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Intelligence in War: The value--and limitations--of what the military can learn about the enemy

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_Intelligence in War_ by John Keegan asks a basic question; just how useful is intelligence in warfare? There is he wrote a great deal of literature that seems to suggest that it is of enormous importance but Keegan sought to show exactly just useful it really is.

First, Keegan defined intelligence. There are five fundamental stages in intelligence practice, the first being acquisition. While the data gathered may include published and publicly available information, generally information that is useful in a military situation is gathered through clandestine means, the main types being spying with human agents (human intelligence or humint), the interception of an enemy's communications, a method generally requiring decryption (signal intelligence or signit, the main type of intelligence discussed in the book), and visual imaging or surveillance, through aerial photography provided by aircraft and satellites. Throughout the book Keegan discussed the pros and cons of each type of intelligence and their relative importance over the years. Second, there is delivery (something nontrivial especially for the transmitter of humint). A major problem for centuries was the difficulty in sending collected intelligence to a potential user in a timely fashion, in "real time" (a major problem before the telegraph). The third stage is acceptance of the gathered intelligence, of either accepting the source or believing instead that the information is wrong or in fact is an example of enemy counter-espionage. The fourth stage is interpretation, the art and science of weaving together a picture from the many scraps collected to produce a useful picture of an enemy's capabilities and intentions. Finally is implementation of this intelligence.

The bulk of the book is a collection of case studies, examples that Keegan took from history to illustrate various points about the collection and use of intelligence and how these points are still applicable to the modern policymaker. He began in the age of sail, when the main difficulty in the intelligence field was in the struggle to acquire useful information and deliver it to intelligence officers at such a speed so it wouldn't be out of date, and ended near the present, when there is such a vast wealth of information of all sorts - "frustratingly rich" as Keegan put it - that the volume threatens to overwhelm the minds of those seeking to evaluate its worth.

The cases Keegan chose were extremely interesting and very well-told stories, ranging from Admiral Nelson's chase of Napoleon's fleet in 1798 that culminated in the Battle of the Nile to the use of intelligence in the 1982 Falkland Islands War, each case study well illustrated with photographs and excellent maps. Though each case study could simply be read as a detailed and well-written historical account, they also served to illustrate various points Keegan was making about intelligence in war.

For instance, the German airborne assault of Crete in May 1941 vividly showed that even the best intelligence in the world is no good if the defense is unable or unwilling to profit from it. Despite nearly real time intelligence provided to the commander of Allied forces on the ground in Crete, including the timing of the attack, the objectives, and the strength and the composition of the attacking force, the Germans won the day. The Germans won by a combination of extreme nearly berserker recklessness on their part and the belief of the local Allied commander that he could successfully retire, regroup, and counterattack after a bit of rest at one part in the battle, leaving a small opening that the Germans were able to exploit, something that they should have not been able to do. This illustrated two points that Keegan made several times in the book; one, that no matter how good the intelligence, that given equality of force, the outcome will still be decided by the fight, and that in a fight, again given equality of force, the outcome will be the result of determination.

The Battle of the Atlantic - the struggle with the U-boats in World War II - has long been cited as an example of the victory of intelligence use, but Keegan showed that while intelligence was very important, one should not overlook the parallel importance of non-intelligence factors. Though Bletchley Park has been lauded for its ability to break Enigma and route convoys around U-boat wolfpacks and patrol lines, other factors played as big or a bigger role in an Allied victory, including an increase in the size of the merchant fleet, vast improvements in the technology to detect and destroy U-boats, improvement in the capabilities and numbers of escorts, and the advent of escort carriers.

