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Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied

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This very useful volume's goal is an analysis of British policies at the end of World War I towards their new mandate of Iraq. Dodge offers a careful analysis of a British policy constrained by limited resources, limited political will, little on-the-ground knowledge, and a considerable load of baggage based either on other imperial experiences or a heady mix of Orientalist preconceptions and romanticism. The result, according to Dodge, was a series of mis-steps which weakened the nascent Iraqi state and set the stage for Iraqi history thereafter.

Although this work is primarily concerned with the period directly after World War I, Dodge offers some useful - if tentative comparisons between the British experience and that of the United States today.

Overall, this is a useful book for serious students of Iraq or Middle Eastern history. It may be too specialized for casual readers.

This scholarly and fascinating book studies a previous occupation of Iraq, by the British Empire's rulers, and it shows how and why this occupation failed.

British forces seized Iraq at the end of World War One and until 1932 successive British governments tried to rule it. To support this forcible occupation, Britain's ruling class used a network of self-serving deceptions. It believed, and wanted everybody else to believe, that the majority of Iraqis wanted British rule; that Iraqis would freely choose a pro-British government rather than a pro-Iraqi government; that it could divide Iraq into `good' countryside and `bad' city, `good' Kurds and `bad' Sunnis and Shia; that its desire to rule Iraq was selfless, nothing to do with the Empire's demands for Iraq's oil and for airbases; that the continuing violence and unrest were legacies from the Ottoman Empire, not responses to being occupied; and that withdrawal would lead to anarchy.

The forms of the Empire's control shifted from annexation, to League of Nations mandate, to a treaty of alliance, to an advisory role, and finally to disengagement. But the British people were not fooled by the propaganda or by the shifting constitutional arrangements. Dodge writes of `the long-running public hostility of British public opinion towards maintaining an interest in Iraq'. This anti-imperialism helped Labour to win the 1929 general election, but Labour in government failed to do what the nation wanted - withdraw immediately from Iraq.

Now Blair seems to want to repeat the dismal, costly and futile cycle. He follows Bush in rejecting the Iraqi people's demand for rule by Iraqis who win democratic elections. He denies the power and validity of nationalism, a nation's legitimate, democratic desire for sovereignty and self-determination. The people of Iraq have already defeated the Pentagon's effort to rule Iraq directly, and General Garner has been sacked. The Iraqi people have vetoed the State Department's effort to rule by courtesy of the returning exiles, and they have overturned Bush's proposal of rule by US-selected caucuses.

Since 1990, US and British governments have forcibly occupied one country after another. But, as Dodge sums up, "Post-Cold War military interventions into failed or rogue states with the overt aim of reforming their political systems ... have been uniformly unsuccessful." These interventions all failed because intervening is wrong. The effort to run another country is not noble and selfless; it is immoral because it is undemocratic and anti-national, and it is bound to fail. Blair damns nationalism as old-fashioned and reactionary, but what could be more reactionary than waging an illegal war of aggression then trying to rerun the Empire?

Only the people of a country can rebuild it. Outside interference always worsens the problem and delays a solution.

This short book presents the (failed)attempt at nation-building in Iraq under the British Mandate system of post WWI. In 170 pages of actual text, the author shows how Orientalist discourse colored the declining British Empire's perception of Iraq and the middle east, relying on templates that were formulated in the Indian colony and then applied wholesale and on the cheap (sounds familiar) to the Iraqi area. The book doesn't go very far in discussing the roles of the sunnis, shi'ites and kurds; it focuses more on the ideology of the colonizers and then briefly applies these sentiments towards the US current babylonian adventure.
This isn't the final word on European colonialism in Iraq, but it's an excellent start. I recommend reading David Fromkin's "peace to end all peace" first of all to get the total overview of the great power conflict at the heart of the reconstruction of the middle east and its continuing repercussions today.

Edward Said, now we need you more than ever ...

Dodge's book is about the British Mandate over the newly created Iraqi state. But the lessons are obvious for the American invasion and subsequent nation-building effort in Iraq. The result reminds one of the statement by Marx, attributing to Hegel the statement that history repeats itself, first as tragedy then as farce. This book should be read in conjunction with several others, the totality of these sending a strong message that not even a superpower can fully anticipate and control events--especially when such a country never really did decent post-war planning (and that which was done by the State Department was ignored).

Consider Dodge's book along with: Risen, State of War; Bacevich, The New American Militarism; Packer, The Assassin's Gate; Diamond, Squandered Victory; and, dare I suggest it, Albert Somit's and my, The Failure of Democratic Nation-Building: Ideology Meets Evolution.

It will be interesting to see how the history books treat the American war and occupation of Iraq. I fear that those histories will be most unkind; one can only hope that the United States can learn something from this. And the Dodge book can help inform that discussion. Would that the author had done more reflection on the relevance of the British adventure in Iraq to the current American nation building effort in Iraq.

Many would be quick to lament the fact that no one from the Bush administration read Toby Dodge's book Inventing Iraq. While it is abundantly clear that many mistakes have been made, Dodge himself states on page 158 that "for U.S. forces currently involved in attempting to reform Iraq's political structures, the libaries are full of books that provide no guidance. This is an important point because it underscores the fact that the situation facing the U.S. today is markedly different than one facing the British. Iraq was just coming into existance as a political entity and there was no sense of a collective "Iraqi" identity or nationalism when the British were involved. Also, Iraq's political development from 1932 onward would alter the society in many important ways.

