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17 of 17 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Mahan in Full, March 10, 2005
This review is from: Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Woodrow Wilson Center Press S.) (Paperback)
There is no more prominent name - American or otherwise - in naval theory and grand strategy than Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914). The only more enduring name in strategic studies today is that of the Prussian master, Carl von Clausewitz. Unfortunately, like Clausewitz, Mahan's work is rarely read in the original; instead, his ideas are summarized and conveyed in secondary sources or, worse still, in isolated quotes often extracted out of context and with the express purpose of defending a particular contemporary position.
One might argue that personal interpretation is necessary when discussing Clausewitz. He never published in his lifetime; his masterpiece "On War" was published posthumously. The treatise was largely a rough draft and the main arguments were built using the theoretical construct of dialectical relationships, which, almost by definition, are open to debate. Moreover, from the American perspective, Clausewitz wasn't translated into English (and not translated very well at that) until 1873, which remained the only English edition for nearly a century. (For more on Clausewitz's reception in the English-speaking world and the transmogrification of his ideas see Christopher Bassford's authoritative "Clausewitz in English").
For some reason, Mahan's magnum opus "The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783" is approached in much the same way as Clausewitz even though it suffers from none of these interpretive handicaps (although both books are, admittedly, tough reads). As anyone who has studied military strategy knows, Mahan and his theories have been distilled down to a few prescriptive policies or actions: the call for an all big ship navy; the positive attributes of imperialism; a focus on a decisive battle at sea; and, above all, the maxim "never divide the fleet!"
In "Inventing Grand Strategy" the distinguished navalist Jon Sumida takes a full view of Mahan and his work, and puts particular focus on Mahan's thoughts on teaching and fostering naval command. To begin with, "Influence" was merely the first of a three-part series, and just one of eighteen major pieces of history, biography and philosophy Mahan published over his lifetime. In the twenty-five years after "Influence" first appeared, as Sumida demonstrates, Mahan refined his arguments and, in some cases, changed fundamental conclusions from his first work. For instance, Mahan came to the conclusion that overseas trade was NOT a prerequisite to building a large navy and he came to doubt that a continental power like France or Russia could ever put the appropriate focus on seapower that an isolate island power like England, Japan and United States.
In closing, this book is a real gem and should be read by anyone with an interest in seapower and strategy. It provides great background and perspective on Mahan and his ideas, without being merely a redaction of "The Influence of Seapower Upon History."
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6 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Grand Analysis, April 14, 2007
This review is from: Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Woodrow Wilson Center Press S.) (Paperback)
This book is considerably more than a mere summary of the thinking of one of the most important naval strategist in U.S. history. Sumida has undertaken, very successfully, to organize the thoughts of Alfred Thayer Mahan into an accessible and coherent structure. This work provides the student of Mahan's strategy with an indispensable framework to understand the thinking that produced that strategy. Of particular value are a "select analytical index" of Mahan's writings. This book is not meant to be a substitute for reading Mahan's work, especially the first volume of `Influence' series, but does provide a sure guide for interpreting those writings.
Alfred Thayer Mahan himself, although a brilliant thinker, clearly had a number of faults. Sumida while by no means diminishing Mahan's accomplishments engages these to demonstrate the full scope of Mahan's thought process. All in all I would say that this is the best book that this reviewer is aware of on the meaning and implications of Mahan's seminal work. Mahan's version of grand strategy is now pretty much obsolete in many respects, but it is still worth studying and analyzing. This book makes both these activities considerably easier.
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11 of 13 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A Review From One of the Author's Students, August 24, 2004
This review is from: Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Woodrow Wilson Center Press S.) (Paperback)
This book is a fresh re-analysis of the complete works of Alfred Thayer Mahan, certainly one of the greatest American military strategists. The author is Dr. John Sumida, a well-respected military historian and professor at the University of Maryland at College Park (GO TERPS... hehe). The work is part of a thesis that Dr. Sumida (and I seem to recall him mentioning that a few others were in his camp) has been slowly and carefully developing through his research in recent years that is a radical reinterpretation of Mahan's work, but mainly his intent, along with the equally seminal work, of the famous 19th century military genius/theorist/strategist Carl von Clausewitz, "On War." This thesis is the basis of high-level graduate and under-graduate classes he has at UM, a truncated version of that class that he gives at the Naval War College (I believe), and lectures that he gives at numerous other institutions. The work exists within the sub-category of military history that has been termed "Strategic Theory," which is basically the intersection of advanced philosophy with complex military situations and strategy. This is not your average history book, it is complex, difficult, challenging, and fascinating. A careful read of the, relatively, short book is necessary to grasp the message and concepts. However, if you are a person who cut their teeth on Nietzsche and reads (not: watches movies) about battles from hundreds or thousands of years ago for fun, then I assure you that you will feel a great reward for having conquered this complex topic. It is worth noting that Dr. Sumida's views in the field are far from traditional. His analysis of Mahan and Clausewitz is counter to the predominant culture's views but his point of view is steadily gaining acceptance, as evidenced by the fact that he teaches (or taught) at the Naval War College. This book is just the beginning however, covering only Mahan but still presenting and backing up Dr. Sumida's thesis. The bulk of his work and insight should be coming along soon in a book that he says will be an adaptation of the class (focusing on Clausewitz and his "On War") that I took with him. I recommend this book and the rest of his work, but of course you must decide if this is the stuff for you. All I can say is that when his book on Clausewitz come out, it will go in between this book and "On War" on my bookshelf. After I read it, of course.
Note: If you want the poor man's version of his class (good luck) the books he had us read were these and in this order.
1. Hare Brain Tortoise Mind by Guy Claxton
2. Zen in the Art of Archery by Eugene Herrigel
3. Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered by Jon Tetsuro Sumida
4. On War by Carl von Clausewitz
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