The British coming to terms with the German V-Weapon program illustrated the importance of interpretation and the pitfalls of photographic intelligence. Despite a number of over flights of Peenemünde - the test center for the V-weapons - and ample photographic surveys and despite humint pointing to radical new weapons programs being developed there, the British were slow to understand what was going on at Peenemünde chiefly because the British intelligence apparatus lacked any practical knowledge of either rocket or cruise missile technology and did not know what to look for nor realize what they had in fact seen. In truth the aerial surveys had photographed equipment related to the V-weapons as well as the V-weapons themselves but the intelligence officers did not know what they were looking at and/or dismissed it, with such policymakers as Lord Cherwell insisting that any German rocket be a huge, slow-speed, solid-fueled, multi-stage rocket requiring a huge launch tower, rather than looking for or accepting the existence of a smaller, high-speed, liquid-fueled weapon requiring only a very small launch apparatus.

So what did Keegan conclude? Intelligence is important in war, there is no doubt, but good intelligence does not "unerringly point the path to victory;" that while it is necessary, it is not sufficient to ensure success. Willpower often counts for more in warfare, intelligence only being useful when there is the strength and the will to use it.

Does intelligence win wars? No, but it helps, according to Keegan. What ultimately matters most are: will, numbers, and material. That is an honest conclusion, which obviously won't resonate too well with intelligence organizations like the NSA, CIA, MI6, FSB, Mossad, etc. However, it should make political/ideological leaders and defense contractors happy.

Keegan examines the effect of intelligence in several campaigns/battles throughout the past 200 years - Nelson's pursuit of Napoleon in the Med, Jackson's Shenandoah Valley campaign, the Royal Navy hunt for Von Spee's squadron and for the Emden, Crete, Midway, the Atlantic U-boat campaign, and the search for Hitler's V-1 and V-2 weapons. In conventional battle, the importance of intelligence lies in locating the enemy, determining his dispositions, and unveiling his intentions. However, intelligence of itself doesn't win battles - even the best informed but outnumbered force will often be defeated by a stronger foe. Keegan demonstrates that time and again.

Intelligence outside of battle, however, plays a more significant role. It can provide users with orders-of-battle, advance warning of new weapons technology, the internal situation of one's enemies (or even allies). And today, its value has increased dramatically thanks to modern electronic telecommunications, which can send info instantly across the world. (However, this has proven to be a double-edged sword to commanders on the ground who must now also cope with continual - often counterproductive - interference from anxious superiors.) In addition, the ease of electronic eavesdropping (signals intelligence - sigint) has caused Western intelligence agencies to rely almost exclusively on sigint to the detriment of human intelligence (humint).

In conclusion, I understand Keegan to say that intelligence is overrated as a tool to win battles. Furthermore, Western intelligence agencies are perhaps dangerously over-reliant on sigint. In their battle with al-Qaeda, they have been frustrated by an organization which has recognized this weakness and hence largely refuses to use modern telco technology.
Overall, an interesting book, but what I just wrote above largely summarizes its findings.

John Keegan is often considered the foremost military analyst of our time. He is certainly one of the most prolific - he publishes a thought-provoking and well-researched book a year. Unfortunately, this recent effort - on the nature of intellegence and its use in war - is one of his less satisfying efforts. It doesn't have quite the zing and coherence of his earlier work, especially Face of Battle and Mask of Command. One more go with the editor may have helped some. However, the main reason the book is unsatisfying is because his thesis - that intellegence can "help" in war - is weak if truthful.

Keegan takes us through several classic campaigns in which intellegence, in a variety of forms, played a key part. Most obvious are probably Stonewall Jackson's harrassment of the Union in the Shenandoah Valley in 1862 and the WWII Battle of Midway. In both cases, tactical intellegence was used to great effect. Jackson used local knowledge of the terrain and the sympathy of the locals to harrass the Union armies while remaining aloof and avoiding a set-piece battle with the numerically superior enemy. This is a classic example of "human intellegence" giving the possessor of the intellegence an overwhelming tactical advantage, which allowed Jackson to choose the time and place of engagement. At Midway, a similar situation existed. By reading the Japanese naval ciphers (signal intellegence), the Americans were able to locate and bring to battle the Imperial navy on their terms. However, in both cases, Keegan is quick to point out that intellegence only set up the situation, it did not allow Jackson to ultimately defeat the army he was facing, which was far more powerful than his own. All he could do was give it the runaround and pin it in the Shenandoah Valley so it couldn't be used elsewhere (i.e. at the seige of Richmond). Likewise, although the Americans chose the time and place of Midway, they were numerically inferior (3 fleet carriers to 4) and almost lost everything when the Japanese Combat Air Patrol shot down 5 of the 6 bomber squadrons that found the Japanese Fleet. That the 6th got through and mortally wounded 3 of the 4 Imperial carriers was sheer good luck (or bad luck for the Japanese).

