Customer Reviews

The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb

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Skates believes that invading Japan would have been preferable to dropping nuclear weapons. He spends most of the book describing how the invasion would have happened. He does admit that there would have been problems with the invasion. For instance, over half of the divisions would have come from Europe, however, most of the combat veterans in these units were being discharged and replaced with new draftees. Retaining the veterans would have caused severe morale problems.

Skates' main argument is that an invasion would have caused fewer casualties than died in the nuclear bombing. I believe he fails to sustain this argument. The War Department staff in Washington estimated there would be 250,000 to 500,000 American casualties in an invasion of Japan. After the war, some politicians casually made this a "half-million dead" and then "a million dead." In any event, the estimate of casualties included killed, wounded and missing. The original estimates were a not-unreasonable figure based on American experience with fanatical Japanese defenders of the Philippines, Iwo Jima and Okinawa, and one which a postwar examination of Japanese plans for the defense of the Home Islands bore out. There was no indication the Japanese would fight any less strenuously if their Home Islands were invaded. Indeed, it was a safe bet that the fighting would have been even more costly. And this doesn't even consider the Japanese casualties.

The Japanese consistently demonstrated a marked reluctance to surrender, either on the battlefield or at the negotiating table. The American people, in light of Germany's surrender in May 1945, were eager to get the war in the Pacific over with as soon as possible. The voters were making this wish quite clear to their elected officials and the chief among these, President Truman, was listening intently. He had been told that a blockade of Japan might have to go on for a year or more before Japan finally gave in. A successful invasion would not be noticeably shorter. The American people would have none of this and wanted something done. Nuclear weapons were simply another incentive for the Japanese to surrender, and no one was sure they would be any more persuasive than the fire bomb raids (which killed more people than the atomic bombs).

As early as mid-1943, the American joint chiefs had begun to analyize the alternatives to ending the war in the Pacific. This book describes one alternative; the invasion of Japan itself. The invasion was to take place in two assaults; one, scheduled for November 1, 1945, was to involve the southern Kyushu area while the other, scheduled for March 1, 1946, was to occur in the Kanto plain area near Tokyo. After the island of Okinawa was secured in June, 1945, the Americans turned their attention to the coming invasion. The Kyushu portion of the invasion had the endorsement of President Truman and the joint chiefs. The invasion would have been on a scale never seen before. Thousands of ships, planes, and men would land on Kyushu and begin their drive northward. However, due to ULTRA intelligence intercepts, the Americans learned that the Japanese build up on Kyushu was much larger than expected. Many divisions of men and upwards of 10,000 aircraft were poised to meet the Americans. The Japanese were also prepared to meet the Americans on the beaches, differing from their customary approach of leaving the beaches uncontested and fighting it out inland. If the Japanese defense of Kyushu failed, there would be little left to defend the Kanto plain with, so the road to Tokyo would be wide open.

The author takes the view that Japan was a defeated nation ready to surrender due to the blockade and bombing missions being employed by the Americans. He points out that Japan had virtually no navy or air force and that the remaining elements of the imperial army were so poorly fed and equipped that they would be no match for the Americans. I tend to disagree on some points. The Japanese have always been fanatical fighters, and would be even more so if their home islands were invaded. Furthermore, the kamikazes, if employed in force, could have done tremendous damage to the invasion force. Inevitably, the Japanese would succumb to the Americans, but not before they inflicted serious damage. Also, he points out that the atomic bombs were used to send a political message rather than an end to the war. Again, he feels that the Japanese were a defeated nation ready to surrender, but the build up on Kyushu leads one to believe otherwise. The atomic bombs, in my opinion were wisely used. Yes, they caused great loss of life on the Japanese side, but the invasion would have cost many more. Furthermore, the American public wouldn't have stood for a prolonged battle against the Japanese after the invasion. They wanted the men home as soon as possible, and the invasion would have kept them fighting for at least another year.

Overall, I thought this book did a good job of explaining the logistics and construction of the invasion plans. The organization is good, and the book is well-researched. It gives good information regarding a possible invasion, but little information about the atomic bomb.

Reading a book like this for me is a bit of a disappointment. It seems that the author started out with the idea that the A-Bombs were bad and sought to justify his beliefs rather than take an objective look at the evidence. In my opinion there are much better books out there that lay out the facts and let you draw your own conclusions.

In a nutshell the author postulates that the Japanese were just about starved out, were worn down, and were ready to throw up their hands in surrender at the first sight of American troops on Japanese soil.

IMHO, nothing could be further from the truth. The Japanese were not used to losing wars, and their multi-generational Bushido code called for death to the last man rather than surrender. This code was being adhered to rigorously throughout the war, and as American invasions came closer to the home islands (ie Okinawa & Iwo Jima) the suicide code was adhered to almost exclusively. Further, based on the civilian suicide training being ramped up as American forces drew nearer there is little evidence to suggest that they would have surrendered as meekly as the author seems to suggest. The Japanese public was being spoon fed false news of great successes which buoyed their false hopes for ultimate victory, as well as news of the atrocities Americans would commit upon them in time of invasion. Given these factors (and many others) along with the fanatical Kamikaze spirit that had already been continuously demonstrated, I don't think the Japanese would have given up as easily as the author does.

