Customer Reviews

Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda

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John Keegan is a well known military historian, and the defence editor for a major UK newspaper. In this particular book, he tackles the broad topic of intelligence and war. He uses case studies to help illustrate his points. (These include the 1942 Midway campaign, Nelson's pursuit of the French fleet leading to the Battle of the Nile, and Jackson's Shenandoah valley campaign). As some of the other reviewers have noted, these examples are not new, and some of the points he makes may be quite familiar. But I think in fairness, it should be remembered that while his work may be used to comment upon current policy, the roots of the work is as a history. It is not meant to be a polemic about how defence budgets may be better spent or the ultimate folly of war. While he does offer insights - and perhaps the best observation is that even if one has a great intelligence advantage, that advantage to be decisive must still be converted in some concrete way. The US knowing that the target was Midway was a great intelligence coup, but it still needed a big break when the Enterprise and Hornet's dive bombers managed to find the Japanese carriers while they were in the midst of re-arming. Of note in the later battles, the Japanese were able to determine US intentions (Phillipine Sea, Leyte Invasion) but the disparity in carriers and battle fleets was so great that the insight was almost irrelevant. Intelligence because it often has a short 'shelf life' unless it is acted upon or can be converted into some other tangible advantage can be transient and illusory. A very interesting work, and worth a read - more aimed at history buffs and not for ultra serious academics (who want more details) nor for policy pundits and mavens who are looking for historical 'evidence' to support their particular political and policy positions.

This history is well timed in the sense that it appeared at a time when certain people were attempting to spread a myth that the United States should have been able to avoid the tragedy of 9/11. Keegan, a military historian of the first tier, examines the full scope of military intelligence and its ramifications.

He convincingly demonstrates that accurate intelligence has almost always been unavailable - and even in the few instances it was available, its impact has not been the decisive element.

Keegan examine Lord Nelson's 73 day quest for the French fleet, relying upon merchants, captured sailors, ambassadors and just about everyone else for information. In the end, it was Nelson's experience and intuition that brought his fleet to battle with the French.

Perhaps his most telling example concerns the Battle of Midway. The Americans had exceptional intelligence and yet, as Keegan shows, the American victory resolved itself to four minutes of good fortune. So it goes in war.

Yes, some governments spend millions and billions on gathering intelligence. No, it is very rare for that intelligence gathering process to produce sucessful results as a norm. War is a business where secrets are not given up easily and are difficult to ferret out.

Keegan maintains that in the end, intelligence isn't a handmaiden to victory in battle, but perhaps a cousin once removed.

Jerry

Sir John Keegan, the world's foremost living military historian, has written a book which thoroughly examines the role of intelligence in warfare, reaching a conclusion that is sure to tick off the intelligence community: even the best military intelligence on an enemy's forces and plans is secondary to having adequate military forces and planning with which to defeat the enemy. Keegan gives a number of case studies, including the World War II submarine Battle of the Atlantic, Stonewall Jackson's 1862 Shenandoah Valley campaign, Admiral Nelson's hunt for the French fleet in the Mediterranean, and the battle of Crete, to show the effect of various degrees of knowledge of the enemy's forces and plans on the outcome of battle. The battle of Crete contributes most to Keegan's conclusion on the usefulness of military intelligence: the commander had a high degree of knowledge of German forces and plans for the batttle, so much so that when the first German paratroopers began to land while he was eating breakfast, he looked up and said: "they're on time." Yet the British lost this battle despite this high degree of foreknowledge of the German invasion plans. Keegan would not deny the importance of military intelligence in future military operations. With the satellite intelligence and codebreaking available today, much can be learned about enemy forces. However despite this foreknowledge, the intention of the potential enemy's command structure can still be unknown: witness the beginning of the first Iraq War, when Iraqi forces were massing on the Kuwait border, yet U.S. intelligence did not believe Saddam would cross the border and invade Kuwait. Technological intelligence capabilities have been overemphasized by the U.S. intelligence community since Carter's Stansfield Turner headed the CIA, to the detriment of even more valuable human intelligence. Keegan's book, as all his books, reaches a reasoned balance: good intelligence is vital, but ultimately the outcome of military conflicts is determined by the skillful deployment of superior military forces--superior not necessarily in numbers, but in training, tactics, weaponry, and most of all, fighting spirit and leadership. Keegan has produced another masterpiece, which all military historians and commanders, and historians of the mysterious arts of espionage, must read--and heed, to their peril if they do not.

Not Keegan's best effort. It felt like I was reading parts and pieces from other works that may or may not be turned into full books. Love his work but this is for completists only.

