... it may be too late. Let me start by addressing a misconception you may get from another review. Sokal, in his famous hoax, did not write "a bunch of nonsense and falsely attribute it to prominent French intellectuals". Indeed, much of it was not nonsense - to postmodernists - which is why it was snapped up by 'Social Text'. It appeared to touch all the right bases, with scientific bells on. Physical reality is at bottom a social and linguistic construct. Postmodern science has freed itself from dependence on objective truth. A truly liberatory mathematics is what we need. Etc, etc. The article starred in a special issue on the so-called 'Science Wars', and one editor refused to believe it was a parody even after Sokal said so.
In itself that showed not much more than the tenuous intellectual grip of some cultural studies grandees. So Sokal and Bricmont followed up with this book. Their stated intention was far from producing a critique of the entire oeuvre of Lacan, Deleuze, Derrida and a dozen others, all between two covers:
"We make no claim to analyse postmodernist thought in general; rather, our aim is to draw attention to the repeated abuse of concepts and terminology coming from mathematics and physics."
"We show that famous intellectuals such as Lacan, Kristeva, Irigaray, Baudrillard and Deleuze have repeatedly abused scientific concepts and terminology ... throwing around scientific jargon in front of their non-scientist readers without any regard for its relevance or even its meaning."
"There is nothing shameful in being ignorant of calculus or quantum mechanics. What we are criticizing is the pretension of some celebrated intellectuals to offer profound thoughts on complicated subjects which they understand, at best, at the level of popularizations."
That's what the authors say they will do in this book, and that's what they do. As for the hoax with its 219 references:
"The parody was constructed around quotations from eminent French and American intellectuals ... the passages may be absurd or meaningless, but they are nonetheless authentic."
All this is spelt out carefully and at length in the Introduction, which a reviewer above seems to have missed.
If you want to know what ruffled so many feathers, read the book. It's well researched and well written. But be warned that despite the authors' light touch, reams of inanity and bafflegab, which can give you a mild high at first, will eventually rot the brain. You never thought that E = Mc^2 was a sexed equation because it privileges the speed of light over other speeds that are vitally necessary to us? You haven't kept up with Irigaray. From Lacan we learn, along with much else, that the torus - a topological figure like a doughnut - is exactly the structure of the neurotic *and this torus really exists* (I know, I know, Lacan wasn't post-anything). Did we teach Einstein anything, asks the sociologist Latour? Er, no. This may be a French intellectual joke, or more likely it reflects a misreading of a popular introduction to relativity. I bet you didn't know that acceleration and deceleration are what physicists call positive and negative velocities. I have a Ph.D. in theoretical physics and I didn't know. But that's what Virilio, the philosopher of speed, tells his readers. And so on, and on. Several hundred errors, from the venial to whoppers, are documented and patiently explained in terms that non-specialists can understand. In addition, there is a long and sensible chapter on epistemic relativism, an extreme form of which fertilized the ground for this, and an interesting epilogue with suggestions on the way forward. The parody is reprinted with commentary in an appendix.
Reactions to the book come in a variety of flavors:
1. It's the wrong book. The authors should have written an in-depth appreciation of the philosophy of Deleuze.
2. The errors are illusory. For example, Lacan was an M.D. so he was perfectly capable of mastering topology. If he said that the neurotic torus really exists, then it does. This has been seriously argued, and not just by Woody Allen.
3. The errors are peripheral. They arise mainly in mathematics and physics where, unfairly, words and concepts are used with precise meanings, and rhetoric (usually) carries no weight. In feminist theory, continental philosophy and cultural studies, on the other hand, these thinkers can 'create concepts' with the best. In short, the vessel is leaking but only in parts where it is easy to detect; the rest is watertight.
4. The errors are endemic. For a theory to be worth the name, it is not enough to have a repertoire of theoretical-sounding jargon, perhaps tricked out with mathematical decoration. There is a missing ingredient: reality (whatever you understand by that). If you believe that 'there is nothing outside the text' or that 'truth is determined by social convention', you have a problem. This is painfully apparent when soft practice blunders innocently or otherwise into hard science, but it is also, less obviously, present in all the other fields, with the possible exception of literary theory.
Maybe Kuhn was right, at least as regards the humanities and social sciences, and it will take another generation for this paradigm to die out along with its practitioners. Meanwhile, what a waste: not for the practitioners but for students who are paying to have their brains addled.
It's instructive to compare this book with Gross & Levitt's 'Higher Superstition', an earlier and more scathing attack on some of the same targets. Quote: "When such solecisms as we find in these writings are confidently put forth as scholarly discoveries, with every assurance that something profound is being uttered, one must wonder about the system - and the ideology - that nurtures and rewards them." You won't find anything like that in Sokal & Bricmont but they caught most of the flak. There wasn't a Gross hoax, you see.