Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform [Hardcover]

Paul R. Pillar (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: September 6, 2011

A career of nearly three decades with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council showed Paul R. Pillar that intelligence reforms, especially measures enacted since 9/11, can be deeply misguided. They often miss the sources that underwrite failed policy and misperceive our ability to read outside influences. They also misconceive the intelligence-policy relationship and promote changes that weaken intelligence-gathering operations.

In this book, Pillar confronts the intelligence myths Americans have come to rely on to explain national tragedies, including the belief that intelligence drives major national security decisions and can be fixed to avoid future failures. Pillar believes these assumptions waste critical resources and create harmful policies, diverting attention away from smarter reform, and they keep Americans from recognizing the limits of obtainable knowledge.

Pillar revisits U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and highlights the small role intelligence played in those decisions, and he demonstrates the negligible effect that America's most notorious intelligence failures had on U.S. policy and interests. He then reviews in detail the events of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, condemning the 9/11 commission and the George W. Bush administration for their portrayals of the role of intelligence. Pillar offers an original approach to better informing U.S. policy, which involves insulating intelligence management from politicization and reducing the politically appointed layer in the executive branch to combat slanted perceptions of foreign threats. Pillar concludes with principles for adapting foreign policy to inevitable uncertainties.

Editorial Reviews

Review

[A] rich, useful, and important book.

(Thomas Powers New York Times Book Review 10/2/2011)

A thoroughly documented, cogently argued work by an author with vast personal experience of his topic.

(Kirkus Reviews 7/1/11)

A vigorous and hard-hitting insider's account,

(Lawrence D. Freedman Foreign Affairs January 2012)

Pillar provides a telling and comprehensive new perspective from the inside.

(Steve Coll New York Review of Books 2/9/12)

This is a well-written effort by a former intelligence offer and academician. Hopefully, members of the national security community and their staffs will read and benefit from it.

(Choice April 2012)

Review

Pillar's combination of qualifications as a high-level practitioner and careful scholar is unmatched. He weaves together general analysis of the role of intelligence with insights from his own involvement in the most important foreign policy issues over many years.

(Richard K. Betts, Columbia University )

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Hardcover: 432 pages
• Publisher: Columbia University Press; First Edition edition (September 6, 2011)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0231157924
• ISBN-13: 978-0231157926
• Product Dimensions: 6 x 1.2 x 9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.5 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (8 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #746,609 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

20 of 21 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Four for Omissions, Six for Precision Relevance September 22, 2011

By Robert David STEELE Vivas HALL OF FAMETOP 500 REVIEWER

Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase

I have to give the book a solid five, not my norm by any means for books on the intelligence profession. It loses one star for eschewing deeper discussions of the lack of integrity across the intelligence system (to include George Tenet refusing to implement any of the recommendations of the Aspin-Brown Commission, or Jim Clapper continuing to do the wrong things more expensively than ever before), but abundantly compensates for those omissions with devastatingly fresh precision attacks on the political side of the house, where intelligence is generally irrelevant. This is, without question, the ONLY first class book on this topic, and it is certain to be of lasting value, along with a still relevant companion by Mort Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy; Second Edition, in which "rule one" is--I do not make this stuff up--"Lie to the President if you can get away with it."

The killer quote that makes the book for me is from Richard Immerman, and appears on page 318:

"regardless of any benefit from reform of the intelligence community, 'the effect on policy is likely to be slight so long as the makers of that policy remain cognitively impaired and politically possessed.'"

Wow. I've never heard politicians called stupid and corrupt in such elegant terms. It works for me. Pillar makes a stab at addressing the importance of openness, but this book completely avoids the trenchant details that are better found in Hamilton Bean's No More Secrets: Open Source Information and the Reshaping of U.S. Intelligence (Praeger Security International) and Dana Priest and William Arkin's Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State. The three books together comprise a perfect troika for advanced study, with my own books being still relevant as the obvious solution. In June 2012 Random House will publish Manifesto for Truth: Expanding the Open Source Revolution, a modest book that will mark the beginning of the third stage of intelligence--beyond secret war, beyond strategic analytics ignored by everyone, toward public intelligence in the public interest, creating a Smart Nation where sunlight and collective intelligence eradicate corruption and ideological idiocy.

Here are my detailed notes:

+ Preface focused on both the Viet-Nam and the Iraq wars as "tragically ill-conceived military expeditions," with the book described by the author as an attempt to address the WHY of such US misadventures, a book written from the perspective of a concerned citizen and scholar of foreign policy.

+ Core focus is on US foreign and national security failures stemming from misguided and even dangerously wrong images in the minds of the policymakers (mostly political appointees--in his discussion of the neoconservatives, all both ignorant and arrogant).

QUOTE (4): "The implication of the intelligence community's work on Iraq was to avoid the war, not launch it."

This is nice but I would have gone much further--from Charlie Allen and his line crosses to the debriefing of the idiot son-in-law that went back, the professional got it right. The seventh floor never had integrity to begin with, and pimped the war for the wrong reasons.

