power, and business, made significant by its view that the oceans provide a means of connecting nations and peoples rather than imposing a barrier to contact and communication. Reverses your thinking about the importance of land versus sea transportation.

This book ,written by an obscure U.S. Navy officer, is credited with opening the eyes of many emerging countries to the need for seapower. It lit off the first arms races that almost bankrupted countries building "dreadnoughts" (early Battleships) and lead to the rise of both Japan ,Germany and the U.S. as serious Naval powers actively seeking colonies.

This book ignited the fuse that lead to the battle of Jutland and to Pearl Harbor.

History buffs,Naval officers and students getting ready for their first year at Annapolis should check it out.