Thus, through these two examples and many others (from Nelson to the Falkland Islands War) Keegan amply proves his point that intellegence can play an important part in military engagements - especially at the tactical level - but intellegence victories do not bring miltary victories. This is what makes the book unsatisfying - in a book about intellegence, the author is continually having to downplay the ultimate contribution of intellegence, burying it in with other factors such as size of force, morale, and worst of all, luck.

Interestingly, Keegan focusses entirely on tactical intellegence, not strategic. He discusses in detail the British efforts to find and neutralise the Argentine Super Etandard fighter-bombers that carried the deadly Exocet missiles. However, at no point does he discuss the strategic intellegence breakdown that lead to the invasion in the first place. Keegan's good friend Max Hastings has convincingly demonstrated that the Falklands conflict was the result of a breakdown in strategic intellegence on both sides - the British misunderstood the political crisis in Beunes Aries, and the Argentinians misunderstood the resolve of the British government to defend the Islands.

Don't get me wrong - the book is very readable, characterised by Keegan's sharp insight, interesing writing style, and overarching thematic elements. I guess the subject is inherently unsatisfying and even Keegan can't bring it to the same level as his other works.

Sir John Keegan is the premiere military historian writing today and this book is yet another in his collection of fine works. I would have given it 5 stars had it been a bit more comprehensive. It is a collection of case studies aimed at the theme that while military intelligence is very important, superior intelligence does not guarantee victory. This is a great book for anyone interested in military history and a very useful one for anyone interested in understanding the current military situation. This is a well-written and very important book. I highly recommend it. Professor Keegan has a newer book with a similar title that I have not read yet.

The first case study is that of Nelson chasing Napoleon in his campaign in Egypt. This is a case where good intelligence was not available, but nonetheless Nelson was finally able to bring the French fleet to battle and win a great victory.

The second study is that of General Lee in the Shenandoah Valley in the American Civil war. Here Lee's superior intelligence and knowledge of the terrain was put to great advantage. This points out the second great lesson of the book: to be valuable, military intelligence must be used properly. In the hands of a great general like Lee it was invaluable.

I will not go into all of the chapters but would like to cite two other examples where the book runs counter to the general view of the overriding importance of military intelligence. The battle of Midway is generally cited as showing the premiere value of military intelligence. To be sure, the breaking of the Japanese naval code was of critical importance, but luck and intuition also played a great role. The American Navy knew of the Japanese objective and where they were headed, but they did not know the exact location of the Japanese fleet. It was only the determination and skill of a navy Catalina (a reconnaissance aircraft) pilot, operating at the extreme extent of his range, that gave the critical information about the location of the Japanese fleet. Without this, Midway might have been a great Japanese victory, changing the course of the Second World War.

The final case study is that of the breaking of the German Enigma machine. This is another example of where the common view of history gives too much credit to the importance of the breaking of this code. The breaking of the Enigma machine code was indeed very important and critical in many areas. However, Keegan points out that there were many variations in the code machines and how they were used, making the ability to read the codes quite a bit more variable than is generally known. More importantly, Keegan points out that there were many times when, due to changes in the code or how the code was operated, the Allies were blind to Germany's intentions. Furthermore, to safeguard the fact that the code had been broken required great care in the use of the knowledge gained, often requiring ignoring the information that was gathered.

Perhaps the best summary of the point of this book can be taken from the last paragraph of the book. "Foreknowledge is no protection against disaster. Even real-time intelligence is never real enough. Only force finally counts." Current events in the wars against terrorism show how important this is and how critical it is not to place too much blind faith in the importance of intelligence, at the expense of being able to apply enough force. Intelligence is very important and can speed up victory, but it cannot in and of itself guarantee victory.

