8 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Great book. A must for students and researchers., September 8, 1999
I have researched the Gulf War for several years and found this book to be one of the best to give an inside look into the corps command level. Clancy and Frank's book shows the campaign through the eyes of the VII Corps commander, which was in charge of the main effort during the Iraqi campaign. It contains facts and details that are unavailable elsewhere (at least not in non military sources). This book, together with Schwartzkopf's "It Doesn't Take a Hero", Atkinson's "Crusade" and Gordon's "The Generals'War", is a must for every Gulf War researcher.
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7 of 7 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Fascinating as biography, flawed as history, March 19, 2002
By A Customer
Since this is one of the relatively few popularly-available, yet widely-distributed, histories of the Gulf War published to date, I approached this with certain mixed feelings. Tom Clancy's involvement was a plus and a minus - he is a moderatly capable writer (though his ability to craft character, vs. technology, is sub-optimal), but he has become something of a military-industrial complex on a small scale in and of himself, the McDonalds franchise of military fiction.
Fred Franks was, at the time I bought the book, somewhat less well-known, but as a corps commander in an operation I wanted to understand much better than existing published material would allow, he was a more credible source.
What results from this mix is an unexpected melange - mostly for the better (relative to, say, Clancy's take on potential Russian/Chinese conflict, which was abysmal), but with certain flaws. Franks certainly has the expertise, credibility, and transferable wisdom to lend some real substance to Clancy's usual wanna-be star-stricken jingoism. The background on Franks' experience as a junior, and then senior, officer in the Army during and after Vietnam also help provide valuable context to close the vast conceptual gulf between 1973 and 1991, socially, personally, and militarily.
What is lacking is a coherent, detailed story of the overall Desert Storm (versus VII Corps-perceived) operation itself - a story that is implied, if not promised, by the book's title and stated premise. At times, the narrative loses focus and does not follow the overall action closely enough; at other times, it dives into tantalizing description of individual unit actions that are not fully placed in context or followed up; or divergences into Franks' personal thoughts and schedule, which (though interesting on the level of understanding the blow-by-blow experience of a large-unit commander) do not add much to the overall clarity of the action. Some points of leadership philosophy become repetitive - nor is it clear where the boundary between Franks' (Clancy's?) specific beliefs diverge from some assertion of universal concepts.
At times, the narrative becomes a thinly-veiled personal defense against higher-level criticism of Franks' asserted failings in pursuing the Iraqis in the early stages of the ground action. Given the overwhelming victory achieved and the extremely lopsided casualty ratio, this seems unnecessary - since the internal discussion among theater- and corps-level command in the operation has been largely invisible to the public, it is difficult to assess to what extent the implicit back-and-forth indicated in this book is valid, but the results speak for themselves. Whether the Iraqi Army could have been defeated 207-0, instead of 200-0, seems irrelevant compared to the larger strategic question (still alive today) of whether or not Coalition forces should have gone after Saddam Hussein's regime at its root - a question that was answered at a much higher level than any to which Franks had access. As it is, the nitpicking and (apparently bitter) counter-criticisms that sortof-kindof surface in the book between Franks' VII Corps and CENTCOM (Schwartzkopf) appear to be more a reflection of the power ploys within US command structures than anything that will (ultimately) have any real meaning to anyone but the immediate participants. In real terms, they seem to have relevance primarily to the pros and cons of different styles of leadership and command, rather than to any real possibilities for different outcomes for Desert Storm - given the constraints operating at national command (rather than tactical or even theater) levels.
Ultimately, this is an interesting primer in tactics for (patient and committed) lay readers, and a solid contribution to a future body of first-person perspectives on a critical event in late-20th-century history. However, it is neither objective enough, comprehensive enough, sufficiently researched, nor inclusive enough of Iraqi (or non-US Coalition) perspectives to constitute a major historical contribution to our understanding of this particular conflict.
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4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Great Look at the Ground War, April 23, 2002
Clancy really did an average job with this book. I have also read the other book in this new series he is putting out "Every Man A Tiger" and I have to say that Into the Storm is a second to it. I think that as this was his first attempt at this type of book, he used it as a learning tool and the second book got better. Then again maybe the co-author was just a better writer. Clancy has teamed up with the General that was in charge of the ground war in the Gulf War.
The book is basically three parts, the first section talks about the Generals career in the Army, the Army's development from Viet Nam to the Gulf War and a touch of the politics involved within the different military branches. The second section of the book deals with the build up to the ground war. The final section deals with the ground war both the stand-alone part and as a joint effort with the air war.
The author does not give you an action packed, inside the tank type of story. What we do get is the process for building up the forces, developing a plan, working with the other countries and military forces and finally the execution of the plan. I found the discussions of attack plan creation and the relationship between the air and ground element to be the most interesting. Overall this is a well-written and constructed book. It has a lot of value if you are interested in the Gulf War or just how current U.S. battles are planned and fought. A good compliment to this book is "The Commanders" by Woodward; it deals more with the U.S. politics involved in setting up the coalition and the interaction between the main U.S. players.
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