Years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a loosely organized insurgency continues to target American and Coalition soldiers, as well as Iraqi security forces and civilians, with devastating results. In this sobering account of the ongoing violence, Ahmed Hashim, a specialist on Middle Eastern strategic issues and on irregular warfare, reveals the insurgents behind the widespread revolt, their motives, and their tactics. The insurgency, he shows, is not a united movement directed by a leadership with a single ideological vision. Instead, it involves former regime loyalists, Iraqis resentful of foreign occupation, foreign and domestic Islamist extremists, and elements of organized crime. These groups have cooperated with one another in the past and coordinated their attacks; but the alliance between nationalist Iraqi insurgents on the one hand and religious extremists has frayed considerably. The U.S.-led offensive to retake Fallujah in November 2004 and the success of the elections for the Iraqi National Assembly in January 2005 have led more "mainstream" insurgent groups to begin thinking of reinforcing the political arm of their opposition movement and to seek political guarantees for the Sunni Arab community in the new Iraq.Hashim begins by placing the Iraqi revolt in its historical context. He next profiles the various insurgent groups, detailing their origins, aims, and operational and tactical modi operandi. He concludes with an unusually candid assessment of the successes and failures of the Coalition's counter-insurgency campaign. Looking ahead, Hashim warns that ethnic and sectarian groups may soon be pitted against one another in what will be a fiercely contested fight over who gets what in the new Iraq. Evidence that such a conflict is already developing does not augur well for Iraq's future stability. Both Iraq and the United States must work hard to ensure that slow but steady success over the insurgency is not overshadowed by growing ethno-sectarian animosities as various groups fight one another for the biggest slice of the political and economic pie. In place of sensational headlines, official triumphalism, and hand-wringing, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq offers a clear-eyed analysis of the increasingly complex violence that threatens the very future of Iraq.
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"Another embed at Tal Afar was Ahmed S. Hashim, an academic who has taught at the US Navy War College and served three tours advising the US command in Iraq. His analysis of the battle from the front line in Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq diverges sharply from the official line given by Time and similar publications, and by the BBC, and illustrates the deadly game of war and truth now being played in Iraq, with the latter usually coming off worse."—Robert Fox, Times Literary Supplement, 16 December 2005
"Ahmed Hashim is well-placed to study the Iraqi insurgents and their opponents. An American of Turkish-Eygptian origin, he is a professor at the Naval War College and was an advisor to the American authorities following Saddam Hussein's fall, both in Baghdad and in hotbeds of violence such as Tel Afar, near the Syrian border. His bleak appraisal may well be the most detailed analysis yet of the insurgency and America's efforts to squash it."—The Economist, 4 February 2006
"Hashim has written a much-needed assessment of the Iraqi insurgency. . . . His interviews and experience there, combined with his use of primary sources, have resulted in a compelling account of the socioeconomic factors that spur the insurgency as well as the problems, both political and strategic, that have fed its growth and hampered U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. Hashim has succeeded in putting together an analysis of the violent situation in Iraq that avoids ideological posturing."—John Russell, Library Journal, June 15, 2006
"Ahmed Hashim is well-placed to study the Iraqi insurgents and their opponents. An American of Turkish-Eygptian origin, he is a professor at the Naval War College and was an advisor to the American authorities following Saddam Hussein's fall, both in Baghdad and in hotbeds of violence such as Tel Afar, near the Syrian border. His bleak appraisal may well be the most detailed analysis yet of the insurgency and America's efforts to squash it."—The Economist, 4 February 2006
"Hashim has written a much-needed assessment of the Iraqi insurgency. . . . His interviews and experience there, combined with his use of primary sources, have resulted in a compelling account of the socioeconomic factors that spur the insurgency as well as the problems, both political and strategic, that have fed its growth and hampered U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. Hashim has succeeded in putting together an analysis of the violent situation in Iraq that avoids ideological posturing."—John Russell, Library Journal, June 15, 2006
About the Author
Ahmed S. Hashim is Professor of Strategic Studies at the U.S. Naval War College. His previous books include Iran: Dilemmas of Dual Containment and Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond, both written with Anthony H. Cordesman.