+ The author slams the 9/11 Commission from the very beginning of the book, and in much more detail toward the end, and I completely agree. As one of those interviewed by one of the children assigned to the commission, as one of those close to ABLE DANGER principals betrayed by their own leadership (still serving as the leader of NSA and Cyber-Command, a compound sinkhole), and as one who has studied both intelligence and policy ineptitude for decades, I find the author's views compelling. I learn from him.

+ The author's bottom line is that intelligence influence on policy is negligible. While I agree with that observation, I completely disagree with his refusal to discuss how $80 billion or more a year, 70% of it spent on contractor butts in seats, can be considered competent by any stretch of the imagination, when it produces, "at best," 4% of what the President needs and nothing for everyone else, and his avoidance of what deep integrity and public outreach (not a traditional concept, to be sure) could do to keep policy honest. He does get to his ideas at the very end.

QUOTE (5): "Policy has shaped intelligence more than vice versa. This relationship has entailed significant corruption of intelligence through politicization, but official inquires have refused to recognize this influence."

I actually thought Aspin-Brown did pretty well, and in his discussion of Senator Boren's 2004 try, am reminding that the 1992 try was killed by Senator John Warner and then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, both opposed to any reduction of the fraud, waste, and abuse monies flowing into Virginia and across the country.

+ The second bottom line: politics, not intelligence, drives policy. Perhaps a blinding flash of the obvious, but this book delivers something I have never seen before, a truly superb discussion of why intelligence reform is irrelevant and why political and policy reform are essential, and I for one find this to be a much needed contribution to the field.

+ Citing Doris Kearns Goodwin, he begins his expert dismantling of the politicization of policy and the ignorance of intelligence by noting that world views once formed are difficult to change, and I certainly agree with that. Harlan Cleveland, in The Knowledge Executive; Neustadt and May in Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers, and Kristan Wheaton in The Warning Solution : Intelligent Analysis in the Age of Information Overload all have useful contributions on this topic, but at root the point he is making is that the American electoral system is skewed toward the election of ideologically-driven politicians who are finely tuned on local politics and relatively naive and loosely-educated about the real world.

+ Although he touches on corruption, this is not a book about special interests (although Israel does get mentioned, as well as oil), it is mostly a book about how national policy no longer has any semblance of checks and balances, from experts, from Congress, from the press, or from the public. These people are out of control. Here I will just mention one of the better books on Dick Cheney, my review of that book itemizes over 20 documented impeachable high crimes by this man: Vice: Dick Cheney and the Hijacking of the American Presidency.

+ There are excellent turns of phrase throughout the book, and it is clearly a masterwork, but I would emphasize it is a masterwork on the political deficiencies, it's soft-shoe coverage of the intelligence community is not helpful. Among the phrases I enjoy are "naive optemism," "blind determination," "guerrilla parsing," "feckless coordination," "picking the cherries," and a phrase I have used for many years, "ideology over intelligence."

EMPHASIS: The political portion of this book is six stars and beyond. I have a note, that this is truly a nuanced and robust study of policy politicization absent integrity or intelligence, and this author's contribution on this point will stand for a decade or more.

Chapter 5: Great Decisions and the Irrelevance of Intelligence, pp. 96-120, is the stand-alone extract for those teaching courses, and it reminds me, a favorable comparison, with the work of Ada Bozeman, Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft: Selected Essays (Brassey's Intelligence & National Security Library), where the 25-page introduction is an essential start for all intelligence and policy professionals.

+ I read the book carefully for hints of where the author stands on Bob Gates and George Tenet, and generally feel that he subtly slams Gates as I would, and covers up for Tenet, as I would not. As the second era of national intelligence comes to an end in the USA, we have over-paid clerks as "leaders" and integrity is not part of the equation.

The final chapters of the book address proposed solutions, and while I am disappointed to some extent, I must agree with both of the author's recommendations:

RECOMMENDATION #1: The intelligence community must be truly independent, and also treat Congress and the public as customers for national intelligence. Quite right, and that is the whole point of the Open Source Agency that Congressman Rob Simmons (R-CT-02), Joe Markowitz, Kevin Scheid, and a handful of others have been championing--under diplomatic auspices, with Charlie Allen as the Deputy for National Security, such an agency would be both open and independent, and would set the gold standard for the classified side of the intelligence community to match, while also helping Congress and the Administration cut the 50% fraud, waste, and abuse from across the various stakeholder stove-pipes (in the US Government today, the Cabinet represents the recipients of taxpayer funds, not the taxpayers). Read more ›

4 of 5 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars The 9/11 Commission Exposed October 13, 2011

By Retired Reader

Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase

The core of this book is a scathing critique of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (aka 9/11 Commission). It makes a persuasive argument that the 9/11 Commission inquiry and its subsequent report were more an exercise in public relations and political gamesmanship than a serious study of the events associated with the 9/11 tragedy. The argument is made that the staff director of the Commission, Philip Zelikow, not only was politically biased toward the Bush Administration, but entered into the inquiry with a predetermined agenda to "reform" the U.S. Intelligence Community by creating a new layer to an already top heavy bureaucracy by advocating the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to oversee the entire IC.

