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9 of 11 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Fantastic and engrossing study of military intelligence, September 27, 2005
This review is from: Intelligence in War: The value--and limitations--of what the military can learn about the enemy (Paperback)
_Intelligence in War_ by John Keegan asks a basic question; just how useful is intelligence in warfare? There is he wrote a great deal of literature that seems to suggest that it is of enormous importance but Keegan sought to show exactly just useful it really is.
First, Keegan defined intelligence. There are five fundamental stages in intelligence practice, the first being acquisition. While the data gathered may include published and publicly available information, generally information that is useful in a military situation is gathered through clandestine means, the main types being spying with human agents (human intelligence or humint), the interception of an enemy's communications, a method generally requiring decryption (signal intelligence or signit, the main type of intelligence discussed in the book), and visual imaging or surveillance, through aerial photography provided by aircraft and satellites. Throughout the book Keegan discussed the pros and cons of each type of intelligence and their relative importance over the years. Second, there is delivery (something nontrivial especially for the transmitter of humint). A major problem for centuries was the difficulty in sending collected intelligence to a potential user in a timely fashion, in "real time" (a major problem before the telegraph). The third stage is acceptance of the gathered intelligence, of either accepting the source or believing instead that the information is wrong or in fact is an example of enemy counter-espionage. The fourth stage is interpretation, the art and science of weaving together a picture from the many scraps collected to produce a useful picture of an enemy's capabilities and intentions. Finally is implementation of this intelligence.
The bulk of the book is a collection of case studies, examples that Keegan took from history to illustrate various points about the collection and use of intelligence and how these points are still applicable to the modern policymaker. He began in the age of sail, when the main difficulty in the intelligence field was in the struggle to acquire useful information and deliver it to intelligence officers at such a speed so it wouldn't be out of date, and ended near the present, when there is such a vast wealth of information of all sorts - "frustratingly rich" as Keegan put it - that the volume threatens to overwhelm the minds of those seeking to evaluate its worth.
The cases Keegan chose were extremely interesting and very well-told stories, ranging from Admiral Nelson's chase of Napoleon's fleet in 1798 that culminated in the Battle of the Nile to the use of intelligence in the 1982 Falkland Islands War, each case study well illustrated with photographs and excellent maps. Though each case study could simply be read as a detailed and well-written historical account, they also served to illustrate various points Keegan was making about intelligence in war.
For instance, the German airborne assault of Crete in May 1941 vividly showed that even the best intelligence in the world is no good if the defense is unable or unwilling to profit from it. Despite nearly real time intelligence provided to the commander of Allied forces on the ground in Crete, including the timing of the attack, the objectives, and the strength and the composition of the attacking force, the Germans won the day. The Germans won by a combination of extreme nearly berserker recklessness on their part and the belief of the local Allied commander that he could successfully retire, regroup, and counterattack after a bit of rest at one part in the battle, leaving a small opening that the Germans were able to exploit, something that they should have not been able to do. This illustrated two points that Keegan made several times in the book; one, that no matter how good the intelligence, that given equality of force, the outcome will still be decided by the fight, and that in a fight, again given equality of force, the outcome will be the result of determination.
The Battle of the Atlantic - the struggle with the U-boats in World War II - has long been cited as an example of the victory of intelligence use, but Keegan showed that while intelligence was very important, one should not overlook the parallel importance of non-intelligence factors. Though Bletchley Park has been lauded for its ability to break Enigma and route convoys around U-boat wolfpacks and patrol lines, other factors played as big or a bigger role in an Allied victory, including an increase in the size of the merchant fleet, vast improvements in the technology to detect and destroy U-boats, improvement in the capabilities and numbers of escorts, and the advent of escort carriers.
The British coming to terms with the German V-Weapon program illustrated the importance of interpretation and the pitfalls of photographic intelligence. Despite a number of over flights of Peenemünde - the test center for the V-weapons - and ample photographic surveys and despite humint pointing to radical new weapons programs being developed there, the British were slow to understand what was going on at Peenemünde chiefly because the British intelligence apparatus lacked any practical knowledge of either rocket or cruise missile technology and did not know what to look for nor realize what they had in fact seen. In truth the aerial surveys had photographed equipment related to the V-weapons as well as the V-weapons themselves but the intelligence officers did not know what they were looking at and/or dismissed it, with such policymakers as Lord Cherwell insisting that any German rocket be a huge, slow-speed, solid-fueled, multi-stage rocket requiring a huge launch tower, rather than looking for or accepting the existence of a smaller, high-speed, liquid-fueled weapon requiring only a very small launch apparatus.
So what did Keegan conclude? Intelligence is important in war, there is no doubt, but good intelligence does not "unerringly point the path to victory;" that while it is necessary, it is not sufficient to ensure success. Willpower often counts for more in warfare, intelligence only being useful when there is the strength and the will to use it.