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19 of 23 people found the following review helpful
By Mercator
Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase
The author is a soldier/scholar who is now back in the US teaching college, after a tour of duty in Iraq's Tell Afar as an Army reservist specifically trained in counterinsurgency. The Iraq situation seemed an amorphous mess to me before I read this book; after reading it I understood better the groups involved and their motivation. The author is quite candid in his views, praising some officers and decision-makers he came across, while subjecting others to whithering criticism. There are some other good books about the initial invasion phase of the war, but this is the best book so far about the insurgency phase that still continues. An excellent book for those who want to understand the current challenges facing the US in Iraq.
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful
Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase
Ahmed Hashim has produced an excellent overview of the insurgency in Iraq. Hashim views the insurgency as a largely Sunni phenomenon and devotes a majority of the book to detailing the Sunni insurgents' means, motives and opportunities.
With shorter overviews of the Shia and Kurdish insurgency, plus a review of Coalition counterinsurgency policy to late 2005, Hashim has produced a good review of what went wrong for the American's in Iraq prior to 2007.
With shorter overviews of the Shia and Kurdish insurgency, plus a review of Coalition counterinsurgency policy to late 2005, Hashim has produced a good review of what went wrong for the American's in Iraq prior to 2007.
Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase
I purchased this book in order to get a better perspective on the way the Americans conducted themselves during the first years of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The author did a great job in both laying out what we did well and what we didn't do so well. Being a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom I (March 2003 - April 2004), I understood and experienced a lot of the same issues that were brought up by the author - i.e. the lack of cultural awareness training prior to invading, the struggles the CPA had in first forming. I now have a better grasp on what happened when we first invaded, which gives me a better understanding of how to deal with Iraqis today.
Although the author's predictions on whether or not the Iraqis will be able to form an independent and strong nation-state is a little too much on the bleak side for me, he reflects the views that the world had at that time period when the sectarian strife was growing exponentially.
Overall, great book detailing the war during the pre-surge period. The author's extensive interaction with the local nationals is above reproach and gives the reader an excellent window into how the Iraqis reacted to the American invasion and the consequences of those actions.
Although the author's predictions on whether or not the Iraqis will be able to form an independent and strong nation-state is a little too much on the bleak side for me, he reflects the views that the world had at that time period when the sectarian strife was growing exponentially.
Overall, great book detailing the war during the pre-surge period. The author's extensive interaction with the local nationals is above reproach and gives the reader an excellent window into how the Iraqis reacted to the American invasion and the consequences of those actions.
Format:Hardcover
This work has proved invaluable in resourcing a thesis paper, by being one of the best-sourced works in the category of Iraq literature. However, I would class this work as an essential tool for anyone searching for an understanding of the conflict in Iraq primarily because of Hashim's narrative ability. What is by any measure an academically hefty title is not bound by inaccessibility; wether it be through a constant provision of first-hand accounts of motives and actions by Iraqis themselves or an insistence to maintain a hounding sense of focus in the narrative, Hashim provides a unrelenting and encompassing look into the origins of the greatest problem in current American foreign policy.
By Munawar Ali
Format:Hardcover
Hands down, the best analysis of the Iraqi insurgency situation in Iraq, circa 2005. I've read many books on the subject, and have been getting tired of the "personal opinion = fact" journalist coverage of the war.
Ahmed Hashim, an Arab American working for the Military, provides a thorough analysis of the situation. His analysis, insight, knowledge and overall understanding of the "high level picture" is impressive, and useful. He provides a picture of the occupation, and insurgency that I haven't found elsewhere, and creates dialogue in areas, up till now, unseen.
The book is also a good reference guide (albeit getting dated by 2007), on the various organizations, political groups and insurgency groups operating in Iraq.
My only knock on the book, was the American military "cheerleading". It wasn't required, and only detracts from the book. Some chapters are slightly disjointed, but overall it's still a great read.
Ahmed Hashim, an Arab American working for the Military, provides a thorough analysis of the situation. His analysis, insight, knowledge and overall understanding of the "high level picture" is impressive, and useful. He provides a picture of the occupation, and insurgency that I haven't found elsewhere, and creates dialogue in areas, up till now, unseen.
The book is also a good reference guide (albeit getting dated by 2007), on the various organizations, political groups and insurgency groups operating in Iraq.
My only knock on the book, was the American military "cheerleading". It wasn't required, and only detracts from the book. Some chapters are slightly disjointed, but overall it's still a great read.