I found John Keegan's book well written, although the title is somewhat misleading. In my opinion, this work focuses mostly where Mr. Keegan seems to be most comfortable, in World War II. Even though some of the concepts he describes span across time, I found few take-aways for the current war on terrorism. Additionally, there appears to be more written about the military operations themselves, rather than about the intellgence influence in those ops. I appreciate the fact that Mr. Keegan defends the intelligence community, as all too often intelligence is simply a scape goat for leadership to blame when they make bad decisions. I would recommend this book to any history oriented readers interested in wars during the first half of the 20th Century.

John Keegan is an amazing writer who makes history accessible and fun to read. He uses careful and exacting research then creates a living world of history into which a reader is thrust. There is no argument in me that this is a fine read. However, as has been pointed out, the case study system makes a great book but a very weak argument. Keegan would have us believe that Intelligence in War has little impact on the actual outcome of the battle, whether it be plethora or dearth. I had a bit of trouble believing that.

Now if that was all of my review, everyone could just tell me to bug off. But I wish to explain exactly why I had trouble with Keegan's argument. As of right now I am a college student studying Military History. So I know my field pretty well. I can think of a few case studies where Keegan would be proved wrong...Case in point! The use of the Navajos language as a code by the American forces in the Pacific Theater gave us a distinct strategic and tactical advantage over our enemy, translating directly into lowered casualties and surprise (I think...I am after all a student still and absolute sentences like this are bad bad bad...). While Keegan would point out that armed force was still required to complete objectives, this event was an intelligence coup of some proportion and should not be ignored. I would also have liked to see an explanation of how Cold War Intelligence, especially that collected by nuclear subs, could be explained as being useless.

Keegan could not have included all of this...so its basically silly for me to demand it. But when a writer makes a thesis, he or she should be careful about how certain they are. I think Keegan would have benefited from someone giving him a counter argument, even if it would have weakened his argument...

But I have a thesis of my own. I make it for all of Keegans books, although I have only read two, this one and The Face of Battle. Keegan's supposedly faulty arguments aside, read these books for the amazing descriptions and analysis of war...you will not be sorry.

A Further Note...added in my old age. Having graduated college and grown a little, as well as re-reading Keegan's book, I find I was overly cirtical of Keegan and his thesis. While I still feel that his final claim that intelligence ALONE cannot win a battle is pretentious, I do not do believe so because he is wrong. I do so because this statement is much like me saying that a flower cannot grow without sun. Obviously this is true. But this statement is also very much a singular and direct statement, covering little ground. Were I to say instead that a flower, given less sunlight but all other things remaining equal, will grow slower than a well lit counterpart, I would be making a factual but arguable statement. Thus, had Keegan said that a singular battle, fought twice, once with intelligence and once without, would have ended the same in both cases, he would be making a arguable statement. Keegan does not. He simply states that, at least in his case studies, the addition or dearth of intelligence had little real impact and the "battle" was decided by luck or force of arms. And, as much as I try nto disect this statement, I have yet to find a large enough number of campaigns or battle where intelligence alone was the deciding factor. So, if my rant has become as unclear to you as to me, I make the following summary. Keegan is right because he states an obvious and inarguable fact. Simple battlefield intelligence, considered alone, cannot win a fight. I would argue though, that intelligence can give a uncalcuable advantage to one side or the other depending on its use and pertinence, armed forces aside.

John Keegan, deservedly one of the world's most respected military historians, has done it again with this simply outstanding, magnificent book. For it is not just a fascinating history of the ways in which intelligence has been used down the centuries - though for intelligence buffs it is that. But he also shows how human insight on the battlefield itself makes all the difference to the success or failure of a battle. You can have all the intelligence you need and still lose, you can have none at all and be lucky and still win. It is this vital insight - plus the fact that he is an effortlessly superb, readable and fluent writer - that makes this particular book so unique in the plethora of books coming out at the moment on intelligence related subjects. Buy this book yourself, then buy it for all your friends interested in history and the fate of battle. Christopher Catherwood, the author of CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS AND ISLAMIC RAGE (Zondervan, 2003)

In war, if you know what the enemy is going to do, you've won. Right? That's not necessarily so, as the British showed in the German invasion of Crete. John Keegan's Intelligence in War uses this as just one example of how intelligence is used in wartime and how it's not always the end-all and be-all of how a battle is won. Keegan explores the entire gamut of intelligence and how it's been gathered and used in modern warfare, using examples ranging from Admiral Nelson's chase of Napoleon's fleet on its way to Egypt in 1799 to some World War II examples. He finishes the book by discussing modern techniques that range from Vietnam to the war on terrorism. Put it all together and you have a fascinating book that turns the historical stereotypes on their head.