I found this book to be fascinating, not only in respect to Military Intelligence, but its tying historical fact to the subject. One of those sources that reminds you that there are many sides to provocation by nations.

John Keegan has a stellar reputation as a military historian, but this book proceeded from a hypothesis that needs no proof to a conclusion that is also axiomatic, used cases that didn't clearly support his hypothesis, and failed to provide relevance or rational discussion of how to better procure or use intelligence. That he failed to differentiate between tactical intelligence and operational/strategic intelligence only aggrevated the other short-comings.

The question stated in the introduction is "how useful is intelligence in war?" and the hypothesis at the end of the intro is "intelligence in war, however good, does not point unerringly to victory", and his conclusion is that "war is ultimately about doing not thinking". This is self-evident. War is the imposition of will, not the acquistion of information and sysnthesis of that information into understanding. War is about application of force (although sometimes not in the traditional fashion), not merely making abstract decisions.

The case studies are excellent. Detailed, well researched, relevant to discussions of intelligence, but don't support Keegan's efforts to trivialize the role of intelligence. The Midway case study didn't support Keegan's implied position that intelligence doesn't deserve equal consideration with logistics, maneuver, and leadership. The Stonewall Jackson-Shenendoah Valley case study's conclusion was absolutely baffling to me; "The proof of his [Jackson's] generalship was demonstrated above all, however, by his exploitation of the secrets of place and passageway in the complexity of the Shenendoah Valley, which he possessed and the enemy did not." It strikes me that Jackson's superior intelligence regarding the terrain did provide him with the crucial edge over his opponent.

The underlying problem with this work is twofold. First, Keegan never offers a clear taxinomy of intelligence, its subdisciplines, and practices. Second, and of greater impact, is his explicit fear of intelligence and inability to seperate the craft of intelligence from treasons against his own country.
A taxinomy would have clarified the difference between tactical intelligence and strategic, collection and analysis, intelligence and secure communications and especially between intelligence collection and direct action operations. He seems very fuzzy on the difference between human intelligence; people out talking and listening to opponents and their activities, and returning with information; and special operations, like the Special Operations Executive's efforts to sabotage the WWII German war efforts. But Keegan's alternately hostile and fearful attitude towards intelligence, expressed in the Acknowlegments calls into question his ability to address the topic in a rational and even-handed manner. Based on the tone of the Acknowlegments and the rest of the book, I got the impression that Keegan was offended that there is a discipline called "Intelligence" and he is not really part of it, leaving him with the impression that his intellect has been slighted. Hardly a good starting place for a discussion of the role of reconnaisance and analysis in war.

Recon, whether tactical, like infantry scouts, or strategic, like aerial photography, is as important to success in war as good logistics. Keegan's enduring outrage at the Cambridge traitors (Philby, Burgess, McLean, Blunt, and Cairncross) has colored his view of all intelligence. Similar to an infantry general who had a bad experience with air support as a company commander, and allows that experience of thirty or more years prior to color his opinions and decisions as a division commander. Or maybe I'm missing something. The underlying message is almost one from the Napoleonic era British army; "It just isn't cricket to know more than your opponent", and I have to take exception to this. In war, if you are in a fair fight, you didn't plan it right. Knowing more than your opponent is one piece of tipping the balance in your favor.

Excellent case studies, blindingly obvious hypothesis and conclusions, and heavily biased and almost phobic subtext.

Edward M. Van Court

Mr. Keegan, a preeminent military historian, has tackled the subject of the use and misuse of intelligence, or sometimes alternatively, information, in wartime. Intelligence can have a number of different types and permutations, but Keegan here focuses on the role of intelligence in deciding conventional battles. While there are brief discussions on such things as human intelligence's role in uncovering Nazi missile development, what is more heavily covered are examples such as Admiral Nelson's defeat of the French in 1798 and Stonewall Jackson (and his mapmaker)'s campaign in the Shenandoah Valley in 1862-3. Regardless of whether his focus on the role of intelligence could have been netter balanced, it is still a fact that Keegan's presentation of the question in a historical contact is first rate.

