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45 of 48 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Hitler's Willing Executives: General Disarray and Decline, May 24, 2000
This review is from: Inside Hitler's High Command (Hardcover)
Within months of Germany's unconditional surrender in May 1945, his former military "advisors" tried to distance themselves from his over-reaching grand strategy. Beginning with Halder's self-exculpatory _Hitler as Warlord_ in 1949 and continuing through the highly popular memoirs of Guderian, Manstein, Warlimont, Mellenthin and Bock, the dead Hitler was put in the docket and found guilty of strategical naivite. Post-war propaganda depicted a German High Command which "knew better" than Hitler but were intimidated and brutalized into submitting, or being replaced and disgraced. This myth has been unravelling piecemeal of late with respect to certain "fatal decisions" (Invasion of Russia, Battle of Britain, Declaration of War on the US, the North African Campaign). However, until Megargee's well-written study, none have presented a dissection of how the High Command collectively shared responsibility with the Little Corporal for confusing phase lines on a planning map with logistical, mechanical and manpower realities. This is most likely because "organizational history" tends to be boring. It's much more interesting to read about behind-the-scenes feuds among monocled martinets than the precise way in which orders and intelligence were processed and disseminated. Megargee manages to envigorate his descriptions of the "system", such as it was, with the constant reminder of the clash of egos that diffused what little "opposition" there was to Hitler's conceptions. Throughout it all, Megargee shows how the once powerful vaunted "General Staff" became a mere cog in the awkward_Army High Command_(OKH)structure working alongside, but hardly in synch with Hitler's personal war cabinet, the _Armed Forces High Command_ (OKW). The High Command at work is the heart of this illuminating expose. The most detailed case study is that of _Operation Barbarossa_, often described as Hitler's leap into the dark. Megargee shows how, in spite of the reservations that many of the senior commanders expressed at the time, they were brought along by the seeming precision and foresight of detailed operational staff studies. Megargee illuminates the Wehrmacht's poor use of and regard for intelligence staffs and their work. Paricularly illuminating is Chapter 8 "The System at Work: A Week in the Life of the High Command". The week for display was well chosen: December 15-22, 1941, when the first signs of Operation Barbarossa's failure SHOULD HAVE become apparent. The clear exposition of decision-making and breaking demonstrates exactly how and why Hitler's "professionals" came to share his delusions. Throughout, the illusion of controlling the situation hundreds of miles away by dint of modern instantaneous communications was reinforced by the misuse of raw information filtering back from the beleaguered field commands. Megargee's clear exposition and lively prose should dump the final shovel of dirt on the grave of the lame lament:" If only Hitler had not interfered, his generals would have won the war".
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26 of 27 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Not all Hitler's fault after all., October 16, 2000
This review is from: Inside Hitler's High Command (Hardcover)
The author's intention to analyse a complex subject, whilst at the same time entertaining the general reader, has succeeded in this excellent book. His view that the generals and OKW shared willingly in Hitler's military blunders - post war memoirs tend to be disingenious - is not in itself new. However, Megargee has assembled the primary evidence in a convincing and comprehensive form. As he argues, there is no significant evidence that the High Command seriously opposed the Fuhrer's declaration of war on Russia or America in 1941. Indeed, they took a most simplistic view of Russia's strength and America's likely impact over time. Detailed here too are Hitler's poor attention to strategic planning and military intelligence. In the Gotterdammerung phase of the war, the author has an excellent chapter on Hitler's insistence on promoting men wildly above their ability just because they were loyal. Himmler's dismal showing as a military commander is the best example of this. The book is a most readable insight into the mind set of those who led Germany to defeat in a flawed system.
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24 of 25 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Excellent Academic Look At Hitler's General Staff!, January 28, 2001
This review is from: Inside Hitler's High Command (Hardcover)
Conventional wisdom regarding the fate of the Wehrmacht in World War Two has always been that it was Adolph Hitler's maniacal meddling in the day to day affairs of the armed forces that created the catastrophic defeats along the eastern front that lost the war. Indeed, many of the first hand post-war memoirs of those German generals and other staff officials supported this point of view, giving one the idea that if only the generals had had their way, Germany would have been victorious. There is much to commend such a view; certainly Hitler's decisions were often counter-intuitive and counter-productive, and he often seemed to change his mind and the tactics associated with a campaign in mid-stream. The results of these actions were indeed often disastrous. Yet, as the author of this scholarly investigation into the machinations of the General Staff and its decision making process brilliantly argues in this fascinating and informative book, the evidence supporting such a theory that Hitler single-handedly lost the war through his incompetence simply does not exist. In fact, this book is quite well written; it is authoritative, informative, and extremely well documented. The author has managed to turn what could have been a historical curiosity for the amusement of other academic historians into a terrific reading experience for a more general audience. He approaches the subject with verve and a plethora of telling examples of how the general staff were involved and complicit in the day to day decisions that were so disastrous for the Wehrmacht; far from being helpless factotums who merely carried out Hitler's demands, they initiated debates and discussions in which Hitler often played the provocateur, attempting to gain a better idea of what each of the participants in the discussions really thought regarding a particular course of action. Also, in employing the kinds of primary evidence used here, he illustrates how involved and enthusiastic many of the generals were in making fateful decisions. As the author maintains, there is no credible evidence that they did in fact take any serious issue with Operation Barbarossa or with its conduct until things began to go awry. The simple truth of the matter seems to be that they shared Hitler's myopic faith in the invincibility of the Wehrmacht, and seriously underestimated the capabilities, endurance, and determination of the Soviet forces. The fateful decision was the first one, the effort to invade the Soviet Union without recognizing the serious logistical and tactical problems that were ensue when prosecuting a fight over such a vast distance and with a front that was thousands of miles long. Likewise, the decision by Hitler and General Staff to declare war against the Americans seemed more the result of an arrogant disregard for facts in favor of self-serving ideology. Of course, to argue that the general staff itself was complicit is not to deny the degree of sloth and banality associated with Hitler's command and control of the armed forces. He brashly demoted men who had failed him and his wildly unrealistic expectations while promoting incompetent sycophants based solely on their loyalty. Such policies compounded the difficulties associated with attempting to execute a war that had turned into a much wider and more complex effort than Hitler or the General Staff had ever envisioned. This is a wonderful book, one that gives fresh evidence of the dangers inherent in consensus management. Hitler's fateful problem was that by demanding the outrageous and the unrealistic, he increasingly gathered around him the worst liars, game-players, and toadies in the history of modern warfare. He consistently winnowed out anyone who told him the unvarnished truth, especially if it was negative. By doing so he guaranteed the desperate failure of his most audacious and precarious adventures into the realm of war, and brought the heavy weight of ruin and destruction upon himself, the General Staff, the Wehrmacht, and the German people. Of course, along the way, he managed to ruin most of Europe and kill tens of millions of people, as well. This is an excellent book, and is one I heartily recommend. Enjoy!
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