Customer Reviews

Insurgent Iraq: Al Zarqawi and the New Generation

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Napoleoni's book is well researched, full of useful information and easy to read. It is a biography of al Zarqawi and at the same time the story of the Jihadist movement and the chronicle of the war in Iraq. She writes beautifully, as a skillful and passionate author, so that the reader cannot stop turning the pages. I bought the book at LSE book shop and read it overnight, I simply had to get to the end of it.

This is a book which stands out from the vast production of books on terrorism and Iraq, a book written by someone who understands the meaning of terrorism. Napoleoni, I found out by reading her biography on the net, did a PhD at LSE in the early 1990s on terrorism, at the time she was the sole student working on such a topic. We often forget that until 9/11 terrorism was not a hot topic and famous journalists and authors were uninterested in researching it.

This book confirms what most academics and studends of current affairs know, you cannot master a topic in a short time. True knowledge requires years and years of research, reading and above all experience.

Well done from a fellow LSE scholar,

Susan

A 'must' for any seeking to understand the roots of terrorist activities is INSURGENT IRAQ: AL ZARQAWI AND THE NEW GENERATION. It examines Iraqi insurgency and the forces which contribute to it, documenting the regrouping and strengthening of terror networks and the development of an Iraqi resistance since the invasion over two years ago. Most of all, it tells of al Zarqawi and his history and involvement in Iraq, providing a blend of history and social inspection throughout.

Diane C. Donovan

California Bookwatch

"Insurgent Iraq" is the most lucid account I've been able to find on the dynamics behind the current threat posed by radicalized Islam. I've read books by American, European, and Muslim writers, but "Insurgent Iraq" seems the most unbiased account of how we've reached the point of near-certain civil war in Iraq. Ms. Napoleoni provides a clear analysis of the myriad players and agendas in this very complex situation. Key leaders within the Democratic and Islamic camps have made ill-conceived decisions because of their reliance on dogma rather than on realistic assessments. Too bad Napoleoni had not been consulted right after 9/11; we might have implemented much more astute policy. In the meantime, readers can rely on this exceptional work to better understand how we've gotten to this point. I look forward to her future writings -- this story is far from over.

Napoleoni is obviously a talented and knowledgeable writer on the subject on Sunni extremist, however, her political bias hurts her credibility.

The U.S. did not invent Zarqawi, nor did the Bush administration build up his infamous reputation. Zarqawi was on his way to become a leader in the Jihadi circles, he independently ran a training camp in Heart without pledging bayat to bin Laden, (no minor point given the money paid to the Taliban in those days to operate on Afghan soil.

The Bush administrations debacle in Iraq stands is enough for pointed criticism of how the war was handled, but Napoleoni uses some silly logic to blame the administration for Zarqawi's rise to power and U.S. policy in Iraq and other places:

* She points out that the jihadi's beheadings started after the "torture" at Abu Grhab prison by U.S. military personnel with no supervision and too much time on their hands. While the fraternity like acts were despicable by any modern country, I find it hard to believe that if that those acts did not happen, jihadist would not be chopping off heads.
* The silly notion that the FBI took control of the investigation of murdered USAID worker Lawrence Foley from the Jordanians, causing consternation among Muslims in Jordan.
* She dismisses any information from the US administration about Zarqawi as "wrong" or purposely misled by other Muslim countries looking to use US force for their own agenda. She does not take into account intelligence community information about Zarqawi on the mere basis that it cannot be confirmed as in the case of al-Qai'da member Abu Zubadayah who may (or may not of) mentioned Zarqawi during interrogation.
* Implies that the US employed "death squads" in Iraq as they did in El Salvador.
* Implied that the Pentagon led the press to believe that Zarqawi was behind the 7/7/05 London bombings. (I do not recall reading that at the time).
* The silly quote that the Marines were forced to withdraw from Falluja, implying that the anti-imperialist insurgents caused the retreat instead of what happened- A decision in Washington to let local Iraqi forces battle the jihadists.

I have a big problem with her sourcing, much of which is former websites, quoting a paper that quoted an anonymous FBI official and my favorite source-Scott Ritter, the former UN inspector turned child rapist who's opinions about handling Saddam changed as much as his penchant for having sex with underage children.