Pillar appears to have done a good deal of thinking about the complicated issue of how intelligence relates to policy and how domestic political considerations can influence both. Although his uses the 9/11 Commission report as the center piece of his thinking, he discusses other examples of what is sometimes called `politicalization' of intelligence as well. He makes the important point that intelligence often is used to sell policy rather than inform it. He notes that in the run up to operation Iraqi Freedom, the administration of President George W Bush appears to have decided upon a military invasion of Iraq with no discernable evidence of a formal decision making process. Once the decision was made, intelligence reporting was considered principally as a means of selling the decision to the American public and Congress. The events of 9/11 were sized upon as a catalyst to build public support for the invasion of Iraq.

This is an important book that makes a major contribution to the understanding of how the U.S. Intelligence System actually works. Yet Pillar is after all a retired CIA intelligence officer who in his last years was head of the CIA Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) then National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for the Near East. So of course he has a few axes of his own to grind with this book. For this reason he tends to obfuscate CIA's failures and rationalize its mistakes. He also appears at times to be isolated from the day to day business of intelligence production as evidenced by his remark about the "uninspiring work of transcription and translation" a misrepresentation comparable to those made by the 9/11 Commission.

2 of 3 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Insider's View of the Intersection of Intelligence with Policymaking January 7, 2012

By Philip A. True

Format:Hardcover

This book is a must for anyone interested in how intelligence is used and misused by policymakers, in particular prior to the invasion of Iraq, as well as historic examples by past administrations. As the National Intelligence Officer [NIO] for the Near East/South Asia from 2000 to 2004, and previously as deputy in CIA's CounterTerrorism Center, few people have the background and experience that the author has in viewing these turbulent years. Bonus: the book is not only an insider's view, but also thoughtful and well written. It is not without flaws; but they are few in contrast to the wealth of informed judgement that Pillar brings to the subject.

Question: Did the Bush Administration go to war in Iraq through a deliberative process that identified reasons pro and con? Pillar states there was "the absence of any apparent procedure for the determination of whether the war was a good idea..." thus agreeing with other insiders, such as former Treasury Secretary, Paul O'Neill and Deputy Sec. of State Richard Armitage. But the administration needed a reason to "sell" the idea of war to the American public. In August 2002, it was decided that the threat posed by Iraq's potential for using so-called weapons of mass destruction--chemical, biological, and nuclear, the latter the only truly "mass destruction" weapon--would be used justification. The CIA was asked to produce a hurried National Intelligence Estimate on this topic. Pillar agrees that the NIE was badly flawed, that the key judgments "leaned forward" in government parlance, agreeing that a threat was there. However, as Pillar notes, the body of the NIE spelled out in detail the flimsy nature of the evidence, the disagreements by the Department of Energy and State as to the key findings. But almost no one bothered to read the entire text, and hence understand the fragile factual basis of the estimate. Pillar agrees with critics as to flawed analysis and acknowledges that insufficient attention was given to alternatives of the conventional wisdom that though little evidence was available, somehow Saddam had managed to hide something that gave credence to the threat. Pillar is scornful of the administration's taking the NIE and elaborating, suggesting far more--the mushroom cloud--than even the flawed estimated stated. Pillar is also scathing that the Bush Administration cited the WMD NIE as gospel, but ignored later and prior to the war estimates that an invasion of Iraq would be costly and likely result in long-term internal conflict among the various groups in Iraq.

Other examples of how policymakers, in Pillar's view, fail to pay attention to intelligence assessments unless the assessment agrees with the policymaker's own judgment and perceptions are included, notably the failure of Vietnam policymakers to heed the pessimistic, and largely accurate, intelligence judgments of that war and probable outcome. Pillar feels that intelligence has been largely useless and ignored in helping policymakers, primarily because those who reach key positions--the presidency, other high officials, advisors--are so steeped in their own mindsets of how the world works, or should be, that they are immune to contrary advice. I think this is overdrawn and that while the main point is well taken, there are examples where the advice of intelligence officials have helped clarify to policymakers the foreign policy problems they face.

Finally, the author is extremely critical of the influence of the 9/11 Commission, and its recommendation to create an office of Director of National Intelligence. [My review of the 9/11 commission report did not, unfortunately, sufficiently critique the recommendations]. Pillar is not alone in that many former CIA officers and others share his view. He blames Philip Zeiikow, the commission's staff director and his close ties with Condi Rice, in exonerating the Bush Administration's laxness-- by Rice, President Bush and other officials--as to the danger of an al Qaeda attack prior to 9/11. A bit of ax-grinding, but understandable.

Many other valuable insights and examples are in this must-read book for those interested in this topic.