You might be able to accuse Dodge of writing a book that told his readers more about his own beliefs than Iraq's early development because of his timing. This book was published in 2003 (right around the time of the U.S. invasion), and it has many noticeable comparisons between the British and American experiences. For example, he notes that the British thought they would receive a warm welcome by Iraqis just in the same way that the "flowers and candy" lines were tossed around by the Bush administration. These types of examples don't fill the book, but there are enough of them to make Dodge appear as if he's making a statement about the 2003 war.

Rather than going into an unorganized account of the British mandate period, Dodge offers an array of chapters that focus on particular details such as land reform, and the rural/urban divide. This type of organization will be a source of frustration for some because by focusing on these types of details, Dodge sometimes loses track of the bigger picture. This type of criticism has some validity, but the overall result is a revealing look at the Mandate period.

If Dodge is to be faulted for anything in Inventing Iraq, it would have to be his lack of a discussion of domestic British politics. He doesn't completely ignore this area, but no discussion of what's currently happening in Iraq would be complete without also discussing how events were being shaped in Washington. Dodge goes to great lengths to discuss what he calls "Oriental Despotism" in attempting to explain British actions and motives, but this is ultimately not as effective as analysis of domestic British pressures.

These minor problems notwithstanding, Inventing Iraq is a concise and well-written book that has a lot to offer to anyone interested in modern Iraq's origins. At 171 pages, it's a quick read and while prior research on Iraq certainly helps with this book, it's not a requirement. If one were to make a top ten list of Iraq history/politics books, Inventing Iraq should certainly be on it.

Toby Dodge, a British political scientist who has studied Iraq extensively, has produced this book in order to educate others about one role that an occupying power has taken, 1920's Iraq via London, or 2003 Iraq via Washington.

In 1920, The British officials in charge f Iraq imported many British ideas on Iraq. For example, the was a colonialist disregard for urban iraqis opposed to urban dwellers. This had larDodge Review


Toby Dodge, a British political scientist who has studied Iraq extensively, has produced this book in order to educate others about one role that an occupying power has taken 1920 Iraq via London, or 2003 Iraq via Washington.

In 1920, The British officials in charge f Iraq imported many British ideas on Iraq. For example, the was, a colonialist disregard for urban Iraqis opposed to urban dwellers. This had largely to due to political feelings in Europe at that time. However, additionally, Iraq became a more difficult issue for the UK because of domestic issues. These issues includes, political, mainly economic, and other issues. But in both instances domestic politics played a part in the ultimate rule.
gely to due to political feelings in Europe at that time. However, additionally, Iraq became a mere difficult issue for the UK because of domestic issues. These issues includes, political, mainly economic, and other issues. But in both instances domestic politics played a part in the ultimate rule.

This book is a must read for all. The book speaks volumes about a whole lot. This book proves the old saying history repeats itself. I know nowadays history isn't popular. That subject has been pushed aside for other things. This book shows the danger in that idea. We need to know history so as to hopefully understand the present and avoid disasters.

The book gives a short history of the British occupation of Iraq in the 20s. As you read that story you have to keep telling yourself this book isn't about the current US occupation. The book shows through the British experience how history repeats itself. To bad no one in the White House read this book. You will see that the issues and problems the British experienced are the exact same problems the U.S. has been experiencing over the past 5 years in Iraq.

Much of Iraq today is shaped by the British experience. To understand Iraq one has to understand the British experience. Their actions helped shape events today.This book also offers a good deep explanation of Iraq. It shows how their national bonds are very weak. You see how certain things like the transportation and tribal structure affects things.

Everyone will see something in this book. Most of all you will see in very clear terms how history does repeat itself.

It is difficult to understand how anyone can really understand the enigmas and contradictions of 21st Century Iraq with out understanding its 20th Century origins. This remarkable book, successfully for the most part, attempts to provide that understanding.

The Turkish Ottoman Empire essentially imploded at the end of WWI. For strategic reasons the UK was particularly interested in retaining control the former Ottoman provinces of Mesopotamia (most of modern Iraq). This aim was complicated by the heady if unrealistic idealism of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson that greatly influenced the way the world was ordered after the "war to end all wars." Rather than simply establishing a colonial government over Mesopotamia, the UK was given a League of Nations `mandate' to exercise what is now called `nation building' and create a viable, democratic, and above all, a stable state called Iraq in place of the Ottoman province of Mesopotamia.

This the UK was perfectly willing to do as long it could also ensure that its influence would predominate in the new state. The principal British architects for the new state of Iraq were soldiers and administrators under the India Office or the Colonial Office. Their efforts were hampered by serious misunderstandings of Iraqi society that caused them to divide Iraq between what they believed were a `natural', rural tribal society and a more sophisticated, but corrupt urban population. This misunderstanding caused UK officials to attempt to resurrect a tribal structure that was an anachronism by the end of the 19th Century. Tribal ties were far less important than those of landowner, clan, and village. In the end the UK execution of the mandate produced a dubiously stable monarchy that was not necessarily sympathetic to British interests. In spite what generally were good intentions, the UK only partially succeeded in carrying out its Iraqi mandate. This was do to two reasons: scarcity of funds to maintain the size of garrison to really exert UK control over Iraq in its formative period; and the failure of the UK to really understand the nature of the Iraqi people or the very real nationalism that had been awakened in them after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. This book to its credit manages to treat both the British and Iraqis with fairness and appears to have accurately captured the complexities of nation building.

great background history to today's strategic events in Middle East