Customer Reviews

Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror

5 star:		(11)
4 star:		(7)
3 star:		(6)
2 star:		(2)
1 star:		(4)

 

 

This book appears to be a good reference source. I don't have the expertise to judge its accuracy, but I'm willing to assume the author knows his field.

There are problems. Foremost among them is Gunaratna's charge that Osama bin Laden acquiesced in the killing of his mentor, Sheikh Azzam, in 1989. This claim is worded more boldly on the cover flap: "[Gunaratna reveals] how bin Laden had his mentor and Al Qaeda founder, 'Azzam,' assassinated in order to take over the organization and how other Al Qaeda officers who stood in his way were murdered."

Gunaratna may "reveal" this to readers who haven't heard the rumors, but he doesn't prove it. He simply asserts that there was a falling out between Azzam on one side, and bin Laden and Egyptian members of their group on the other, because Azzam opposed using terror tactics. He claims the Egyptians assassinated Azzam after having "won over Osama to their cause"--that he "sanctioned, if not condoned" the killing. A sample of Gunaratna's biased writing: "All this is of a piece with Osama's exceedingly duplicitous nature."

How's this for evidence of involvement? "[Bin Laden's] cunning was...demonstrated by the fact that he left Pakistan for Saudi Arabia in the year that Azzam died. It has been impossible to pin down when exactly he left, and no sources on this have been forthcoming, but one should not in the least be surprised if it transpires he was not in Pakistan when Azzam was murdered, furnishing himself with a sound alibi and allowing him to distance himself from the act as much as possible."

The only source Gunaratna cites in support of his claims is a statement made by a prisoner a decade later: that bin Laden ordered the assassination because he believed Azzam was aiding the CIA. That's a completely different motive from the one he alleges.

What about those other murders of people who stood in bin Laden's way? More may be described in the book, but this is the only one I've found: "Mustafa Shalabi, who was close to Azzam, was killed on March 1, 1991. Although there is no evidence that Osama ordered his death, it is clear that Shalabi was not with the Egyptians who backed Osama."

No evidence. Gunaratna admits it.

Here's another blurb from the cover flap: "[Gunaratna reveals] how the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui forced Al Qaeda to move forward on the September 11 attacks." This implies that the date was moved up, as others have speculated; but again, there's no hard evidence. All Gunaratna shows is that the hijackers' financial activity picked up in the week after Moussaoui's arrest. That could well have been the case, in a late August time frame, if the attacks were planned all along for about September 11.

There are other problems. Gunaratna states in one chapter that some of the world's intelligence agencies aren't convinced al-Qaida #3 man Muhammad Atef is dead. It may be excusable that in another chapter, he says without qualification that Atef was killed last November. What's not excusable is that he also says Abu Hafs was killed in January. Muhammad Atef and Abu Hafs are or were the same man! [A later note, 8/29/02: A recent news account made clear that a second man, Mafouz Walid, used the same nom de guerre, but was usually differentiated from Atef by calling him "Abu Hafs the Mauritanian." Walid was supposedly killed in January, but it's now claimed he's still alive. Could this name-confusion have influenced the suspicions that Atef is alive?]

Something else: Gunaratna tells us Sudan's President al-Bashir once offered to extradite bin Laden to the U.S. The wording implies this happened in 2001--when bin Laden was nowhere near Sudan. Gunaratna can't mean 2001; he says the U.S. President was Bill Clinton. But the passage is hopelessly unclear.

The book's most interesting claim is that the 9/11 plot was meant to include strikes on the British Houses of Parliament, the Indian Parliament, and a target in Australia. This is based on statements made by a single prisoner, which may or may not be proven true as more facts come to light. Less startling, but new to me: Gunaratna says the men wounded in the capture of Abu Zubaydah included "1 Pakistani and 3 American officers." If he has more details, I wish he'd shared them.

Despite my quibbles, I give the book four stars for its information on names, dates, and terrorist activities in obscure parts of the world.

Having read the book and all of the reviews on Amazon, what more could I possibly add? A couple of the early reviews said, in essence, this book is a waste of time and money. Most of the reviews since then have, while pointing out the many editing faults, effectively demolished that put-down.

Well, there is now one thing worth adding. This week's 64 CNN Al Qaeda training tapes have provided visible verification of what Dr. Gunaratna wrote and published last spring, notably including the animal chemical weapons tests.

If one cannot quite handle this data rich volume in toto, at least read the two concluding chapters on Asia and on Al Qaeda's threat and the international response.

For importance, this book rates a 5. For content, it also rates a 5. For editing, only a 3. Net conclusion: 4 plus.