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5 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Keegan Analyzes the Value of Intelligence in Winning Wars, April 19, 2005
This review is from: Intelligence in War: The value--and limitations--of what the military can learn about the enemy (Paperback)
Does intelligence win wars? No, but it helps, according to Keegan. What ultimately matters most are: will, numbers, and material. That is an honest conclusion, which obviously won't resonate too well with intelligence organizations like the NSA, CIA, MI6, FSB, Mossad, etc. However, it should make political/ideological leaders and defense contractors happy.
Keegan examines the effect of intelligence in several campaigns/battles throughout the past 200 years - Nelson's pursuit of Napoleon in the Med, Jackson's Shenandoah Valley campaign, the Royal Navy hunt for Von Spee's squadron and for the Emden, Crete, Midway, the Atlantic U-boat campaign, and the search for Hitler's V-1 and V-2 weapons. In conventional battle, the importance of intelligence lies in locating the enemy, determining his dispositions, and unveiling his intentions. However, intelligence of itself doesn't win battles - even the best informed but outnumbered force will often be defeated by a stronger foe. Keegan demonstrates that time and again.
Intelligence outside of battle, however, plays a more significant role. It can provide users with orders-of-battle, advance warning of new weapons technology, the internal situation of one's enemies (or even allies). And today, its value has increased dramatically thanks to modern electronic telecommunications, which can send info instantly across the world. (However, this has proven to be a double-edged sword to commanders on the ground who must now also cope with continual - often counterproductive - interference from anxious superiors.) In addition, the ease of electronic eavesdropping (signals intelligence - sigint) has caused Western intelligence agencies to rely almost exclusively on sigint to the detriment of human intelligence (humint).
In conclusion, I understand Keegan to say that intelligence is overrated as a tool to win battles. Furthermore, Western intelligence agencies are perhaps dangerously over-reliant on sigint. In their battle with al-Qaeda, they have been frustrated by an organization which has recognized this weakness and hence largely refuses to use modern telco technology.
Overall, an interesting book, but what I just wrote above largely summarizes its findings.
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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Interesting case studies, but ultimately unsatisfying, October 22, 2005
This review is from: Intelligence in War: The value--and limitations--of what the military can learn about the enemy (Paperback)
John Keegan is often considered the foremost military analyst of our time. He is certainly one of the most prolific - he publishes a thought-provoking and well-researched book a year. Unfortunately, this recent effort - on the nature of intellegence and its use in war - is one of his less satisfying efforts. It doesn't have quite the zing and coherence of his earlier work, especially Face of Battle and Mask of Command. One more go with the editor may have helped some. However, the main reason the book is unsatisfying is because his thesis - that intellegence can "help" in war - is weak if truthful.
Keegan takes us through several classic campaigns in which intellegence, in a variety of forms, played a key part. Most obvious are probably Stonewall Jackson's harrassment of the Union in the Shenandoah Valley in 1862 and the WWII Battle of Midway. In both cases, tactical intellegence was used to great effect. Jackson used local knowledge of the terrain and the sympathy of the locals to harrass the Union armies while remaining aloof and avoiding a set-piece battle with the numerically superior enemy. This is a classic example of "human intellegence" giving the possessor of the intellegence an overwhelming tactical advantage, which allowed Jackson to choose the time and place of engagement. At Midway, a similar situation existed. By reading the Japanese naval ciphers (signal intellegence), the Americans were able to locate and bring to battle the Imperial navy on their terms. However, in both cases, Keegan is quick to point out that intellegence only set up the situation, it did not allow Jackson to ultimately defeat the army he was facing, which was far more powerful than his own. All he could do was give it the runaround and pin it in the Shenandoah Valley so it couldn't be used elsewhere (i.e. at the seige of Richmond). Likewise, although the Americans chose the time and place of Midway, they were numerically inferior (3 fleet carriers to 4) and almost lost everything when the Japanese Combat Air Patrol shot down 5 of the 6 bomber squadrons that found the Japanese Fleet. That the 6th got through and mortally wounded 3 of the 4 Imperial carriers was sheer good luck (or bad luck for the Japanese).
Thus, through these two examples and many others (from Nelson to the Falkland Islands War) Keegan amply proves his point that intellegence can play an important part in military engagements - especially at the tactical level - but intellegence victories do not bring miltary victories. This is what makes the book unsatisfying - in a book about intellegence, the author is continually having to downplay the ultimate contribution of intellegence, burying it in with other factors such as size of force, morale, and worst of all, luck.
Interestingly, Keegan focusses entirely on tactical intellegence, not strategic. He discusses in detail the British efforts to find and neutralise the Argentine Super Etandard fighter-bombers that carried the deadly Exocet missiles. However, at no point does he discuss the strategic intellegence breakdown that lead to the invasion in the first place. Keegan's good friend Max Hastings has convincingly demonstrated that the Falklands conflict was the result of a breakdown in strategic intellegence on both sides - the British misunderstood the political crisis in Beunes Aries, and the Argentinians misunderstood the resolve of the British government to defend the Islands.
Don't get me wrong - the book is very readable, characterised by Keegan's sharp insight, interesing writing style, and overarching thematic elements. I guess the subject is inherently unsatisfying and even Keegan can't bring it to the same level as his other works.
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