Customer Reviews

Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare

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Dr. Bard O'Neill has written a superb book that presents a clear framework for analyzing and understanding terrorist activity and violent insurgent activities. I highly recommend this book for the military student, political scientist and the armchair strategist alike.

Insurgency & Terrorism was one of my textbooks when I attended the U.S. Army's Command & General Staff College. The author systemically dissects insurgency and terrorism so that one may understand the causes, effects and very nature of revolutionary warfare. He examines the nature of revolutionary war (causes and effects)and the strategist's ways, means and ends. He clearly lays out a framework for one to understand the nature of a particular conflict. O'Neill then goes on to examine various strategies used by terrorists and insurgents. He discusses such critical factors as popular & external support, governmental response, and the political conditions that created the atmosphere for insurgency. He uses historical examples to illustrate specific points. O'Neill discusses the Spanish guerrilla movement to combat Napoleon's invasion, the American revolutionary effort, Soviet partisans attacking the Nazi invaders, the numerous Central American insurgencies and Cuba, and Bernard Fall's commentaries on the Vietnamese insurgency of the 50s and 60s. O'Neill also delves into the theoretical, Lenin's theories of revolution and Mao's guerrilla war strategies are particulary valuable in illustrating his points.

The value of this book is in providing the student of revolutionary warfare a framework with which to evaluate and analyze insurgencies and terrorist activities. An excellent tool and highly recommended.

In "Insurgency and Terrorism", Bard O'Neill has provided his audience (whether a fighting man or a student) with a framework through which to analyse insurgencies, past, present and future. O'Neill states that he believes that insurgencies are likely to remain a key level of conflict in the future. I agree with him. This is an important area and one which receives all too little attention, especially, in my experience, among the armed forces of the United States. Hopefully Dr O'Neill will redress the balance a little.

The book is split into 9 sections;

- Insurgency in the Contemporary World
- The Nature of Insurgency
- Insurgent Strategies
- The Environment
- Popular Support
- Organisation and Unity
- External Support
- Government Response
- Conclusions

In each case, O'Neill splits the areas up into smaller sub-sections for easy reference. He deals with different types of insurgent groups, different ways insurgents operate, the effects of terrain and outside support, the coverage is fairly comprehensive. He also, usefully, uses historical examples to illustrate his points.

As O'Neill himself points out, no framework for analysis can be infallible or perfect, but this is a pretty good start, whether you are in a counter-insurgency situation or in a seminar room. Good stuff. It should, of course, be supplemented with further reading (a bibliography would have been useful) but all in all this is an excellent piece of work in a field that has been somewhat neglected in recent times (it isn't fashionable in America at the best of times and many of the classic texts are now out of print).

A good piece of follow-up reading to this book (especially for a student) would be Ian Beckett's "Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies".

This is an excellent framework for analysis, but you will need specialist information which is both current and validated before you can do much more than generalize in any given situation. Still, even this can be quite useful.

I came across this book while reading "Peace Operations in an Insurgency Environment", a paper written by Major Grootendorst for the CSC in 1997. In this paper he effectively uses the marketing management model of Kotler to combine the Mackinlay and Chapra theory of peace operations with O'Neill's insurgency model. Very nicely done. (I like Kotler - he seems to view business as war by other means!)

O'Neill's treatment is necessarily very narrow. Except in passing, his scope does not include pre-insurgency nor post-insurgency. I don't find this a deficiency with his work, but I do find it a deficiency with our thinking about insurgency. A common agreement among participants at the recent Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration course sponsored by the Norwegian Defense Force in Oslo is that we need to move beyond the central focus on insurgency. Necessary as it is to "calm the waters", current process does not seem to solve the underlying structural problems which then rise to a boil every decade or so -- and in addition the initial societal disturbance creates generational shockwaves that take decades of sincere and costly efforts to reduce to a manageable level. While O'Neill's is the close examination of a particular facet of a problem, we cannot afford to be so parochial.