It is shocking when a major university press publishes a book as sloppily edited as this one. In addition to the factual errors other reviewers have noted, there are numerous typos and sentence fragments. The notes at the back are also very inconsistent in their level of citation. All of this is particularly unfortunate, since the author clearly has amassed a great wealth of detail on al-Qaeda's worldwide operations, including much "new" evidence hitherto unpublished in English. But given the carelessness of so much of the editing, how can we be sure the author's information is accurate and trustworthy?

I did think this book had two virtues. The country-by-country survey of al-Qaeda operations gave a very thorough and complex picture of the ways in which al-Qaeda infiltrates and liaises with local groups and causes, while retaining its global ideology and focus. And the reporting is happily free of the America-centric emphasis of so much recent work on al-Qaeda. Although sympathetic to the American position, the author lets al-Qaeda 'speak for itself' and stresses the danger it poses in many countries, not just the United States.

Frankly, I would not allow such a shoddily edited book (obviously hastily rushed to press to capitalize on the current crisis) to be published under my name, particularly when I clearly had such a detailed command of a subject, as this author seems to.

Excellent book. A well researched and overview of Al Qaeda. Provides excellent insights into the ideology and methods of operation for one of the world's most dangerous terrorist groups. Unlike other books on this subject, this work is superbly footnoted, perhaps reflecting the author's academic background. This is essential for a truly authoritative work of non-fiction, something sadly lacking in many other books in this genre. The section on Al Qaeda's operations in Southeast Asia is groundbreaking, providing information not seen anywhere else. Tellingly much of what the author described about Al Qaeda operations in Asia was subsequently demonstrated in spades in Bali last October. The general reader might find this book somewhat dense, the print is small and the reading somewhat dry. For the serious student of modern terrrorism, however, this book is a must have. Other authors should take a lesson from Gunaratna's footnoting. Well worth the price!!

This is THE definitive book so far on Al Qadea for several reasons. One of the biggest is that since it came out in 2002 (it is now in paperback too) it has proven more correct every single day. If you've heard some of this information before or read some of it before it's mainly because this is the book that clearly has been the authorative source for many of journalists (I was a journalist and know how that works!)who do not attribute their on-the-air brilliance to the fact that they read this book. It's all HERE. And more and more of this book is proving to be correct every single day.

The latest sign of author Rohan Gunaratna's solid scholarship, analysis and nuts-and-bolts-inside-info in Inside Al Qaeda has been displayed on the front page of the Los Angeles Times which ran a story about how the terrorist organization is undergoing a "major shift" in strategy -- mutating into more of a decentralized network, relying on an array of regional and local allies to launch more frequent attacks on targets. If you read the book before, you KNEW that this network was in place -- and that this development was coming.

Guanaratna painstakingly lays out the huge worldwide network of terrorist groups that are directly or indirectly allied with Al Qaeda. He breaks it down into regions and countries. In fact, this book is a virtual directory: see an event in the newspapers, then look it up in this book and you have all the background to sound like an on the air expert (but you won't get paid big bucks).

No, it does not read like a novel. But this superb book is highly readable -- reading like a straightfoward newsmagazine report. There is not a word of filler or ideological rhetoric in it -- the author only lays out....facts. When he states that there is no evidence of a solid connection between Iraq and 911 he has 100 percent credibility due to what has come before. He's NOT proclaming it due to any political agenda.

The book details it all: the bloody and highly political rise of Osama Bin Laden, Bin Laden's motives and goals (basically achieve a political goal by garnering a high victim body count, and whether that includes civilians, women, children or Muslims is absolutely irrelevant); the skyrocketing rise of militant Islam; how slights from fellow Muslim national leaders created and radicalized the Al Qaeda into a terrorism Frankenstein; an account of 911 from an operational standpoint; predictions on what is likely to come; and the highly detailed profiles of various cells.

To those who are not sympathetic to Bin Laden or Al Qaeda's political goals (in other words, those who do feel upset if they see innocents intentionally murdered to make a political statement)this book is depressing, as it documents Al Qaeda's highly fluid and adaptable "multidimensional" nature -- which you now see in newscycles each day. Nor will it vanish soon. Writes Gunaratna: "Al Qaeda's leadership, membership and supporters firmly believe that everything happens according to God's will."

There have been some informed and insightful commentaries on the terrorism problem. This is not one of them. Gunaratna has no real background in Islamic studies or the Middle East and it shows. It might impress people who have no real knowledge of the terrorist problem, but it is likely only to mislead them. Gunaratna is a former intelligence officer for the Sri Lankan Government. With that war largely over, Gunaratna has jumped on the counter-terrorism bandwagon and is marketing himself as an expert on international terrorism. Whether you buy what he says here or elsewhere is up to you. Some of the inaccuracies in this book were highlighted in an article in the Australian newspaper The Age.

As a former student of Rohan's, I began reading with high expectations. A conscientious academic with an extraordinary amount of experience in actually comabatting terrorism in his own homeland, Rohan again demonstrates how taking significant risks through often dangerous research can provide insights otherwise unavailable to the interested public.

