Customer Reviews

Information Operations Planning

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Every new and rapidly exploding field needs an integrating book to guide practitioners as well as strategists in understanding and acting on the emerging knowledge. Patrick D. Allen's book, Information Operations Planning, is just such a valuable addition. This work is an antidote to the hundreds of deskchair information war philosophers proposing policies they themselves have never tried. It serves a guide to conducting sensibly researched, adaptively implemented, and properly monitored information operations (IO) missions. The material in this book informs and instructs, offering both the research insights of the social scientist and the knowledge base of the technical fields.

In particular, for major operational considerations, Dr. Allen provides guiding checklists excellently devised as tools for strategists and implementers to ensure their thinking and actions are systematic as well as responsive to complex situations. The lists are not meant as a plug-and-chug alternative to thinking; rather, they are useful ways to integrate the lessons here with the actual circumstances faced by the strategist or operational planner. For example, the book's breadth ranges from a section on legal issues of IO to the best practices for training computer network operations (CNO) to how to design messages for particular effects irrespective of the technical means at hand. Furthermore, while acronyms can get dense at times, Dr Allen carefully defines them and minimizes confusion. Furthermore, the writing is clear and systematic even as the discussion ranges widely across the relevant literatures of both information and behavioral sciences.

Defense or security practitioners of all flavors, academics, technology professionals, government leaders, or managers of learning organizations will find this book eye-opening to read, and exceptionally useful to keep handy in considering employing information whether offensively and defensively. The final chapter on the future of information conflict in the 'idea battlespace' is less a conclusion than a set of operational axioms to guide the thinking of current and future IO warriors. From noting everyone has a message and a preferred audience, to the absence of permanent enemies to the observation that there is no rear area or sanctuary in the information battlespace, Dr Allen blends the social with systems analysis with computer networking to offer a valuable contribution across the board.

It has been said that if used properly, Information Operations (IO) could dramatically shorten the duration and drastically reduce the destructions and casualties of military conflicts. So far however, IO has hardly measured up to the hype. In his Planning Information Operations, Patrick Allen argues that the US has failed to take the full measure of the information age and therefore has under-utilized IO in support of national objectives.
Allen then proceeds to show that IO could be better leveraged. He develops a series of step-by-step practical guides to assist planning development across the spectrum of operations and planning processes. Allen proposes a series of checklists designed to provide specialists and observers alike with a systematic methodology to transform concepts and ideas into ready-to-use strategies.
Allen should be lauded for describing IO as "one system," not simply as one of or as the aggregation of pre-existing operational functions, namely EW, CNO, PSYOP, MILDEC and OPSEC. He should also be lauded for placing much emphasis on the need to generate feedback continuously. Indeed, feedback and effect assessment have generally sorely lacking in real operations.
Allen's discussion of the field of influence operations is not as convincing as the rest of the book. This is in great part because he uses the joint definition that defines PSYOP as the core capability for influence operations. However, in the real world, support capabilities such as public affairs, civil affairs and public diplomacy are as important, if not more, in shaping the media environment than PSYOP. The contributions of public affairs, civil affairs, and other military functions need to be taken into account in a comprehensive analysis of influence operations.
Overall, Patrick Allen's book is a must-read for anyone interested in information operations, observer and practitionners alike.

Patrick Allen's Information Operations Planning is a very useful reference for those interested in the field of IO and planning from an analytic point of view. His review of the history and differences of the various forms of IO is, if not unique, of great use to both researchers and analysts. I particularly liked Part III and his development of the fifteen features of IO. A book that belongs on the shelf of every academic and analyst involved in current operations across the spectrum of civil and military engagement.

One of the biggest reasons for Allied success in World War II was the success on the British part (thanks to Polish and French assistance) and the American part in breaking the German and Japanese codes. This provided information of very high quality because the traffic consisted of (among other things) reports from the field of their side of the battles and orders from headquarters to the field forces.

With computers the opportunities for information warfare of this type are greatly increased. This book explores aspects of offensive, defensive and influence operations. It is really quite fascinating. For instance:

In Operation Desert Storm, electronic tags placed in US exported computers reported where they were located.

The Serbs generated false radio messages and decoy targets to get allied air power to bomb the wrong targets.

Israeli and Palestinian have been attacking each others web sites.

How the opposition forces in Iraq use the western media to present a different story than what our soldiers are seeing.

All of this is just in the first chapter. Subsequent chapters go into much greater detail in all three areas of information warfare. It should be required reading for all kinds of people including commentators, the press, teachers, and a whole bunch of other people. Unfortunately I doubt that it will be.