This book is a really thorough look at the Allied (American) plans for the invasion of Japan. What is valuable is the perspective in which these plans were developed, from the start of the war right up to the Japanese surrender. I would have liked more detail on the nitty gritty of the Japanese plans. The big picture perspective from the Japanese standpoint was outstanding, in my opinion. The Japanese had really studied American tendencies and the US troops would have faced a very hot reception on Kyushu during Operation Olympic. I'm sure there will be people who disagree with Mr. Skate's assertion that if Kyushu were taken, actually not if but when and with how many casualties, taking Tokyo would have been relatively easy. But Mr. Skates seems to back up this claim with facts gleaned from the historical record. The book is somewhat of a dry read, but very informative. Highly recommend!

This is the best analysis of Operation DOWNFALL, the two-part plan to invade Japan in November of 1945 that is in print. Skates details Allied preparations, deployments, strategy and tactics along with Japanese plans to defend their home islands in a detailed and scholarly manner. If you ever had doubts about the use of the atomic bombs, they will leave you when you read this book and realize the carnage that was awaiting both the Allies and the Japanese in 1945.

I have been interested in finding out what the detailed plans were for the proposed invasion of Japan for some time. The author does an excellent job of identifying the planning phases and is somewhat good at maintaining an unbiased view. In the end I think it would have been nice to have included a summary page with the head to head statistics such as number of divisions to be committed by the U.S. (and the conversion to number of men - for the non-military literate) and the Japanese. Also he simply glosses over the A-bomb at the end and although this wasn't the primary purpose of the book - it would have been a nice addition to explore the use of the device on an actual target and with such a short delay between strikes.

He contends that the invasion would have been far less costly than some of the projections and puts forth a large amount of information to that effect. Although I now believe that there would have been fewer casualties than the gross estimates - his analysis that the casualties would have been along the lines of Normandy or Okinawa - I just don't buy it. Even with unfinished preparations the cost would have been too high to warrant an invasion - if it could be prevented but other means.

Overall excellent facts - you must decide whether the invasion would have been necessary for your self.

Skates has brought new information to bear on the invasion plans. That is my only reason for giving this book any stars at all.

Here are some of my reservations about his Monday morning quarterbacking:

1. Choosing the best way out of the situation may have been logical for the Japanese but it did not fit their mind-set at the time.

2. Despite the feelers put out by some leaders, the country was still in the firm hands of the warriors who had no intention of surrendering.

3. Suppose we do rewrite history and carry out the invasion. Given Skates' best case, we would still have lost many soldiers' and sailors' lives as well as many more lives of admittedly poorly prepared Japanese defenders. No thank you.

Advertised as an alternative to the Atomic Bombs released on Japan to end World War II, Skates spends most of the thesis explaining military capabilities, background of contemporary leaders along with government and public opinion concerning the end of the war. As little as two chapters actually deal with alternatives. While the background is vital in understanding the options, more time could have been utilized to further develop alternatives. Skates uses a certain degree of presentism to disclaim the decision of the bombs to end the war. Despite flaws, argument of alternative well expressed and researched.

This book is quite fascinating. What Skates has done is write a history of the planning for the invasion of Japan. The invasion never happened; the planning did. What he is doing is exploring the alternatives to the use of the atomic bomb that U.S. leaders thought they had before them in 1945.

Skates explores all sorts of plans including airpower, deception, the possibility of employing special weapons (everything ranging from missiles to chemical weapons) and the planned inclusion of British, Australian, and Canadian troops. What he finds is that the invasion never was considered an alternative. It was going to happen. American policy makers always intended to use BOTH atomic weapons against Japan and then invade. In explaining his decision to use the atomic bomb rather than invade, President Harry S. Truman was making things up. It never an either/or choice for the United States. This book was published in 1994 and became hugely controversial in 1995 as part of the crisis over the "Enola Gay" display at the Smithsonian Institute. He found that planners never expected the one million dead that Truman used to explain his decision. There were a number of figures floating around, but at worst it was 124,935 casualties (both dead and wounded). "While there is little evidence except assertion and repetition to support the huge numbers used by Truman and Stimson after the war, the U.S. leaders, both civilian and military, were extremely conscious of the costs of Okinawa and reluctant to repeat those loses" (p. 82).

Many revisionists have attempted to use Skates's study to argue against the use of the atomic bomb because of the low numbers. In interviews, Skates has said that he does not believe the general revisionist claims that Japan was trying to surrender, believing that the evidence argues to the contrary.

This excellent book was written based on a study the author made to answer the following questions:

What was the role of the Soviets in the war against Japan?
Why did the JCS choose a strategy of invasion?.
What would have been the costs in casualties?
Would Japanese homeland defenses have proved as formidable as those on Iwo Jima and Okinawa?
What was the connection, if any, between the plans to invade and the decision to use the bomb?
To what extent did the invasion plans depend on redeployment of forces from Europe?
What were the invasion plans, and had they been carried out, what would have been the likely results.