His primary question he wants to answer, "Can intelligence turn the tides of wars (or battles)?," his answer is not really. There are larger factors than intelligence in deciding the outcome, such as leadership and command, resources, luck and chance, and any number of other factors that might have a bigger impact than intelligence.

If this is an area that interests you, or if you are just in the market for great historical reading, I highly recommend this book.

John Keegan's central theme in Intelligence in War is that battles are not won by superior intelligence; they are won by the application of superior force of arms and all that it entails: quantity and quality of forces, leadership, strategy, tactics, and just plain luck. I believe that Keegan undervalues intelligence throughout much of the book. However, I think that he does so only to make and emphasize his point. I draw this conclusion from his acknowledgement in the last chapter that "Intelligence may be usually necessary but is not a sufficient condition for victory."

This quibble aside, Intelligence in War was an interesting and readable presentation of seven detailed case studies designed to demonstrate Keegan's point. In these case studies, Keegan makes the following points:

1. Nelson was limited by the intelligence technology of his time: The only means of locating Napoleon's fleet was direct visual observation. Once the fleet was sighted, the intelligence could only be communicated to Nelson by courier traveling at about the same speeds as Nelson and Napoleon.

2. In the Valley Campaign, Stonewall Jackson made decisive use of his superior knowledge of the geography of the Shenandoah Valley in holding multiple Union armies at bay, preventing them from reinforcing McClellan's army at Richmond.

3. In WWI, wireless communications provided partial solutions to Nelson's difficulties in detecting Napoleon's fleet and reporting the information in a timely manner. However, the use of wireless for communications between fleets provided the enemy with a means of locating them and led to the development of such tactics as maintaining radio silence and transmitting misleading signals.

4. The plans for the airborne German invasion of Crete in WWII were known to the defending British commander. However, no major over-water invasion had ever been accomplished without a strong naval/amphibious force. Consequently, the British commander held his numerically superior forces in reserve to counter the seaborne threat until the Germans had seized control of the air base that was their initial objective. With control of the air base, they could land sufficient forces to win the battle.

5. In the Battle of Midway, the US obtained an intelligence advantage by breaking the Japanese naval codes and discovering that a major Japanese offensive was imminent. However, the decoded messages did not clearly specify the Japanese objective. The US forces on Midway were instructed to transmit a clear-text message that they were running out of water; when the Japanese coded messages reported that the target was short of water, their intentions became clear. Nevertheless, the Battle of Midway was a close run affair; the first five attacks by US carrier aircraft were decisively defeated. The sixth, and last, attack succeeded mostly by luck.

6. In the early phases of the Battle of the Atlantic, both sides had broken their opponent's naval codes. By 1943, the British had implemented a new, more secure code which the Germans failed to break. Denying this intelligence to the German U-boats was one factor in the Allies victory in the Atlantic. Others included persuading the Americans to adopt convoy tactics, the use of long-range aircraft to detect and attack German U-boats, the development of mini-carriers that provided air cover for the Allied convoys.

7. The detection and identification of the German V-1 and V-2 development programs was among the first instances where multiple intelligence sources came into play: aerial photography, signal interception, code breaking, and human sources all contributed. Despite the use of these multiple sources, the threat was underestimated by differences of opinion in the British scientific community and confused by the combination of intelligence on two different programs. In the end, the German V-threat was overcome when Allied invasion forces seized control of the launch sites after DDay.

Intelligence in War is well worth reading, especially if one believes, as I do, that Keegan is pointing out the limitations of intelligence, not suggesting that there is little of no value to be gained form intelligence.

If you happen to like the selected examples, fine,
but if you are looking into some analytical or bird's eye view of military intelligence,
you will be dearly disappointed.

Excellent book. Well written and researched. The author uses specific examples from history. The book is easy to read and interesting.