This could have been a good book, it is a shame that Napoleoni used it as a vehicle for her political biases.

The author has presented a candid, vivid, precise and penetrating understanding of Al Zarqawi; his life, his passion for a caliphate for the region and certainly, his thirst to inflict as much harm and death as possible upon those who oppose his interpretation of a radical Islam. His youthful and turbulant experiences in Jordan; hence, the introduction to al Qaeda and of course, his leadership role, as an outsider, in terms of the Iraqi insurgency is seen and heard in the daily death bombings dispatches involving the occupaton forces and ordinary Iraqis who are in the wrong place at the wrong time. The tentacles of his organization have invaded Jordan and perhaps other regional nations as well; his further objective to attack Israel and even Saudi Arabia is not in doubt.

To understand the man, the financing and the radicals recruited with similar loyalties, is to be in step with today while anticipating the dark clouds that are further moving toward us n tomorrow. His hatred for America evolved in recent years and his ease in terms of televised and filmed beheadings is a reminder of his rules for engagement.

Ms. Napoleoni writes well; her depth of research leaves no doubt about her and her astute reportorial genius. We need more writers like her to tell us who we are, where we are and where we are headed. The book is educational, polished, easy to read, and it merits five stars for excellence.

History is our companion and we thank Ms. Napoleoni for recording this reality.

Napoleoni argues that Zarqawi was basically some unknown jihadi thug that was in the right place at the right time. But, a better look into Zarqawi as a planner and tactician shows otherwise. In order to understand why Zarqawi has been successful in building a worldwide terrorist network you first have to look at the man himself. Dr. Jaril Post is in the process of profiling Zarqawi and did an interview two days ago where he discussed what makes him sucessful. His personal charisma which is at least equal to that of Bin Laden's and his incredible organizational ability were his two greatest attributes in building his network.

Bob Bare a retired CIA analyst said in 2002 (before most people heard of Zarqawi) on CNN that Bin Laden could die tomorrow and Zarqawi would lead the al-Qaeda movement. He said he believed this because Zarqawi had an uncanny ability to bring together very unlike terrorist groups and most importantly he knew where and how to get massive amounts of money for funding terrorist operations around the world.

In 2001 Zarqawi was already planning attaks on a world stage. Four Zarqawi angents were just got convincted of plotting a 2002 attack on targets across Germany. Zarqawi was already at that time looking global. The Iraq War greatly increased Zarqawi's power, but only because he saw it coming and laid the groundwork to take advantage of the situation. Loretta Napoleoni states that Zarqawi became a major name because Colin Powell linking him to Saddam. But, that is simply false. Zarqawi in the US and on a world stage was still very much an unknown. The US public and the rest of the world first stood up and took notice of Zarqawi in mid 2004 when he released the video of an American being beheaded. At CNN.com they label the most watched video from each year. In 2001 it was Bin Laden in a cave laughing over 911. In 2004 it was Zarqawi beheading an American.

It was Zarqawi's own ingenuity and use of the internet that rocketed him to univeral recognition and infamy around the globle which in turn brought in far more money and men to fill Zarqawi's ranks. Since then he has managed a very brutal campaign linking major attacks on the ground with a well managed internet campaign.

The Iraq War helped Zarqawi by giving him a battlefield to use to bring in much more money and men, but Napoleoni is very much wrong to say the US created Zarqawi. It was Zarqawi himself who came to Iraq a year before the war to prepare the ground work for the looming battle with the US. It was Zarqawi that managed to make a major public enemy of himself in May of 2004 to advance himself worldwide.

Zarqawi made opportunities for himself when he saw them, he wasn't just some jihadi that happened to be in the right place at the right time. Without the Iraq War it would have taken him much longer to gain worldwide infamy, but as long as he continued to target Western nations like Germany and managed to keep from getting a bullet in the head he would have grew in stature over time, especially with Bin Laden out of the action hiding in a cave in the middle of nowhere.

As much as Napoleoni would like to credit Bush for making the monster that is Zarqawi, it simply is not the case. Zarqawi took opportunities when he saw them and was the main person responsable for getting himself to where he is today.