Inside Al Qaeda, while clearly rushed to publication after September 11, provides the most comprehensive understanding available to the world's newest type of terrorist threat. Rohan explains clearly how the global reach of this organization evolved and how it will be maintained without a more broad-based approach by the coalition of nations aligned to defeat it. Furhtermore, Rohan begins to explore the psychological dynamics that drive UBL's long-standing leadership status and the means to defeat those dynamics in the future.

Certainly more time would have brought with it more eloquent prose, but what we need now are the facts. And Inside Al Qaeda delivers facts in unprecedented depth.

After 9/11, publishers naturally raced to fill the demand for books on the Middle East, terrorism, and al Qaeda in particular. This book feels like it was thrown together in haste by the publisher, due to the poor organization, bad translations, and glaring omissions. However, the book contains a wealth of interesting facts - now dated - for the reader with a good background who can slog through. I tepidly recommend it to advanced students of terrorism and geopolitics.

Many of the passages were not so much written as vomited onto the page. Gunaratna mentions, for example, that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) "has ideological and political links with a few members of the following: Movement of Islamic Unity (APU); Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM); Islamic Front of Malaysia (IFM); Front Malaysia Islamic Council (FMIC); Kongress Indian Muslim Malaysia (KIMM); Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (MIYM); Barisan Nasional; and PAS (Parti Islam Se Malaysia)" (p. 263). I cannot fathom who could find this acontextual alphabet soup, with no further discussion, interesting reading.

The book assumes a certain level of background knowledge. Gunaratna quotes an al Qaeda source as threatening India with "another trial like Kargil" (p. 290). If the reader does not know what happened at Kargil, the passage loses much of its meaning.

Other reviewers have noted the author's translation errors. He also misidentifies the Urdu phrase "Mujahidin ki Lalkaar" as Arabic. Simply stated, Gunaratna's qualifications "to talk with authority about al-Qaeda," according to London's Sunday Times, are highly suspect, if he can't read the primary sources in the original language.

Finally, the book notes that in 2001, at the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Sheikh Abdel Rahman al-Sudeis "converted [the mosque] into a political platform" (p. 316). This, and Gunaratna's frequent, unsourced assertions about what "the vast majority" of Muslims think, is extremely odd, given the centuries-long history of mosques as centers of political activity.

The book is not useless, but could and should have been much better with more thorough editing and better organization.

Rohan Gunaratna's book on Al Qaeda is the most thoroughly researched available. The level of detail is impressive; he even gives the exact address of the former Al Qaeda headquarters in Brooklyn and Osama bin Laden's cell phone number! This book provides Americans with credible specifics we need to fight terrorism.

I wish to point out to the reviewer from Alexandria, VA, that if he/she had read the book carefully they would have understood that the twentieth highjacker Rohan Gunaratna referred to was Moussaoui, who was arrested by the FBI three weeks before the 9/11 attack.

2003's "Inside Al Qaeda" is the third edition of Rohan Gunaratna's extensive investigation of Osama bin Laden's extremist Islamic terrorist group. "Inside Al Qaeda" provides much detailed background information on the origins and history of al Qaeda. It documents how al Qaeda (AQ) organized and manipulated a global network of associated Jihadists to conduct terrorism around the planet.

Gunaratna opens with a biographical sketch of Osama bin Laden. He devotes a long chapter to a description of AQ's organization, ideology, and strategy. The bulk of the book is a long narrative describing the actions of al Qaeda's global network, including its array of points of contact and associated groups around the world. The final chapter assessed al Qaeda's status as of 2003 and projected both its future and a recommended response by the United States.

"Inside Al Qaeda" represents a signficant amount of unclassified research, and probably captures the lay of the land as it was understood at the time of publication. Gunaratna predicted that AQ would evolve in the face of US and allied countermeasures. Its sanctuaries in Afganistan are long gone, and its personnel and communications are under increasing pressure, but as he predicted, AQ was able to adapt as an organization and continue its mission of Jihad.

Time has moved on since this edition was published. New investigations have released much formerly classified material. Some of the gaps in our knowledge of AQ have been filled, in the process rendering poritions of Gunaratna's content out of date. Constant combat since 2003 in Iraq has also seen the waxing and the likely waning of a dedicated AQ effort to make Iraq the centerpiece of its strategy to restore the Caliphate. AQ's central staff is isolated and under pressure in the tribal areas of western Pakistan, while neither AQ nor its associated groups have quite managed to duplicate the stunning success of 9/11. Readers are cautioned that Gunaratna's writing style tends to mix assumptions, assertions, and facts in a manner that may be confusing to those without background on the topic.

"Inside Al Qaeda" is recommended as a good background document on AQ. It contains worthwhile information on a still evolving organization that continues to threaten the United States and its allies.