This book is not some revisionist theory or an imaginative alternate history. This book is a careful reconstruction of history based on primary documents and some secondary sources. The events described in this book actually took place throughout the course of the war or were discussed, debated or argued in the planning stage for Operation Downfall. The author does convey his opinions throughout the book but he's not heavy handed about it. There is little criticism by the author. He tries to recreate the story as true as possible without shading it with excessive personal comments. Mr Skates uses the statements and actions of the key people to describe key events or circumstances of the war. For example in regards to the use of the bomb within the invasion plan or as a replacement to the invasion, the author doesn't state his opinions on the topic but just describes what the key people wanted or expected.
The key players that really "write" this book by their deeds, influence and statements are MacArthur, Marshall, King, Nimitz, FDR, Stimson, Arnold and Truman. Their profiles play a large part to this book.
Marshall wanted to use the bomb as a tactical weapon, figuring nine would be needed for Operation Olympic. MacArthur also wanted to use it with the invasion. Truman thought of it as a strategic weapon. Stimson wanted to use it to shock the Japanese to surrender so an invasion wouldn't be necessary. There were a few who didn't want to use the bomb.
In addition to the controversy of the bomb, there were several other main themes in the book. One of these themes is involving the Russians with the invasion. It was thought by just about everybody in the US that we would need the Russians to attack Manchuria in order to prevent the Kwantnug Army from leaving the mainland and redeploying on the home islands. FDR was a big proponent of this idea and Truman followed along in his footsteps. This attitude changed a little after the successful testing of the Trinity bomb.
Another main topic was FDR's demand for unconditional surrender which was the main cause for the Japanese resistance and the reason why we almost had to invade the country which was estimated would cost the Allies up to a million casualties.
Another hot button topic of mine that was discussed is FDR's wish to arbitrarily end the Japanese War within twelve months of VE day. This almost certainly meant invasion and Marshall, MacArthur and later Truman backed FDR's wishes on this. Americans wanted the war to end but if you had a referendum with the following choice: Have the war end in 12 months with up to a million casualties or have the war last two years through blockade and bombing and few casualties, I'm sure the latter would win. To me, it just didn't seem right the leading commanders would be willing and anxious to sacrifice so many so that they could punish the Japanese into submission.

Besides stating clearly the facts of the war, the author also clearly points out the ambient circumstances of the war. First that there was a lot of friction and lack of coordination between key people as well as the different services. King against MacArthur and Marshall. Nimitz against MacArthur. Arnold against MacArthur. The Navy against the Army. Should the Pacific War be prosecuted through the Central Pacific or the Southwest Pacific was hotly contested. And of course there was FDR's Europe First order which really curtailed the Pacific progress and Churchill did everything in his power to discount King's influence with FDR. The Lend-Lease program to England and especially Russia also had a major impact on the Pacific War.

The author describes the invasion plans, stating the forces, ships, planes, supplies etc that would take part as well as the the landing zones and what what would be needed to accomplish on the island to launch Operation Coronet by early 1946. The mobilization and defense procedures the Japanese enacted in order to stop the landing were also described.. The 6th Army under General Krueger would be used for Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu but it was estimated that men from Europe would be needed in 1946 for Operation Coronet, the invasion of Honshu.

Instead of describing the author's own views on the probable results of an invasion, he uses a report produced by a special committee after the war to explain the probable scenario. In their estimate the Japanese, though still fanatical, would have surrendered from a blockade and bombing strategy and that an invasion of Kyushu wouldn't have been necessary. If the initial invasion did take place, and without using the bomb, it would have taken 90 days or less to defeat the enemy and that a second invasion would have not been needed. The reasons for this stance is based on the fact the Japanese military and commercial navies had been destroyed by 1945 and that the people and the country's industrial sector didn't have the necessary food or resources to continue. The new divisions defending the homeland were mostly raw cadets without proper training or equipment. The Japanese had few heavy weapons or ammo. Their command and control was poor for they had no communication capability by 1945. And their defenses were incomplete and would be fairly easy to penetrate. It would not be like another Iwo Jima or Okinawa. The US Army, Marine and Navy in 1945, was the strongest, most experienced, most capable condition of the war and though it would be costly, the Japanese would have been defeated fairly quickly, especially if the bomb was used tactically.

This book has extensive Endnotes and an impressive Bibliography if further study is desired. This book is highly recommended for the author has accurately described the events of the war and gives a good description and appraisal of the invasion plan. To make your reading even more productive, I would suggest reading Joseph Alexander's "Storm Landings" before reading Mr Skates's book. Mr Alexander explains in good detail the US evolution of amphibious warfare doctrine and describes the actual landings on some of the toughest island battles sites like Tarawa, the Mariannas, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, Okinawa among others. It would make a good foundation for reading the reviewed book.