"Its theme is that intelligence in war, however good, does not point out unerringly the path to victory. Victory is an elusive prize, bought with blood rather than brains. Intelligence is the handmaiden not the mistress of the warrior." Pg 5

Methods of intelligence acquisition range anywhere from "humint" (the acquisition of intelligence through human means, usually spying but also including local knowledge of the area) and "sigint" (the interception of signals, whether radio satellite, or just seeing the semaphore flags). As technology has increased, the use of humint has decreased as more signals, and more ways of intercepting those signals, have been developed. The problem in the past has always been conveying the intelligence found to your superiors before it becomes outdated. The first case study, Nelson and Napoleon, demonstrates this completely, with Nelson getting increasingly outdated information, making some choices based on false assumptions of what he knew, but ultimately prevailing because of a decisive mind willing to take a chance on suppositions based on that intelligence. Keegan does an excellent job here showing the troubles Nelson had to go through to even get what he had.

Other case studies include Stonewall Jackson and his Shenandoah Valley campaign (demonstrating local area knowledge), the chasing of the German surface fleet in World War I (the interception and use of wireless signals), the battle of Crete (how intelligence doesn't always win the battle), the battle of Midway (the breaking of Japanese codes), the battle of the Atlantic (how intelligence was just one part of the defeat of the German submarine fleet), the German V-1 and V-2 rocket campaign against Britain (how human intelligence became very important) and then an evaluation of military intelligence from 1945 to today. He finishes with a conclusion that sums the whole thing up, that war is not won just by intelligence, but by brute force.

The broad examples Keegan uses to illustrate his point takes the reader gently along the path to understanding. He first shows some instances where intelligence was instrumental in helping the winning side succeed in their action (Nelson surprised the French fleet at Alexandria and destroyed it). He then shows us Crete, and how the British knew almost the entire German plan, but misinterpretation of parts of it kept the local commander from deploying his forces correctly, causing the loss of the island even though the Germans lost 40% of their paratroopers. This brutally enforces Keegan's notion that intelligence is nothing without the blood and sweat necessary to make use of it, or how that same blood and sweat given by the enemy can overwhelm even a prepared force.

Even without the intelligence theme running through the case studies, they are fascinating history. Keegan tells the story completely even as he uses the chapter to illustrate his point. While at times the entire chapter is illustration (the Nelson chapter continually refers to the intelligence that Nelson had received and figured out), other times he seems to abandon the theme and just tell the history (the Jackson chapter and the Battle of the Atlantic). Doing this in the Atlantic chapter reinforces the fact that, while intelligence was important in the fight against the submarine wolf packs, it was the sailors who were the most important in winning this particular battle.

Keegan's research is top-notch, though there are times you wonder about the variety (or lack thereof) of sources he uses for a particular chapter. The number of "ibid" notations can be quite alarming sometimes, though he always uses at least five or six sources for any one chapter. I do notice that there aren't any primary sources (though some of the notes say "quoted in..." so the text he is using as a source may have been using a primary source). While this is an issue, I don't think it's a major one in this case, however. He is not trying to tell a definitive history with his case studies, but instead to use them as support of his thesis about intelligence. Thus, he's not trying to get into the heads of parties involved. Some people may have a problem with that, however.

Keegan's style is very easy for the layman to read. The chapters flow effortlessly, and if you have any interest in the subject whatsoever, you should find yourself intrigued. You may not agree with him, but you will not have any trouble getting through the book. It is not dense at all. It's a thick book, at almost 400 pages before notes and bibliography. However, you will find yourself breezing through it so it doesn't feel that long. Personally, I couldn't put it down, but Keegan always entrances me with his writing. It's no different from any of his other books that I've read, so if you've found that you can't stand his writing, this book won't be any different and you should probably pass on it.

Read this book, and discover just how important intelligence is in warfare, and how sometimes it just isn't enough.

David Roy

Keegan was once regarded as the top of the military history profession. In the last several years, however, his star has begun to fall.

Intelligence, as other reviewers have pointed out, is a difficult concept to write a concise history of. Keegan makes the attempt, and the result is an average book, repetitive and lacking in a definate thesis.

In essence, all Keegan proves with his research is that the commanders of any given battle play far more of a role than any intelligence they receive. Their use of the infomation gathered means more than anything else. Yet Keegan never admits that, through the entire tome. Instead, at the beginning of a conclusion which drones on and on about topics never touched in the rest of the book, he states that force, not intelligence, always wins war.

Furthermore, the author overuses naval examples. One would think that ninty percent of the entire history of warfare was fought at sea. Also, utilizing three battles from the Second World War, and then lumping all post-WWII into one chapter seems a bit on the cheap side. Too much extra info to research? We have come to expect more from someone as world reknown as Keegan.

Keegan's writing is also slightly transparent throughout the book. Some phrasing is jumbled and the repetition wracks the nerves. Certainly not his finest work. Keegan remains better than most, but this would not be a book I would recomend to many folks.