11 of 19 people found the following review helpful
Format:Hardcover
A chrystal clear insight in an extremely complicated subject. It is, however, hard to follow some of the reasoning, and the back-history could have been more thoroughly documentede. Otherwise, a very engaging, satisfying and fascinating depicture of a chaotic movement and its counter-force.
9 of 20 people found the following review helpful
Format:Hardcover
The Iraqi insurgency continues to bedevil U.S. plans for a new Iraq. Hashim, a professor at the Naval War College, seeks to address three interrelated issues: who the insurgents are, how they are organized, and what tactics they use. He also seeks to analyze the popular mood in Iraq and trace the development of U.S. policy.
He is at his best as a chronicler of groups, tracing their evolution and charting their organization, and in identifying key insurgents and their supporters. As an analyst, though, Hashim falls short: he writes that many Sunni Arabs saw themselves as targets of the invasion but initially took a wait-and-see attitude before joining the insurgency. While he notes that Sunni clerics rallied opposition from the mosques, he misses the forcible eviction of moderate Sunni clerics by Islamist gangs, who installed handpicked replacements.
As Hashim chronicles the growth of the insurgency in response to the mistakes of the "occupation authorities," he makes mistakes. For example, he cites strong distrust of the U.N. in Fallujah, but Sunni Arab leaders led the call for U.N. involvement. He downplays Iranian and Syrian involvement, stating that "The insurgency has few sources of external state support," suggesting that the Bush administration fingered these two states for political reasons. But his analyses offer little support for such statements. He does a better job demonstrating that foreign jihadists are a minority within the insurgency, but sometimes quality counts more than quantity; foreigners are far more likely to be suicide bombers than Iraqis.
Other problems: Hashim does not discuss the issue of pre-invasion subsidies from Baghdad to Sunni tribal leaders, some of whom refused to rise up.... Read more ›
He is at his best as a chronicler of groups, tracing their evolution and charting their organization, and in identifying key insurgents and their supporters. As an analyst, though, Hashim falls short: he writes that many Sunni Arabs saw themselves as targets of the invasion but initially took a wait-and-see attitude before joining the insurgency. While he notes that Sunni clerics rallied opposition from the mosques, he misses the forcible eviction of moderate Sunni clerics by Islamist gangs, who installed handpicked replacements.
As Hashim chronicles the growth of the insurgency in response to the mistakes of the "occupation authorities," he makes mistakes. For example, he cites strong distrust of the U.N. in Fallujah, but Sunni Arab leaders led the call for U.N. involvement. He downplays Iranian and Syrian involvement, stating that "The insurgency has few sources of external state support," suggesting that the Bush administration fingered these two states for political reasons. But his analyses offer little support for such statements. He does a better job demonstrating that foreign jihadists are a minority within the insurgency, but sometimes quality counts more than quantity; foreigners are far more likely to be suicide bombers than Iraqis.
Other problems: Hashim does not discuss the issue of pre-invasion subsidies from Baghdad to Sunni tribal leaders, some of whom refused to rise up.... Read more ›
Citations (learn more)
This book cites 85
books:
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8
books
cite this book:
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- A History of Iraq by Charles Tripp on 4 pages
- Middle East Review: All the Central Asia States of the Former USSR, Plus Countries Such as Libya, Egypt and Algeria by Hunter Publishing in Back Matter (1), Back Matter (2), and Back Matter (3)
- Islam in the Political Process by James P. Piscatori in Back Matter (1), Back Matter (2), and Back Matter (3)
- Thunder Run: Three Days with the Tusker Brigade in the Battle of Baghdad by David Zucchino on page 16, Back Matter (1), and Back Matter (2)
- Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied by Toby Dodge in Back Matter (1), Back Matter (2), and Back Matter (3)
See all 85 books this book cites
- Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and Its Legacy (Crises in World Politics) by Eric Herring in Back Matter (1), and Back Matter (2)
- Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo (Crises in World Politics) by Iain King in Front Matter
- American Empire: A Debate by Christopher Layne in Back Matter
- Iraq: People, History, Politics (Hot Spots in Global Politics series) by Gareth Stansfield in Back Matter
- Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide by Gerard Prunier in Front Matter
See all 8 books citing this book
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