I strongly recommend this book. Much of what we have seen come to pass in Iraq was largely predictable, at least in broad brush strokes, based on competent consideration of his model. (I actually read the book in early 2002 and have reviewed it again just this month.) Just keep in mind the broader picture -- think outside the box. We seem to be doing the same things over and over again, only harder and faster; and then seem surprised when we get the same results -- only quicker. A clear prerequisite is being able to empathize (as opposed to sympathize) with the opponent, no matter how we feel about his actions.

Since the conclusion of the cold war, insurgency and terrorism have become the primary means for the disenfranchised to demonstrate their global discontent. During the same time, however, the defense and intelligence communities have staunchly resisted adapting to new threats and recognizing the new players on the international stage.

Simply stated ..."Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics." P. 13. "Terrorism is a form of warfare in which violence is directed primarily against noncombants (usually unarmed civilians), rather than operational military and police forces or economic assets (public or private)." P. 24.

Dr. O'Neill's Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare is one of the best volumes I've found that focuses on cause and effect, along with viable solutions as a whole.

Academicians and practitioners alike had long given insurgency and terrorism little attention, instead stressing studies on the military/defense industry's technical structure - particularly ignoring the waning of human assets.

So the lack of a comprehensive and up-to-date counterinsurgency program is hardly surprising. "A key point to be addressed when evaluating a counterinsurgency program is how well the government knows its enemy." P. 126.

This book presents the most important, current challenges facing counterinsurgency and anti-terrorism policy, addressing key issues and analyzing solutions within the perspective of collective expectations and role definitions for both civil and military players. "Experience and the experts suggest that the most effective way to deal with internal terrorism and small-scale urban guerrilla attacks against soldiers and policemen is to emphasize police work, good intelligence, and judicial sanctions ...Police and intelligence agencies are also the main instruments for combating transnational terrorism. In today's world the problem of transnational terrorism places a premium on international police cooperation and intelligence sharing ...Numerous cases suggest that the centerpiece of successful counter-guerrilla campaigns are small-unit operations - that is, sustained and aggressive patrols and ambushes in guerrilla-infested zones." Pp. 128 - 130.

If you wish to know/understand how insurgent/guerrilla and terrorists groups function, this is the book to read.

Moreover it helps the reader put in perspective insurgent/terrorist groups when reading about current events.

Bard E. O'Neill has made a name for himself within the military community as one of the premiere experts on insurgency and revolutionary warfare. After reading this volume, I no longer considered this to be in anyway surprising. Written in the late 1980s/early 1990s, it is a short book that nevertheless touches upon all aspects and types of insurgencies in a rigorous and analytic manner. Readers should be aware, however, that it is incredibly dry, but to the point - something that a "just the facts" type reader such as myself can appreciate. Unfortunately, I have not been able to read any of Mr. O'Neill's more modern works, but will nonetheless suggest that readers might want to take a look at them as well.

Although it was originally published in 1990, this book was the most relevant I read during my tour of Iraq. I found many direct comparisons between the concepts mentioned by Mr. O'neil and the operations of the Iraqi insurgency. If you are interested in learning the inner workings of insurgency, or especially if you are delpoying to Iraq (in an MI capacity), you need to read this book.

This author does an outstanding job of organizing, synthesizing and conveying the essence of insurgency and terrorism. The one drawback to this book is that you will need to have a specialized understanding of the art and science of war. If you are a novice, buy the book and continue to do your research and professional reading. This book will become invaluable to you later and you will be grateful that you have it. Side bar... of course you might not agree with everything that this author says; thats ok, look past that and focus on the content of what he is trying to convey.

Of particular note, What I like about this book is that it is organized and fits nicely with the notion that there are "many" centers of gravity. for those that believe, like myself, that clausewitz had more than just a narrow defintion of how the principles of war were tied to more than just the political, then this book will become an excellent source reference for your continuing professional development as you explore the nuances and variables of the many types of strategies. All in all, this book is worth the effort.

Terry Tucker, Prof Military Studies/History

Senior Doctrine Developer, SANGMP