John Keegan's study, Intelligence in War, attempts to portray the value of intelligence as over-rated in military history. Up front, Keegan admits that he has no background in intelligence, but that he can use historical examples to "prove" his case. While Keegan has a great reputation as a military historian, it has been steadily chipped away by a series of books with reckless conclusions. In 1990's The Price of Admiralty, Keegan concluded that aircraft carriers were obsolete and that submarines were the new capital ships. In 2000's The First World War, Keegan suggested that if armies of that era had possessed tactical radios, that much of the carnage could have been avoided. Now, Keegan tells us - based upon an "analysis" of a half-dozen campaigns - that intelligence in war cannot be decisive.

Keegan's entire argument about the value of intelligence is fundamentally flawed. First, who ever said that intelligence IS the primary determinant in war? Keegan never bothers to tell the reader and it seems that he is wrestling with phantoms. Second, he states that even when intelligence analysts have gained vital answers about enemy intentions, as at Midway in 1942, that the decision ultimately rests with the trigger-pullers. He says warfare is a physical, not a mental, exercise. No kidding. In the absence of telekinetic means of warfare, this is a strawman and nonsensical argument. Obviously, intelligence doesn't kill enemy soldiers, but neither does logistics or communications. Would a commander want to fight without intelligence, logistics or communications? Keegan employs an intellectually dishonest approach by asking a question that can only have the answer he is seeking.

A volume of this kind would be a daunting task for someone with good credentials in the study of intelligence, but Keegan's credentials appear very weak. In addition to lack of direct experience he also candidly admits a lack of interest in intelligence matters, but he is not beyond flagrant name-dropping in the introduction. Keegan's brief meetings with the heads of MI6 and the CIA appear designed more to bolster his lack of credibility than to provide any meaningful content to this volume. It might have been more impressive if Keegan had spent time interviewing real intelligence analysts rather than just highlighting his grip-`n-grin encounters with high-level bureaucrats. Keegan also seems unduly influenced by spy novels and the works of John le Carre, who is mentioned aud nauseam. There are deep layers of ignorance and prejudice underpinning this book, which seriously detract from Keegan's ability to say anything useful on this subject.

Keegan's argument is also severely weakened by his unwillingness to define his terms. He continuously mixes the terms "intelligence" and "information," which are not interchangeable. What does he mean by "intelligence in war"? Does he mean to examine the value of intelligence at all three levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) or only certain levels? Keegan erroneously depicts the intelligence cycle as a 5-phase rather than 4-phase process and he clearly does not understand the basic flow. Keegan fails to appreciate that asking the right question is almost as important as getting the right answer. Furthermore, Keegan falsely uses "real-time intelligence" as the gold standard for assessing the value of intelligence, but oftentimes this is not necessary, as long as the intelligence requirements are met before key decisions need to be made. Apparently, Keegan does not understand the difference between reconnaissance (one-time look) and surveillance (continuous look), either.

The campaign examples do not seem to support the author's argument very well. If Stonewall Jackson's map of the Shenandoah Valley was so important - as Keegan asserts - then its capture or compromise would have been a major intelligence coup for the Union. Does anyone think that Union commanders like Nathaniel Banks would have done any better in the campaign if he had gained Jackson's map? The 1862 Antietam campaign, with McClellan's acquisition of Lee's famous order, would have been a far better example of the impact of intelligence in that period. The chapter on Nelson and the Battle of the Nile is long and dull, and of little value to Keegan's argument. To claim - as Keegan does - that Nelson was a great intelligence analyst, is absurd. Nelson merely received sighting reports and led his fleet around willy-nilly. It appears that Nelson's movements were directed more by intuition than intelligence, which usually happens when commanders try to be their own intelligence officer. The best example, Crete 1941, does support Keegan's argument to some extent, but he exaggerates what British intelligence was actually saying about German plans; he makes it appear that Ultra handed the British a victory on a silver platter but that the troops on the ground fumbled the battle. Taken together, Keegan's examples mesh too poorly to form a single, unified theory and lack the basis for any kind of general conclusions.

Although Keegan has relatively little to say about intelligence since 1945 (how he omits Korea, Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli Wars is beyond me), he appears unsettled by intelligence activities in the modern world in general, and the Mideast in particular. He suggests that what the Coalition needs most are not technical capabilities but good-old fashioned trained agents, like in Rudyard Kipling's "Kim." While it is clear that the US needs better HUMINT capabilities for the Mideast, it is a mistake to suggest - as Keegan does - that technical collection capabilities do not play equally significant roles. In this volume, Keegan totters on the line between history and polemics and appears poised to plunge into the abyss.